Prima Pars
Lecture 57: The Name 'God' and the Divine Nature

Transcript
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Or he said to be my creator because, what? I was really brought into existence by him. Okay? And therefore nothing prevents names of this sort, implying a relation to creatures, to be said of God in time, right? Not on account of any change in him. He's unchangeable, right? But on account of the change of the, what? Creature. Just as a column comes to be to the right of the animal, no change taking place in it, but the animal being translated from one place to another, right? Okay? So the column's on my right and now it's on my left. Any change in the column? No. There's a change in me, right? Okay? Very subtle, this teaching. You can see why Thomas says an article just on this because it's a difficult thing. Okay, now he's going to reply to the first rejection. Let's look at that again now. Ambrose and others seem to be saying that what? These names signify the divine substance, huh? Okay? The divine substance as we saw before was eternal, right? Okay? Now, in the reply to this objection, he's going to give another famous distinction. And this distinction goes back to the book called The Categories, right? Because in the beginning of the chapter on relation or towards something, as it's called in Greek, Aristotle begins with the definition of Plato, right? Whatever is said to be of another or towards another anyway is relative, right? And Aristotle goes along as if that was it, right? And then he starts to raise a problem later on, huh? Because my arm is the arm of me, right? My leg is the leg of me, right? And my knowledge is the knowledge of something, right? And everything's going to be, what? A relation. And there won't be any, even the parts of substance will be, right? And then he sees necessity of making the distinction that Thomas is repeating here, right? There's some things whose whole, what, nature is to be towards something else, right? And there are nothing in themselves or by themselves. How much is double? It could be four, it could be six, it could be eight, right? You know, in itself it's, it's what? It's no amount, is it? It's only can be said to be double towards another, right? And that's what they call in relativas secundum esse in the Latin, right? Okay? There are other things which are fundamentally something other than a relation, but they have followed upon them that they're towards something else, right? So knowledge, for example, is a certain quality of my mind, but implies a certain relation to the thing known, right? Okay? And so they call those relativas secundum adici, right? Okay? Because they're said to be of another, but they're fundamentally belong in a different category than towards another, right? And they're kind of relation to follow upon them, okay? Thomas is referring to that, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that some relatives are placed upon things to signify the very, what? Relative having yourself towards another, right? As lord, servant, right? Father, son, right? And things of this sort. And these are called relativas secundum what? Let's say. And that kind of goes back to Aristotle's nasty habit of referring sometimes to the nature of the thing as its being, right? Some things are imposed as signifying things which are follows upon them, right? Certain having themselves towards another, right? As mover and moved, head and what? Headed and so on. And other things of this sort which are called relativas secundum adici, right? Now, just stopping one, huh? These are the fundamental distinctions we make of relativas, and don't confuse these two distinctions we've met, huh? Relatum secundum esse, relative secundum adici, and relative, what? What's called a resonator, it's a resonator, real relation, real relation, and then a relation of reason, huh? Okay? Now, some people mix up these two. And I've seen elsewhere in Thomas, you know, where an objection would be based upon mixing up these two ones. They'll think that, oh, secundum esse means it's a real relation. And secundum adici, well, it's just said to be, I don't know, that's for any reason. You understand what these words mean, right? And as Thomas will point out, Tom, a real relation could be secundum esse or secundum adici, right? So my being taller than you, let's say, or shorter than you, is a real relation, and secundum esse, right? Okay? But my knowledge of you, right? As a relation to you, right? So that's a real relation. But secundum what? Dici, right? Because knowledge is fundamentally in the category of quality, right? It comes under habit or disposition for a species of quality, right? But this is a disposition or habit that consequently, right, because of its very nature, involves consequently a certain relation, right? But it's fundamentally naming a quality of my mind, okay? But a quality of my mind, because of the kind of quality, as it has a certain relation, following upon it. So knowledge would be translated, knowledge of the known, that relation would be a relative secundum adici, right? Okay? But still a real relation, right? And the relation of reason could be what? Secundum esse, right? So genus and species, right? The whole meaning of genus is to be towards another, right? Okay? Rather than be something more fundamental that has a relation. So don't mix up those two ones, right? In the body of the article, Thomas was touching upon this distinction here on the left here between the real relation and the relation of reason, right? 