Prima Pars
Lecture 71: The Ideas in God and the Location of Truth

Transcript
================================================================================

to the third article here. Whither of all things which are known by God, there are ideas. To the third, thus one proceeds. It seems that not of all things which God knows are there ideas in him. For the idea of the bad is not in God because it would follow that the bad is in God. But bad things are known by God. Therefore, not of all things which are known by God are there ideas. Moreover, God knows those things which neither are, nor were, nor will be, as it has been said above. But of these, they are not ideas because, as Dionysius says in the fifth chapter of the divine names, the exemplars are what? The divine wills, right? The willings. That determine and are what? Effective of things, huh? Productive of things. Therefore, not of all things which are known by God are there ideas in him. That's going to probably require some distinction, right? Moreover, God knows the first matter, which cannot have, what? A form, right? An idea. Because it has no form. Therefore, the same as before, right? You know something you don't have an idea of. There can't be an idea of that. Moreover, it stands that God knows not only the species of things, but also the genera, and also the singulars under these, right? And the accidents, and so on. But of these, there are no ideas according to the position of Plato, who first introduced the forms, as Augustine says. Therefore, not of all things known by God are there ideas in him, right? But against this, I can say that ideas are the reasons in the divine mind existing, as is clear to Augustine. And that's also, I guess, in the 33 questions. This is in my footnotes, it's here. Okay, that's quite a book. But, it's kind of like a quadribitalis in Thomas. Have you seen these quadribitalis, you know? Which means, what you will. where you have kind of a, you know, both such novels, you know, bring things in kind of random. But of all things which he knows, God has proper reasons. Therefore, of all things which he knows, he has an idea. I answer, it should be said, that since ideas were laid down by Plato, right? He's a Uniform Augustine responsible for this question getting here in the Prima Pars. I answer, it should be said, that since ideas were posited by Plato, as, what? Beginnings of the knowledge of things, and beginnings of their, what? Generation, right? To both of these, idea has itself, insofar as it's, what? Posited in the divine mind, right? And according as it is the beginning of the making of things, it can be called a, what? Exempla, right? And it pertains to practical knowledge, right? But according as it is a beginning for knowing, it's properly called a ratio, right? It's always a little bit hard to kind of translate ratio into English, you know? It seems to have, sometimes, not just the mental aspect of thought, you know? In English, we don't have it exactly, although sometimes you use the word reason, right? For what's in the thing, you know, you might say, you know, the reason why that happened, you know, I mean, or if somebody says, you know, it's an eclipse of the sun, the reason why the light of the sun is being, what, cut off, is that the moon has come between the sun and the earth, let's say. Now what am I talking about there? See? Then I'm, it's kind of on the side of the thing, right? Okay, so, there's a little bit of that, a little hard to translate sometimes, reason there. But according as is a beginning for knowing, is properly called a rotsiorite, and is able also to pertain to what's speculative knowledge. According, therefore, as it is an exemplar, according to this, it has itself to all those things which come to be from God in some time, at some time. But according as it is a principle of knowing, it has itself to all those things which are known by God, even if at no time they, what, come to be. Things which has a science of vision. And to all things which are known by God, according to their, what, proper reason, and according as they are known by him, by way of, what, speculation, right? That's probably the distinction. He's going to be involved in answering the objections, huh? Now, what about the bad, huh? Well, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the bad is known by God not through its own, what, reason, but through the reason of the good. And I suppose that's practically going to be seen if you realize that, what, the bad is a lack, right? So we might say, even for us, blindness is known through sight, which is something good, right? Ignorance is known through what? So we're going to be talking about it. So we're going to be talking about it. knowledge, right? Because if you define what is ignorance, it's a lack of knowledge, right? And blindness is a lack of sight and so on, right? And something able to happen and so on. So the bad, even by us, to some extent, is known through the good, right? And that's why there could be a form of the good, but through that you'd know the bad too. And therefore the bad does not have in God a, what? Idea, right? Nor, neither