Prima Pars
Lecture 66: God's Knowledge of Infinite Things and Evil

Transcript
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He did, right? In every age, he makes something like itself. In some way, it must be what? Like God, no? Last time you distinguished that, when you were explaining that argument of Aristotle against Plato, when you said, I can't remember exactly if you were distinguishing, you said, well, the form is like God because of the act, the potentiality is more distant. Yeah. But you said, I can't remember exactly what it was. What he argues is... It's not nothing. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He argues from a common understanding that he and Plato have a form that's God-like, something good, therefore, right, and desirable. And then he says, well, then, matter could be said to desire form, right? Meaning that it's perfected by form. But the lack of form wouldn't make any sense to say that desires form because that's not going to be perfected by form. It's going to be, what, eliminated, right? Or he'll say if form is something good, then matter-desiring form is in some way good, too. Not as good as form, right? But insofar as it's keepable, form is good. And then, but privation or lack, being opposed to form would seem to be something bad and opposed because it's the bad that's opposed to the good. And that's kind of a hint there that what badness really is, huh? It's always some kind of, what, fundamentally, it's a lack of something, something is able to have, it should have, but it lacks it when it should have, right? And so that's why, you know, Gustin kind of talks about that, too, and says, you know, sin is nothing and the man who sins becomes nothing, right? But he's kind of, in a sense, a little bit exaggerating what the bad is, right? It's not, strictly speaking, nothing or none being. It's none being of something you're able to have in these subject-able habits, right? So blindness is bad, right? But this cup here is not blind, right? Because it's not able to have such a thing, right? So it's not lacking something it's able to have and should have. I can't complain that you gave me no sight on this, yeah. But for an animal or a man, say, which is apt by nature to have sight, the none being of sight is something bad, right? And this is true of any kind of bad, I mean, moral badness, right? You know, my love or my anger or my fear, if they're not reasonable, are bad, right? I was thinking, you know, I said, yeah, I'm a lover of wisdom. Is this a reasonable love on my part? What is wisdom? Well, wisdom is the highest and greatest perfection of reason, right? And therefore, the highest and greatest good of reason. Hey, this is reasonable. This is about wisdom, you know? And of course, God is not only wise, but he's wisdom itself, right? So, gee, maybe in loving wisdom, I'm loving God, you know? So, no, I'm not going to be careful about that, though, because if the wisdom I love is what we call first philosophy, that's not exactly God. But nevertheless, you can say, and Aristotle says in the premium to the 14 books there of wisdom, that either God alone should be said to be wise, or only God fully, right? So, in a way, there's kind of an affinity between the love of wisdom and the love of God, right? And you can say the same thing about the love of truth and the love of God, right? And, like he says, I am the way, the truth, and the life, right? For this was I born, and for this I came to the world, that I might give, what, testimony unto the truth, you know? So, there's a certain affinity of these things, you know? So, the likeness of matter, then, to God is less than the likeness of act to God, right? There still is some kind of likeness there, huh? I was looking in the treatise of the Trinity the other day, and I was talking about the word Father said of God, and the word Father said of a member of the Trinity, yeah? And which is called Father First? Yeah, this is a very interesting article, right? But, it's actually the person, right? It's called Father First, and then God has said, Father, with respect to us. But then Thomas, in one of the replies and objections, he distinguishes four fatherhoods, when God is said to be our Father. And he begins with a quote from the book of Job, where God is said to be the Father of rain. And these irrational things, right? And what we say has only a vestige of God, a footprint of God. That's the lowest kind of fatherhood, right? And the lowest kind of likeness there, right? And then, those who are made in the image of God, we are much more the sons of God than the rain. That's the higher step. Then those who have grace are even more, and he quotes St. Paul and so on and so on, right? And finally, those who have glory and see God as he is, they are most of all the sons of God, right? So, you see, it's reflected in Scripture, right? So, you have different... It's right here, it's in the treatise on Trinity there. I don't remember seeing it. It's 33, article 3, question 33, article 3, right? That's right. Okay. Thank you. It's in 33, on the Trinity. Yeah. So, it says in the Bible article, but in creatures, affiliation is found in respect to God, not according to a perfect reason, because they don't have the same nature, right? Since there's not one nature of the creature in the creator, but according to some likeness, which the more perfect it is, the more