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Indirectly, right? Okay. So Ambrose is thinking of the fact that God being our Lord presupposes His, what? His power, which is His substance, right? Okay. But nevertheless, His being Lord over us, right? Spirit is signifying a certain relation towards us, and that relation towards us cannot be in Godhood. Really, right? But it begins to be said of Him when we begin to be subject to Him. And then it says, therefore, if Him extemporary, right? It's just how subtle this is, right? Because we learn that God is eternal, right? And it might seem, therefore, that how could anything be said of God extemporary? It's the Latin phrase, right? And He says, well, because that can't be something real, being added to God, because then God would really have acquired something, right? He really had changed, and that's impossible. So Aristotle says, you know, in the ninth book of wisdom, that motion is the act most known to us, right? And therefore, it seems most real, right? And if something doesn't move, you know, we tend to think it's not real, you know? It's not. And I told you, you know, the seminary one time asked me, you know, do angels really exist? And I just said, you know, they're more real than you are, right? But, you know, God is much more real than something that moves. That's not hard for us to understand, huh? You know how young people want to go where the action is? That's the reality, yes, huh? And of course, but you have this in the philosophy, right? In Hegel and in Marx and so on, the communists, you know, that what is real is motion, right? And that's why you have, you know, a special emphasis upon history in the modern philosophers, huh? You know, they used to summarize, even the existentialist position, as saying, man has no nature, it's only history. So, I mean, you read Karl Marx, there's no such thing as man, really. There's bourgeois in man, and there's proletariat man, and there's slave man in math, you know, but, you know, but there's no man, you know? That's abstraction, you know, that's not real, huh? It's just, you know, they... I have a book there by the great physicist Max Born, called The Restless Universe, huh? It says in there, strange, you have a name for what doesn't exist. Rest. That's what's real is motion, right? Okay, so you see how Thomas replies in the first objection, right? To the second, huh? Let's look at the objection again, so you remember it. To whatever something happens from time, or in time, can be said to what? Been made, right? Or to become, maybe you could say it too, I suppose. Okay? But it doesn't belong to God to be made or to become, right? So if God is said to be our Lord, but he wasn't our Lord until we were, then he's become something that he was not, and now there's been a real change. Okay? Well, of course, that's no problem for Thomas, because he said these relations are what? So, you know, it becomes secundum rationum. To the second, it should be said that just as relations which are said of God in time are not in God except what? Secundum rationum, a reason. So neither coming to be nor has been made is said of God except according to what? Reason, right? No change existing about him, right? Just as it is said, the Lord has been made a refuge for us, right? That's been a real making in him? No. Now, the third objection was saying, hey, but he loves us eternally, right? Okay? He chose us, huh? He knew us, huh? He always knew us, huh? Okay? God didn't, we don't say God began to know us when he made us. He didn't know us before that. That's what the moderns would think that, right? He had no something else to make it. But God knew us before he made us. Okay? Well, Thomas brings out the distinction that Aristotle again talks about between the activity that remains in the doer, right? And the one that has an exterior, what? Effect, right? To the third, it should be said that the operation of the understanding and of the will is in the one doing it, right? And therefore, the names which signify relations following upon the act of the understanding or the will are said of God ab eterno, eternally. That's like that quote from Jeremiah, right? About you with eternal love. But those which follow actions proceeding according to the way of understanding them to some kind of exterior effect, transitive actions, to call it in grammar, you know, are said of God, what? Yeah. As creator, savior, and so on, right? Okay. That's what Thomas distributes between those two, right? Okay. So God always loved us, huh? But did he always create us? No, because there's a beginning, the creation. Okay. Okay, now the fourth objection. That's the one about being named from your opposite, right, huh? Okay. That's got to be solved, I suppose, by understanding this little kind of what situation, huh? To the fourth, it should be said that the relations signified through names of this sort which I said of God in time are in God by reason only, right? But the opposite relations in creatures are really there as a kingdom realm, huh? Nor is it inconvenient, right, that from relations really existing in a thing, God is, what? Denominated, right? Nevertheless, according as, what? Are understood together through our understanding the opposite relations in God, right? You know, as I say, sometimes Thomas says there's a kind of necessity of our mind, right? That you can't think of this as being towards that without thinking of the opposite as being conversely towards you, right? The subtle thing is, in some cases, that other thing isn't really towards you, right? You realize how independent God is of us when you think he is, huh? And thus, God is said relatively to creatures