according as idea is an exemplar, going back to the distinction we saw in that thing, nor according as it is a, what? Ratio, right? No, see, this is neque secundum qua idea, exemplar neque secundum qua ratio. It's like, can you think of nothing? Nothing to think of. But, you know, when we use the word nothing, we understand something by the word nothing, don't we? But, I mean, you understand nothing through what? Something. It's no thing, right? In some way you can think about nothing. Well, teacher, because sir gets to joke, you know, you know, philosophy is the only class you can pay for talking about nothing. And it's a chat to do, right? And sometimes Augustine kind of, you know, exaggerates there what the bad is, and you'll say sin is nothing, and the man who sins becomes nothing, right? But strictly speaking, sin is not simply none being or nothing, it's what? Privation or lack, right? Which is an unbeing of something, and a subject able to have it, right? So, now the second objection was saying, God knows those things which neither were nor are nor will be, right? But of these there are no ideas, according to this text of Dionysius, right? Now, to the second it should be said that of those things which neither are nor were nor will be, God does not have practical knowledge except in his, what? How, right? Whence, with respect to them, there is not an idea in God according as idea signifies exemplar, right? But only according as it signifies the, what? The reason, huh? The third one, what about God knowing first matter, right? To the third it should be said that Plato, according to some, laid down that matter was not created, right? And therefore he did not pause an idea of matter, but of the, what? Concausa, what is caused with matter? Well, I mean something like form in matter, right? Concausa, what is caused with matter, okay? Or else the, the, what? The thing that is made out of matter and form, right? The whole, the whole thing, right? That's the way Plato seems to speak in the, in the tomatoes, right? Now, you know, I often refer to a text there in Marx and Engels, right? Where they divide all thinkers into materialists and idealists, right? And they say the, some thinkers say that matter is the beginning of all things, even of what? Thought, right? So, comrade Lennon says, you know, that thought is the highest product of matter, he says. Okay? And you might say the first philosophers were kind of materialists, right? Mother Earth or water or something, but it's the beginning of all things, right? So they think of some kind of matter is the beginning of all things, even of, of thought, you know? Like Empedicus says blood around the heart is thought. And then, if you take somebody like, uh, uh, St. John, beginning was gospel, right? He's saying the beginning was the Logos, right? The thought. Thought. And all things are made from thought. So, there are people, and Hegel seems to be in that line a bit, right? Starting out with logic, right? In a sense. So, they divide all thinkers into those who say that matter is the beginning of all things, even of thought, and those who say some thought is the beginning of all things, even of, what? Matter. Now, as a logician, I ask, is that a good division of all thinkers? Or is three, you know? Yeah. If you take these two great thinkers here, Anaxagoras, right? And, um, Plato, right? In Demers, at least. There, they distinguish between mind and matter. And the great Anaxagoras is the first man maybe to realize, uh, somewhat, that the mind is immaterial, right? So, we've got this great fragment there on mind, huh? And the greater mind, you know, moves matter, and so on. But he doesn't seem to have the idea that it is responsible for the existence of matter, right? Okay? So, in a sense, he's a dualist, in a sense, huh? There are two beginnings of all things, mind and matter, right? And Plato gives that position, at least in the tomatoes, he puts it in the mouth of tomatoes, right? There's a Demiurgos, right? And then there's matter, and the Demiurgos is looking at the forms and trying to form matter according to these things. Now, um, whether by intention, um, or ignorance, uh, that Hegel, that Marx and Engels leave out that middle position, right? But there's something devilish that's considered current iconically to say there's some diabolical influence in modern philosophy. Because if you leave out that middle position, it's very hard to go from the materialism that we kind of naturally start off with, to what is the truth, that there is a mind and, and, uh, thought that is the beginning of all things and created even matter. You've got to, first of all, see mind as something immaterial and that doesn't depend upon matter for its existence, right? Before you might eventually come to the idea that there's a mind that is responsible even for what? For matter, yeah, yeah. So, um, uh, Plato, at least, you know, I can't say what, you know, Plato is tomatoes, I mean, but, uh, Plato, according to some, lays down matter not to be created, right? And that seems to be the way that Anxiebris speaks on it. It doesn't speak as if the greater mind is responsible for, um, uh, the