Prima Pars
Lecture 61: Suffering, Undergoing, and Divine Understanding

Transcript
================================================================================

Perhaps the next meaning of suffering is being acted upon in a way that changes you, but not necessarily for the, what, words, right? So I had a piece of clay here in the shape of a sphere, and I molded it into a cube, right? Well, it's undergoing another shape now, but it's not really contrary to its nature, right? But it's losing the shape it had, right? And then maybe it's carried over and applied to the, what, the senses, which are acted upon by their objects, and as a result of that, they're actually being perfected, then. So the result of your shape acted upon my eye is that I see your shape, right? And now you're receiving the form of another while keeping the shape you already have. So you're dropping out more and more of this meaning, right? But it's still taking place in the body, the eye, the brain, and so on, right? And then finally it's carried over to what? The reason, huh? And there you even drop the idea of the body being involved in. And then you're being acted upon, right? In a way that, what, perfects you on. So when my reason sees the nature of a triangle, I understand what a triangle is, right? When I see the nature of a dog or a cat, I understand, to some extent, what a dog or a cat is, huh? So there comes something very, what, perfect, right, huh? So it moves a long way, right? But the English word for apostille, suffering, seems to be stuck on the first meaning, huh? I remember this one professor saying, you know, comes into class and he's lecturing and so on, and the expression on the students' face is, you know, why are you doing this to me? So they seem to be suffering that first sentence, right? I'm trying to find a word that to some extent is more movable in English, right, or in a more mood. So I take sometimes the word, what, undergoing, right? Perhaps the word undergoing has something of the sense of suffering, huh? Because if we say about somebody that he's undergone a lot, what do you understand by that? Yeah, he's suffered a lot, right? See, okay. But perhaps the word undergoing can be moved more in English, huh, than the word suffering, huh? And so undergoing is being acted upon, right? And it's being acted upon necessarily suffering, see? Because my sentences are acted upon by objects, right? And it's somewhat material, so that, you know, if you shine a light in my face too long, I can kind of go blind, right? Or if the sound is too loud, you can go deaf and so on, right? But there's a kind of undergoing there that is a perfecting of the senses. And you see and hear as a result of being, what, acted upon, right? So I listen to Mozart, and now my ear is being perfected, right? I look at the beautiful painting and so on, and my eye is being perfected, right? And then finally you can speak of the reason as what? Undergoing, right? Being acted upon by the images and by the act of understanding them. And then it's a perfect thing, right? Now, Thomas is going to point out some more things here. To the second, it should be said that to be moved and to undergo are taken equivocally according as to understand is said to be ascertained, to be moved or undergoing, huh? As is said in the third book about the soul. But to understand is not the motion in its first sense, which is the act of the imperfect, huh? So when Aristotle defines motion there in the third book of natural hearing, the so-called physics, he says it's the act of what is able to be, insofar as it's able to be, right? It's incomplete. Which is from one thing into another. But to understand is an act of the perfect existing in the one, what, acting, huh? Now, we talked about that a bit, that distinction in the ninth book of wisdom here, if you recall a bit of that, huh? When I'm walking home, have I walked home yet? And when I'm building a house, have I built a house? And my wife's making a cake, has she made a cake? Is she making an apple pie, she made an apple pie? So it's essentially an imperfect or incomplete act. And when I have walked home, am I walking home anymore? When I have made a house, am I making a house? So, so long as I'm making a house, there's something incomplete and imperfect about this act, huh? But, when I'm understanding what a triangle is, have I understood what a triangle is yet? Yeah. And the same thing about love, huh? When I'm loving somebody, have I loved them yet? Huh? Yeah. Now, that's the difference there, right? When I'm loving someone, I have loved them, right? When I understand something, I've understood it. But when I'm walking home, I haven't walked home. You see? So, he called both of these emotions. They're emotions in a different sense, right? So, he says, To understand is not the motion which is the act of the imperfect, huh? But it's the act of the perfect existing and the one, what? Acting, huh? That's the distinction that Aristotle makes in the ninth book of Wisdom, huh? It's amazing what he does, huh? Likewise, also, that the intellect be perfected by the understandable, or that it be, what? Made like it, huh? This belongs to the understanding, to that