because the creature is referred to him, right? Just as the philosopher says in the fifth book of wisdom, right? That the noble is said relatively, not because it has a relation to the knowledge, but because the science is referred to what? To it, huh? Okay. Thinks a lot to digest, Thomas, right? Mm-hmm. Says a lot in a few words, huh? The conic, I guess, had some teachers that, you know, the way to learn these things to memorize the summa, you know? So, the conic sits out there writing the summa. There's a lot to think about there, you know? Okay, now, the fifth objection, remember, was the one that, you know, hard to see at first. And then, you know, the first one that, you know, the answer to it. Moreover, by a relation something is said relatively, right, as by dominion, lord, or by lordship, lord, as by whiteness, white. If therefore the relation of lordship is not in God, secundum rem, right, but only secundum rationum, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is clearly false. That's where it's hard to see, right, okay? But Tom's going to answer that God is really Lord because we really are dependent upon him, okay? He's not really Lord because something has been added to him, see? But because if anything doesn't add to us, because we forget to have something, right? But independence upon him, huh? In the same way you can say, you know, if I know that tree in the backyard, right, that tree is really known by me, right? It's really known. It's it, right? Yeah. Even though it's being known, is nothing added to the tree, right? Before I studied the tree, I didn't know it, so when I come to know the tree, it's not really added to me. I've been improved in my mental condition, right? But does the tree gain anything from being known by me? Hmm? No. And if you didn't know the tree and we asked you about it, you'd be stumped. You got to the root of the problem. You know, the old saying, the girl is supposed to say, you know, she likes a guy and he's not paying attention to her, right? You know, the old saying he doesn't even know I exist. Well, maybe he does, but I mean, it's as if he doesn't know I exist, right? That's kind of, there's nothing in him, apparently, towards her, right? But just towards, you know, her towards him, right? That's the way it is going to be the tree, right? You know? I really have acquired something of a relation to that tree by knowing it. But there's a tree, you know, develop some relation towards me now. Oni secundum rationum, right? To the fifth, then, it should be said that for that reason God is referred to the creature by which the creature is referred to him, right? Since relation of subjection is really in the creature, right? It follows that God, not by reason only, but really is Lord, right? Okay? For in that way he is said to be Lord, in which the creature is such to him. So that's kind of a subtle thing to say, you know? That because I'm really dependent upon God, he really is my Lord, but his Lordship is not something added to him, right? That's a subtle thing, right? You might think as, you know, he's not really my Lord, because his Lordship is not something added to him, right? But because I really depend upon him, he really is my Lord. That's kind of a subtle thing to see, huh? Okay, and the sixth objection is talking about things being simul-nature, right? And Aristotle speaks to relations as being simul-nature. Can I be taller than something without that thing at the same time being, what, shorter than me, right? Okay? Okay, so Thomas says, to knowing whether the relatives are together by nature or not, is not necessary to consider the order of things about which the relatives are said, but the meanings of those relatives. For if in one of them is included the understanding of the other and a converso, then they must be together by what? Nature, right? As double and half, father and son, and similar things, huh? So I can't be a father before someone is my son or my daughter, right? And I can't become double without somebody at the same time becoming half, right? If however one includes in its understanding the other and not a converso, then they are not together by nature. And in this way, knowledge and the, what, knowable are, right? Notice he's saying knowable rather than the knowable, right? Okay? For knowable is said according to ability, and not according to act. But knowledge by habit or by act, right? Once the knowable, according to the way of its signifying, pre-exists the knowledge, right? But if one takes the knowable and act, let's say the knowable, then it is together. And that's really the strict relation, right? And the third, which relation? The strict relation, right? Yeah, yeah. Because the known is relative to knowledge, right? I would say he might say knowable is relative to knowledge, right? But strictly speaking, if you have knowledge, then there's something known. And something known is known by some knowledge. Okay. So if something is taken as knowable in act, as a known, then it is together with knowledge in act. For the known is not except such except, because the science of it, huh? There's a science or knowledge of it. Thus, although God is before creatures, right? Because nevertheless in the meaning of Lord is included that he had a servant, or a slave, or what you call it, in a conversal, then these two relatives, Lord and servant, are together by what? Nature. What's Thomas called himself in the communion prayer? Indignum fagnum tuum, I mean, right? Indignum fagnum tuum. Okay. Whence God was not Lord before he had a creature, what? Sent to him, right? Okay. He didn't acquire anything, right? Yeah. Take a little break here. We need a little rest after that article, huh? In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds. Order and illumine our images. Arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise God. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. So I've been asked to go back over 8, and 9, and 10 here, because there's a malfunction here. To the 8th one proceeds thus. It seems that this name, God, is not a name of what? Nature, huh? I noticed in 8, 9, and 10, and then also in 11, Thomas is descending to some actual names of God, right? Of course, the first name is God, right? Deus, Deus. And so you have three articles of the name God, and then one article on the name that God gives us his own name to a guy named Moses, huh? I am who I am, right? Okay, so let's look at 8 now, the first one. This is the name of the divine nature, the divine substance, and the divine essence, huh? For Damascene says in the first book, that God is said from Thaian, which is to run, right? And to what? Foster all universal things. Or from Athene, which is to burn, huh? For our God is a consuming fire, a fire consuming all evil. Or, this is the one that Thomas usually pretends to favor, Athiasthea, which is to consider, right? Omnia, consider all things. But all of these pertain to operation, to what God does. Therefore, this name God signifies the operation of God and not his, what, nature. I think that curare is to care. Fulveri? Curare? Oh, it's not to run? I think the one you're thinking of has two R's? This sounds pretty in this one. It says curare, C-U-R-R-E-R-E. Oh, that's interesting. This has, okay. Yeah, this says two R's, too, yeah. Yeah, it says C-U-R-A-R-E. Oh, yeah. Yeah, to care. Huh. Well, you're both the same addition. Yeah, that's great. Maybe it's... But against this is what Ambrose says in the first book about faith, that God is a nomen naturae, a name of the nature, right? Now, this is what, the feast is in Ambrose today? Do you celebrate Ambrose at this? We celebrate our calendar. Yeah, yeah. So he's getting quoted here, huh? Appropriate on this feast day, huh? One of the four or five great doctors of the Western Church. Okay. Now, Thomas is going to begin by pointing out a distinction, right? Common distinction about names. I answer you, it should be said that not always is the same that from which a name is placed upon something to signify something, and that to which it's going to signify it is placed upon. Now, sometimes we call it, first of these, the etymology of the name, right? But it's that from which the name is taken, right? And that to which it is applied, the meaning of the name, the signification of the name. Like I'm often pointing out the word philosophy, yes, you know, even philosophers, what is philosophy? And they'll say the love of wisdom, right? And I suppose you could use it to mean that, but at least in Aristotle, I see him using the word philosophy always to name the knowledge which a lover of wisdom pursues. So you might say, well, the love of wisdom, then, is the id-a-quo-nomen-a-poenitur, that from which the name is taken. But it's not the meaning of the name, huh? Okay? The meaning of the name philosopher would be lover of wisdom. And therefore, you might think the meaning of the word philosophy would be the love of wisdom itself. And I suppose it could be used in that sense, but it's not the way that Aristotle uses it. I don't think even Plato. It's used in the sense of the knowledge which a lover of wisdom would pursue. So Aristotle, in the 14 books of wisdom, will sometimes call this knowledge wisdom, but sometimes they just call it philosophy. And when Thomas talks, you know, about the definition there in the 7th book of wisdom, and he says, definition, as Aristotle is saying there, the definition is always a logos, huh? It's always a composizio nominum, like, a putting together names, right? It's never just one name, right? And Thomas says, now sometimes, in explaining a word or a thing, we give another name that the thing has, it's more, what, familiar, right? Like the student who was saying, you know, desiccation is a greater problem with land animals than water animals. But you might use a more known word, right? Drying up or drying out. But that's not really the definition of desiccation. It's a word meaning the same thing, but a more familiar word, huh? Okay, so I was going to mention that Thomas says, now, we get the word philosophia, and in Latin we give sapientia. That's the meaning of the word, right? Not the amor, sapientia, but sapientia itself, wisdom. So, he's going to apply that distinction now to the thing at hand, right? For just as, right, we know the substance of the thing, right? I know Thomas uses these words somewhat insofar as they are univocal, or synonymous, rather. Nature, substance, essence, sometimes. These words have more than one meaning, and not all the meanings are the same, but the one meaning they have in common. Sometimes you use the one, sometimes you use the other. For just as we know the substance of a thing from its properties, or from its, what, operations, right? Like we say a dog is a four-foot animal, it barks, right? Well, I don't know what really separates the dog from the cat, but I do know that the one barks and the other, what, meows, right? And so, but I'm not really talking about that. I'm talking about the kind of animal it is, right? So just as we know the substance of the thing from its properties and operations, so we denominate the substance of the thing, sometimes, from its operation or property, right? So denominonomous