it approaches to true, what? Sun blood, right? For God is said to be the father of some creature on account of a likeness of the footprint only. Vestige. As the rational creature is according to Job, 38, who is the father of rain, right? Or who generated the drops of the blue. Of another creature, though, named the rational creature, according to the likeness of the image, huh? The image and likeness of God. Any quotes there? Of some, he is the father, according to the likeness of grace. Well, grace is said to be a, what? Sharing the divine nature. So, by grace, I'm more a son of God than I am just by my nature as a human being. You're a rational animal, right? But my nature as a rational animal makes me more of a son of God than the rain. You kind of understand, you know, the truth of St. Francis's, you know, hymn there to the son and the things he's calling brother, brother, these irrational things, huh? Because they are. Our brother is another, what? Son, and sometimes Scripture speaks of them. It seems like kind of far-fetched when Francis does it, but it has a scriptural basis to it, huh? You know? Well, the rain in here, did he snore out here? Well, hello, brother. Where have you been, brother? You know? It's January. January. You know, January, you're not here, brother. I didn't expect you to show up a long time before this part. That's kind of way Francis would speak, you know, but those of us who have grace are even more the sons of God, right? So, and he quotes Romans there, right, huh? The spirit renders testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God, right? If we're sons, then we are heirs, right? But if we're heirs, we haven't inherited yet, huh? Okay. And then the son, there's a likeness according to what? Glory. Insofar as he already possessed the inheritance of glory, right? According to that of Romans 5, 2. Glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God, huh? So, even more like God, you might say, well, I'd say we are more like God when we see God as he is, right? And then we are most of all his sons, huh? And more his sons than we are in this life, right? But we are more his son in this life if we have grace than if we're just a human being, right? We're more a son if we're a human being or a rational animal than if we're the snow or the rain or the dog or some other brother of ours. So, you have to be careful when you say brother, but I mean, different grades, right, huh? You know? Well, because St. Francis referred to his body as brother ass. Yeah, well, that's putting it in his place. Like that. So let's look at Article 12 here now, shall we? Whether God is able to know an infinity of things. To the twelfth one proceeds thus. It seems that God is not able to know an infinity of things. For the infinite, according as it is infinite, is unknown. Because the infinite is that whose quantity, those taking it, one can always take something outside, right? As is said in the third book of the Physics and Actual Hearing there. So you can see that about, you know, the infinity there and the straight line, right? You can always bisect a straight line. And what do you get when you bisect a straight line? Two shorter lines, right? Well, you can bisect those, right? There's always another beyond this, right? Okay? And the same with numbers, right? There's always a greater number than the number you have, right? Okay? So there's always something beyond that you have. But Augustine says in the twelfth book on the City of God, that whatever is comprehended or grasped by knowledge, right, is limited by the grasping of the one knowing. So how can you grasp something that always has something outside of what you have? But the infinite cannot be made, what? Finally. Therefore, they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God, huh? Now, if it be said that those things which are in themselves infinite are limited to the knowledge of God, right, against us you can say that the notion of the infinite is something you cannot go through. And of the limited, it's something that you can go through, as is said in the third book of the physics. But the infinite cannot be gone through neither by the finite nor by the infinite, as is proved in the sixth book of the physics. Of course, Ezekiel was trying to use that, huh, to say he couldn't get out the door, right? He can't sit in the chair. He can never get there. Therefore, the infinite cannot be finite to the finite, nor even to the, what, infinite, huh? And thus the infinite are not finite to the knowledge of God, which is, what, infinite. Moreover, the knowledge of God is the measure of things known. But against the notion of the infant is that it be measured. Therefore, the infinite cannot be, what, known by God. You know, Aristotle defines number as a multitude measured by one, right? So I remember when I was in college there, and we had the Oxford translation of Aristotle, right, and we were reading in class, and the translation has infinite number. And my teacher, Kassarik, says, Aristotle didn't speak of an infinite number. That would be a contradiction in, what, terms, yeah. Now, Dwayne, he says, look up in the Greek. I thought you touched my arms, I didn't know Greek, right? Because my advisor, he said, well, it's this, I didn't know Greek, so look it up, right? There's no infinite number there in the Greek. There's infinite number. And, you know, Shakespeare