existence of matter, but merely for moving it and ordering it in some way, right? Okay? And Timaeus speaks that way in Plato's dialogue. But because we lay down that matter was created God, right? But nevertheless, it is not created without giving it some, what, form. Matter has an idea in God, but not one, what, other from the idea of the composite of matter and form. And that's what he, maybe he's referring to, he's talking about con causa, right, huh? Okay? God can't make matter without some form. He can't make it therefore by itself, right? Yeah. Yeah. But for matter by itself can neither be, nor is it, what, knowable, right? And so the philosopher says there in the first book of natural hearing that the first matter is knowable by, what, a proportion, remember that? That the first matter is to man and dog, uh, something like, right, clay is to sphere and cube, okay? But the likeness there should not be, what, misunderstood, right? Because, uh, sphere and cube are two accidents, right? And clay is an actual substance. While man and dog are not two accidents, but two substances, and the first matter is not an actual substance, right? But just as clay is able to be a sphere in a cube, but not both at the same time. And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other, but if it becomes the other, it seems to be the former. So the first matter is able to be a man, or a dog, or some other material substance. And when it's one, it's able to be the other, right? But if it became the other one, it seems to be what it was, right? But Aristotle is saying you can't know it by itself. And therefore, the difficulty that we have there is a difficulty due to the thing itself. It lacks no ability. Remember that thing that we do in the second book of wisdom, right? Where Aristotle talks about the difficulty of knowing and it can be in the thing or in us. And that's a very good distinction, right? And it can be applied to other things. You know, some things are difficult to love and most people don't find it difficult to love wisdom, right? But that's difficulties in them. Because wisdom is something very good, right? But if you find it difficult to love cancer or something like that, right? Don't think it's a defect in your heart because you can't love cancer. You don't have a loving heart. You see, it's not a very lovable thing, right? Or I don't love rock and roll, you know. I don't use a very lovable thing, right? I can't really like this stuff. But that's not, it's a defect in my heart, right? If I didn't like Mozart, that would be a defect in my heart, you see? But that's really good stuff, you know? So, notice Thomas is saying something like what he said in the reply to the first objection, right? The bad is really a lack, a kind of non-being. Matter is not non-being, but it's not being an act. It's considered by itself, right? It would be only in potency. And so Heisenberg says, right? We only know matter through the forms of matter. We don't know it by itself. He's saying something like what Aristotle said. Now, the last one is talking about genera and singulars and accidents and how Plato didn't give forms for these things. The fourth, it should be said, the genera are not able to have an idea other than the idea of the species. According as the idea signifies what? Exemplar, right? Because one never, what? Has a genus coming to be except in some species. So you never make an animal that isn't either a dog or a cat or a horse or some other particular kind of animal. Likewise, for accidents that, in an inseparable way, follow upon the subject because these come to be together with the what subject, huh? But the accidents which come upon a subject can have a special idea, right? For the artist, through the form of the house, makes all the accidents, which are like properties, right? Which follow from the house from the very beginning, right? But those things which come upon the house are already made as pictures or something of this sort, huh? He makes through another form, right? You get an interior director. But individuals, according to Plato, do not have any idea other than the idea of the species because the singular is individuated through what matter, right? Which he laid down to be, what? Uncreated, right? And a concausum idea, right? Then, because the intention of nature consists in species, nor does it produce singulars except insofar as in them species are saved. But we'll come back to this. We take it at divine providence, right? Because divine providence extends only to species but to the singulars. And to some extent, God takes care, especially for us, as individuals and not just reference to conservation of human species. So I have to wait, you know, two weeks now until I come back, right? I'm going away this Friday. I'm going to be in. I'm going to be in. I'm going to be in. I'm going to be in. I'm going to be in. I'm going to be in. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, common doctor and angelic doctor, pray for us and help us to understand what you have written. The Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Before we begin the 16th question, you know, I happen to pick up this book here called the 33 Doctors of the Church. Have you ever seen this one? Oh, no. And we went to this little religious bookshop that my daughter-in-law goes to a lot, and I figured I had to buy something, so this looked interesting, you know. And it's kind of interesting. It's kind of a, you know, popular treatment of them, but it gives interesting anecdotes and interesting quotes about them, and so on. And we've got to share, as time goes on, some of these things. But just share a couple of things here about Thomas Aquinas, because he's one of the 33 Doctors of the Church, huh? Now, Pope John XXIII, if you've heard of, right, he dwelt on the title of St. Thomas as the common doctor, right, huh? That's another title, this is the angelic doctor and the common doctor. And there's a little quote here from Pope John XXIII. His teaching was more than any other, fully in keeping with the truths that God has revealed, with the writings of the Holy Fathers, and with the principles of right reason. And therefore, Holy Church has adopted it as her own, and has given the name of common or universal teacher to its author. So he's a common or universal teacher. He has that title, right? As well as the angelic doctor. Now, not to leave out a personal note, Pope John XXIII recalled that he was linked to St. Thomas by the fact that his predecessor of the same name in the papacy, Pope John XXII, right, had canonized, what, St. Thomas, huh? He also confessed that he himself had been quite attached from the earliest years of our priesthood to mystic studies, huh? But now, going back to his namesake there, John XXII, who canonized Thomas, huh? Pope John XXII, who canonized St. Thomas in 1323, made a statement that is hard to surpass. And actually, there's two statements in the quote from Pope John XXII. This is the first quote. He illuminated the Church more than all the doctors. That's quite a compliment, right? He illuminated the Church more than all the doctors, huh? It's like when Thomas Aquinas died and Albert the Great, who outlived him, was informed of it. He says, the light of the Church has been extinguished, huh? That's interesting, huh? He illuminated the Church more than all the doctors. And now the second thing, like, is very important for us as students. Again, from John XXII. In his book, son, a man will advance more in one year than in the teaching of the others for a lifetime. That's interesting, huh? And of course, he's referring to Pope Peter XIII. They're talking about Thomas and the Council of Trent. You've heard this. But this is the quote from Peter XIII. But the chief and special glory of Thomas, one which he has shared with none of the Catholic doctors, is that the fathers of Trent made it part of the order of the conclave to lay upon the altar, together with the code of sacred scripture and the decrees of the Supreme Pontus, the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, quenched to seek counsel, reason, and inspiration, huh? So it was put next to the Bible and to the decrees of this Pontus. Enough to encourage us to read some more Thomas, huh? You can learn more from one ear now, this guy, than from a lifetime of reading the others, huh? Yeah, it's Father Christopher. I think this was in St. Lawrence, or Gendizio was made a doctorate of the church that he was a Capuchin, and that was the kind of occasion for him doing it. There's a lot of interesting things in there. I was reading just this morning, I happened to be reading about St. John Damascene, and two things that stand out, I guess, in Damascene's teaching. One, of course, is the defense of statues and so on against that kind of class. You don't realize how long that lasts. Almost a hundred years, right? And then he's supposed to, but especially the great doctor for the assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. But another thing he mentions in there is that he upheld the Immaculate Conception, too, which wasn't, you know, generally taught in those days by everybody, you know? And it's interesting that he stands out. Very nice things. He's very important, I guess, for the Byzantine liturgy, too. And they say he's regarded in the East as their greatest doctor, St. John Damascene. Okay, we're up to question 16, huh? Thomas has a little premium here for the 16th question. He gives a connection, first of all, between what we've been talking about, the knowledge of God, right, and this consideration now of truth, right? Since knowledge is knowledge of the truth. After the consideration of the knowledge of God, one ought to inquire about what? Truth. And about this, four things are asked. And the first question is whether truth is in things or only in the understanding. Secondly, if it's in the understanding, whether it is only in the understanding, putting together and dividing. That is to say, the understanding making a, what, affirmative statement or a negative statement, right? And not when I say man, true or false. Unicorn, true or false. I don't make a statement about man or unicorn. Is there something true or false? Or do you mark that unicorn, true or false? One of my granddaughters