Prima Pars
Lecture 59: The Divine Names: 'Who Is' as God's Proper Name

Transcript
================================================================================

So now we go to the 11th article, which we divide against the three previous articles, just dealing with another name, where the other three articles are dealing with the name God. To the 11th, one proceeds thus, it seems that this name, who is, is not Maxime, most of all, the proper name of God. For this name, God, is a, what, incommunicable name, properly speaking, right? But this name, qui est, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore, this name, who is, is not most properly the name of God, huh? I suppose, certainly what is, is incommunicable to many, right? Although God tells, what's her name, St. Cathar's hand, remember just two things, I am, who am, and you are she who is not. It's interesting, in John's Gospel, how many times the Lord says, I am, because I am he, and when St. Peter denies him, three times Peter says, I am not. I am not, I am not. It's kind of, I don't know what it's going to mean. Moreover, Dionysius says, in the third chapter, the divine names, that the naming of, the name God, I mean, good, rather, is manifestive, is making known all the divine processions, right? But this, most of all, belongs to God, that he be the universal beginning of things. Therefore, this name, good, is most proper to God, right? And not this name, who is, huh? You know, because Dionysius, in that work, is taking these names as they signify, you know, a section from God into creatures, you know, so. I think he begins with the name, good, right? Even though, in some sense, it's not the first name we say about God. Moreover, every divine name seems to imply some relation to creatures, since God is not known by us except the creatures. But this name, who is, implies no relation to creatures. Therefore, this name, who is, is not, most of all, the proper name of God. How do you think of all those objections? But against this is what is said in Exodus 3, that Moses asking, if they say to me, what is the name of the one who is sending you, right? What shall I say to them? And the Lord responds, thus you shall say, who is, sent me to you. Therefore, this name, who is, is most of all the proper name of God. Okay, Thomas says, I answer, it should be said, that this name, who is, for a threefold reason, is most of all the, what, proper name of God, eh? First, an account of its, what, meaning, eh? For it does not signify some form, but to be itself, eh? Whence, since the being of God, the to be of God, is its very, what, essence, its very substance, its very nature, and this belongs to nothing else, as has been shown above, is manifest that among other names, this one most properly names God, for each thing is denominated from its, what, form, right? It's as unique about the divine form and its, is the very existence, the same thing. Secondly, because of its, what, universality. For all other names are either less common, right? Or, if they are convertible with it, nevertheless, they add something above it by reason, eh? And that goes back to the distinction that Aristotle makes in the, what, beginning of the fourth book of wisdom, right? That the name being is more fundamental than the name good. Or the name one. And even if one is convertible with being, it adds something by reason, namely the undivided being, right? Okay. Or good means desirable being, or something of this sort, eh? So, uh, Whence, if they add something to it, in a certain way, they inform and determine it, right? But our understanding is not able to know the divine essence in the state of the via, in this life, according as it is in itself. But whatever Modi determines about it, what he understands about God, it falls short of the way in which God is in himself. And therefore, when some names are less determined and more common absolute, to that extent, they more properly are said of God by us. Because God is, what, infinite in a sense, eh? Whence Damascene says that, um, more principal or more chief of all those things, of all those names which are said of God is the name who is, right? For the whole which is in him, it comprehends, having to be itself as a certain, now the word, Pelagos, is actually kind of transliteration of the Greek word, Pelagos, right? Which means the ocean. So it's like the ocean, huh? The infinite and undetermined, what, infinity or ocean of this divine, what, substance, huh? So no wonder he had one of the five things about the substance of God was his being, what, infinite, right? Because unless we knew that God was infinite, we wouldn't appreciate this, what, name? Because we name things as we know them, right? So we have to know that God is infinite before we can appreciate this name, huh? Did you ever read that in the life of Saint Tresor de Sue, you know, when she goes to the ocean and sees it for the first time? She's so impressed with the, the, the... The dimensions, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of, you know, reminds me, you know, of her, uh, obviously, uh, being worthy to God, right? And she sees the universe. I mean, the word's very concrete, almost like a metaphor, you know, Pelagos, huh? The ocean of the divine being, you know, kind of the infinite ocean there, huh? Because the ocean, to us, seems to be endless, huh? Mm-hmm. The endless ocean of the divine being, yeah? Something gets about that. Um, and I know myself, and I talk about the, the choice that you had to make in your studies. Your choice you can make is between knowing all things in general, and, and the best things in particular, or knowing less of things in detail. And, uh, so, it's kind of interesting, huh, that the science of being as being is also science in which we come to know the best thing, God, right? Mm-hmm. And the, uh, or general parts of natural philosophy, like in the eight books