understanding which sometime is an ability, right? Which is not true of the divine, what, understanding, huh? Because from this fact that it is an ability, it, what, differs from the understandable. And it becomes like it through the understandable form, which is a likeness of the thing understood, huh? Okay? Just like my eye is not like the shape of you, right? Until it, what, receives the shape of you, right? Okay? And then it sees your shape, right? Okay? But when it's an ability to receive in the shape of you, it's not yet like you, huh? Okay? And it's perfected by it, as ability is perfected by act. But the divine understanding, which in no way is an ability, right, is not perfected by something understandable, nor is it made like it. But he is his own perfection and his own, what? Understandable. So in God, what is understood, and what understands, and that by which he understands, they're all one and the same. In us, they're all different, right? Okay? If I understand the triangle, the triangle is not my understanding. And that by which he understands the triangle is not my understanding either, huh? I don't really kind of multiply, huh? You know? Okay. But in God, they're all one and the same. Because he's a pure act. Quite something, this guy's understanding, huh? Now, Aristotle points out that our understanding knows itself only insofar as it knows other things, right? And, of course, you're going to separate, see, the distinction there between us and God. To the third, it should be said that natural being is not of the first matter, which is only an ability, except according as it is reduced in act to some form. But our understanding, possible understanding now as opposed to the act of understanding, has itself in the order of understandables as the first matter in the order of what? Actual things. That's a beautiful proportion, right? This is the one that there was, I think, even before Thomas saw this, huh? Okay? Now, you remember this, this is about the first matter, right? Okay? If you consider the first matter by itself, Now, it's pure, well, ability, right? Okay, so the first matter, which we talked about in the first book of nature, if you call it, the first matter, considered by itself, is pure ability. And that's why Aristotle said that the first matter is not knowable, but by itself. And he made it known there by proportion, right? Okay, you can say that the first matter is to any material things you want to take. Let's just take man and dog. Something like a piece of clay is two-way what? Sphere and cube. Let's take a simple example, right? Okay. Now, what do you call that? And I just put there on that. What do you call this here? Proportion. Yeah, you could have called it proportion, right? Okay. And what is a proportion? Yeah, it's a likeness of ratios, right? And what is a ratio? What's the order or relation of one thing to another, right? So saying the first matter is to man and dog, or man and tree, if you want to take that. Something like clay is to sear and cube, huh? Now, you've got to be careful with a proportion, right? Because a proportion, we say, has a likeness of ratios, but it's a kind of distant likeness. So you don't want to make them more alike than they are, right? Okay. And you've seen my simple example that I give, you know, going back to the most exact proportion we have in that, right? And try to illustrate the point, and say, four is to six as two is to, what, three. Okay. Is that correct? Okay. But now I'm going to misunderstand this proportion here. You'll study the danger here, right? Two is to three is the ratio of an even number to an odd number, right? Therefore, four to six is the ratio of an even number to an odd number, right? Well, what's wrong with that? Isn't two an even number and three an odd number? And therefore, is it not the ratio of an even number to an odd number? And isn't four to six like two to three? Therefore, four to six must be the ratio of an even number to an odd number. Well, four is an even number, and therefore six must be an odd number. What's wrong with me? What have I done? I've done something wrong here. What have I done? Is that the way in which four to six is like two to three? In being a ratio of an even number to an odd number? Okay. So I fail to understand this proportion, haven't I? Now I'm going to make a second attempt, right? Two is a prime number, right? And three is a prime number, right? Therefore, two to three is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number. But four is to six as two is to three, right? Therefore, the ratio of four to six is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number. Four prime number? Well, it's measured by the number, too. And six is measured by both two and three, right? What have I done wrong here? I misunderstood the proportion, right? I misunderstood the likeness between these two, right? Because there's more than one ratio, one thing in which you can relate to. Yeah, yeah. And what way is the ratio of four to six like two to three? If there's a really understanding proportion, you've got to see in what way the ratios really are like. What way is four to six really like two to three? I showed you two ways of misunderstanding, in what way they're like. Because in those two ways, they're unlike. So I just understood the proportion in that respect, right? What way is four to six as two is three? Is it double, double? Well, Euclid would say four is the same parts of six as two is a three, right? Two to three parts of three. Yeah. So if you kind of imagine six as being, what, three twos and four as being two twos, right? Well, then four is two of the parts of six, just as two is two of the three parts of three, right? Okay? So it'll take me there, right? Okay? But that's what the light actually consists. So now when I say the first matters to man and dog is clay is the sphere and cube. So you might say, well, clay is an actual substance, and sphere and cube are two, what, accidents. Because shape, as you know, is the fourth species of quality, right? So man and dog are two accidents. No. Man and dog are two actual substances, right? They're not two accidents, right? And is the first pattern an actual substance? No. Well, it's substance only to do it, right? So I haven't seen the likeness here, huh? Well, again, I misunderstood the likeness here, right? The first matter is to man and dog, like clay is to sphere and cube. Not in that the first matter is a substance, the two accidents, right? As clay is a substance of two accidental forms, right? Well, what does the likeness consist, right? Well, it consists in this, that just as the clay is able to be a sphere or a cube, but not both at the same time, right? And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other, but in order to become the other, it would cease to be the one it is. So the first matter is able to be a man or a dog, right, huh? But not at the same time. And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other, but if it became the other, it ceased to be this one, right? So if the dog ate the man or something, right, the first matter would become a dog, but then it would no longer be a man, right? So that's where likeness consists, right? So the first matter is not really knowable by itself, because it's only an ability. So you have to know it by disproportionate. Well, what is our understanding in the order of understandables? It's like the first matter. It's understandable only an ability. And it has to become actual by reason of something that it, what, receives and becomes actually understandable through receiving, what, the natures of other things at first. It's like the first matter has existence through receiving, what, some kind of form. Makes it to be actually a man or a dog or a tree or a stone or something else. So this is the great likeness now that Angevara was first pointing out, if not before him, but at least he did, right? So that in the order of understandings, our understanding is like what first matter, right? It's like pure potency. That's where we're at the bottom of all understandings, right? And the divine understanding is at the other extreme, pure act, then, and the angels in between, partly in ability, partly in act. So he says, to the third it should be said that natural being is not of the first matter, which is in ability, except according as is reduced in act to some form, right? And that form is something other than itself, right? Now, our understanding, our possible understanding, has itself in the order of understandable things as first matter in the order of natural things. There's the proportion, right? In that it is in potency to understandable things, just as the first matter to natural things like man and dog and tree. Hence, our understanding, our possible understanding, is not able to have an understandable operation, except insofar as it is perfected by the, what, understandable form of something else. And thus it understands itself through an understandable form, just as it understands other things. And thus, our understanding of what we're doing, right? And thus, our understanding of what we're doing, right? And thus, our understanding of what we're doing, right? For it is manifest that from the fact that it understands the understandable, it understands its own, what, act of understanding, and through the act it knows the understanding power. That's the thing that Aristotle points out, that in knowing, in general, the powers of the soul, right? You know the powers of the soul through their acts, and the acts through their, what, object, right? Okay? So, you know the difference really between the sense as a sense of sight, let's say the sense of, what, hearing, by the difference between seeing and hearing. And seeing and hearing are both sensing, but one is sensing color and the other is sensing sound. So through the difference between color and sound, you know the difference between sensing color and sensing sound, and then the difference between the ability to see and the ability to hear, right? In the same way the understanding knows itself, right? For it is manifest that from the fact that it knows the understandable, it understands its own, what, understanding. And through the act, it knows the understanding power, right? And notice, it's something like that in ethics, when you know the, what, virtues, huh? You know the virtues through their, what, acts, and the acts through their, what, object, right? Right? Okay? So chastity and sobriety are different virtues, right? But how do you know these two virtues? Yeah. And both acts, there's a kind of moderation there, right? What's the difference between the acts of these two? You've got to go back to the object. The one object is a middle woman, and the other object is wine or beer or something, right? The alcoholic beverage or something of that sort, right? Right? Okay? So, the difference in the objects helps you to know the difference in the acts, and the difference in the acts, the difference in the, what, in the virtues. Yeah. Oh, virtues. Yeah. So, it's similar to what you have here, huh? Where you know the difference in the powers, the difference in the act, right? Is the ability to walk and the ability to talk the same ability? How do you know they're not the same ability? Is the ability to talk and walk the same ability? Suppose I maintain the act. Well, you can walk without talking. Yeah. Yeah. So, I mean, you have to see the difference between walking and talking, right? And see that walking is not a kind of talking, and talking is not a kind of, what, walking. So, once you see that those two acts are different, and one is not a particular kind of the other, then you realize the ability must be different, right? Okay? So, this is the way understanding works, huh? But God is, what, just the exact opposite. God is as pure act, both in the order of, what, yeah, natural existence, as well as in the order of understandables, huh? And, therefore, he understands himself through himself. Wow. That's the way to go, huh? That's not the way for us to go, right? Again, he's distinguishing, huh? Between the way in which we know ourselves and the way God knows himself, right? God knows himself through himself, right? We know ourselves through knowing other things first. See, that's why the baby refers to himself or herself in the third person sometimes. The baby does this, he does that. Kind of funny. I guess I have to kind of stop now here. Yeah. Okay. Okay. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds. Order and illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise God. And help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Let's interrupt Article 3 now, right? And we know that God knows himself, but now does he comprehend himself? Does he know himself as much as he's knowable? The third one proceeds thus. It seems that God does not comprehend himself. For Augustine says in the book on the 83 questions, that that which comprehends itself is finite or limited to itself. But God is in all ways, what? Infinite, as we saw, that was the third attribute of the substance. Therefore, he does not, what? Comprehend himself. And the second one. If it be said that God is infinite to us, but to himself finite, against this, that is more true which each thing is before God, than according as it is before us. If, therefore, God is finite or limited to himself, but unlimited to us, more truly God is limited than unlimited, which is against what has been determined before, the third attribute of the divine substance. Therefore, God doesn't comprehend himself. So, you're all convinced, huh? He doesn't comprehend himself. Okay. Against this is what Augustine says there, that everything that understands itself, comprehends itself. But God understands himself, therefore he, what? Comprehends himself. Now, we have two words we use there in philosophy sometimes, for the first act of reason. One is intelligere, to understand what a thing is. And the other is to, a simple grasping, to grasp what something is. So, the word comprehend has, etymologically, something of the idea of grasping, right? And therefore, it might imply that something's got to be finite to get around, you know, for you to comprehend it or grasp it. Now, Thomas is going to reply. I answer, it should be said that God perfectly comprehends himself, huh? Which can be made clear in this way. For then something is said to be comprehended, in the strict sense, when one comes to the end of the knowledge of it. And this is when a thing is known as perfectly as it is, what? Knowable. So, it's known as much as it's, what? Knowable, right? Okay? And then this example that Thomas often uses, huh? It's important when they talk about the, the atomic vision, right? You know, that some people see God more perfectly than other people. But everybody sees the whole of God. You know, if I see God less perfectly than you do, it's not because you see some part of God I don't see. In fact, God doesn't have parts anyway. But Thomas often uses this example here, right? That the man who knows the conclusion by the demonstration knows the whole conclusion. And the man who accepts the demonstration through some probable reason, like Euclid says this or something, right? He knows the whole conclusion too. But he doesn't know it wholly or perfectly. Because he doesn't know why it's so. So, just as a demonstrable statement is comprehended when it is known by, what? Demonstration. Not, however, when it is known through some probable reason. So you might know the whole conclusion, but not know it as much as it's knowable. Not as fully knowable. Now, it is manifest, however, that God thus perfectly knows himself just as he is perfectly knowable. Now he's going to manifest those two things and how they go together, right? For something is knowable according to the, what? Way of its act, huh? This is something our style brings out and we saw it a bit in the ninth book of wisdom, right? Something is knowable insofar as it's an act, huh? So when you see a building going up and you say, what's that going to be? But the more it's, what? Completed, right? The more knowable it is, right? If somebody's painting something, what's he painting, you know? But the more actual it becomes, the, what? The more knowable it becomes, huh? Of course, you learn in the ninth book there, wisdom, that ability is not knowable except through the act for which it is an ability. So how do you know that I have the ability to talk? Because you're talking. Through my actually talking, yeah. Okay? And the ability to walk through my walking, right? So ability is knowable only through act, huh? But act is knowable to itself. So as you recall in what Aristotle teaches there in the ninth book of wisdom, that something is knowable to the extent it is an act. But we saw back in the question on the simplicity of God, that God is what? Pure act, right? And that goes back again to the teaching in the ninth book of wisdom, that although the thing that goes through ability to act is an ability before it's an act, it goes through ability to act because of something already in act. So that simply speaking, act is before what? Yeah. And so the very beginning of all things is going to be just an act and in no way in the surpassability. It'll be pure act, right? So if something is knowable to the extent it is an act and God is pure act, then God is, what, completely knowable. But not to us. For it's manifest that God, well, let's go on to where the extent it said, for each thing is knowable according to the way of its own act. For something is not known according as it is an ability, but according as it is an act, as is said and explained in the ninth book of the metaphysics, the ninth book of wisdom. So on the side of God's knowability, it couldn't be more knowable than God is, right? But now it goes to the other side of the equation, you might say. And why does God know himself as much as he's knowable? Well, so much is the power of God in knowing as his actuality in what? Existing. Because, as we saw in the previous articles, the first article, in fact, because through this fact that he is an act and separated from all matter and all, what? Potency in the passive sense. God is a knower, right? So being pure act, he's also, what? Most of all, knower. Okay. Whence is manifest that so much he knows himself or he knows himself as much as he is knowable, we probably say in English. So he argues from God being pure act both that he's, what? The most knowable thing and that he knows the most, right? And therefore he knows himself as much as he is, what? Knowable, right? Of course, as Aristotle says, the knower in act and the knowable in act are the same, right? So God is most of all an act, right? Both as knowable and as knower. So he knows himself as much as he's knowable. Therefore he comprehends himself, right? So notice what we've seen so far in the three articles, right? The first article reasoned out that God, what? Knows or understands, right? And the second article says that what he chiefly knows is what? God himself, right? We'll find out better on whether he knows anything else. We don't know him yet. Ed? And now, this third article was, how much does he know himself, or how well does he know himself, right? And he knows himself perfectly. He knows himself as much as he's, what? Knowable, right? Now, Thomas, coming back to that first meaning of comprehend, right? And the first objection there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that to comprehend, if it be taken properly or strictly, signify something having, right? Another, and including it, surrounding it, so to speak. And thus it's necessary that everything comprehended or grasped be limited, just as everything included, surrounded. You can't surround the infinite. Now, not in this way is God said to be, what? Comprehended by himself. In the sense that his intellect is something, what? Other than himself, right? And that it, what? Grasps itself and, yeah, surrounds itself, huh? But then how are you supposed to understand these things, right? Well, these ways of speaking should be expounded by, what? Negation, right? For just as God is said to be in himself, right? Now, notice, grammatically, you're saying God is in himself. Grammatically, it's what? Affirmative, right? But how should it be understood? Yeah. Okay? And something like that, you know, sometimes when people distinguish between substance and accident, right? They'll say accident is a thing that exists only in another, it's a subject, right? But substance, I'll say sometimes, exists in itself. Well, should that be understood affirmatively? Can something be in itself? Not strictly speaking, no. So it's a affirmative way, in a way, of saying something, what? Negative, right? And we need to say substance exists in itself, means that substance exists not in another, right? Okay? So Thomas, you know, explains substance very formally. He'll say in Latin, res, a thing, cui, to which, conveniat, belongs, esse, to be, non in aglio, not in another. Okay? So you've got to be careful there, right? You know, some of these words that have got like infinite or unchangeable, immobile, grammatically the word is negative, right? But a word like, say, simple, simple is what? Grammatically affirmative. When you go through the question on the simplicity of God, what you're shown is that God is not composed in this way, not composed in that way, and all the ways that his composition is in preachers, and then universities not composed in any way, but it's said with a firm to me. God is what? Simple, right, huh? Okay? So, so thus God is said to be in himself because he is not contained by anything, what? Yeah. So, he is said to be comprehended by himself because there's nothing of himself that is hidden from him. For Augustine says in the book about seeing God, huh? He's got so many books, Augustine, huh? Where do you find all the time, you know? That whole is comprehended in seeing, that is seen in this way, that nothing of it is hidden from the one, what? Seeing, right? Okay? Now, the second objection that God is in a way, what? Finite to himself, we sometimes say that, right? Well, this is misunderstanding the likeness and ratios here. The second, it should be said that when God is said to be finite or limited to himself, this should be understood according to a certain likeness of, what? Proportion. Because, thus he has himself and not, what? Exceeding his understanding, right? Just as something finite and not exceeding a, what? Finite light. Not, however, should it be understood that God is limited to himself and he understands himself to be limited. Okay? What you're saying, in a sense, is that just as a limited thing is to a limited mind, right? So an unlimited thing is to a, what? Unlimited mind, right? Okay? But you shouldn't exaggerate that, what? The likeness of those two, right? It doesn't mean that the unlimited is limited. To be speaking, no, it's unlimited. But the unlimited is to the limited. Like the limited is to limited. Okay? So now we know that God comprehends himself, right? Okay. Now before he goes on to talk about whether God knows anything other than himself and into the problems of his knowing certain things in particular, he's got this, what? Different article, right? This is a very important thing for understanding God and for understanding that are on the Trinity, right? Why isn't my definition of reason or Shakespeare's definition of reason, reason itself, right? The word of God is God himself. Don't get into Trinity yet here. We'll leave those difficulties to get to the Titus on the thing. It's going to depend upon seeing this, huh? Upon seeing that the active understanding of God is the same thing as a substance, right? And the same thing would be true for that matter about the act of the will. To the fourth, thus, one proceeds. It seems that the understanding of God is not his very, what? Substance, right? For to understand is a certain operation. But an operation signifies something going forth from the one doing it, huh? Operating. Therefore, the understanding of God is not the very, what? Substance of God, huh? That's a nice objection, huh? Now, the next two objections, you know, are more based upon thinking about our own, knowing our own thinking, huh? Moreover, when someone understands himself to understand, this is not to understand something great or something chiefly understood, huh? But it's to understand something secondary and accessory. So, you know, when I understand something important, that's important. But when I understand that I understand something important, is that so important? As Thomas says, it pertains to the perfection of my mind to understand God, even to understand what the soul is, right? But to understand that you understand it, doesn't mean it pertains to the perfection of my mind. It's no big deal, right? If, therefore, God is, what? He's very understanding, right? To understand God would be just like when you understand, what? To understand, right? So he's kind of thinking of what it is for us to understand our own understanding, right? And if God is just his own understanding, well, then what's the big deal? And, therefore, it would not be something great to understand God, right, huh? You know? If you understand what a triangle is, right? And then you understand what it is to understand, right? Is that all it is to understand God? Is that all it is to understand? That's all he is? And Aristotle talks about this, the kind of translated kind of funny in English text, you know. God is a thought thinking itself. God is a thought thinking itself. Okay, now the third objection. Morver, every understanding is an understanding of something, right? Every to understand is to understand something, right? When therefore God understands himself, if he himself is not other than his own understanding, he understands himself to understand, and he understands himself to understand himself, and so on forever. Therefore, the understanding of God is not his substance, right? So notice, in me, these are all different things. I understand what a triangle is, and I understand what it is to understand a triangle, and I understand that I understand what it is to understand a triangle, and you can go on forever, right? Aristotle talks about that in the third book about the natural here, the physics. There's one reason why we speak of the infinite existing, right? Because there's a kind of infinity there, okay? Or you can do it like this. You can say, Socrates is Socrates, and the statement Socrates is Socrates is the statement Socrates is Socrates. And the whole statement is itself, and you can go on multiplying Socrates forever, right? Okay? In that sense, there's infinite things. That's true, right? But against this is what Augustine says in the seventh book about the Trinity. That in God it's the same thing, right? To be, and to be what? Wise, huh? But to be wise is to understand, you know? Therefore, for God to be is for God to understand. But the to be of God is a substance, as has been shown in the previous treatise on the substance of God. Did that in the treatise on the, what? Simplicity of God, right? Found out that, yes, I am who I am. Therefore, to understand of God is his very, what? Substance, huh? Now, how's Thomas going to answer this, huh? Well, he's going to go back again to God being pure act, right? I answer you, it should be said that it is necessary to say that the understanding of God, to understand of God, is his, what? Substance, huh? That would be interesting, huh? You know? For you to be is for you to understand. I don't know. I'm trying to fall. We currently exist. Some of us get off of Descartes. I think, therefore, I am, you know. And if I stop thinking now, I'll be what else used to be. For if the to understand of God is other than his, what? Substance, huh? Then, as a philosopher says in the 12th book of Wisdom, huh? 12th book of Metaphysics. 12th book after the books of natural philosophy. It's in the second half of the 12th book that Aristotle takes up, what? God, huh? Okay? And there he'll show these things, huh? That God and his, what? Act of understanding are the same thing. For if he to understand of God was something other than his very substance, it would be necessary, as the philosopher had already said in the 12th book of Wisdom, that something other than the divine substance would be the act, and therefore the perfection of the divine substance, right? Because the divine substance would be to that act of understanding, his ability is to act. To which the divine substance would be as ability is to act, which is altogether impossible, because God is in no way, what? In potency. He's pure act. For to understand is the perfection and the act of the one understanding. So that would be the divine substance be pure act, if it was an ability to the act of understanding. Well, it would be an ability to the act of understanding if that was something other than the divine substance itself. And therefore the divine substance itself would not be pure, what? Act. You see, I always emphasize the 9th book of Wisdom when I taught metaphysics, because that's the book on act and ability, right? And it seemed to me the most important book for coming to know the first cause, most of all, right? I mean, all the books are important, but that book had a particular importance, if we're knowing something about the divine substance, its simplicity, he argues, and now the operation of God is the same, huh? But it's interesting to all these articles, really, huh? He tried to show that he comprehends himself, but when he tried to show that he knows, right? That pure act is very important. Okay, now he's going to go on a little bit about, after showing kind of that it's so, a little bit about how this is so, right, huh? But this qualitation, how it is, so to speak, should be considered, huh? For, as has been said above, huh, to understand is not an action going forth to something extrinsic, huh? Aristotle had made that distinction between an operation or a doing that remains in the doer, right? Like understanding and loving and even, what, sensing, right? An activity that goes out to something else, like kicking or shoving or heating something or knocking it or whatever. So as has been said above, to understand is not an action proceeding to something outside, but it remains in the one doing, as the act and perfection of it, right? Okay, now he's going to be giving a kind of proportion here, right? For just as to be is the perfection of the one existing, right, huh? Okay. And just as to be follows upon form, right? So to understand follows upon the understandable form, huh? Okay. That's what he's saying there, right, huh? You know, it's something like this, huh? You can say, when does the wood become a chair, huh? It's a boy or a one. Yeah, yeah. So through its form, the wood is a chair, right, huh? It has to be a chair, right? But something like that is knowing, huh? Starting from our own knowing, huh? Because I have to receive the form of something outside of me, as a form of something outside of me, not my own form, before I know it, right? So I have to receive the shape of the chair, let's say, or the shape of you, color of you, color of this chair, before I know that, right? So the sensible form is to sensing, like the natural form, or the form in matter, is to the being of the material thing, right? Okay? So proportionally, it's like that in God, right? But now, in God, going back to the substance of God, is there any real distinction between the form of God and the existence of God? And we saw that his very form, his very substance, his very nature, was his existence, right? Well, then it would be the same thing in regard to his knowing, right? Okay? So you've got to kind of develop that likeness between the two, huh? Secret in a message, just as to be, follows upon form, right? So to understand, follows upon the, what? Understandable form, huh? Okay? Speechion has a sense of what? Form. Form that you see, no? Shape of a thing. Okay? But in God, the form is not other than is, what? To be, right? Whence, since his essence, right, is also the understandable form. Now, the understandable form, or the form by which God understands, you can speak that way, is his very what? Substance, huh? Okay? Well, if the understandable form is the same as his essence, then his what? His to understand is the same as his to be. And his to be is the same as his nature, therefore his to understand is the same as his what? Substance, huh? You see that? Okay? So he's saying that the form or the substance of God is to his to be like the what? Understandable form is to understand, right? But there's no distinction between the substance of God and the being of God, as we learned in that question on the simplicity of God. And there's no distinction between the substance of God and the what? Yeah. So there's no distinction, then, between his to understand and the understanding of the form. Or between the to understand and the to be. Okay? Interesting? Yeah. You know, I'll just put that in abstract terms. If A is to B and X is to Y, and A is X, then what? B is Y. Then B is Y, yeah. And these two are the same, and therefore these two are the same, right? But the to be of God is the same as the substance, therefore. Huh? Kind of. Cloud of the sky, huh? Townsend. Yeah. Yeah. It was kind of funny there. I was looking a little bit in the internet there, under Albert the Great. And they had one of Father Weisseipel's articles on Albert the Great. I guess there was a little flurry of interest in Albert back in the 1980, I guess, which is, I think he died around 1280, so there was the Centennial Summoning. Mm-hmm. And so anyway, he says very interesting things, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. But there's a little bit of humor there, too, because Hegel, I guess, has some things to say about being doing philosophy, but he has no comprehension of what it's already about. Yeah. Yeah, what he does mainly, I guess, what Weisseipel says is to give a few of these crazy anecdotes that have come down from the Middle Ages, you know, that Albert had all kinds of magical powers and stuff. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. And one that he tells is that Albert made some kind of a robot, you know, a robot today, and one moved around and spoke, and Thomas was supposed to have been so alarmed that he thought the devil was in the thing, and he hit the thing, you know? Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha a model to the story, you know, but I don't think it's true, you know, but these kind of stories, it's kind of the scholarship of Hegel about Robert the Great, you know, but Albert apparently was even no more famous than Thomas during his time, you know, so it's, you know, interesting things he wrote. Okay, so, to the first objection, that an operation proceeds from you, right, well, it kind of seems to imply that it's getting away from you, right, but to understand is an operation, is not an operation, Thomas says, going forth from the one doing it, right, but the one that remains in him, right, okay, that's very important to understand, huh, an operation that proceeds to something exterior could not result in what, a person who is God, right, okay, but a proceeding that remains within the one can be also God, huh, anyway, let's leave that to the trees in the Trinity, but you can see how you've got to understand, in a sense, the operations of God, and the operations of God are the same as a substance before you can understand, so far as you can, the, what, the Trinity, right, so that's in this order perfectly, right, sure, yeah, why in the, in the, in the, um, from a right thing, in the sentences of the long part, you're almost jumping into the Trinity at first without having really gone through the, uh, explicitly this all about the substance of God, and then all about the operation of God, and then finally Trinity, but it seems to me that's the order of what? Um, when Thomas calls in the beginning of the first part, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um Um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um, um Chris like that he had come up with an injection and, of course, I hadn't heard all these injections before, wasn't I?