means the name from, right? Okay. Then Thomas' stock example here, huh? Just as the substance of lapidus, which is what the word for stone there in the genitive, we denominate from some action of it, which is ledipedova, hurts the foot, right? I don't know if that's the official Latin etymology of the word, but it's in the Isidorean etymology. And whether it's true or false, it illustrates the point he's making, right? That if the word stone is taken from hurting the foot, that's not the meaning of the word. It's the thing, it's the substance of the thing which is apt to do this, right? So it's being named from that, but that's not the meaning of the word. Nevertheless, this name is not placed upon something to signify the action, but the substance of the, what? Stone. Stone, huh? It's enough to make a little side, just to encourage to my mind there. You know, when Thomas speaks of the impositio nominisa, that's what you have in a word that's equivocal by reason. You have a new impositio nominisa. A new placing of the name, impositio means a placing upon. Okay, you're placing this name upon something else with a different meaning now, but it's become now the name of this other thing as well as what it had named before. But in the case of a metaphor, you're not really getting a new impositio nominisa. And when Thomas explains that word, positio latina, he does so in the text of St. Paul, you know, where St. Paul is, he's positus, you know, in his position, you know. And part of the meaning of positio is you don't place yourself, someone else does. God places you in this position. But also the idea that there's something, what, firm. God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you. God bless you. about this, huh? And that's the difference between a name equivocal by reason and a metaphor. A metaphor is kind of in passing that you call the glutton a pig, right? Or the guy who does something nasty to you, a rat or something, right? You know? It's not as if you're giving a new meaning to the word pig or a new meaning to the word rat. And it's only kind of what? You're calling him, I would say this, right? You're not really naming a glutton a pig now. See, when there's a new impositio nominus, then you're naming something, right? So you have the word impositio in the definition of what? The syllogism too, huh? You know, we say it's a speech in which some statements laid down, right? The way you translate it in English, but in Latin would be positis, right? And the essay Thomas says that in that idea of positus or positio, there are three things, huh? Someone places you, the thing doesn't place itself. There's a firmness to it, and then it leads to something, right? And you see that a little bit in English when you say the word, let me translate, positis by laid down, you know? I'm going to lay down the law here, you see? Well, the law doesn't lay itself down. I'm laying the law down, and there's a firmness there when I lay the law down. You better not violate it, right? And a certain course of action is expected of you as a result of the law that I've laid down. That's the way the premises are of syllogism, right? They're laid down by reason, right? And they've got to have a certain, what, stability and firmness in the mind. I mean, if I thought of the major premise, and I forgot about it, and I thought of the minor premise, I'd never be able to syllogize, right? I've got to lay them down together, right? They've got to remain firm in the mind, and then they lead to something else, right? Okay? So, we sometimes have a word like impositio, we say, put a label upon something, you know? Put a name upon something, right? But that's in the sense what the Latin is saying, impositio. Nevertheless, this name, lapis, is not imposed to signifying the action of hitting our foot, right? But rather the substance of the stone itself. That's a nice clear example of what he's trying to say, huh? The male teacher at the search said you can tell man's understanding by the examples he chooses, huh? And the modern philosophers like to take an example that's kind of setting in itself, you know? But it doesn't particularly illustrate the point. And Aristotle and Thomas, you know, take a very simple example that's very clear for the matter. And you find Thomas often using the same example in many different texts, or maybe actually using the example that Aristotle used, right? You know, if he did so. And this one here is peculiar to Thomas. But if there are some things which are, what? Known to us by themselves, sequindem se, right? Some things that are partially sensibles as hot, he says, or cold, or whiteness, and so on. We don't tend to name these things from others because they're not known from others. They're known sequindem se. So in those cases, it is the same thing that the name signifies and that from which it is placed upon something to signify something. Now, because therefore God is not known to us in his very nature, right? But he becomes known to us from his doings, his operations, and from or from his effects. From these, we are able to what? To name them, right? Once this name, God is a name of operation as regards that from which it is, what? Placed upon something, signify something. Because it is placed upon something, this name, from his universal providence, or foresight over things. For all speaking about God intend to name God, what has a universal providence over all things. Whence Dainicia says in the 12th chapter about the divine names, that the deity, deitas, is what sees all things by a, what? Perfect providence and a perfect, what? Goodness, huh? So