of natural hearing and the three books on the soul, are useful for knowing the best things in the natural world, like the soul itself, huh? Or the man who studies, you know, ants in particular, the entomologist, right? He knows lesser things in detail, right? Mm-hmm. But in a sense, because the limitations of our mind, you have to almost make this choice, right? Mm-hmm. It's kind of interesting that this name here that is in some sense the most proper to God and in the second reason, on account of its what? Universeality, right? Mm-hmm. It's better to, in almost a sense to say, the one who is. I always say that at the house there. Let us thank the one who is for all that is. But as if he's the one who is, right? Nothing else quite is. I'm not quite here. I'm not quite sure. Just in this definition of God's being, being all the being can possibly be. Yeah. For any other, for by any other name, right, you determine some way of the substance of the thing, right? But this name who is determines no particular way of being, right? But it has itself indeterminately to all. And therefore, it names the, what? The infinite ocean of substance, right? Church of the keeps that word. And in Greek, it's what? Pi, epsilon, lama, alpha, gamma, you know? Isn't that it? It's what I'm saying? In Greek, it's O-S at the end, omicron, sigma. So, Pelagos, I don't know if it's originally a Latin word, but it's originally a Greek, you know, but it's the same almost letter for letter. And third, from its consignification, it signifies to be in the present, and this most properly is said of God, whose being or to be does not know past or future, as Augustine says in the fifth book of the Trinity. So Christ says, you know, before Abraham was, I am. And in a sense, he's saying, I am, who am, right? So the reason it's out-signifying the present, right? It seems un-dramatical, but it's more proper to speak that way than to say before Abraham was, I was. You know, he says, for Abraham was, I am. Okay? So, these are very difficult reasons, you know, but I think it makes some sense to you when you first hear them, and the more you think about them, the more need they'll have. In the chapter on perfect there, in the fifth book of wisdom, right, Aristotle, you know, distinguishes three senses of perfect, which really fit creatures, and the perfect, the first meaning of perfect is that which has all its parts. So if you're missing an arm or a leg, you're incomplete. Or if you have all your arms and legs and parts, then you're complete. In some sense, you're perfect. Then the second sense of perfect is in a way like that, but what has all the ability of its kind. So Homer is the perfect poet, right? He can write good plots. In fact, he teaches all the other Greeks what make good plots. And his characters, you know, are, you know, multidimensional. They're not the one-dimensional passion of the French dramatists, and so on. And then his words, you know, are so, everything comes alive, as Aristotle says. Everything's in motion, right? So when somebody shoots an arrow, you know, the arrow is striving to get into your insides, you know, and so on. It's just a vivid image, you know, the arrow, you know. And, or his great, what, similes, right? Give this, you know what Shakespeare says, in the very whirlwind of your passion, you must get a calmness, right? So in these terrible battle scenes, you know, you have these beautiful similes that kind of give a, as Hegel says, give a tranquility to the scene, right? And so you say, okay, he's the complete poet. He has the whole ability of a poet. But he doesn't have the ability of Mozart, or the ability of the medical doctor, or the ability of the logician, or the ability, you know. So it's an ability of a particular kind, right? And then a thing is perfect that has reached its end, huh? See? Well, God is endless, right? God is, um, and then Aristotle goes on to the sense in which God is perfect, right? Other things are perfect in their kind, huh? But God is not, what, lacking in anything, right? So even Averroes saw that Aristotle's talking about God there, right? And Thomas sometimes says, you know, as Averroes points out there, coming on the fifth book, this is the sense in which God is perfect, right? But it's tied up with his, what, not being limited in any way. And, uh, well, everything else is perfect in its kind, huh? So in some imperfect way, it's perfect, huh? And that's very much brought out here by this infinite ocean, huh? Now, the first objection, though, is an opportunity for Thomas now to see another distinction, huh? Because this, um, name God may seem to be more proper, and in some sense, maybe it is Thomas's, okay? And this is a very subtle distinction here. The first, therefore, it should be said that this name, who is, is more the proper name of God than this name God, it seems strange, right? As it guards that from which it is imposed, huh? Because it is taken from to be, right? And that's, looking back to the first reason he gave in the Bible, the article, why this is the most proper name of God. It's taken from to be, and we name a thing from its, what, form, its substance, right? But only God is the substance, is to be, okay? No other thing is its substance or what it is, it's to be, okay? So as far as what it's taken from, it's more, what, proper to God, right? And as regards the way of signifying, because it's not, what, reticular in the way other names are, right? They seem to confine God a bit, right? Don't fence me in, God is saying. And the way of consignifying, right? Signifying the eternal presence of God, right? But as regards that to which the name is imposed is signifying. The name God is what? More proper, right? Because it is imposed to signifying the, what? Divine nature, huh? And even more proper is the name, Tetragamata. Okay, the name there. Which is imposed as signifying the incommunicable divine substance, and