there is interested in unicorns as a pet unicorn. So unicorns are in fiction, at least, right? That would be true, right? Unicorns are in the woods, I suppose, would be false. But if you don't make a statement, affirming or denying something unicorn, unicorn is neither true nor what? False, it seems. Now, the third and the fourth questions. True, like, good are, in a way, among the most universal things. Of course, the first of the most universal things is being. Whatever is, must be a being in some way, right? Okay? And you'll find that Thomas would take up the other most universals and he'll compare them, right? And in the third article, it'll be about the comparison of the true to being, right? The equally universal and so on. And fourth, about the comparison of true to what? Good, huh? And the most universal, sometimes Thomas would speak about all the most universals. And they are being, right? Thing or something. One and something other. And then true and what? Good, right? And Aristotle already pointed out these as being most universal. But Thomas, therefore, in the first four articles, he's talking mainly about truth like the wise man talks about them and the physician talks about them. And then he starts to go a little more to God now in particular. Whether God is truth, right? Of course, you might remember our Lord having said one place, what? I am the way, the truth, and the, what? Life, right? And why is truth and life appropriated to the second person? Because if God is truth itself, then this is true of the Father and the Holy Spirit as well as the Son. But why is the Son saying in particular that I am the way, the truth, and the, what? Life. He's coupling truth with life there, right? But why is this appropriate? Well, the Son proceeds by way of, what? God's understanding himself. And so, truth is tied up with God's understanding himself. Truly. And so, because the Son proceeds by way of God's understanding himself, he is the Word, as St. John tells us, is also appropriate to him truth, right? And of course, as you'll see later on here, after taking up truth and falsity, and at the end of the consideration of the mind, he takes up where the life is found in God, right? So, Thomas puts consideration of God's life with the consideration of God's truth, right? Together. And Christ, when he says, I am the way, the truth, and the life, he puts truth and life together. Same thing. Okay? Christ is the way, as man, he's the way, right? But as God, he's truth itself and life itself. But those two things are connected in the same way that Thomas has it connected here, we'll see. Where he takes up the life right after the truth and the falsity consideration. Okay? But it's appropriated to the Son because he proceeds by way of understanding, by the Word of God. Now, the sixth article, whether all things are true by one truth, namely the divine truth, right? Or by many truths. And the seventh article, about the eternity of truth. It's a very interesting thing to take up. And the sixth, eighth, and last, about the unchangeableness of what? Truth, huh? So we're going to learn a lot about truth, right? We're going to learn the truth about truth, huh? So we can learn the truth not only about other things, but about truth itself. That's kind of interesting, huh? Just as the mind can think about other things and even about itself. So let's look now at the first article, whether truth is only in the understanding. To the first one proceeds thus, it seems that truth is not only in the understanding, but it's more in, what, things. For Augustine, in the book on Syloquies, I'm talking to himself, right? He was the work of Augustine. He disproves or rejects this making known of truth that the true is that which is, what, seen, right? Because according to this, stones, which are in the very depths, you might say, of the earth, would not be true stones because they are not, what, seen, right? He also disproves or rejects this other statement that the true is that which thus has itself as it seems to the, what, knower, right? If he wants to and is able to know. So if you want to and are able to know, then truth is what seems so to you. Thomas just injects that. Because according to this, it would follow that nothing would be true if no one was able to, what, to know. And thus he defines true. The true is that which is. And thus it seems that truth is in things and not in the, what, understanding, right? Okay, moreover, second objection. Whatever is true is true by what? Truth, then. Just as whatever is, what, colored is colored by color, right? Okay. Whatever is white is white by whiteness. Okay. If, therefore, truth was in the understanding only, nothing would be true except that which is understood, which is the mistake of the ancient philosophers who said that everything that seems to be so is, what, true. And Plato discusses that opinion of the ancient philosophers in the dialogues. He doesn't agree with that. To which you would follow that contradictory things would be at the same time true. Moreover, for contradictory things together are seen to be, seem to be true by, to different people, right? In Aristotle