from this operation, this name God is taken, but it's placed upon, what? It's imposed to signify the divine, what? Nature, huh? That's the way he replies then to Damascene, who's looking at that from which the name is taken, right? All things which Damascene lays down pertain to providence, from which is imposed this name God to signify something, right? Now the second objection, huh? About the God divine nature being unknown to us. So how can we name something you don't know? Well we have to know it in some way, right? To the second it should be said that according as the nature of something, as we're able to know the nature of something from its properties and its effects, right? Thus we're able to what? Yeah, to signify it by a name, right? Whence because, take this example again, because we're able to know the substance of the stone from its property, uh, by itself, in knowing what is a stone, this name, what? Stone signifies, yeah, according as it is itself. For it signifies the definition of stone to which we know what is a stone. I'm not sure we do know what a stone is. But the, for the ratio, or the thought which the name signifies as a definition, as is said in the fourth book of wisdom. But from the divine effects, we're not able to know the divine nature according as it is itself, so we know about it what it is, right? But nevertheless, we know it in some other way, right? And the three other ways are what? By way of eminence, and by way of causality, and by way of what? Negation, right? So when we say God is the sumum bonum, right? That's by way of eminence, I suppose, huh? When we say he's the first cause, that's by way of causality. When he says, we say he's bodiless, or he's not composed, it's by way of negation, right? And thus, this name God signifies the divine nature, right? Insofar as it's known in these three ways, through his effects and what he does, huh? For this name is imposed, huh? To signifying something that exists above all other things, right? And that's the way of eminence. It is a beginning of all things, and that's the way of causality, and that is emotum, huh? That's the way of indicating, from all things. For this, they intend to signify who are naming God. Now, the next article, whether this name God is communicable, right? To whatever is communicated, the thing signified by the name is communicated also that name. But this name God, as has been said in the eighth article, signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others according to that of what? Second Peter, the first chapter, the fourth verse. The great and precious promises he gave us, that which we are made partakers of the divine, what? Nature. Nature, huh? It's one of the texts that the divine issues, right? Trying to prove that Christ was not God by his birth. Oh. It's said in the same way, right? You know? Okay. More of those names, huh? Proper names are not communicable, right? But this name God is not a what? Proper name, but a what? Nickname? Palatibum, huh? An appellation, we'll say, huh? Which is clear from this that it has a plural. I have said that you are gods, right? That's another one that Titus takes, right? Therefore, this name God is communicable, huh? I have said that you are gods, right? I have said that you are gods, right? I have said that you are gods, right? I have said that you are gods, right? I have said that you are gods, right? I have said that you are gods, right? I have said that you are gods, right? I have said that you are gods, right? I have said that you are gods, right? I have said that you are gods, right? Moreover, this is the third objection, this name, God, is placed upon something from operation. But other names which are imposed upon God from operations or from effects are communicable as good, wise, and others of this sort, right? Therefore, also this name, God, is communicable, right? But against all this is what is said in the Book of Wisdom, 14th chapter. They placed the incommunicable name upon wood and stones, right? And he spoke about the name of the deity. Therefore, this name, God, is an incommunicable name, right? Well, again, Thomas begins with a distinction. He's going to then apply to the matter at hand. I answer, he says, it should be said that some name is able to be communicable in two ways, huh? In one way properly, in another way by a certain likeness, huh? Properly it is communicable when the whole what? Meaning of the name is communicable to many, right? Okay, so we say man of each one of us here or something like that, huh? So I'm a man, but that name is communicable to you guys, I think. Because you have the whole meaning of the name, right? You're a two-footed animal with reason, right? Huh? And no feathers. This name, for example, of lion, huh, is properly communicated to all those things in which is found the nature which is signified by this name, what? Lion, huh? But by likeness, that name is communicable to those who partake of something lion-like, huh? As, for example, audacity or fortitude, huh? And these are, what, metaphorically called lions, huh? So which is the lion-hearted, right? Kings are often called lions, huh? I was reading, reading Abbotsford there, you know, which is Irving's account of his first visit to Walter Scott, right? Walter Scott had all kinds of dogs he was very fond of and so on. But he also had a cat, right? And the cat, you know, was the supreme authority among the animals. And when the dogs would come in the house, the cat would sit in the chair there and put her paw on each other's one body. And they put up with this, right? See, kind of the, you know, the