Prima Pars
Lecture 58: Analogical Predication: God Said of Nature, Participation, and Opinion

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article 10 presupposes what we see in article 9 because we've seen that the name God is said properly of what God and it said though sometimes of other things by participation of a certain likeness of God right to God and then it said the opinion right okay and so Thomas now comes back upon this and says how was the name God said of all these three right okay you know they come out and sacrifice was in Ephesus to St. Paul oh yeah he held them to stop them from sacrificing to him so this name being said you never really well you can probably guess it's not going to be said univocally but anyway to this tenth one proceeds thus it seems that this name God is said univocally of God by nature and God by participation and by opinion for where there is a diverse meaning there is not a contradiction between the one affirming and the one negating for equivocation contradiction impedes contradiction huh so to have a contradiction you've got to have one person affirming of something but someone else denies it right but if they just affirm the one guy the word in one meaning another guy denies it in another meaning then they're not contradicting each other but the Catholic saying that the idol is not God contradicts the pagan saying the idol is God right therefore God is taken in the same way by both right taken univocally by both otherwise he would be contradicting him moreover just as the idol is God according to or by opinion and not by truth so the enjoyment of carnal delights huh is called happiness by opinion and not by truth but this name the attitude beatitude is said univocally of this opined beatitude and about the true beatitude therefore this name God is said univocally of God by truth and of God by what opinion huh is that so about the word beatitude it's said univocally we'll see what he says moreover univocally univocally are called those things of whom there is the same ratio the same meaning but the Catholic when he says there is that God is one understands by the name of God an omnipotent thing and something to be venerated above all things and this same thing is understood by the Gentile when he he says the idol is a God therefore this name God is said univocally in both places but against this son that which is in the understanding is the likeness of that which is in the thing as is said in the first book of the perihermeneus it's Aristotle's book on the statement right but animals said of the true animal and of the pictured animal painted animal is said equivocally therefore this name God said of the true God and of God by opinion is said equivocally moreover known is able to signify that which he does not know but the Gentile does not know the divine nature therefore when he says the idol is God he does not signify the true deity but this the Catholic signifies he says as one God therefore this name God is not signify the true God and of God by what opinion right now Thomas is going to reply to both sets of objections in this case right which maybe is a sign that he's he wants to point out some truth in between the name being the name being said univocally and the name being said maybe purely equivocally right or equivocally by chance so he says I answer that this name God in the four said three meanings is not taken either univocally or equivocally but analogously right okay now what's the distinction between those three right well when a name is said of many things with exactly the same meaning in all cases we said it we said it we say it's said univocally right and you know sometimes people get all mixed up but you know I say to ask students sometimes when animal is said of dog and cat doesn't mean the same thing and sometimes they're thinking that dog and cat are not the same thing never doesn't mean the same thing but it does mean the same thing when it's said of dog and cat even though it's being said different kinds of animals right the name animal doesn't signify those differences between those two things it signifies what they have in common right a living body that has sensation period and and the dog is just as much that as the cat and the cat is just as much that as a dog right yeah well they're mixing up just mixing up the fact that the dog and the cat are not the same kind of animal as if that means that the word animal said to them doesn't have the same meaning yeah mixing up those two things yeah they're thinking of the differences of the subject of the two statements right I'm putting that in the in the meaning of the predicate or another way they're they're mixing up uh the meaning of a word right with what it's said of oh and is that the same thing the meaning of a word what it's said of no they're they might you might a person might confuse them a bit though right you know you know when you're talking about a purely equivocal word like the word back right well instead of the piece of wood using baseball that's one meaning instead of the thing coming out of the belfry or something it has another meaning right so um you're thinking that therefore the meaning is what what it said of well it's kind of accidental in a way too then and sometimes you know that that kind of equivocation that I talk about sometimes it's not too equivocal but you know Thomas will sometimes say that man