speaks of something as being countless and infinite. If you could count something, it would not be, what, infinite, right? So even Shakespeare saw that, you know, translate it as something. Well, that's kind of interesting, because Kassarik didn't know Greek, really, but he knew philosophy, and he knew, therefore, the guy was so mistransitive. And sometimes, you know, Thomas, of course, has a very good translator, Meribaki, right? But sometimes Thomas will disagree a bit with Meribaki, right? And he'll explain what Aristotle says, and you look up in the Greek, and that's where Aristotle's in the Greek. And that, you know, Thomas knows that, huh? Okay. I noticed that in the seventh book of Wisdom there, where the Greek word is, Aristotle's talking about definition. And he says the definition is never just one name. It's always a logos, right? Now, how should you translate logos? Well, you could translate logos in English, into Greek, or into Latin, rather, as ratio, right? Which is more the thought, right? But in this context, if you're saying that you don't have a definition with just one word, you've got to have many words, right? You've got to translate it into Latin, by oratio, right? Well, Meribaki translates as ratio, and Thomas, of course, understands it as to be, it is composizio nomino. You know, you put together a number of words or names to make a definition, huh? So, it might have been better to translate it oratio than ratio, right? But Aristotle, I mean, Thomas understands Aristotle as meaning that a definition is always what we call speech, right? It's composed of names, huh? He's not talking about the ratio in the mind, then, but he's talking about the spoken or written definition, right? And that would be a better translation, too, because it would, I'd say, what would you say, the form of the expression would agree better if you have a ratio and you have an oratio? Yeah. At least as far as the form of the word. Yeah. And Aristotle makes a point in other places, too, you know, so Thomas seems to know what these things mean, you know? Okay. So, something can be measured, right? Then it's, what, limited, right? Okay. And the knowledge of God is a measure of things, don't. But again, this is what Augustine says, huh? This is Augustine, you know, he's calling this guy, huh? He's quite an authority, this Augustine, huh? I've been reading through the, uh, the Catena Aurea there on Matthew, again. It seems that Thomas quotes most at length, Chrysostom and Augustine, those two guys. Mm. And, uh, I think it's even more explicit, though, in the commentary on John, you know, that he's, he's always giving what Chrysostom and Augustine have said, as well as what he himself is saying, following these guys, huh? But he has a lot of respect for Chrysostom, huh? I don't know. It's even well. But, uh, because if you go through it, you know, homily, homily, one, homily, two, homily, three. I think now I'm up in about the chapter, what, uh, 14, I guess, yeah. And it's up to about, you know, 48 or something like that, or almost the 50, you know, homily, you know. And then there's a, another thing of Chrysostom, you know, which, uh, incomplete thing he did on John, on Matthew, too, as well as this major work, I guess. So there's two things he quotes from, sometimes one signs from the other. But, uh, if he keeps up, he's going to be up to a hundred. But against this is what Augustine says in the 12th book about the city of God. Um, though, although there is no number, right, of what? Yeah. Nevertheless, it is not incomprehensible to the one whose knowledge is no number. Okay. Now, in some of the, in some of the official search documents there, you know, consuls and so on. Um, I've seen God called Immensus. Have you seen that in the Latin, that official text? And, literally, what does that mean in English? How do you translate? Immensus. What? Oh, yeah. Yeah? Not measured. Yeah, not measured, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Um, so it, it's really, um, I suppose, connected with the, the attribute of the substance we call God is infinite, right? But, but they speak of as being Immensus, huh? Okay. Um, Let me see that the Latin word for the mind there, mensa, comes from the word to measure, right? Oh, yes, that's true. And that's kind of an important thing to see, huh? Immensus. Yeah. The number of things, measure of things, seems to be an act of reason very much, uh, the mind. Pretty sure that's in the Athanasian Creed. And that's in the Athanasian Creed. And that's in the Athanasian Creed. And that's in the Athanasian Creed. And that's in the Athanasian Creed. Yeah, I've seen it in a number of things in some of the councils. St. Thomas quotes the Adonation Creed. He quotes a lot there in the Trinity, you know. But the one there, I think it's beautiful about, we should adore unity and trinity and trinity unity. And of course, as an old student of the fourth book of natural hearing, Baristow distinguishes in, sense of in, right? And kind of the fundamental text, the fundamental example I always give is, in one sense the species is in the genus, in another the genus is in the species. And of course, if you don't see the different senses of in, then you're going to end up with saying something is in itself. Strictly speaking, something cannot be in itself, yeah. So if A is in B, and B is in A, then A is in A, it seems, right? Unless