if one can speak thus, as the singular one, right? Okay. Now that's a lot to think about, that reply to the first objection, right? So, which is more the proper name of God? I am, who am, or God, huh? Well, Thomas says, well, as far as that from which the name is taken, I am, who am, is the most proper name of God, right? But as far as that to which the name is applied, God is the most proper name of God. Okay. I think it's interesting, because it's kind of strange if God is not the proper name of God, you know? Now, if you go back to the problem here in this article, you know, when you state a problem, you use the word utrim, huh? And as you say, whether the name who is is most properly the name of God, well, you can't even raise the problem without using the name God, right? And so, in some way, you're asking about the name of God, using the name God to refer to what you're asking the name of. So, in some sense, the name God should be the most proper, yeah. And he says, as far as that to which the name is applied, right? That's the most proper. But as far as that from which the name is taken, who is, for the three reasons given the body, is the most proper name of God, right? So he's coming back to that distinction that we saw in the earlier article, right? When he's asking whether God is the name of what? Substance, right? Of God, or is the name of his operation, right? And then he made the distinction between the two, right? But now he's making use of that same distinction to say that in one way, I am who I am is the most proper name of God. And it must be in some way, because Moses is saying, what's your name? And that's what he says, I am who I am, right? Okay. But in another way, the name God is his name most properly, huh? Well, how can both be true? Well, as far as that from which the name is taken, I am who I am is the most proper name of God, right? As far as that to which the name is imposed, right? God, and even more so maybe, the Tetragamaton is the name of what? God, huh? Okay. It's more common to see the use of the name God in terms of what it refers to, and it seems more, I mean, Aristotle did something about it, maybe some of the other philosophers, and certainly divine revelation, revealed to us, or not only divine revelation, but the philosophers had an idea that this first name from which it's taken is more proper. Because it seems like that's more subtle, the name. from which it would be taken. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And you know Thomas, you know, he talks about this truth in the Summa Contra Gentiles that in God the substance of God and his existence are the same thing, you know, and he speaks of this sublime truth. Of course, he's in a place where he's talking about all kinds of sublime truths, you might say, but he's kind of struck this as being a sublime truth. And I think I mentioned before that Hilary of Poitiers as he became known as. Hilary was a, you know, a Greek philosopher so to speak before he became a Christian, right? And in his book on the Trinity there he has a little autobiographical sketch on how he first picked up the Bible and he heard this, you know, I am who am, you know, that was a motive of credibility for him as to the sublimity of this book, right? That this was maybe the Word of God after all. Or, you know. And, but as a philosopher he was struck by that, right? In a way maybe that other men would be struck more by the miracles or something else, right? But he was struck by that as a kind of more of credibility for him, as a philosopher he saw how profound this was. Okay? So that's quite a great thing. Okay? Let's look at the 12th article here if we can a little bit. Now this is a little different now because now we're talking about when you can make affirmative statements of God, huh? About God, huh? To the 12th one proceeds thus. It seems that affirmative statements are not able to be formed about God, huh? There's a little bit of theology, right? For Dionysius says in the second chapter of the celestial hierarchy that negations about God are true but affirmations don't fit. Don't come together so much, huh? Moreover, Boethius says in the book of the Trinity that a simple form cannot be a subject, right? But God is most of all a simple form. Therefore, he's not able to be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative statement can be formed is taken as a what? Subject. Subject in the sentence, right? Therefore, of God an affirmative proposition cannot be formed. Moreover, every understanding understanding a thing to be other than it is is false. But God as being without any composition as has been proven above. Since, therefore, every understanding, every affirmative understanding understands something with a composition, it seems that an affirmative proposition cannot be, what? Formed about God. Now this third objection is confusing the way we know with the way things are, right? And the old question I asked before, you know, the central question of philosophy. Does truth require that the way we know be the way, what? Things are, right? And Aristotle says, no. And Plato seems to be saying yes, right? But the great Boethius, as I mentioned in the Consolation of Philosophy, when he's approaching, you know, talking about the divine knowledge, and the divine knowledge of temporal things, right? But the divine knowledge of temporal things is what? Eternal. So you have an eternal knowledge of what is not eternal. And how is that possible, right? But at that point, Lady Wisdom, who's leading the conversation, introduces Aristotle as her true follower. And it's kind of a subtle thing, you know, that Boethius is going out to Aristotle there. Because in the beginning of the Consolation of Philosophy, he gives himself as a member of the Academy, right? And therefore the school of Plato, right? And when he talks about happiness, to some extent, he proceeds in a kind