as well as the angel has the ability to understand and therefore they both have an understanding then other times they'll keep the word understanding for the angel and they'll say man doesn't have understanding he has reason reason is kind of a overshadowed understanding right a defective understanding and so so you Sometimes understanding is said of man sometimes is denied of him, right? It has something to do with it, it has a different meaning in two cases. But is it meaning the same thing as it being said of? So you guys say, when I say man of each one of you guys, what do I have in mind when I say the word man of each one of you, right? I have exactly the same meaning in mind when I say it of each one of you. If I say, are you a man or a mouse? I might be using man now in a different sense, right? Because of things that are univocal, there is omnino, all together, right? Entirely, right? Holy. The same ratio, the same meaning, right? Of equivocals, there is omnino, entirely, holy. A ratio, what? Diverse. Diverse, yeah. So you have a, in the case of equivocals, you have a meaning that's wholly other in two cases. Univocal, wholly the same. In analogous things, it is necessary that the name, taken in one of its meanings, right? Be placed in the definition of the same name by, what? Taken in other meanings, huh? I see an interesting example there from ethics there that Thomas brings up in the sentences. And someone is saying, well, do you divide foresight or prudence against the moral virtue, huh? And the objection is saying, well, foresight or prudence is placed in the definition of moral virtue. Now when you divide one thing against another, you don't put one in the definition of the other. So if you, well, I suppose that's true for the most part, anyway. And Thomas says, well, that's true when the thing being divided, huh, instead of these things, is, belongs to all of them equally, right? And not to one more than another, right? So you wouldn't put dog in the definition of cat or cat in the definition of dog, when you divide one against the other in your animal, right? Because the animal is said to them equally, right? Okay? But now, in the case of moral virtue, you put reason or foresight in the very definition of it, huh? The definition of moral virtue is a habit, existing in the middle, right? Towards us, as determined by foresight. As determined by right reason, as we sometimes say, right? Meaning by foresight. So you're defining moral virtue by foresight, huh? Well, the good of man is to be in accord with what? Reason. Reason. And foresight, being a virtue of reason, partakes of the good of reason more than the moral virtues, which are not in reason, but in the emotions or in the will. And so, it's not being said equally of these, right? But it's said primarily of reason, huh? What's in reason? And the other one is by participation. So what has something essentially the good of reason, and what has the good of reason only by participation, it can't be said of them, what? Equally, right? And what it's said of essentially is going to be the definition of what is so by what? Participation. So since the good of reason is said essentially of foresight, but of the moral virtues by partaking of foresight in some way, huh? Then foresight enters into the definition of that, right? We made it something like that with at least two of these meanings here. God essentially, and God by participation of God, some participation of likeness to God, huh? And therefore, when we define grace sometimes, sanctifying grace, we say it's our partaking of the divine nature, right? We don't say that it signifies the divine nature, we have not become God, but we are partaking of the divine nature. So the meaning of God instead of God, signifies the divine nature, essentially. But instead of us, it signifies only a partaking of the divine nature, and it's going to be defined by the divine nature, right? It's a partaking of the divine nature, that text from St. Peter that he had there, right? Divinae consortes naturae, right? Partakers in a sense of the divine nature, right? So you're putting the divine nature in the definition of grace, a little bit like we put foresight in the definition of what? Moral virtue. Moral virtue, yeah. Okay. So, for analogous things, it's necessary that the name, taken in one of its meanings, be placed in the definition of the same name, taken in other what? Meanings, huh? Just as being said of substance is placed in the definition of being according as it is said of what? Accident, right? And of course, you know, this reminds me of what Aristotle brings out in the Seventh Book of Wisdom, and he's talking about the definition of substance, and then he says, can accident also be defined, right? And what's funny about this is that the word definition comes from the word for limits, huh? And going back to the first meaning, say, of limit there, like in the city limits of Worcester, let's say. That's a very precise notion. All Worcester has to be within the city limits of Worcester, and no part of Shrewsbury or Ida or Holden or any other surrounding towns can be within the city limits of Worcester, huh? But now, as Aristotle points out in the Seventh Book of Wisdom, when you try to define an accident, you have to bring in something other than the accident into the definition, namely the subject in which the definition, or the accident