and Taxus, I did it too also in the fourth book of Wisdom, fourth book of Metaphysics. Moreover, on account of which each thing and that more. Now that's a famous principle we've talked about before, right? But when Aristotle or Thomas quoted, they often quote it in this brief form, right? And sometimes I unfold that more fully and say that when the same belongs to two things, but to one of them because of the other, right? It belongs more to the, what? Cause, right? So if the fire is hot and the air around the fire is hot, but the air around the fire is hot because of the fire, which is hotter. So, now Aristotle says, in the book on the categories, the predicament is the way they say that in Latin. So we get the word predicament, huh? If you're in a category, you can't get out. From this to the thing is or is not, the opinion or the speech is true or false. So Aristotle is saying, you know, when I sit down, it becomes true that I'm sitting, right? And when I stand up, it becomes false that I'm sitting, right? So my sitting is the cause of the statement I'm sitting being, what? True. Well, then isn't my sitting more true than the statement? Cause it's the cause of the other one being, but, yeah. So it seems to be a question of that, right? I might mention, but Thomas doesn't seem to do so explicitly here. Aristotle seems to speak in the second book of wisdom as if truth and being went along together, right? And he speaks there as if the cause is more true than the effect. Because if, using the principle again, if true is said of the cause and of the effect, but the effect is true because of the cause, then the cause is more true than the, what? Effect. And therefore, the first cause would be most true. So it makes sense to Aristotle that the first cause would say, I'm truth itself. You could not be more true than to be truth itself, right? But it agrees with what the first cause says in another place, that I am who am, right? Because that means he's what? First in being, too. But if he's first in being, he's first in what? Truth, right? So the one who says, I am who am, is also the one who says, I am truth itself. It makes a lot of sense to Aristotle, as it did to Hilary of Poitiers and so on. Mm-hmm. Okay. But that's what Aristotle speaks of in the second book of wisdom, right? But in the sixth book of wisdom, Aristotle seems to say that truth is in the mind, right? And he makes a contrast in the sixth book between truth and goodness, and where he says that goodness is chiefly in things, and the will is good only because it wants the good, right? But truth is primarily in the mind, and most of all in the, what, mind affirming or denying one thing or another. So in the said contrary, he quotes the philosopher, and that's the figure of speech you've mentioned many times, that dominates, you know, the Bible, Gospel, Christ, they're all named by Antoinette Messiah. And so he calls Aristotle by Antoinette Messiah the philosopher, just as Aristotle called Homer the poet. But against this is what the philosopher says, meaning Aristotle, in the sixth book after the books of natural philosophy, sixth book of wisdom, that the true and the false are not in things, but in the, what, understanding, right? And so I'll explain that to students. I'd say, now, if you dug down in the earth, did you find bits of truth down there, do you think? Yeah. If you go swimming in the ocean, you know, or going to spread the net, you go, oh, I've pulled up some truth today, you know? And I've got some fishes and some truth, you see? It doesn't seem to be any truth in the ground or any truth in the, what, air, right? Air in the water, right? Walk around, walk into truth, and they'll fall off the trees. So truth doesn't seem to be in things. It seems to be something, seems to be true or false in the same place, in generally speaking, in the statements that your mind makes, right? Okay. And so, you know, if I gave students a true-false exam and I had stone, man, horse, did you mark it true or false? No. It's only when you say man is an animal or man is not an animal that you have something true or false, right? Or man is a stone or man is not a stone, right? Okay, sometimes the negative is true and sometimes it's affirmative, right? And sometimes the negative is false and sometimes the affirmative is false, right? Like in those examples, they just gave it. So it's not until you make a statement which the mind makes that you seem to have something, strictly speaking, true or what? False, right? But there might be some way in which you might say also the truth is in what? Things, right? Okay, now notice the way Thomas begins to reply now. I answer it should be said that just as good names that to which desire tends, right? So Aristotle first defines the good is the good is what all want. But it's what is wanted. So true names that in which the what? Or towards which the understanding tends. But there's this difference, or distance, this difference. Distinction between desire and understanding, or for that matter, any kind of knowledge. Because knowledge is as the known is in the what? Nowhere, right? And of course, Empedocles had already