Prima Pars
Lecture 73: Truth in the Understanding and Composition and Division

Transcript
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Now, the second article, it seems that truth is not only in the understanding, putting together, and dividing, right? That's going back to Aristotle's way of speaking in the sixth book of Wisdom, but also in the third book about the soul, where the second act of reason, the first act of reason is what? Understanding what something is, right? Better or worse. And the second act is what? Putting these things together in an affirmative statement or dividing them in a, what? Negative statement, right? And Aristotle teaches that truth is found in that second act primarily, huh? And in logic, you state that second act with the study of this product, the statement, huh? The statement is speech signifying the true or the false. So the second one proceeds thus, it seems that truth is not only in the understanding, putting together, and dividing. For the philosopher says in the third book about the soul, that just as the sense of its own sensibles is always true, so the understanding of the what it is. That's the first act of the reason. But putting together and dividing is neither in sense nor in the understanding knowing what it is. Therefore, truth is not only in the putting together and dividing of the understanding. Well, he's going to admit in some way there's truth in the senses, right? Truth in the first act of reason, but fully, right, and properly only in the second act. And we'll see that in that thing. Moreover, Isaac says in the book about definition that truth is the equality, right, of the thing and the understanding. But just as the understanding of complex things, of a affirmative or negative statement, can be equal to things, so the understanding of incomplex things, and even the senses sensing the thing as it is. Therefore, truth is not only in putting together and in the dividing of the intellect. But against all this is what the philosopher says in the sixth book of wisdom, that simple things and the what it is is not truth, neither in the understanding nor in what things, right? But only in the second act of what Aristotle says there. So Thomas is going to reply now. I answer it should be said that true, as has been said, according to its first definition, is in the, what, understanding, right? Now, since everything is true, according as it has its own form of its own nature, it is necessary that the understanding, insofar as it is knowing, is true, insofar as it has the likeness of the thing known, which is its form insofar as it's knowing. And an account of this, the conformity or agreement of the understanding of the thing, excuse me, an account of this, through the conformity of the understanding of the thing, truth is what? Defined, huh? Okay, now this special way, I'm going to talk about truth here. Whence to know this conformity is to know, what? Truth, okay? Now, this in no way does the sense, what? Know, huh? Because although the sense has a likeness of the thing visible, nevertheless, it doesn't know or consider the comparison between the thing seen and that which it, what? Of it, yeah. But the understanding is able to know the conformity of itself to the thing, what? Understood, huh? So he's saying that in the senses there can be a conformity of what is in the sense of what is out there, right? Okay? But the senses don't consider that conformity, right? Yeah. Okay? But the understanding is able to know, he says, the conformity of itself to the thing understood. But nevertheless, it does not grasp this according as it knows about something what it is. But only when it judges, right? A thing thus to be, as is the form which it apprehends about the thing. Then first it knows and says the, what? True. And this it does by putting together and dividing. For in every statement, some form signified by the, what, predicate, huh? It either applies to some thing signified by the subject of the statement, or it removes from that, right? So when I say that man is an animal, I say that animal, what, belongs to what man is, right? When I say man is not a stone, I say stone doesn't belong to what a man is. Okay? I'm not doing that when I understand what a man is, period. Or understanding what a stone is, right? Or understanding what an animal is. And therefore, it is well found that the sense is true about something, or the understanding and knowing what it is. But not that it knows or says the true, huh? And likewise, is it true about the vocal sounds that signify what's on the mind? The complex ones or the incomplex ones. So, is man true or false? I'm going to say something now. Can you tell me what is true or false? Man. Stone. See? It means true or false, right? Okay? When I say man is an animal, or man is not an animal, it's going to be true or false, right? Well, man is a stone, man is not a stone, huh? So, he says truth is able to be in the sense, or in the understanding, knowing what it is, as in a certain, what? True thing, right? But it's not as the known is in the knower, which is implied by the name of true. For the perfection of the understanding is the true as, what? Known. And therefore, properly speaking, truth is in the understanding, putting together and dividing, but not in the sense, nor in the understanding, knowing what it is, right? And in this way, the solution to the two objections is, what? Clear, right? In a sense, he's saying that the senses can be, what? Conformed to the object, right? And the intellect understanding of what something is can be conformed to that thing, right? But that's not to know that conformity, is it? And to say that conformity, right? It's only in the second act, when you affirm or deny something or something, that you know the conformity itself of the mind to things, and you speak of that conformity of the mind to things, huh? And then you know the true as known, right? So, the senses might know the taste of something truly, right? But do the senses know that they are conformed to the thing? Or do they speak about that, right? And reason in knowing what something is might be conformed to that thing then, right? But in being conformed to that thing by knowing what it is, is it saying that it is conformed to that thing? And knowing that it's conformed to that thing? Yeah. So, truth is only fully in the second act of reason. So, we're putting together, we're dividing these things, right? And saying man is an animal, or man is not a stone, right? That's a subtle point. thing, right? But