rather, is, right? So if I try to define what health really is, I'm going to have to define health as the good condition of the body, right? I can't define health by itself without reference to the body of which it is a good condition. You have to define an accident as something of another, huh? For the simple reason that it is, that's what it is. It's something of another, it's not something by itself, huh? That's why, too, when Thomas, you know, is explaining the famous statement of Aristotle, which runs through scripture, too, that belongs to the wise to order things, right? And Thomas says, the reason for this is that wisdom is the highest perfection of reason. And as Shakespeare tells us, reason is the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after, right? So it's the very nature of reason to look for order, right? To try to order things. So if wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, it most of all must be able to order. But in a sense, he's defining wisdom by saying it's something of reason, right? Our wisdom, anyway, right? Our wisdom is not something by itself. It's not a package put in the mind, let's say, that could be left outside the mind, right? No, it's something of the mind, right? It's the highest of the greatest perfection of the mind. And therefore it has what the mind reason has in a superior degree, right? It's the highest perfection of the mind. It's the highest perfection of the mind. So, substance, then, enters into the definition of accident, and that's where Aristotle says in the Seventh Book of Wisdom that either then there's no definition of accident or it's definition in a somewhat lesser, what, sense, huh? Because of the fact you're bringing something in. I'm not saying. Yeah, other than what you're defining, right? He gives another example which is taken from the Fourth Book of Wisdom. Aristotle uses an example there. Not the original examples, this guy. Healthy, said of animal, is placed in the definition of healthy as it is said of urine and of medicine, right? Because what does it mean to say the urine is healthy? Well, because it's a sign of the health in the animal, right? It's a sign of that good condition of the animal. And why is healthy said of the medicine? Because it's factiva, it makes or produces, right? That good condition of the body or maintains it or something of that sort, right? So the healthy as meaning this condition of the body, right? Isn't the definition of healthy said of urine or healthy said of your complexion, right? Which might be a sign of your health. And, you know, you look sick, you don't look, you know? But your sick expression is a sign of the sickness that you are undergoing in your body, right? So the sign of the sickness that you are undergoing in your body and the meaning of sick is that bad condition of your body is in the meaning of sick instead of your complexion, right? If I said your diet was sick, we had a cookaholic. Did I tell you about the cookaholic? No. Well, we'd see, you know, that big truck that delivers Coke to the supermarkets, we'd see it, you know, come down our street and stop in front of some house, and the guy brings things in. I'd say, what the heck is this? And so one time my wife happened to run into the wife of the man who lives in that house, and she said, oh yeah, he's a cookaholic, you see? And he drinks so much Coke, and he had to get these big bottles and drinks it, that he wanted the truck to deliver it to his house. He didn't have to go to the market, right? And of course, the local guy at least didn't want to drive the thing up to this guy's house and deliver it there, you know? I'd make an extra trick, and then he called the national Coke, and they said, you deliver it to this guy, right? Oh, wow. So I would say this is a sick diet, you know, and he's drinking Coke all the time, all long. I had a history professor there in high school, you know, and actually the freshman had him in a senior course, too, or junior course, and he had real bad teeth, you know, and he maintained he got it from drinking Coke when he worked in the factory, you know, and you drink a lot of Coke, and the story's told you, you put a loose tooth in a glass of Coke, it's going to dissolve it, you know? Oh, yeah. So sick set of this diet. See, if I was as productive of a teeth rod and other harms, it does to you, I suppose. Now, having made these distinctions and illustrated them, right, Thomas is now ready to apply it, right? And thus it happens in what is proposed here. For this name, God, according as it is taken for the true God, right, is in the meaning of God, according as is taken, when God is said according to opinion, or by what, by taking, right? For when we name something God by participation, as scripture itself does, right, we understand by the name of God, something having a likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call the idol God, right, by this name God, we understand to be signified something about which men think that it is God, right? And thus it is manifest that other and other is a meaning of the name, but one of those meanings, right, is contained in the meanings of the others, huh? Whence it is manifest that it is said, what? Yeah, it's not said purely equivalently, right, huh? There's a connection among the meanings, huh? So one meaning of God and the fundamental and the first meaning of God is that the divine nature, right, what has a divine nature, and then what has a likeness by participation to that nature is said God because it's a likeness of that nature. Let us make man to our image and likeness, he says, right, even in the Genesis, I guess. And the other is said, what, to be called God because it's what people think is God, not what in fact is God, but what they think is God, right? Right? Makes sense? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, notice it is replied here to the first objection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the multiplicity of names, the multiplicity of names, yeah, I suppose their meanings, is not to be noted according to the predication of the name, right? It's being said, right? But according to its meaning, right? And that's what I was talking about, the example I noticed is students in class, you know, sometimes when you say, you know, animals said of man and dog, or animals said of dog and cat, they'll want to say that it doesn't mean the same thing, see. But they're thinking about the fact that dog and cat are not the same thing. But I'm not thinking about that, see. And so it's one thing to say that animals said of dog and cat are not the same thing, right? It's said of diverse things, right? Mm-hmm. But does it mean diverse things? You see? And you can confuse those two, couldn't you? And I think from experience, students would do that, right? You see? And you try to exemplify these things, and you see that they make that confusion, right? Well, Thomas is pointing out the distinction between what it is, the predication of a name, what it's said of, right? And the signification of the meaning of the name, huh? Mm-hmm. Not the same thing, are they? Maybe you said somebody, is a woman, instead of a beautiful woman, an ugly woman, have the same meaning? Well, no, no, not at all! But it does have the same meaning. Even though it's a different thing you might be excited about. So this is a fundamental distinction that needs to be seen, huh? Aristotle says, you know, that men are not good, most men are not good at seeing distinctions, huh? And that's quite true. I know that's from experience. For this name, man, of whomever it is said, right, whether truly or falsely, right, is said in the same way, right, huh? Okay? So if I say, three is an odd number, and four is an odd number, right? Does odd number mean the same thing in those two? Yeah. But in one case I'm saying it's truly, in another case falsely, right? But it has the same meaning, right? Mm-hmm. I'm not saying it's some peculiar meaning myself, but I'm not saying it. I'm asking about a philosopher. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But then it is said in many ways, if by this name, man, we intend to signify diverse things, right? See? So when I say the word animal, dog, and cat, if I said a dog, I mean not animal, but dog. Oh, yeah. You see? And when I say a cat, I mean not a living body with senses, but I mean a living body with senses that meows. Mm-hmm. If by one, if one intended to signify by this name, man, that which is truly a man, right? Another intended to signify by the same name, a stone, or something, what? Else. Else, yeah. Okay. Once it is clear that the Catholic saying that the idol is not God, contradicts the pagan asserting this, right? Because both use this name God to signify the true God. For when the pagan says the idol is God, he does not use this name. Of course, it signifies God by the opine God, yeah. For thus he would say something true, right? Since also Catholics sometimes in this meaning use the name, right? As when it's said, and he actually quotes scripture using it this way, right? Psalm 95. All the gods and the Gentiles are demons, right? So, what does the word gods there mean in Psalm 95, verse 5, right? You're not saying the true God is a demon, right? You're saying that the God by opinion is a demon, right? And the same thing can be said to the second and the third, right? Objections, huh? Because those arguments proceed according to the diversity of the predication of the name and not according to a diverse, what? Meaning. Meaning, okay? So, the objections are having the same difficulty my students have, right? Confusing the two, huh? So, if I'm saying the sense pleasures there are true beatitude, and you're saying they're not, we're contradicting each other, right? Because we're both using it for true beatitude, right? But if I, if you mean that the sense pleasures are apparent happiness or something, right? And I say that, but they're not true happiness, well then we're not using it in the same sense, right? Although we're using it in an analogous sense, right? Okay? Now, the other two objections, in a way, are looking at the, are kind of being answered by Thomas insofar as they say or seem to say that it's purely, what? Equivocal, right? And so, taking the objection of what Aristoteles says in the periomeneus there, or I mean in the, actually in the categories, where he takes the example there of the animal. So, to the fourth it should be said that animal said of the true animal and of the one in the picture in the statue is not said pure equivoce, right? And we talked about this last time. Purely equivocal is often called also equivocal by chance, right? There's no reason to say the same name about both. It just happens that the two, right, have the same name. But the philosopher, and