A is in B in one sense, then B is in A in another sense, huh? And it's kind of striking because this thing about genus and species, that in one sense species is in genus, in another sense genus is in species. You can also say in one way species is a part of genus, in another way genus is a part of the species. But again, different senses are a part, otherwise the thing is a part of itself. It wouldn't make any sense, huh? And this is now, gee, what two senses of in are they? Well, Tom kind of distinguishes the two senses of in there, right? When we say, in the Athanasian Creed now, that we should adore trinity in unity, right? And unity in what? Trinity. There's one nature in three persons, right? And three persons subsisting in one nature. In one sense the nature is said to be in the three persons, and in another sense the three persons is said to subsist in the one nature. There'd be a bit of the words of the Athanasian Creed, yeah? See, I think the Athanasian Creed is the one that divides the articles into two, and the Nicene into three. Into that in the humanity. Yeah, yeah. Which is more of the division we follow in theology, right? Because the Trinity is going to be all in the prima part, and the Incarnation is going to be all in the third part, huh? Yeah. And you find out that there is something stereotypically of God and creatures. Because man is stereotypically of Christ, right? And of us, huh? So something can be stereotypically. Right. It's kind of a, kind of a, kind of a, kind of a, kind of a sensuality of this. At least, uh, do you have an answer for the two senses of in, for this question? Yeah, yeah. I mean, you can attach them eventually to the senses in the fourth book, I think, in the actual hearing, but, uh, they're kind of, you know. Extended senses, right? Yeah. But I mean, we speak of the, of the, what, um, the nature of a thing as being in that thing, right? Okay? Yeah. Uh, but you also speak of the thing as subsisting in that nature. Mm, mm. And then those are different senses, huh? Yeah. Um, you know, what's that famous text of the Epistle to the Philippians, is it? It was talking about the Incarnation, but he was in the form of God. Mm. And then he didn't, uh, hesitate to take on the form. Mm-hmm. But what does it mean to say he was in the form of God? See? Yeah. Form means nature, there's Aristotle. Mm-hmm. And that's clear to study the word nature there in, in the, uh, fifth book of Wisdom, right? Now, um, sometimes we're said to be in, in form, right? You know, like, like, in daily life, you can speak and say, um, um, what, what shape are you in? Mm-hmm. See? I'm in good shape. I'm in good. Or, I'm in good health. Right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Mm-hmm. Now, what sense of in is that? You see? It's a kind of strange sense, in a way. Okay? Because you might say, in another sense, my health is in me. My shape is in me. How can I, what do you mean I'm in, in health? Mm-hmm. I mean, I'm in good shape, right? Bubble orange. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, you see, uh, form in matter, uh, would be like the sense in which you say, health is in your body, right? Or shape is in your body, right? But the sense in which you say that, I'm in good shape, or I'm in health, good form, um, it's kind of a distant cousin of the sense in which the part is said to be in the whole. Because, as Aristotle explains in the second book of Natural Hearing, parts are to whole like matter is to form. So the parts are like matter, because matter, that kind of cause called matter is defined as what? That from which something comes to be, existing within it, right? Mm-hmm. So this table came to be from wood, I guess, and the wood is in it. So that's the cause and things of matter. Well, you might say that the parts that compose a whole, that the whole comes to be from the parts, right? Mm-hmm. Like the chair comes to be from the seat and the back and the legs and so on. And they are in it, right? So parts are like matter, right? Okay? And so we can speak of, you know, the soldiers who make up the army as being the matter of the army, right? Okay? Or like in marriage, you can say the man and the woman are like the matter, because they're the parts of it, right? Okay? Or we're parts of the church, right? Like the material clouds. Okay. Okay. Well, then the whole is like the, what? Form. Okay? So, like, part, and whole is matter and form. That's how I understand it, anyway. So I'm in good shape, right? It's kind of a strange sense, though, right? Mm-hmm. Because I think really that the health is more in me, in my body, or the shape of my body is in the matter, right? Mm-hmm. Rather than I'm in that shape. It's kind of an odd thing, you know? See? But there's a certain proportional likeness there, that parts are to the whole as matter is to form. Mm-hmm. And therefore, as we speak of a part as being in a whole, so we speak of matter as being in form. Mm-hmm. Strange, huh? There's so many different sense of in, right? From the sense of which we speak of the shape or the health as being in the body, huh? Mm-hmm. Could you speak of the body being in good health? Mm-hmm. So then that sense of the form acting on the matter, actualizing the matter in a certain way, then you could say that that form is in the matter. Yeah. Yeah. I think that's true. But I might also ask, how did the wood get into this