regal authority of the big cat, huh? Well, even a little cat, huh? Now, it should be known, huh? Okay. To knowing, he says, which names properly are communicable, right? It should be considered that every form existing in a singular... Now, suppositum is a word, we don't really have an exact word in English to translate that by... But it's an individual in the genus of what substance, right? Suppositum. Suppositum is more general than the word person, right? Because person is a suppositum of a rational nature. But suppositum is of any substance, uh, individual. So he says, every form existing in a singular suppositum by which it is individuated is common to many, right? Either secundum rem or at least, what? Secundum ration now. Why does he make that distinction, you'll see? Well, he exemplifies the first one. So, just as human nature is common to many, secundum rem and rationum. But the nature of the sun, of which he thought there's only one like that, is not common to many in reality, you'd say, right? Secundum rem. But it could be found in many, huh? Okay. For one is able to understand the nature of the sun as existing in many, what? Suppositum, right? Just like if there's only one, what, square in the, what, world, right? Or one cube, rather, let's say, in the world, right? You say, okay, there's only one cube in the world, but that form, that cubicle shape, secundum rationum, these Thomas' words there, could be in many things, right? And you could see, you know, a pietos, let's say, a famous statue in Rome, something like that. Well, if no one had imitated that statue, right, it might be the only one, the only piece of marble in the world that has that shape. But yet that form or shape could be understood to be found in many, what, pieces of marble without any contradiction or any impossibility in that, right? Even though secundum rem, it might be only in that one piece of marble in the Vatican, right? Actually, I got a piece of, I got a little statue, my son, my son brought that, you know? I got one down the field there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, that's then both secundum rationum and secundum rem, right? That in things are now are many of that same form, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. When you mentioned suppositum, then you put it in reference to some other word, what was that other thing? Well, an individual of a, in the genus of substance, right? Uh-huh. Okay. When you mentioned as opposed to or? Person. Person. Well, person is a more particular name, a supposing term of a rational nature, right? Yeah. Okay. And this will come up again, these questions a lot, when you get into the Trinity, right? Because some people want to say there's two suppositories, but only one person or, you know, or vice versa or something, and they're not really understanding what the words mean. What Thomas is thinking here is, you know, especially of material things, where matter is the source of individuation, right? And so the same form can be realized in different matters, huh? And this because the understanding understands the nature of each species by separation from the singular. Whence to be in one singular suppositum, or in many, is outside the understanding of the nature of the species. Whence saving the understanding of the nature of the species, it can be understood as existing in many things, but the singular, from the very fact that it is singular, right, is divided from all other things, right? Whence every name imposed to signify something singular is incommunicable, right, both in re and ratione, huh? And it's what there is in me that separates me from everybody else. If you give a name to that, it would not be communicable to anybody else. Because it's signifying that in me which separates me from everybody else, this flesh and this moment, okay? But it's not possible that in apprehension there fall a plurality of this, what, individual, right? So even if they do some quoting, right, they won't get to me, right? The other guy won't be thinking, same way I think. Or put it in another way, his thoughts, if they were the same, he thought the same way I think, they wouldn't be my thinking, or my thoughts, huh? Whence no name signifying something individual is communicable to many properly speaking, But only according to some kind of, what, likeness, as someone is metaphorically called a, what, Achilles, right? In so far as he has something of the properties of Achilles, namely, what, fortitude, huh? Now he says, forms, huh, which are not individuated to something underlying them, huh? Suppositive, huh? But to themselves, because to it they are... forms. If they are understood according as they are in themselves, they are not able to be communicated, neither in reality nor in what? Understanding. But perhaps by likeness, as has been said about the what? Individual, right? But because simple forms assisting by themselves, we are not able to understand according as they are, but because you understand them in the manner of what? Compose things, having forms in matter. Therefore, as has been said, we place upon them concrete names signifying nature in some supposito. Whence, as far as pertains to the meaning of the names, the same is the reason about the names which are imposed by us to signifying the natures of composed things, and the names which are imposed by us to signifying, what? Simple subsisting things, huh? Now he's going to answer all this to the thing at hand. Whence, since this name God is imposed to signify the divine nature, and the divine nature is not able to be multiplied, because even the Trinity, you