that's the Aristotle himself, in a largo modo, right? Takes equivocal, according as it includes in itself, what? Analogous, right? Because also being, which is said analogously, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of the diverse predicaments, huh? Okay. We talked about that before. I'll say it once more. Sometimes a common name, a set of two things with the same meaning in mind is kept by one of them as its own name, right? And then the other one that adds something significant to the common meaning gets a new name, right? So, we could say equivocal, and we can divide it into two. Equivocal by chance, you find this sometimes in Aristotle, and equivocal by reason, okay? Now, what does equivocal mean when it's said of these two? It means it has more than one meaning, period. That's all it's said. Now, the word that's equivocal by chance, that's all it has, is many meanings. There's no connection among the meanings, right? But the name equivocal by reason not only has many meanings, which is a common meaning here of equivocal, but there's a connection among the meanings, an order among the meanings. And we've talked enough about reason and order to know the connection between reason and order, right? So, where there's a connection and order among the meanings, they call that equivocal by reason. Now, that's something noteworthy and important that equivocal by reason adds to the tongue meaning. Both have many meanings, but in addition, equivocal by reason has an order among the meanings, okay? While the equivocal by chance has nothing noteworthy, nothing besides many meanings, that's all it has, okay? So, sometimes, the equivocal by chance, then, keeps the word equivocal as its own name, okay? And the equivocal by reason gets a new name. And the one that's come in here, I'm just engaged in this, but the name that gets it as its own is a new name, analogous, right? Okay, okay? Let's say it's a very common happening in our naming, right? You'll find that again and again, then. You know, they're always distinguishing between a thing and a person that take the thing here in the parishes all the time, right? But is a person something or nothing, see? Well, thing is divided, then, into thing and person, right? And person adds something very noteworthy, reason and will and so on. So, it gets a new name, person, and those other things just keep the name thing, right? So, sometimes, we say, you've got to treat the girl like a person, not like a thing, you see? But you have the same thing with the word animal, right? You know? You have the rational and irrational animal, right? Or the rational animal adds something significant beyond animal, which means a living body, his senses, namely reason. So, sometimes, the rational animal is given a new name, man, and the irrational animals keep the common name, animal, right? Okay? Now, if you could call this here, let's call it a beast, right? Okay? And then you'd have each have their own name, right? Beast and man, right? But because the beast adds nothing noteworthy to the common name of animal, sometimes, we keep the name animal for beast, and then we divide man against the, what, animals, right? And so, I'd say to my students that if the biology teacher calls you an animal, he's probably not insulting you. Maybe if you hear everything, he thinks about evolution. But if your girlfriend calls you an animal, she's probably insulting you, right? So, that's a common thing in naming, right? So, that in one sense, a person is a thing. In another sense, they're not a thing, right? In one sense, man is an animal. In another sense, man is not an animal, right? Now, I'm going back to the thing in hand here. So, sometimes, more precisely, you could say, right, this kind of equivocal is called equivocal by chance, right? Sometimes, it's called purely equivocal, right? Now, pure means there's nothing else excepted there, right? Like some orderly means, right? But then, sometimes, it keeps the name equivocal as, what, its own. And the other one is given a new name, not equivocal by reason now, but a new name, which is analogous, right? Now, as a footnote, the only concern I have about analogous, I mean, it's very common, Thomas, it's about time. But analogous actually comes in the Greek word for, what, proportional, like there's a ratios. And that's only one of the, what? And that's only one of the, what? kinds of names equivocal by reason. So sometimes I think people take equivocal by reason too narrowly, right, to mean only those ones that are equivocal by likeness of ratios, or by ratios in general, right, when there are other ways in which this takes place. You know, sometimes a name becomes equivocal by reason of having part of its meaning lost. So Thomas is a beautiful thing there when he talks about the names of the emotions, and how some of these names can be carried over and applied to the acts of the will. It's like the word hope first names and emotion, or love first names and emotion, and in the emotion there there's something that comes from the body, there's a bodily aspect, this bodily turmoil, and there's something that comes from the soul, right, the formal aspect of the emotion. And when you carry over to the act of the will, you drop the bodily aspect of the emotion and keep the formal aspect. And so, you know, but this will come up when we point out by Thomas, he talks about the virtue of hope and