of a tonic order, right? But now he has to give up Plato and follow Aristotle. And without saying this, you know, he has Lady Wisdom introduce Aristotle as a true follower. But against this, to faith, nothing can be false, huh? Under faith. But there are some affirmative propositions under faith, right? For example, that God is three in one. And these are omnipotent, right? You have to believe these things. But these are affirmative propositions, right? Therefore they can't be false if they come under faith, right? That's nice argument, isn't it? I answer, it should be said, that affirmative statements are able to be formed about God. But now let's have some evidence for this, huh? Now, it should be known that in every affirmative proposition that is true, it is necessary that the predicate and the subject signify the same thing, secundum rem, in some way, right? But something other in reason, right? And this is clear both in propositions which are, what? Are about an accidental predication as in those which are of a, what? Substantial predication. For it is manifest that man and white are the same in subject, right? In different definition. For other is the definition of man and the definition of white, right? And likewise, when I say man is an animal, the very thing that is a man is truly an animal. In the same suppositum, right? In the same individual substance is the sensible nature from which it is said to be an animal and the rational from which it is said to be a, what? Man, huh? Whence here also the predicate and the subject are the same in subject, but they differ in what? Definition, right? But in propositions in which the same thing is said of itself, this in some way is found in so far as intellect, that which is placed there on the side of the subject is drawn to the part of the suppositum and what is placed on the side of the predicate is drawn to the nature of the form existing in the suppositum. According as it is said, the predicates hold themselves formally and subjects, what? Materially. The predicate is like a form, right? Okay? And the subject like matter. To this diversity, which is by reason, there corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject. But the identity of the thing, the intellect signifies through the, what? Composition, right? Now, all this has got to be applied to God. God, considered in himself, is altogether one and, what? Simple. That's interesting that he puts one and simple together. But in the treatise on the substance of God, the first attribute of God was a simple and the last one was one, huh? Why did he do that? I noticed in the compendium of theology, he considers the unity of God among the consideration of the simplicity of God, right? But here they're kind of separated, huh? Here they're together again, huh? But nevertheless, our understanding knows him by diverse, what? Thoughts, huh? In that he's not able to see him, what? As he is in himself, huh? But nevertheless, although he understands them under diverse conceptions, nevertheless, he knows him, he knows that to all of these thoughts, there corresponds one and the same thing simply. This plurality, therefore, which is by reason, it represents by the plurality of the subject and the predicate. It represents unity by what? Understandings. By the composition of the statement, huh? Okay. Now, I'm noticing, you know, I would take the example of the God of the Senate circle, right? But maybe, if that way of doing it, is the way Thomas does it in the framing there to the fourth book of the Sumacan Gentiles, where he speaks of, from the one simple God, all the perfections of creatures descended, right? Okay. And then quoting the great archetypes, that the way up and the way down is the same, the way down is the same, the way down is the same, the way down is the same, in different directions. So we start down here with the perfections as our founding features and that's why we have many what? Thoughts, right? And so we say God is the beginning of this, he's the beginning of that perfection, he's the beginning of this perfection, he's the beginning of that perfection. So we have many thoughts about God. When we say the beginning of this perfection is the beginning of that perfection, then we signify that it's the same thing, right? Okay? So the multiplicity is in the sign of our many thoughts that God derives from creatures, but we don't attribute the multiplicity of our thoughts to some multiplicity in God, right? And so we affirm one of the other, right? Okay? Now is our mind false doing that? No, because that's multiplicity is in the way we know God, right? So we know a simple thing in one, in a composed way, in a multiple way, where he knows composed things in a multiple things in a one and simple way, which is the reverse, right? But in either case of his knowing us, that's to say, and we knowing him is the way we know the same as the way things are, right? But the mind is not false, because those two don't have to be the same, right? And that's why we affirm to point out that what is many in us is one in him, yeah. Now, to the first one, the text of the authority from Dionysius. To the first, therefore, it should be said that Dionysius says that affirmations are what? Incompacts, they don't fit together, or they're unsuitable, according to the translation, insofar as no name belongs to God by its way of signifying, huh? This is what we said before, right, huh? Difference between the simple names and the, what? I mean, the concrete names and the abstract names. Either one fits God perfectly, right? And so we say God is good because he really is good. And we say goodness itself because he's really, what? Good in a very simple way. But he's not, we don't say only that he's goodness because that might seem to imply that he's only that by which things are good, right? But he's a goodness that is good and a good that is goodness itself. And so