know, you don't multiply the divine nature, it remains one, huh? It follows that this name God is incommunicable, secundum rem, right? But it is communicable secundum opinionum. Well, he makes this distinction. Just as this name Son would be communicable according to the opinion of those laying down that there are many sons. And according to this it is said in Galatians 4 verses 8, to those who by nature are not gods they serve, right? And the gloss says that they are not nature, they are not gods by nature, but by the opinion of man, huh? So that's the distinction he makes. Nevertheless, this name God is communicable, not according to its whole meaning or signification, but according to something of it, through a certain, what? Likeness, huh? As those are called gods who partake something divine, by what? Likeness, huh? According to that text we quoted before, from Psalm 81, I have said you are gods, huh? I presume that's egoist God speaking there, right? Okay? And I think Christ refers to that too, doesn't he? When the gospel's there, when he's being accused? Yeah. If there were some name imposed to signifying God, not on the part of his nature, but on the part of the suppositum, right? According as he's considered as a this something, now that's an individual, right? The genus of substance. That name would be in every, in all ways, incommunicable, as is perhaps this word, tetragrammaton, not for Hebrails. Have you come across that in your Hebraic studies, Father? Um, yeah, a little bit. Tetragrammaton? It's got four letters, is that what it is? That's the divine name. Yeah, yeah. Four letters. Yeah. Okay. And it's similar if one were to impose a name to the sun, designating this individual sun, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. That's what, um, the earthly, very strict views won't even, they won't, not only did they not pronounce the divine name, but they have, sometimes, when they read scripture, they'll pronounce, they'll say Adonai when they come across it, so they won't pronounce it, but then out of reverence, this, I learned this not too long ago, out of reverence, the pious Jews won't even say Adonai unless they're praying, so if you're learning Hebrew, when you come across the divine name, you won't say Adonai, you'll just say Hashem, which means the name, so they've got a name for the name. I'm actually trying to see it, the name. Hashem, that's what they call it. Yeah, yeah. So now you apply to the first objection, which is taking the, what, Texan Peter and so on, that we are something of the divine nature, right? And, of course, Thomas will say, well, in one sense this is possible, in another sense it's not. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the divine nature is not communicable properly, but only according to a partaking of likeness, okay? And that likeness is very distant, according to the Vatican, I mean to the Fourth Latin Council, right? You cannot know the likeness of the creature to God without a greater, what, unlikeness, a particular text that comes in, the guy who's getting confused, you know, the Father and I are one, and we're going to be one, you know, Christ's prayer for unity. In the Gospel of St. John, towards the end there, the prayer, you know, Christ is saying, praying for our unity, that we'd be like one like you and the Father are one. Well, yeah, but tremendous distance, right? And if you brought the Trinity down to the kind of unity we can have, you'd be destroying the Trinity, and if you brought us up to the unity that the Trinity has, you would be making you and me one man. You see, we can't be one man, you know that, can we? We're found in the nature of the divine character, right? Yeah, well, we suddenly save one soul, right? In scripture, I think, in the Acts of the Apostles. Okay. To a second it should be said, this is about the name being appellativum, huh? To a second it should be said that this name God is a nomen appellativum. Appellativum means, what, to be called, I guess. Oh, yeah. What? Yes. Called. And not proper because it signifies the divine nature as in the one having it, right? Although God himself, secundum rem, is neither a universal nor a, what, particular. But names do not follow the way of being which is in things, but the way of being according as they are in our, what, a knowledge. But nevertheless, according to the truth of the thing, is incommunicable. Just as has been said about this name, what, son, huh? Okay, now the third objection was taken from names like bonus and sapiens, which are taken from operations of God and so on, right? To the third it should be said that these names, good, wise, and similar ones, are imposed from perfections proceeding from God into creatures. They are not imposed to signifying the very divine nature itself, but to signifying the perfections themselves absolutely. And therefore they are, according to the truth of the thing, communicable to many. But this name God is imposed from the operation proper to God, which we experience continuously, and taken from that to signifying the divine, what, nature, right? So Thomas says, you know, when you talk about goodness, then, absolutely like that, you can apply it to God or to what? Creatures, right? If you add something to it that restricts it to God, and you say sumum bonum, the highest good, then you can only say it to God, and if you say something that pertains to the, what, uh, way of having goodness in the creature, um, like you say, virtue is a habit, right? Then it could be applied only to the creature, right? The health of the body or something of that sort, right? Okay. Now,