shape? You know? And you kind of think, you know, the wood is getting into that shape like I get into my clothes in the morning. Mm-hmm. Which is kind of, you know, the first meaning of the end is in place, right, huh? Mm-hmm. I come into this room, right? Okay? And the matter gets into shape like the same way. Mm-hmm. It sounds like the first meaning of the end, right? It's kind of an obscure meaning, huh? Now, I answer it should be said that God knows not only those things which are in act, which is said to be, what, his sciencia visioni, but also those things which are in the potency or ability, either in his own ability or potency, or even in the ability of the, what, creatures, right? So you're going to get me on all my sins of omission, right, huh? It was in your power breakfast and you didn't actualize that. Now, it's clear that these are what? Infinite, right? The things that are in the power of God, right? Or even the power of the creatures, huh? And so if he knows these things, it's necessary to say that God knows what? Yeah. And although the science of vision, which is only of those things which are or were or will be, right, is not of infinite things, as some say, right, huh? Since they do not, what, lay down that the world was from eternity, right? Nor that generation and motion will remain forever, right? So that individuals will be multiplied without end, huh? Nevertheless, if one diligently considers, it's necessary to say that God also, right, by the knowledge of vision, the scienzi di jian, knows infinite things, right? For God knows also the thoughts and the affections of the heart, which are what? Multiplied forever, right? So even in heaven, we're going to be, you know, saying, praising him and different things are breaking out. And rational creatures are going to remain without end, right? So some people are praying and praising him again and again, and others will be cursing him. I say down to hell, they'll be cursing him or cursing themselves or something. So they'll be, what, even by the knowledge of vision, which is the knowledge of what was or is or will be, a knowledge of what, infinite, right? Well, a knowledge of those things that are in God's power or in our power but are never actualized, he has this other kind of knowledge, right? And that, before it's theory, he's going to be a knowledge of infinite things, right? Otherwise, he wouldn't comprehend himself, right, his own ability or his own power. Now, this, I'm going to try to go on to explain how this is so. But this is so because the knowledge of any knower extends itself according to the way of its form, right? The form which is the, what, beginning, the source, right, of its knowledge, huh? Now, the sensible form, which is in the sense, is a likeness only of, what, one individual. Whence, through it, only one individual is able to be known, huh? The understandable form of our understanding is a likeness of the thing as it guards the nature of the species, huh? Which is able to be partaken by an infinity of, what, particulars, right? Whence, our understanding, through the understandable form of man, knows, in some way, an infinity of man, right? In the same way that I, knowing what a square is, in a sense, know all squares, right? I know something which is said of all squares, right? So, in some way, know all things, huh? But not in particular. But nevertheless, not insofar as they are distinguished from each other, right? Okay? Now, you know my little, uh, sophisticated argument, right? You know, I just pick out a young lady from the class, and I'd say to her now, um, she's going to convict herself, now just watch. And I'd say now to her, um, do you know my brother Mark? And she'll say no. And I'd say, okay, all right, what'd she say? She'd know my brother Mark. And I'd say, do you know what a man is? Yeah? That's what our brother Mark is. But you do know my brother Mark. You know what a brother is, too, don't you? Yeah, that's what our brother Mark is. He's a brother. So you do know him. So in some way, you do know him, right? But we wouldn't say if you know him, what? Yeah. So simply speaking, you don't know him, right? But in some way, you do, right? But not as distinguished from other people, right? One time, I think her, I said, yeah, I know him. And she knew my son, Marcus. I have a son who's named Marcus, right? And she was named Marcus. You know what? My son, Marcus. I was surprised. I don't know what the other brother is. But nevertheless, not insofar as they're distinguished from each other, right? But according as they communicate or come together in the nature of the species, right? On account of which, the understandable form of understanding is not a likeness of men as regards their individual principles, right? But only as regards the principles of the, what, species, huh? But the divine essence, now, which is his understandable form, the form which he understands, the divine essence of the divine nature, the divine substance, through which the divine understanding understands, as we saw before we found it out, is a likeness, a sufficient likeness of all things, right, which are or able to be, not only as regards their, what, common principles, but also as regards the private principles of each one of them, okay? The ones that are peculiar to them. And that's because they say, what, active power, making all these other things like