you can see it more simply as an insensible sign of these things, right? But strictly speaking, not only is unicorn either true or false, but neither is man or stone, right? True or false. It's not until you put these things together that you really have truth or what? Falsity, right? So when you define the definition there, which kind of perfects the first act of reason, you say it's speech signifying what a thing is, right? But when you talk about the statement that is perfecting the second act, then you say it's speech signifying the true or the what? False, huh? If you go back to the idea here of sentence, huh? And sometimes in grammar we distinguish five kinds of sentence, right? And one kind of sentence might be called the statement, the declarative sentence they sometimes call it, right? Another sentence would be the what? Question. Another would be the command. Another would be the prayer, the request. Another would be the exhortation, right? So if I say shut the door, grammatically speaking that's called a sentence, right? But shut the door is a kind of sentence called a command. Direct to the will of an inferior in some way, right? But it's directed to the will of an inferior that you want to do something, right? Like shut the door. Check your mouth. Okay? The prayer is directed to the will of a superior, right? So give us this day our daily bread. That's grammatically a sentence, right? But it's like a prayer, right? Let's go to the movies. Okay, it's kind of addressed to an equal, right? Okay. Now, what time is it? Well, that's a what? Question, right? But none of these four that we've spoken about so far is really true or false. What time is it? True or false? What's your name? True or false? Isidore. Isidore. Isidore. He's the one of the doctors in the church, I think. Yeah. Isidore, yeah. Isidore, yeah. Yeah, I read about him in here, yeah. Isidore Suthila, right? Yeah. Yeah, I can read about him in here. Okay. It's in there. 33. Shut the door. True or false? Now, that door over there is already shut, right? You might say that if I say shut the door, I'm thinking that the door is open, right? Mm-hmm. Which is false. Mm-hmm. What, this door over here, right? Mm-hmm. This door over here. Mm-hmm. But shut the door, mm-hmm. By itself is either true or false, is it? Help me. If I say I'm in need of help, that's either true or false, right? Mm-hmm. Probably true. But help me, true or false. Let's go to the movies. Let's go for a walk-in. True or false? So none of these is a sentence signifying the true or the false. Mm-hmm. Neither question, nor command, nor prayer or excitation. But the statement, then, which Thomas calls a propositio, but originally proposition is used for the premise of a syllogism. It got being called later on for statement. But the statement is a sentence signifying the true or the false. I am a man. I am not a stone, right? So is it true? I am not a man. I am not a stone. I am a stone. They are false, right? But a statement is a sentence that signifies the true or the false. Now, the logician is primarily interested in that sentence called a statement, right? The logician is not much interested in commands or prayers or excitation, but they are more ordered to action, right? A question he has some interest in, too, as a petition, right? But primarily interested in the statement, right? So the second book has come down to us from the father of logic. It's called, and it did Kerry Herman is, but it's really about the, what, statement, the second book in logic that has come down from the father of logic, who is the philosopher here, huh? Historians call Aristotle the father of logic, as Thomas calls him, the philosopher, right? But he's got a lot of excellences. Okay, I don't know if we've got time to go through article three here, huh? I think we might, because it's short, like the last one, unless you thought it was more complicated than it looks. Now, to the third one proceeds thus, it seems that true and being are not, what, convertible, right? Now, what does convertible mean in logic, huh, in philosophy? Well, yeah. We say that A and B are convertible if every A is a B, and every B is a what? A, right? Okay. And so there's a number of words that are, what, most universal, right? And one of those words, a fundamental one, is being, huh? Ends in Latin, huh? Now, you see, that's most universal, because can there be anything that doesn't come under being as a name? Being means what is, right? So everything that is, is a being, right? That's most universal, right? Now, the second most universal is the word thing, or something, right? Can there be something out there that isn't something? Something is, is most universal, right? Now, what's the opposite of being, by the way? Yeah, okay. What's the opposite of something? So they're almost the same, right? They're both, you can see the universality, right? Nothing and non-being seem to be almost the same, right? But being is, is named more from to be, right? And something from what a thing is, right? Now, the next one is, is, is one, right? And something is said to be one, because it's undivided and distinguished from other things, right? Was that true about everything that is, that's undivided? Well, how do you destroy a thing? So everything is either simple or composed. If it's composed, it doesn't exist unless it's, what, put together. Therefore, it's not divided. And if the composed is undivided, if it's already the simple is undivided. And could something be without being distinct from other things? So Thomas, at various times, would talk about being and thing and what? One, right? Okay. But now he's comparing what? More difficult case. How about true and being, right? Yeah. Okay. Are they equally universal, right? Are they convertible, right? Every being is something and every something is a being, right? Okay. Is, is true about true, right? And later on we ask it about the good too, or we did before. To the third one proceeds thus, it seems that true and being are not convertible. For true is properly in the understanding, as has been said, right? But being is properly in things, therefore they're not, what? Convertible. It's a pretty good objection, right? Okay. Moreover, that which extends its itself to both being and non-being is not convertible with being, right? But true extends itself both to being and non-being. For it is true that what is to be and what is not to be, what is not, not to be, right? True means not only that what is, is, but what is not, is not. So true is not