we can't overcome the defect of our way of knowing, huh? Knowing God. Another second objection about God being simple. To the second, it should be said that our understanding, huh? Is not able to grasp simple forms existing according as they are in themselves. And that's true about the angels as well. I'm going to be surprised when I finally see what my angel really is. Oh, that's what you are. I didn't know what you were at all. But it grasps these things according to the way of composed things, right? In which there is something that is subject and something that is in it, right? And therefore it apprehends the simple form by reason of a subject and it attributes something to it, huh? That's because of the way we what? We know, huh? Now the third objection gets right down to what I call the central question of philosophy and that thing that answers. To the third, it should be said that this statement, the understanding, understanding a thing other than it is, is false, is able to be understood in two ways. Because this adverb otherwise can determine the verb understands on the part of the thing understood or on the part of the one what? Understanding. If on the side of the thing understood, then the proposition is true. And the sense is that whoever understands a thing, whatever understanding understands a thing to be other than it is, is false. But this does not take place in what is proposed here. Because our understanding forming a statement about God does not say that he is composed, but he's simple. In fact, one of the things we say about him is that he is simple. Right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. We say in a composed way, right? We say in a composed way and know in a composed way that God is simple, right? Because he put together God and simple, right? And you say God is simple, right? Okay? Okay? If, however, on the side of the one understanding, then the statement is false, right? Okay? Because other is the way of the understanding and understanding than of the thing and being, right? That's true even about things more known to us, huh? For it manifests that our understanding understands material things existing below it in an immaterial way, right? Not that it understands them to be immaterial, right? But because it has an immaterial way in understanding, huh? I told you about that funny thing there in modern physics, huh? Because there, they're knowing matter mathematically, but there's no matter in what? Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. Mathematics. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. Give a little reading here from the memoirs of General Lord Ismay. You know, he was a big shot in the Second World War there, you know, in the British government and so on. And a goal between Churchill and the other military men, right? But anyways, one chapter is entitled, this is his memoirs, Mr. Churchill's Machinery of War Direction, right? Because he had a, you know, he was kind of a bridge between the two, right? It was not always easy to translate the technical jargon in which Whitehall delighted into the English on which Mr. Churchill insisted. She's got to translate the jargon into English. Or to boil down several foolscap pages into one sheet of paper to which I was so often restricted. Now he has two quotes here from Churchill. He demanded a very brief thing. And it's in print, I mean in quotations, huh? Clarity and cogency can be reconciled with the greater brevity. And Shakespeare says, brevity is the sole foot, huh? But Churchill says it very well, I'm the master of the English language. Clarity and cogency, right? Those two very good. Can be reconciled with the greater brevity. Clarity was one of his favorite admonitions, huh? Which, if unheeded, was followed up by a more direct reproof. This is the second one in quotes. It is stokeful not to compress your thoughts. You know? It's lazy, right? Not to compress your thoughts. I'm kind of reminded of John Locke, right? The English empiricist who at the end of the essay in Human Understanding there says, you know, it's kind of wordy, but he's too lazy to go back over it again. So it is slowful not to compress your thoughts. Of course, some days you want to give some support to what he's put on that one page. I got around the difficulty by a technique which bordered in subterfuge. I used to compress the salient facts of the case into a short minute of the prescribed length, right? And attached thereto the full information on which the facts were based in the form of an extra's A, B, C, etc., etc. To these there was no limit imposed by my chief. And I recall that I once needed all the letters of the alphabet as far as T. There's some interesting things in there. What is his name? Lord Ismay. Ismay. Yeah, generally, yeah. Yeah, very interesting. That's his World War II? Yeah. Well, yeah, he was, starts with his, even before the First World War, right? He's being down in India, right? And he was transferred over to Africa when the First World War took place. He wanted to get up to the war, but he was kept on Africa. He had other things for him to do down there. And then when he got into the Imperial Defense Committee and so on, then he moved up and he was kind of the great coordinator and so on. But you get interesting things in here about his Munich and things of that sort. You kind of get what the mental attitude at that time was. But when Chamberlain came back with the thing, they were so relieved. And the, but he's kind of honest about the, the action of some of these things. There was a Bruce Ismay connected with the Titanic. Who? Bruce Ismay. Yeah, I don't think it would be. I don't think it's him, but maybe it's his family or. No. He describes though, when he was sent down to India after the Second World War, when they were going to get their independence. And of course, the first thing they decided was that they had to separate