itself, right? So they're all included in that likeness. Whence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as they are, what, distinct from each other, right? Now, let's look at the reply to the objections here, right? Christophus speaks, you know, of the infinite as such as the unknown, right? To the first therefore, it should be said that the definition, or ratio, of the infinite belongs to quantity, according to the philosophy in the first book of the physics, huh? In that sense, when you speak of God as being infinite, you've got to realize he's not infinite in the way that, what, quantity is infinite, huh? It's a quite different sense, different meaning of the word, right? It's kind of striking there in the Summa Contra Gentiles. He takes up the infinity of God as the last thing he takes up about the substance of God. A little different in the order than in the Summa Theologiae, right? But he's already considered the simplicity of God, and in considering the simplicity of God, he shows that God is not a body, that he's not continuous. So he's eliminated continuous quantity from God, right? And then, right before he comes to infinity, he takes up, in fourth place there, the unity of God, that God is one. Well, then there's no number there, right? So then, when he begins to consider the infinity of God, he first illuminates the ways in which God is not infinite, and that's the way that's to have the quantity, because there's no continuous quantity as shown in the consideration and simplicity of God, and there's no, what, number of gods, as is shown in the chapter on the unity of God, so then he realizes that infinite must be said of God with a much different meaning, and we saw something like that before, that we just saw on the infinite, okay? But it's not the infinite that's tied up with quantity, right? So if it's in the scripture, you know, that I'm wider than me, this and taller than this, you can't escape from me, that's being said, what, metaphorically, right? And I guess our friend Sir Newton, right? Newton used to dabble in theology, right? And gets into a lot of trouble because he doesn't really have the background for it. And he speaks of space as a sensorium of God, right? Well, he's kind of, you know, making God something continuous, huh? Okay? So, I kind of like, in one sense, the order there, the summa contra gentiles, because you take up the infinity of God after both the simplicity of God and the unity of God, and therefore you realize that the infinity of God is not the infinity that we talk about in physics there, which is tied up with, what, quantity, right? Okay? So the first, therefore, it should be said that the notion of infinite belongs to quantity, according to the philosopher in the first book of the physics, huh? Now, notice the word infinite, you know, comes from negating the word, what, finite, right? And, of course, what's the first meaning of limit? Well, it's tied up with the continuous, right? You see, you see, in the, I think I mentioned this before, but in the third book on the soul, when Aristotle's talking about our reason, he's showing that the proper... The object of our reason is the what it is, something sensed or imagined. And that's why we don't think without imagining, right? Because what we're understanding is the what it is of something imagined. And so, I can't see the blackness of your robe, right, without your robe being there. Because what I'm seeing is the blackness of your robe. So your robe has to be there for me to see the blackness of it. Which doesn't mean that my seeing the blackness of your robe is in your robe. It's in my eye. But I can't see in my eye the blackness of your robe without your robe being there with the blackness. Well, likewise, I can't understand what a square is without imagining a square. Because what a square is, is what it is of that thing imagined. And so I don't think without images. And that's why, you know, Boatius raises the problem there in the Great Treatise of the Trinity. You can't imagine God. So how can you think about God, right? And that's why you have to think about God in comparison to material things, either by negating them, right, or by saying God is, what, their cause or something of that sort, right? But it's not the first thing our mind is going to know, right? Okay. Okay. So, because of that, then Aristotle says in the book on memory and reminiscence and so on, that we don't think without the continuous in time. Because the images are continuous and they're in time. And that's why, you know, in every sentence we've got either past, present, or future. So you don't think of all these things. And that's where it's sort of a problem. When Christ says, you know, before Abraham was, I am. It seems ungrammatical, right? But our grammar is limping there because it corresponds to our conactual way of knowing. It's to have it with the images, right? And so, coming back now to the idea of words, if you look, say, in the fifth book of wisdom for the word limit or in, right, the first meaning of in the limit is the end of the table, the limit of the table, right? Just like the first meaning of beginning is the beginning of the continuous, right? And then gradually carry the word over to things that are not continuous. So, if you see in the word infinite there, the negation of finite, you know, infinite in the sense means, what, endless to speak in