seen this point, the Greek philosopher. Except he misunderstood the way in which the known is in the know, right? Notice how we use the name of an act of the hand for understanding, right? Do you grasp what I'm saying? If you grasp what I'm saying, that means you understand what I'm saying, right? But when I grasp something, right, it's contained in some way in my hand, isn't it? So when the mind grasps something, that's when it knows something, right? But that use of the word grasp is a sign that we think of the mind as what? Containing, huh? The thing known, right? And, you know, when you're studying for an exam or something like that, you're trying to get something into your head, right? You know that famous story, you know, that Guston's supposed to have been walking along the seashore, right? The little boy was running down to the ocean and trying to put the ocean into the little hole, and Guston asked him, what are you doing? And he couldn't put, you know, the ocean there into the hole. And he said, you'll never get that in there, you know? He says, neither will you ever get the Trinity into your mind either. But again, it's indicating, right, that knowing is trying to get something into your, what? Mind, huh? Okay, whether it be the Trinity or whatever it might be, huh? So he says there's this distinction between desire and understanding or any knowledge. That knowledge is as the known is in the knower. But desire is according as the one desiring is inclined to the, what? Thing desired itself, right? So the song says, I left my heart, what? In San Francisco, right? Okay. Not a good place to leave your heart these days. But you are said to be, what? The heart, which is the one that desires, or the faculty of desiring, is said to be in the thing, what? Desired, right? Now, the Lord said something like that where he spoke of, you know, putting away treasures in heaven for yourself, right? He says, where your treasure is, there also your heart shall be, right? Okay. So the good is more, what? In things, huh? Okay. And your heart is where, what? The thing you love. That's right. And the opposite of that, my heart's not in it. Does that mean? I don't want to do that. My heart's not in it. See? And that's why popularly we speak of losing your heart, right? Well, as I used to say to students, you know, it's not good to lose your mind. But it could be good to lose your heart. It depends upon to whom you lose it, right? You see? It's a difference, huh? But just as we use more for knowing, grasping, right? That doesn't seem to name perfection of the heart, though, to be grasping, does it? That's perfection of the mind, to be grasping things, huh? But we use with the heart the word, what? Give, right? To give somebody your love, right? Okay. Now, if I give you my love, in a sense, it's like saying, I don't have any more. It's in you now, right? Because the good is in things, right? That's a big contrast between knowing and wanting or loving, right? Okay. Knowing is the business of getting the known into the lower, in some way, right? So if I remember you, if I recognize you, right, it's because your shape and your color and so on, I've got them inside me in some way, right? Okay. But love is the kind of going out to the thing you love, right? And thus the end or limit of desire, which is the good, is in the thing, lovable or desirable, huh? But the limit of knowledge, which is the true, is in the, what? Understanding itself, huh? You see the distinction, huh? Okay. Sometimes I speak of that, a kind of contrariety of knowledge and, what? Love, right, huh? Did you say loving somebody is taking them apart? No, it sounds kind of opposed to love, right, huh? Taking somebody apart is not, doesn't sound like a very loving act, does it? See? But that's the way to know something, right? Take it apart so you can get it entirely into your mind, right, huh? Okay. The Greek philosopher said, don't try to understand everything, lest you understand nothing. But just as the good is in things, in so far as it has an order to desire, and in account of this, the... The Greek philosopher said, The Greek philosopher said, don't try to understand everything. notion or the definition of goodness is derived from the thing desirable into the what? Desiring. According as desire is said to be good insofar as it is of the good, right? So good will is a will that what? Will is the good, right? Okay. A good desire is a desire for the good, right? So good is primarily in the thing desired, right? And because that's good, then my desire for it is good, right? I'm a philosopher, which means a lover of wisdom, right? Well, is the love of wisdom good or not? Well, if wisdom is something very good, something more divine in human, really, right? Then the love of wisdom is something good, right? Why, if foolishness is something bad, then the love of foolishness would be something what? Bad, right? So also since true is in the understanding, as it is conformed to the thing understood, it is necessary that the definition of true is derived from the understanding to the thing understood. that the thing understood is called true as it has some order