the Hindus and the Muslims. They couldn't unite the whole country. And they had to go back and explain that to Clement Atkinson, the man. And it was just terrible things going on. Yeah. And he describes, you know, one thing happened even to his, his, his daughter was with her fiance on the train. And when the train pulled up to the train station, you know, the Hindus come out and pull all the Muslims off the train and kill them. And they had a Muslim servant who was, of course, scared stiff. So they had hit him underneath the baggage and so on. And, and the Hindus came in, you know, there's one more Muslim around here, you know, and they had their guns, their pistols out and so on. So you realize what a terrible thing it was. But some people think in Iraq, we have to maybe, you know, partition the three groups of people and like that. But the thing about Munich is that he was so relieved when it took place that he came home and his wife, if I chewed him out, you know, if I could find the thing here. I don't want to do it now here, but, and then the thing at Yalta, you know, it's good too. You know, you see what the attitude was. I'm sure that that's kind of the side from our interior here, huh? And I'm going to do a little algebra next, okay? You all know the famous theorem in book two, I mean book one better, partition 32 of Euclid, that shows that the interior angles of the triangle are equal to what? Two right angles, huh? Okay? Now, this is going to be shown through the famous, what, parallel theorems. That when a straight line falls upon parallel lines, one theorem is that it makes the alternate interior angles equal. The other is that it makes the outside angle equal to the interior and opposite angle. So what Euclid does is actually two steps in the proof of this. He extends one of the sides of the triangle out here. And then at this point here, he draws a line parallel to that line over there. Well, then by the alternate theorem, he knows right away that these two angles are equal. And then by the outside angle, the interior and opposite angle, he knows that this angle and this angle are equal. So the theorem has got two parts. It says the exterior angle of the triangle is equal to the two interior and opposite angles. And then from that, he goes on to conclude that the three angles are equal to what? Two right angles. Because obviously this angle and this angle make two right angles. And these two equal those two, so these are two right angles. Now, when I was going up, you know, you used to always hear another way of proving that. But it's similar. And that is, instead of drawing, extending the side and drawing the line parallel there, you just draw one line parallel to one vertex. And then by the alternate one, you see right away that these two are equal. And likewise, the same reason, these two are equal. So these two are equal to those two, and the third one makes up the two right angles. Now, if you wanted to, it's kind of struck when I was thinking about this the other day. You could now go on to prove from this that the exterior angle is equal to the two interior and opposite angles. Because having proven that these three interior and interior angles, you know these two are equal to the right angles, right? So subtract this one, and obviously the remaining one must be equal to these two. Okay? Now, what's the big deal about this? Well, no big deal. But notice in those two ways of proceeding, the order is just reversed. In the way Euclid does it, right, he proves that the exterior angle is equal to the two interior and opposite angles first, and by means of that, he proves second that the three interior angles equal to what? Two right angles. On this alternative proof, I prove first that the interior angles are equal to the two right angles, and from that I prove that the exterior angle is equal to the interior and opposite angles. Does it really make any much difference? There's a little bit of variations there, right? So, when I read this, and I read the Summa Contra Gentiles, the other two Summas of Thomas, you should say, you should say, you should say, you should say, You find that the order is not always exactly the same. I gave a paper once on the order there, the attributes and the substance of God, right? And when we get into talking here about the operation of God, I'll point out a couple of differences. I'm interested to hear about the order which the two books are written. So let's look at the premium here at the beginning of question 14. He says, after the consideration of those things which belong to the divine substance. Now we showed before that there are five things that belong to divine substance, right? It's simple, right? It's perfect. It's unlimited or infinite. It's unchangeable. And it's altogether what? One, right? Okay. He calls that the divine substance. It remains that we should consider about those things which belong to his operation, what he does. Okay? Now, as we will discover here, you don't know it already, his substance and his operation are the same thing. But why do we have two considerations that are the same thing? Yeah. Because we know God through creatures, and in creatures, the substance of a thing, and what it does are not the same thing, right? And you all heard, you know, Descartes' famous cogito, right? Which actually goes back to Augustine, right? Augustine uses that argument in the Contra Academico song where the ancient skeptics, right? And notice Descartes says, I think, therefore I am, right? And that's really based upon something even more fundamental, and that is that you've got to be before you can do anything. And you could add, not only must you be before you can do something, but you must be what you are before you can do anything. And different kinds of things, by reason of what they are, do different kinds of things. So the bird and the fish and the cat all do different