English, or limitless. But end or limit, what happens is the first meaning, the end or limit of the continuous, huh? If you look in the fifth book of wisdom there, Aristotle will speak, first of all, the end or limit, meaning the end or limit of the magnitude, and then the end or limit of the motion, then the end or limit in the sense of your purpose, and then finally, definition, which comes from Phoenix, right? Okay? But he moves gradually from one to the other, you know, and it is, it's actually beautiful how he does it, right? But only Aristotle could do that, I think. Maybe Thomas could, but he had an advantage of Aristotle, you know. But we had, as I mentioned that thing in the fourth book of natural hearing, Aristotle doesn't order for us there the meanings of end, he just distinguishes them. And Thomas says, well, we're going to order them. And he orders them the way he says, Aristotle teaches us to order these things in the fifth book of wisdom. And I think only Thomas could have done that, right? You know, he was, he minded, was able to, yeah, but to understand Aristotle, right? But he's a very faithful disciple in that sense of Aristotle. That's the fifth book. The fourth book of natural, of here, what up? Where it's in how it orders the senses. Of limit? Yeah. Yeah, it's in the third part of the fifth book, yeah. And where does he do that with the senses of in? The senses of in is in the fourth book of natural hearing, the fourth book of the physics. Okay. Where he's talking about place. The first meaning of in is in place. We're in this room, right? And, but he distinguishes all together, eight senses there, but he doesn't order them there. But Thomas Aquinas in the commentary will order them on. It really doesn't. It's very striking, you know? And the, there's some surprising things there, right? You know, like the sense of species in genus is before form and matter. And I say, gee, that's strange, you know? Yeah. Because you say form and matter, I mean, that's more sensible, right? Yeah. You see? But you have to follow the order of the seed in this, right? Mm-hmm. And, see, the first meaning of in is in the room, right? The second meaning of in is part and whole. And Thomas points out that if you cut out the part from the whole, so you can take it in and put it back in, then it would be in there as in a place, see? So my teeth are in my mouth as a part or a whole. But if I had false teeth, you know, or if you, you know, hit me in the mouth and I can take the tooth in and put it back in again, you know? Would it be in there as a part anymore? Or is it in a place? See? If I cut a hole here in the middle of this table here, right, so I can take out a piece and put it back in again, would it be in there as a part of the table anymore? It'd be in there in a way. Yeah, yeah. See, how close those two senses are, part and whole. And there, from there, he goes to the third sense, which is genus and the species. And in general, the part of the definition and the definition. But it's still a part of the whole. But it's less known to us, obviously, than the other. And then he goes to a rather strange sense, the species and the genus. And, of course, we do speak of the universal whole sometimes, right? And in Greek, you know, the Greek word for universal there is katholu, right? We get the word Catholic, huh? The katholu comes in the Greek word for whole, kata, holas. And the word for what comes under the universal whole, in English we'll call it a particular. But the word particular comes in part. So the universal, the genus is to the species a bit like whole to part. So the species in the genus is like part and whole. But it's a much more obscure sense, because the species exists in the genus only in, what, potency, right? Okay? And then he goes on in the fifth sense, form is in matter, like species in genus, because it's in the ability of it, huh? Okay? That's kind of striking, right? So species in genus is like, on the one hand, form in matter, because it's in their only ability, not in act. And in that sense, both of those meanings are different from the first three, where something is actually in something, right? But still, it's like genus and species, because it is a part and a whole. Okay? So you've got to look at it before and after. You know, Shakespeare tells us the importance of that, right? So the fourth sense of in should be more like the third sense than the fifth sense is. And the fourth sense of in should be more like the fifth sense than the third sense is. See? Right? Okay? Well, the fourth sense of in, which is the species in the genus, right, is like genus in the species, because it's also, in a way, part and whole. But it's also more like form and matter than genus in species, because the genus is in the species, actually. And form is in the matter, to begin with, only in potency, right? And the species in the genus, only in potency. So it's more like five than three is like five. And it's more like three than five is like three. So it's pretty, right? And then I discovered a little, you know, thing in daily life, which you'll find people making a mistake, huh? I say, now, you know, you may be ready for this, but, you know. Suppose you have a piece of clay here, right, huh? A piece of clay in the shape of a sphere. And I mold it into a, what, cube, right? What has changed? The clay or its shape, what would you say?