to the what? Understanding, huh? Now he's going to subdivide this out. The thing, however understood, is able to have an order to some understanding either what? Per se or procedence. Now what's this distinction that he's talking about here? Per se, it has an order to the understanding from which it depends according to its being, right? So if an understanding is the cause of something existing, right, huh? He says that's got a per se order, right? But it has a paratchitan's order to the understanding by which it is what? Knowable, right? Knowable, right? So just in human affairs, right, as he goes on to make a comparison here. Just as if we say that a house compared, is compared to the understanding of the artist, the carpenter, right? Per se, right? But per procedence, it is compared to an understanding from which it does not depend for its existence, huh? So he's distinguishing between the relation that what? When I walk out in your yard here and I see a tree there, right? Does that tree depend upon me for its existence? No. And that's different from the, what, carpenter who's made this chair, right? And the chair depends upon him for its, what, existence, right? So he says the judgment about a thing is not taken according to that which is in it. Per acedans, that means what? By accident or by happening, right? But by that which belongs to it as such, huh? Whence each thing is said to be true absolutely according to the order that it has to an understanding from which it, what, depends. And hence it is that artificial things are said to be true by order to our understanding, right? Because we're the cause of those things we make by art, right? For that is said to be a true house which follows the, what, which attains to a likeness of the form which is in the mind of the, what, artist, right? And that speech is said to be true in so far as it is a sign of a true understanding, huh? And likewise, natural things are said to be true according as they reach or take on a likeness of the forms which are in the divine mind, thinking back upon the ideas they talked about in the previous question. For that is said to be a true stone which achieves or arise at the proper nature of a stone according to the forethought of the divine, what, understanding. Thus, therefore, truth is chiefly in the understanding but only secondarily, what, in things. He's not denying altogether that truth is in things. But it's in things according as they are compared to the understanding as to their beginning or cause, huh? Got that? This is why you have different somewhat, what, true notions about truth. And according to this, truth is diversely made known. For Augustine in the book about true religion says that truth is that by which is shown that which is. Yes. And Hilary, huh? Says that the true is what declares or makes known what is, right? Being. And this pertains to truth according as it is in the, what, understanding, right? Which is making known or declaring something, right? Is in things. So if I say man is an animal, right, huh? Then I'm declaring what is, what, so in things, right? Okay. But this is something primarily in my mind, right? My mind that is saying that man is an animal, right? But to the truth of the thing according to its order to the understanding pertains this definition of Augustine in the book of true religion. So Augustine has two definitions there, right? He quoted the, the first one which is taking truth as being in the mind, huh? Truth is that by which is shown what is, right? Okay. So when I say man is an animal, I'm showing what really is out there, right? And that's primarily in my mind, that truth, right? But now, in carrying over truth, though, to the thing in comparison to the mind, Augustine has this definition in the same book. Truth is the, what, highest likeness to the beginning without any, what, unlikeness, huh? And a certain definition of Anselm was one of these 33 doctors here, by the way. The truth is a rightness perceptible only by the, what, mind, right? For rectitude there is what is in accordance with the principle or beginning. And a certain definition of Avicenna, the great Arab or Mohammedan philosopher, who was then, he talked about these most universals of some length. When Thomas at the beginning of the De Veritate, the question is disputate De Veritate, he'll quote Avicenna right about the six most universals. And a certain definition of Avicenna, that the truth of each thing is a property of its being, that is, what, rendered stable to it, huh? But what is said sometimes, the truth is the, what, almost like the equality, right, of the thing and the understanding can pertain to what? Both of them, right, huh? Okay. Now, that third definition I was pointing to the other day when I said that people tend to answer the central question of philosophy, does truth require that the way we know be the way things are, remember that? And people kind of tend to answer yes at first, right? Because they have in mind this idea that truth is the equality or agreement of the mind of things, huh? No, that's kind of a concrete way. That's kind of a concrete way. That's kind of a concrete way.