things, huh? Because of what they are, right? So it's interesting, huh? That in creatures, we distinguish between the being and the substance, right? Of a thing, and what it does, right? As well as seeing a connection and an order between the substance of the thing and what it does, huh? And this axiom, really, huh? I don't think I try to prove that you've got to be before you can do something. It's kind of obvious, huh? To all of us, right? Yeah. So when you know God from creatures, we start with thoughts about the substance of these creatures and thoughts about what they do, right? And then we have this two-fold consideration about God, but we learn that these two are really the same in God, though not the same in our knowledge, huh? and something we've brought out here that's not brought out elsewhere. Now, having distinguished between the consideration we've made in the, what is it, questions three through 11, before this interruption about the method and so on, now to gain the consideration of the operation, what is the first distinction that he makes? Distinction of operations? Yeah. And this is a distinction which Aristotle made in the ninth book of Wisdom, and other places, that beginning of the ethics, you know. And it's between the operation or the doing that remains in the doer, right? Like by seeing you, right? Where the seeing remains within me. Or my understanding, the triangle, which activity remains within me, right? And even my loving geometry or something, right? The love remains within me, right? I might do something for someone because I love them, but my loving remains within me, right? And then there's the other kind of doing that is sometimes called transitive because it's what? It's an outside thing, right? And so Thomas is going to, what? First see that distinction, huh? And because there's an operation which manet, huh? Remains in the one doing, huh? And another one which proceeds to some, what? Outside effect. First we're going to treat of, what? The divine knowledge and the will. And he points out that these are the first kind of operation. For to understand is in the one understanding and to will is in the one, what? Willing. And afterwards, right? We'll consider about the power of God which is considered as the beginning of the divine operation proceeding to an outside or exterior effect. Now, in the Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas considers both of those, right? Both of those operations. But in the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles he considers the understanding and the ruling of God and it's not until the second book that he considers the second kind of operation. And at the beginning of the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles he recalls this distinction between the two operations. And he has a proper quote from scripture and so on that touches upon those two operations in God. And how a complete knowledge of something requires one to, what? See both, right? Okay. But it's kind of striking how far they're separated, huh? In the first book and in the second book. And part of the reason is that in the Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas is much more explicitly, right? Dividing theology into three. The consideration of God in himself and in the consideration of God as the beginning of all things and the Alpha and the Omega, right? And then in the third book is being the, what? End of all things, huh? So, in the first book which is about God in himself he considers only God's understanding and willing. In the second book which is about God as the beginning of all things the maker of all things and so on he considers the operations of creation and so on and actually in the third volume, right? After he shows in God as the end of all things and develops that for a while then he talks about the divine providence and so on, right? But in the Summa Summa Teologii all these are going to be, what? Thrown together here, right? So there's a little difference in the place where things are considered, huh? Okay? And I notice here, you know it comes it only shows up here so much but you'll see later on when he gets through talking about these things the divine operations and so on he'll talk about the what? Divine blessedness and so on and the divine blessedness the divine happiness is talked about in the first volume of the Summa Conscientilis doesn't need us for his happiness, right? And you can see that, right? And but here these things are all come together in this consideration here, right? And to some extent you can say underlying the Summa theologiae is that distinction of the three ways of considering God but it's not as clearly demarcated because in the second part of the Summa he goes in this great detail of what moral theology, right? Which he doesn't do in such detail in the Summa Contra Gentiles. But it's quite a difference there in the order of the two. Of course, a lot of times in Scripture you find this note, the Lord is God, he made us as we are, his people, the flock, he tends. That threefold division underlies the whole theology and it's more clearly and precisely followed in the Summa Contra Gentiles than the Summa Theologiae. Partly because, as I say, the size and the huge expansion here of moral theology in the second part. Okay. Now he comes back to what? The subdivision, you might say, of the first kind of operation. He actually doesn't give the fundamental division here. although he's touched upon it, right? But it's going to be between the understanding and the, what? Willing, right? And with the understanding of God, there will be a number of things connected, we'll see, with it. And when he starts to take up the will, there will be a number of things attached to that consideration of the willing of God. He doesn't make that division explicitly, but it's kind of implied here, right? But he goes directly back to the first kind of operation and without making explicit the distinction between understanding and willing, he goes right to, what, the subdivision here of understanding, right? Do you follow that? To declare, as one thing you do, I would say. Okay. Notice the way he divides it. because to understand is a certain to live, as Aristotle himself says in the third book on the soul. After the consideration of the divine knowledge, there will be a consideration of the divine, what? Life, huh? And that's going to be before he takes up the will. That's question 18, as the great edition tells you here. And then the consideration of the divine understanding, he goes on, and because knowledge is of what is true, we will also consider about truth and, what, falsity, right? And that would be in 16 and, what, 17. 