so on, because that hope is in the will, right? But the same when you talk about the love of God, that love of God, the love of wisdom, that's in the, what, the will, right? It's not really in the emotions. There might be some emotional disposition for this, there might be some overflow, but it properly names an act of the will. And so it becomes equivocal by what? Dropping private meaning, right? Or the meaning, the very famous one, the Dianima there, is the word undergoing, or actually in Greek it would be the word to paskin, right? Or pasio, right? And Aristotle points out that, you know, that if you call sensing even an undergoing, it's not like suffering, you know. And the first meaning of suffering is not only that you're being acted upon, but you're being acted upon in a way that's painful and contrary to instructive view, right? And then Shakespeare kind of plays the word suffering, you know, when Beatrice says to Benedict, you know, for which of my good qualities did you first suffer a love? It's a good thing, you know. I call it suffering because I can't help myself, see? But it's not really suffering in the sense of being, what, painful, right? And then, so you drop out the idea of something contrary to your nature, right? But keep the idea of receiving something. So eventually you say that sensing is a what? A passion. Now I try to, you know, in English, the word passion, the word suffering doesn't seem to have been moved. So I take the word undergoing myself. And I think to some extent, undergoing still keeps a little bit of that first meaning of suffering. When we say, you know, that he's undergone a lot. Well, that means that he's what? Yeah, he's suffered a lot of things, right? But then you can say that sensing, in a way, is undergoing because the sense is being acted upon. And then, the body's involved there too, but it's not something contrary to the nature of the animal, right? It's perfecting of the animal. So undergoing now is being perfected in a way, as opposed to being destructive in the first meaning. You've dropped out that aspect. And then when you speak of understanding as an undergoing, right? Then you have the whole body dropped out, right? And undergoing kind of fits in with understand, right? To understand the Eucharist means to know what stands under the accidents of bread and wine, right? So I just have an aside there, but I'm trying to divide the use of the phrase equivocal by reason, right? In order to avoid limiting equivocal by reason to one or two kinds, you know, of equivocal by reason, right? Nevertheless, whatever you want to call that thing, the fact that you give it a new name indicates that it has something noteworthy, and that is the order among the meanings, huh? So coming back to the reply here, the fourth objection on the first said contour, right? It says animal said of the true animal and the pictured animal is not said pure equivocce, right? He's being more precise because he has to be the answer's objection, right? But the philosopher, when he says it's said equivocally, he's taking equivoco, largo modo, in a large way, you know, large discourses, that same word. But then that's equivocal up here on top, right? According as it includes in itself, analoga, as it includes under itself, equivocal by chance and equivocal by reason or analoga, huh? Because, and he gives an example here, Thomas, because being which is said analogiche, right? Sometimes is said to be predicated equivocally of the diverse, what? Predicaments, right? In the categories, Aristotle's not so much concerned with showing there that being is said equivocally by reason or by chance, right? But it's not said univocally of everything, huh? And therefore you have different highest genre, right? A man and a shape are not a thing in the same meaning, exactly, huh? Man is more a thing and the shape of man is something of a thing, but something of a thing is a thing in a way, you know? So. Now, the last said contra, second one, he's talking about the Gentile not knowing the nature of God, right? Therefore he can mean the same thing. To the fifth it should be said that the very nature of God, as it is in itself, neither the Catholic nor the pagan, huh? Knows, huh? But both know it according to some meaning of causality, as God is said to be the unmover or the first maker or the first cause, or excellence, right? He's the sumum bonum, the highest good, or of emotionis, the negation, huh? As, um, he's incorporeal, he's not composed and so on. And according to this, in the same meaning, the Gentile can take this, what, name God, right? As we do when he says the idol is a God. And he's going to worship him, right? You know, he's taking it the same way that we do, huh? Because we think he should be the one who is God and should be worshiped, too. Except we just don't think the statue of his name. The Great Archdiocese is as if a man should chat to his house, you know, talk to his house. If, however, there was someone who, by no meaning at all, knew God, right? He would not be able to even name him, right? Except insofar as we sometimes put forth names whose meanings we don't know, right? So Thomas says that, you know, the young student in physics, right, huh? Though he says it with his mouth, he doesn't attain it with his mind, you know? So take a little break before we look at eleven here. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay.