Prima Pars
Lecture 62: God's Knowledge of Particular Things and the Universal/Particular Distinction

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And I'd solve them very simply, you know. He was a good student. He realized that I was solving them. And then he'd be like, look at this, you know. A year later he told me, you know, I was trying to catch you, but I never catch you. It wasn't so big. All these objections are in there already, you know. And you hear them coming back again, saying mistakes. And DeConnick used to teach even the first book of natural hearing, you know. And he'd, you know, explain what Aristotle and Thomas, the explanation of Aristotle. And then he'd stop and he'd make an excursion, you know, and bring in Brie Russell or somebody else. He's making the same kind of mistake that this other guy is making. And just like I was saying, you know, Thomas says in the Summa Contra Gentiles, a whole chapter to bring out that God is not the being said of all things. That when God is, we learn that God is I and who I am, right? That doesn't mean he's the being and the son of all things. He has a whole chapter, you know, just to that mistake, right? And this is what Hegel's system begins with, right? I can't find those two, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. But it doesn't even mention, you know, anybody might have thought that they might be different, let alone the reasons why they think they're different, let alone any refutation of the reasons or solution of them. Now he's quote Santayana, you know, the American philosopher taught at Harvard and early in the century and so on, but he says, today we no longer bother to refute our predecessors, we just wave them goodbye. It shows you how much, you know, the modern is a la mode, it's just a matter of fashion, right? Yeah, yeah. You don't, you don't, but... That's a contempt. It's not born a familiarity. Okay, now the second objection was saying, well, it's no big deal when we understand our understanding, right? Okay, to the second it should be said that when one understands that understanding that is not subsisting, right? It's not a substantial, right? One is not understanding something great, huh? So my understanding of the Theogren theorem, well, it's nice to understand it, but it's a big deal about understanding that I understand it. See? As when we understand our own understanding, right? And therefore is not similar about the divine understanding, which is a, what? Subsisting and substantial. And to this is clear the response to the third thing. For the divine, what? To understand, which is in itself subsisting, is of itself and not of something other. So if one has to proceed, what? In infinitum, right? See? But notice, huh? When I understand what a triangle is, can I, by that act of understanding what a triangle is, understand the fact that I understand what a triangle is? That has to be another one, right? Okay? And then if I understand, as I do, I think, that I understand what I understand what a triangle, then that's another act, right? You know? And it goes on. But no act can be really of itself, right? And even, you know, when you talk about logic is possible because reason can come back upon itself, right? And a kind of a sign of this is that there's not only a definition of triangle and a definition of circle and a definition of virtue and so on, but there's also even a definition of what? Definition. Yeah. Yeah. Say, okay. Well, now, is a definition a definition defining itself? See? And sometimes I like to use a Peter Piper or Pickle Pickle Piper's question I ask, you know, is a definition of definition a definition of a definition of definition? In words, I see. And I just like to just do this with the before, right? What sense of before does one sense of before come before another sense of before? Make life difficult. But, let's say, is the definition of definition? I think there's a thing that there is a definition of definition, right? Yeah. Not just a definition of a square and a circle, right? As you use in geometry, but in logic, in science or logic, you have the definition of definition, right? So is the definition of definition a definition, the definition of definition. What does it say? Because the definition of definition is defining what definition is in general, right? So the definition of definition would be something like speech signifying what a thing is, right? And that's no more talking about the definition of definition in particular than it is about the definition of what? Square. Triangle, square, symbol, right? Because that's also speech signifying what a thing is, right? So, you could say, in some way, right? Say, couldn't have quit. The definition of definition is of itself, right? Okay? That's a little bit like saying, you know, is the definition of animal a definition of man? I wouldn't say so simply, would you? Even though man is an animal, right? So, in saying what an animal is, I have in some way, in some imperfect way, said what a man is. But you wouldn't say simply that I said what a man is when I said what an animal is. Right? Okay? You have to say, in some imperfect way, I said what a man is. Right? Okay? In the same way here, you can say the definition of definition is telling us in some general way what the definition of definition is. But at the same time, it's telling us in general what the definition of circle is and the definition of square and the definition of tragedy is and so on, right? Do you see? Okay? Now, what distinction am I using there? I'm applying it to that, yeah. But it's a distinction and the distinction between what is so simply and what is not so simply, right? But in some imperfect way or some qualified way, right? Okay? Now, this distinction runs through the whole philosophy and the whole of what? Theology, right? And it corresponds to one of the 13 kinds of mistakes, right, that Aristotle distinguishes in the book on social reputations. It corresponds to the second kind of mistake outside of speech, right? The mistake from mixing up what is so simply and what is not so simply, right? Okay? I was just in the fourth book of the Summa Pandora Gentila my favorite book there and in the part now where he's got through with the Trinity and now he's talking about the Incarnation, right? And there's a chapter I have to look at this morning there where he's saying where the question is is Christ a creature? What would you say? Because of what that word signifies Christ. Back to the drawing board. You make a mistake. Mistake of mixing up what is so simply and what is so not so, you know? Because Christ refers now to the person, right? And the person is the word of God and the word of God is not a, what? Creature. The human nature of Christ is a creature, right? Okay? So you could qualify and say Christ as man is a creature, right? Yeah. But if you say simply without qualification and that this man even, right, is a creature, pointing to Christ, right? And this man refers to the person, then you're saying something false. Because this man, the person there, right, is the word of God. I was thinking of Christ as the anointed, the nature of the anointed. I think you could say that Christ, that name, is taken from his human nature, right? But he said something that's clearly taken from his human nature. This man, right? You're referring to meaning this person, this man. Is this man a creature? No, because this person is the second person of the Blessed Trinity, and this and that person is not a creature. So Thomas says, simply, Christ is not a creature. But in a qualified way, you can say so, right? And notice, that distinction comes up, you know, in the most universal things, when you talk about being, right? You know, the example I give you in class all the time, I'd say now, if you leave this room where you cease to be, what would you say? You cease to be in this room. You've got to qualify, right? You can't say simply, unless you die in this room. Or, you know, when I came in this room, did I come to be? See? Well, if you don't qualify, you see, it's simply without qualification. Then you say, I didn't come to be when I came into this room, right? You can say, in some way, someone prickly who I came to be, I came to be in this room, right? But I have to stay in this room. So, I mean, that thing stretches all the way through, what? Philosophy, right? And, you know, you'll find that distinction again and again in being, what, seen by Aristavo or Thomas, but overlooked by most other people, right? And the same right here, as I say. You know, sometimes when we say logic is possible because reason can think about its own act, right? But when reason thinks about its own thinking is the thinking whereby it's thinking about its thinking, the thinking it's thinking about. You see? You see? When I say, I understand what a triangle is, and then I understand my understanding what a triangle is. Well, that second understanding is an understanding of itself? No. Then I have to have a third understanding. Understanding that I understand what I'm doing. You see? That's very subtle. So, there's always some kind of distinction there, right? The same distinction used, I just recently looked up St. Thomas' question about Christ's descent into hell. And he says, is the whole Christ in hell? And he says, yes, because it refers to the person. He uses the same thing. It's even though part of his human nature, too, but the whole Christ is in hell. Yeah. Because of the human nature. So, that's the distinction in the Mino that the Mino overlooks, right? Because Socrates wants to investigate what neither of them knows, namely what is virtue, right? And Mino says, well, how can we direct our thinking to what we don't know? How can you aim at what you don't know, right? Yeah. And that's an objection. And that's an objection that's like Zeno's objections to motion, right? You know, you know, Zeno's objections are really saying that motion is impossible, right? Right. And if motion is impossible, then there wouldn't be any motion, and therefore it wouldn't be a natural philosophy, it wouldn't be any nature, right? So, if Zeno's objections are good, and they're to back up, you know, Permanides, he said there is no motion. But if his objections are good, you do away with the whole natural philosophy. And just like, you know, in ethics, if you had the proof that there's no free will, then you'd do away with the whole ethics. Well, likewise, if Mino's argument was good, that there's no, what, way to investigate what you don't know, you'd do away with the whole logic. You'd do away with logistique, too, in the Greek sense, huh? Because logique, logic and logistique are arts for coming to know what you don't know, to what you do know. They're arts that direct you to coming to know what you don't know. And somebody says, well, how can you aim at what you don't know? How can you do that? By using what you do know, there are certain things you do. Yeah, but even to do that, you see, you have to bring together what you do know, right, with a view to knowing what you don't know, right? So the end or goal is to know what you don't know. Unless you know in some way what you want to know, but don't know, you can't see what you have to bring together to know it. Okay, now, I take a simple example there, to bring the solution to this, huh? You say, if you wanted to measure this room, right, I know what to do from the area of this room. I'd what? Measure the length and the width and then what? Multiply the length by the width, huh? Now, before I multiply the length by the width, do I know the area? No. Now, do I know what I'm trying to know? Yes. But simply, no, you see? An example I used to use in class all the time, you know, I have a beer class in this, but maybe you'd have maybe 25, 30 students, and I'd say, you know, I don't know how many students I have in class today, honestly. I don't know how many students I have in class today. But I have to direct myself to what I don't know, the number students in class. I can know exactly the road to take, just a count in this case. And so then I count them and I end up with a number. Let's say I end up with 26. And how did I direct myself to 26 when I didn't know that I was trying to get to? How did I know exactly, in fact, in this simple example, the road to take, right, to get to 26 when I didn't know I was trying to get to 26? Some way. Yeah. Because 26 is, in fact, the number of students in class. And I didn't know that 26 is the number of students in class, right? But I knew I wanted to know the number of students in class. And so did I know 26 in some imperfect way? Yeah. It's a very general way, right? But knowing that I wanted to know the number of students in class was enough to tell me I had a count. When you try to, you know, give people this difficulty, at first you say to them, if I go into the gas station, I ask them, how do you get there? What do you want to say? Where? Yeah. Well, I don't know where I'm going to get, but how do you get there? It's always my time, buddy, right? You see? You've got to know where you're going before you can know how to get there, right? But the difficulty seems that the unknown, right? How can you know? Yeah, you're trying to direct yourself to what's unknown. Well, you're overlooking this distinction, right? That what is unknown simply can be known in some way. That's it? That's the solution of Christ, growing in knowledge, because he doesn't come to know like we do, which is to go from not knowing to knowing. He goes from knowing in one way to knowing in another way. Yeah, we're not sure, you know, Christ might have had some kind of sense knowledge, right? That would be new to him, right? Okay. And therefore some memory and so. But as Thomas, you know, gets older, I guess he attributes to Christ every kind of knowledge, you know, from the beatific vision to infused knowledge, you know, to the arts and the sciences and so on, right? And even experience and so on, right? So there can be a certain growth of certain kinds of knowing in Christ, maybe. Okay. So, I just cut off on this a little bit here, but, you know, the distinction you could say, this is kind of, let me say, how is the... Well, when Thomas explains in the Premium to Logic, he says reason invents the other arts by thinking about how to use your hands and your feet. And so, the carpenter and the tailor and so on, they use their hands, right? But then he points out that reason can think not only about the hands or the feet, but about its own act. Okay? And that's reflected in the fact that you have things like, what, a definition of definition, and statements about statements, right? But is a statement about statements a statement about itself? You see, a statement is speech signifying the true or the false. I mean, a statement's about statements, right? But is that a statement about itself? No. But in some way it is, because it is an example of speech signifying the true or the false. You see? So, that distinction comes up again and again, right? But you usually appreciate that distinction most of all when you see there's a common kind of mistake in particular than before we're looking at particular one. Okay, now the next question is, whether God knows other things besides himself, right? To the fifth, thus one proceeds. It seems that God does not know things other than himself. For whatever things are other from God are outside of him, right? But Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions that God does not, what, look upon anything outside of himself, huh? Therefore he does not know things outside of himself. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I don't want to see. Well, Chris, you know, the solution is going to be that God, in knowing other things, he's not going to look out upon them, right? To know them. Or receive something from them, right? Get information coming into him. I mean, sometimes scripture speaks this way, kind of metaphoric, about God, you know. Now I know you love me, you know. You know, but he really didn't know it already. But God has to know other things in knowing himself, and not by going out to them or by receiving from them something, and not by, in fact, even reasoning, as we'll see, from one thing to another. So Augustine's really touching upon this, but you can misunderstand in what sense, huh? Moreover, the thing understood is the perfection of the one understanding. If, therefore, God understands something other than himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and more noble than him, which is impossible. That, again, is going to be solved by God only knowing other things by, what? Knowing himself, right? So the perfection of his mind is himself, and not the other things. Moreover, to understand has its species, huh? From the thing understood. Just as every other act from its, what? Object, right? Whence, to understand itself is, to that extent, more noble, more excellent, as more noble is the thing that is what understood. That's the way we kind of reason out that the best knowledge is the knowledge of the best thing. Because one knowledge is better than another, because it's knowledge of a better thing. So if knowledge of a better thing is better knowledge, then the best knowledge must be a knowledge of the best thing. So if wisdom is the best knowledge, it must be a knowledge of the best thing. But God is his very, what? To understand. If, therefore, God understands something other than himself, God himself will be specified to something other than himself, which is impossible. Therefore, he understands, does not understand anything other than himself, right? These are all showing in a way that God can't understand anything other than himself as what he chiefly understands. And it's only in understanding himself that he can understand other things. But against all this philosophical nonsense is what is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 4, verse 13, that all things are naked and open to his eyes, right? So that sounds like he does know other things, right? In fact, all the things. They're open, then. I answer, it should be said that it is necessary that God know things other than himself. For it is manifest that he understands himself perfectly, right? Otherwise, his very being would not be perfect, since his being is his understanding. But if something is perfectly known, it is necessary that its power be perfectly, what? Known, huh? But the power of something is not able to be known perfectly, unless there are known those things to which that power extends. Whence, since the divine power extends to other things, in that he is the first, what? The efficient cause of all beings, as has been, is clear from what it's gone before. It is necessary that God, what? Understand things other than himself. Or you could say that because God is, what? The cause of all the things, right? If he knows himself perfectly, he must know himself as the cause of all the things. And he couldn't know that unless he knew the other things. And he says, this more, even more evidently, comes about if one joins, or adds to this, that the very being of the first agent cause of God is his, what? To understand, huh? Whence, whatever effects pre-exist in God is in his first cause, they are necessarily in his, what? Understanding. And that all things are in them according to a, what? Understandable way. Because, and this is a common principle, that everything that is in another is in it according to the, what? Way of that in which it is. So since God is just very, what? Yeah. Everything must be in God in an understandable way. Somebody understands me. He knows you're better than you know yourself. Yeah. So look out. Sometimes you think in real life, you know, somebody knows us better than we know ourselves. It's kind of, it's kind of, it's kind of uneasy, you know. The parents, to some extent, know the little child more than the child knows himself or herself. But to understanding in what way other things, he knows other things from himself, right? It should be considered that in two ways something is known, right? In one way in itself, right? In another way in another. In itself, a thing is known, when it is known through a form that is private and adequate to the thing being known. Just as when the eye sees a man through the one form of the man. In another hover is seen that which is seen through the form of the one, what? Containing it. Just as the part is seen in the whole through the form of the whole. Or when a man is seen in the mirror through the form of the mirror. Or in whatever other way it happens that something is known in another, right? Thus, therefore, it should be said that God knows himself in himself, right? Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Then, let's see. Because he knows or sees himself to his very nature, essence. But things other than himself he sees not in themselves, right? But in him, right? Insofar as his very substance contains a likeness of all the things from him, right? Because every agent makes what is like itself. Can't keep it, I don't have it in some way. Okay. Then he explains the words of Augustine there, as he had in the first objection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the word of Augustine saying that God sees nothing outside himself should not be understood as if nothing that is outside of himself is seen by him. But because that which is outside himself, he does not see except by himself. Okay. So it's in seeing himself that he sees other things, right? It's not by turning away from himself to them that he sees them, right? That's an unusual thing, right? I don't see much in seeing myself, but I turn to other things to see them, right? Now, the second objection was about the understood being the perfection of the one understanding, right? To the second, it should be said that the understood is the perfection of the one understanding, not according to its very substance, but according to its form, right? By which is in the understanding, as a form and perfection of it. For Aristotle says, the stone is not in the soul, right? But the form of the stone, right? As is said in the third book about the soul. So those things which are other than God are understood by God insofar as the divine substance, or essence, nature, contains the, what? Yeah, or their forms. Whence it does not follow that something other is the perfection of the divine understanding, but the very, what? Form which understands, which is the essence of God. Now, the third objection was saying, well, to understand is what? Defined by what you understand, right? And the more perfect a thing you understand, the more perfect it is, right? Okay? Well, Thomas makes the clear distinction here. To the third, it should be said that to understand itself is not specified through that which is understood in another, but through what is chiefly or principally understood. In which other things are understood, huh? For to that extent, to understand is specified by its object, insofar as the understandable form is the beginning or source of the intellectual operation. But every operation is specified by the form, which is the prince of the operation, as heating through heat. Whence through that understandable form is specified the intellectual operation, which makes the intellect to be, what? Inact, huh? And this is the, what? Form of the chief object, or the chief thing understood, which in God is nothing other than his, what? Yeah. In which all these species of things are comprehended. Whence is not necessary that the divine understanding, or God himself, be specified through something other than, what? Through the divine essence, huh? Because he understands nothing else except in understanding himself, right? So his understanding is, what? Specified by nothing other than himself. Now, if he understood something else, not by understanding himself, then that something else would be specifying the understanding, right? And that would be something less. Something imperfect, huh? So for me to understand the soul is better than for me to understand the body, right? And for me to understand an angel is better than to understand what the soul is. And for me to understand what God is is better than to understand what an angel is, huh? Okay? But for me, it's one of those understandings that's different and specified by a particular thing I'm knowing. But God knows what God is, chiefly, right? And in knowing what God is, he knows what a soul is, and what an angel is, and what a body is, and all the rest. So his understanding is specified only by the divine substance, and not by these other things that he knows. Because he knows them only in knowing, what? Himself. If he knew them in themselves, and not in knowing himself, then he would have some imperfect acts of understanding, right? In addition to the act of understanding himself. And you'd have also a problem with having multiplicity of acts in God, and they couldn't be a substance, and so on. And he'd have accidents and all kinds of problems, right? But he understands everything other than himself, only in understanding himself. Got a little break here, no? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Now that we know that God knows other things, now he goes into how well he knows them and particular things that there seems to be some difficulty about knowing. Whether God knows other things from himself by what? A proper knowledge. You see, I wouldn't kind of confuse general knowledge of things. For thus he knows things other than himself as has been said, according as other things from him are in him, right? But other things from him are in him as in a first, what? Common universal cause. Therefore other things are known by God as in a, what? First and universal cause. But this is to know in universal and not according to private or proper particular knowledge. Therefore God knows things other than himself in general and not in particular. And there you're confusing the two sentences we talked about before of universal, right? The universal cause and the universal in predication, right? Well, let Thomas make the distinction. It's the one way, huh? Okay. Moreover, the more the essence of the creature, oh yeah, the same distance that there's between the essence of the creature from the divine essence, the same distance is there between the divine essence from the creature. Okay, you're as far away from me as I am from you. That's what he's saying, right, huh? Okay, as far away as the creature is in its essence or its nature from the nature of God, so also likewise the nature of God has got the same distance from the creature. But through the nature of the creature, the essence of the creature, one cannot know the divine nature, right? That makes sense. We just saw it before. Therefore, neither through the divine nature can one know the creature. It existed, huh? That's a nice democratic argument. And thus, since God knows nothing except through his own nature, it follows that he does not know the creature according to what? Its nature, so that he knows about it what it is, which would be to have a particular or private knowledge of the thing, huh? Glory, private knowledge is not had about a thing or particular knowledge, precise knowledge, except through, what? Its own definition. But since God knows all things through his essence, it does not seem that he knows each thing to its own, what? Definition. For the same is not able to be the proper reason for many and diverse things. Therefore, God does not have a particular knowledge of things, but a common one. For to know things not according to their proper or private reason is to know those things only in what? General. But against us, to have a particular knowledge of things is to know things not only in general, but according as they are distinct from each other. But thus, God knows things. Once it is said in the epistle to the Hebrews that it goes so far as to the division between the spirit and the soul, right? Between your higher powers and your lower powers. And the what? And the sinew or something? Sinews, yeah. And the medulas? Mero. Mero, yeah. And the discrimination of the thoughts and the intentions of the heart, which we can't even do ourselves. There is any creature invisible in his sight. Okay. So he says, I answer you, it should be said that about this, some, and in my Marietta Deshine refers to a very little bit of some, some have heard saying that God does not know things, what, other than himself except in general, right? To wit, insofar as they are beings. Just as the fire, if it knew itself as the source of heat, would know the nature of heat, and all other things insofar as they are hot. Thus God, insofar as he knows himself as the source of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things insofar as they are being. Sounds like he's a metaphysician, right? But this cannot be. For to understand something in general, and not in particular and special, is to know something imperfectly. Whence our understanding, which goes from potency to act, first arise at a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it arise at a, what, proper or particular knowledge. As proceeding from the imperfect towards the perfect, as is clear in the first reading from the first book of the Physics there. If, therefore, the knowledge of God about things other than himself were in general only, and not in particular, it would follow that his understanding was not in all ways perfect, and consequently neither would his being, which is against what we showed above. It is necessary, therefore, to say that he knows things other than himself, by proper or particular knowledge. Not only according as they come together in the notion of being, but according as one is distinguished from the, what, other. So he rejects this mistake here on the grounds that it, what, is contrary to the perfection of the divine knowledge. Okay. Now, to the evidence of this, it should be considered that some wishing to show that God, through one thing, knows many, they use many examples, right? As if the center knew itself, right? If it knew all lines proceeding from the center. Or light, if it knew itself, would know all, what, colors. But these examples, although to some extent are similar, right? Nevertheless, as regards to universal causality, nevertheless, they fall short, in this respect, that the multitude and diversity are not caused by that one universal principle. As regards that which is the source of their distinction, but only as regards that in which they, what, come together. For the diversity of colors is not caused from light only, but from the diverse disposition of the transparent receiving it. And similarly, the diversity of lines from their diverse, what, position. And hence it is that this sort of diversity in multitude is not able to be known in its beginning according to a, what, particular knowledge, but only in, what, general. But it's not thus in God. For it's been shown above, that whatever is of perfection in any creature, right? The whole pre-exists and is contained in God in some more, what, excellent way. For not only that in which creatures come together, for example, in being, retains perfection. But also those things to which creatures are distinguished from each other. As to be alive, right? And to understand and to understand in things of this sort. For which living things are distinguished from non-living things. And things understanding from those not understanding are distinguished. And every form through which anything in its own species is constituted is a certain, what? Perfection. And thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards that which is common to all, right? But also as regards those things by which things are distinguished one from another. And thus, since God in himself contains all perfections, the essence of God is compared to all the natures of things, not as something general to something particular, as the unit to numbers or the center to the lines, but as a perfect, but as a perfect, act to what? Imperfect acts. As if I were to say, for example, man to animal, or sex, which is a perfect number, to the imperfect number is contained under it. It is manifest that through a perfect act is able to be known the imperfect acts, not only in general, but by a what? Particular knowledge. Just as who knows man knows animal by a particular what? Knowledge, yeah? And who knows six knows three by what? Yeah. So six knew itself fully would know what can partake of six imperfectly, like three, right? Okay. Since therefore, thus therefore, since the essence of God has in itself whatever perfection the nature of any other thing has and something more. Then God in himself is able to know all things by a what? Particular knowledge, yeah? For the particular nature of each thing consists in this, according as it partakes in some way of the divine what? Perfection. But God would not know himself perfectly unless he knew in whatever way he could be partaken of by other things, in which his affection could be partaken of by other things. Now would he know the nature of being itself perfectly unless he knew all the ways of being? Whence is manifest that God knows all things things by a particular distinct knowledge according as they are distinguished one from the other. That's hard for us to understand, huh? Because we seem to need, you know, a different thought for each thing we're trying to know distinctly, huh? But, you know, you know what the idea of limits there in mathematics? Yeah. As you kind of used to point out there, you know, is our minds striving to be a little bit like an angel, right? And even more remotely like God, huh? So, you have, let's say you have one thought about what a circle is and another thought about what a a polygon is, let's say, right? Okay? Two different thoughts, right? And so I'm understanding what a circle is and not understanding what a square is and vice versa, right? But now let's say if you inscribe a square in a circle, right? And then you bisect these lines, these parts of circle and make a thing of places in these things and you bisect these, right? Well, then you begin to understand the circle as a limit of polygons as the number of sides increase. So, if you know the circle as a limit of polygons, then you know the circle and polygon are the same thought, so to say, right? And there, in a very feeble way, human mind is trying to know two things distinctly, right? If you properly understand this, the fact that the polygons, no matter how many times you divide this, it'll never, what? Reach the circle. Yeah. It's a limit you can never quite reach. We've seen the distinction between the circle and the polygon at the same time, right? So, there, that's this kind of a feeble attempt of our mind to be a little bit like the angels, right? A very simple thing like that. Yeah. Isn't that the same figure? A circle is a perfect figure? Yeah. Something like that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But you see, here's no different, the point you're trying to make here, right? You're trying to make the point is that in knowing the circle is a limit of polygons, right? You're knowing the circle and the polygon, it seems, by the same thought. And you see the distinction of them because this is a limit that you can never reach. So, you see, the polygon is never a very circle. No matter how many times you can, but you keep approaching it, right? So, you're, in a sense, defining the circle as a limit of polygons, you're knowing circle and polygon together. That's kind of a very vague thing, right? Now, look at the first objection there, right? God is knowing other things as in a first universal cause. That's not to know them the way they are. To the first, therefore, it should be said that to know, thus, something as it is in the knower can be understood in two ways. In one way, according as this adverb, sick implies the way of knowing on the side of the thing known, and thus it is what false. For not always does the one knowing know the known according to that being that it has in the knower. For the eye does not know the stone according to the existence that it has in the eye. But through the form of the stone that it has in itself, it knows the stone according to the being that it has outside the eye. And as someone knowing knows the known according to the being that it has in the knower, nevertheless, it knows it also according to the being that it has outside the one knowing. Just as the understanding knows the stone according to the understandable being that it has in the understanding, right? In so far as it knows itself to understand, right? But nevertheless, it knows the being of the stone in its own, what? Nature. If, however, it be understood according to this adverb, sick, that implies the mode and the part of the one knowing, it is true that thus the one knowing knows the known in the way it is in the knower, right? Because the more perfectly the known is in the knower, the more perfect is the way of what? The knowledge. Thus, therefore, it should be said that God not only knows things in himself, but the fact that he contains in himself, right, things, he knows them in their own what? Nature. And the more perfectly, the more perfectly each thing is what? In him, huh? So they're more perfectly in God than they are in themselves. So God's way of knowing them is more perfect than their way of being. But he still knows them as they, what? Are, right, huh? Okay. I'm surprised that Thomas doesn't distinguish like you might do it sometimes between those two senses of universal, right? He doesn't do that here. I mean, that's not the way he takes the objection is, focusing on that. The objection is focusing more upon them being in God in a different way than they are in themselves. Okay? But God knows not only the way they are in medium, but the way they are in themselves. Just as we know that. That's the old mistake there that you have in the moderns, in Berkeley especially, huh? Where, um, it's true that everything I know is what? Known by me. And I don't know anything that is known by me. And it's known by me only insofar as it is in me. Therefore, I don't know anything outside myself. You're pretty like God. I don't know anything outside myself. I don't think so. What's wrong with that argument, huh? Well, and I know what a triangle is, right? It's true that it's known by me, right? But do I put known by me in the definition of triangle? In other words, what do I know? I know the triangle. I know what a three-sided plane figure is, right? But, you know, by definition of triangle.