16 is on truth and 17 on falsity, huh? And you see, obviously, a connection between that and knowledge, right? Yeah. Is that true that Shin seared or Roar mist? Can't you know it's false? In a way, yes. In a way, no. I mean, I can know that man is a two-legged animal, right? I can know that because it's true. Can I know that man is a three-legged animal? Can you know that? Maybe I could think that. Maybe somebody could think that. I don't know who would be able to think this, but could he know it? No. You only know what is true. No. You could say that I could know that man is a three-legged animal and that was false. But then I'm not, strictly speaking, knowing that man is a three-legged animal, don't I? Can't know the false. You're knowing that it's true that that statement is false. Yeah. So I can only know the true. Right? It's very subtle, huh? What he's saying there. The less is going to have a consideration of falsehood, right? He's got to know some things about falsity, huh? Then the first part, huh? Further, because everything known is in the knower, right? We've talked about that before, huh? And it was what Pedocles who first talked about this. Although he kind of misunderstood exactly the way that the known is in the knower, huh? But the reasons of things according as they are in God knowing are called ideas. And this goes back to what? Augustine, who's influenced by Plato, right? Because Plato first talked about the forms, right? In Greek, which is the word idos, huh? But it kind of gets lost in translation because the word idea doesn't mean the idea. He'd be better translated into English as the forms. Okay? And as Thomas says in many places, Plato made a big impression upon Augustine and he tries to use Augustine so far as he can where he's compatible with the faith, huh? So he doesn't think Augustine of the idea, the forms, as outside of the divine mind, right? But in some way in the divine mind we'll have to see how that's possible. So he's trying to say something like Plato said, huh? Okay? Plato spoke, you know, of the demi-ergos, huh? Fashioning the universe after these forms, huh? But the forms are outside the universe and outside the demi-ergos, the maker. By the forms whereby God or according to which God makes things are not outside of him but in him, right? So that's going to be the 15th question, right? About the ideas. But Augustine got us into that kind of language, right? So Thomas has got enough respect for Augustine that he will talk about that, huh? Okay, now we come finally to the distinction of the, what, articles in the 14th question on the scientia, the knowledge of God, huh? And there are 16 things to be asked here, huh? Now you wouldn't do this in the sentences, huh? This would be probably several questions and so on. So here, they're just kind of all stretched out, 16 of them. I noticed that when I was studying prayer, you know, I mean, the question on prayer in the second part of the Summa, it's got 16 articles too, I think it's the same number here. But in the other work, they're dividing them, like, to whom should you pray, for what should you pray, who should pray, you know, how, you know, you'll subdivide them, huh? Yeah. So here we have to kind of figure out what the distinction and order of these things are. And of course, the first question is whether there's knowledge in God, right? Or sciencia in God, signs in God. And the second article is about what God primarily understands, whether God understands himself. And the third article, whether he comprehends himself, right? Whether God understands himself as much as he's understandable. Because we saw before that even in the British vision, we don't understand God as much as he's, what? Understandable, right? Huh? And we never love God as much as he's, what? Lovable, right? Like I mentioned before, how in St. Francis de Sales, right? You know, kind of goes up, you know, from the lowest of us knowing and praising God, you know, up to the angels and so on, right? And finally, you know, and that you become thankful to someone who knows God eventually as much as he's knowable, right? And who, the more you know God, the more you should love him, right? But you realize that you never love him as much as he's lovable, right? And, uh, uh, you want someone to appreciate him more than you could appreciate him, right? And nobody could appreciate God fully and love him as much as he's lovable as God himself, huh? Okay? So, the same way with understanding here, right? Okay? So whether God comprehends himself, right, huh? He knows himself as much as he's knowable, huh? Now, none of this, up to this point, is telling us that this understanding that God has, right, um, and this understanding of himself, and this understanding of himself as much as he's understandable, that this isn't something other than his substance, right? Okay? So, in the fourth article that we find out, huh? Whether his very act of understanding himself and comprehending himself is something other than or the same thing as his very, what? Substance, Okay? Now, you see the order there between the first three articles and the fourth.