only about what is, but about what is not. Therefore true is more universal than being, right? Right? The first objection says that true is what? Less universal than being, right? Or at least it's not true is in the mind and being is in things, right? Moreover, what have themselves according to before and after do not seem to be, what? Convertible, right? That's most easily seen that the more universal, the less universal, right? If it's an odd number, then it's a number, right? But if it's a number, then it's an odd number? No. Okay. So number and odd number are not, what? Convertible, right? Okay. But true seems to be before being. For being is not understood except under the notion of what? True. Therefore it seems that they are not, what? Convertible, right? But against all this nonsense is what the philosopher says in the second book, Meta Tafusica, right? After the books of natural philosophy, second book of wisdom. The term Meta Tafusica came from what? Andronicus of Rhodes, right? But Aristotle in the premium to the 14 books of the metaphysics calls it what? Sophia, wisdom. So I have to say the second book of wisdom, but the second book, Meta, meaning after, Ta Tafusica, the books of natural philosophy. But as the philosopher says in the second book of wisdom, the second book after the books of natural philosophy, that the same is the disposition of things in being and in what? Truth. I was mentioning that, and it's very interesting for us as Christians to see that, right? Because the one who says in the Old Testament, I am who am, right? Says in the New Testament, I am truth itself. And Aristotle would say that'd be a motive of credibility for Aristotle if he was to run into a Christian, but he died in 322 B.C., right? Okay? But he saw that connection between being and what? Truth, right? And he says, I answer it should be said that just as good has the notion of what? What is desirable, so truth has an order to what? Knowledge. I'm going to make that thing before. But each thing, insofar as it has being, to that extent it is what? Knowable. And an account of this it is said in the third book about the soul, Aristotle's famous three books about the soul, that the soul is in some way, what? All things, huh? By sense and by understanding, huh? And therefore, just as good is convertible with being, right? That's something we took up back in question 5, article 3, huh? So also the true is convertible with being, huh? But nevertheless, as good adds, the thought or the meaning or the idea of desirable above being, right? So true adds a comparison to the what? Understanding, right? So in a sense, you're talking about being, being what? Knowable, right? So that true adds something to the idea of being, right? Namely, knowable, right? It's conformity to the mind. And good adds to the idea of being that it's what? Desirable, right? Okay. Now, the first objection was saying that true is properly in the understanding, but being is properly in things. Well, how does he answer that, huh? Well, he goes back to the distinction that he made in the first article. To the first, therefore, it should be said that true is in things and in the understanding as has been said, huh? Now, it's the true as it is in things that is convertible with being, as the clindum substantia, he says, huh? But the true that is in the understanding is convertible with being as, what? Making known with the thing made known. For this is of the notion of true, huh? Although one is able to say also that being is in things and in the understanding just as a true. Although true is chiefly in the understanding, being chiefly in what? Things. And this happens in account of the fact that true and being differ in their what? Definition, right? Okay. So, um, you can say that the, uh, if you go back to the great, uh, first man to talk about the mind there, uh, Anaxagoras, right? Remember that? And what's the first thing that Anaxagoras said about the mind or reason? Yeah, but he, but what's the very first thing he said about the mind? He said that it's one? He said that it's infinite. Oh, okay. Yeah. It's unlimited, right? Okay. Okay. So, um, even the, the weakest of, of understandings, which is our own, right? In some ways open to knowing all things, right? In fact, um, our mind distinguishes between something and nothing, right? And we even talk about everything, don't we? Now, I might say, well, I don't know everything. And that's quite true, right? But what am I saying there that I don't know? If I didn't know in some, at least imperfect way, right? In fact, in a very imperfect way, what the word everything means, could I know that I don't know everything? You know, the Greeks had a common thought. You can't get something from nothing. Makes sense, doesn't it? Understand that? Okay. Now, if you understand the statement that you can't get something from nothing, just like you understand the statement that man is not a stone, right? Now, you know the, you understand the statement that man is not a stone, don't you? Okay. But if you understand the statement that man is not a stone, you must understand in some way both man and what? Stone. Stone. Right? Makes sense, right? So if you understand the statement that you can't get something from nothing, right? You must understand both something and nothing, right? Okay. Now, everything that is, is what? Something. Yeah. So in some way, you know everything, don't you? Right? I have some bright students in my class, they say, I'll go home and tell my dad, I know everything. Professor Berkowitz said that. But, in some extremely confused way, you do know everything, right? Because everything is something, right? And you know the difference between something and nothing, don't you? And everything is said of, and something is said of everything, right? You know something about everything, right? Not very much, right? But you know something about everything, right? That it's something about everything, right? You know that everything has being, that's what you know about everything. Yeah, yeah. But you also know that it's something, right? Okay. So you can say, in that sense, the mind is open to knowing what? Everything, right? Okay. And as it goes from a confused knowledge that everything is something, right? It's getting more distinct knowledge, more perfect knowledge, right? You can see that the mind is open to knowing everything. Okay? And just the fact, you know, that you know, for example, the universal, right? That's the way we usually try to show that the mind is infinite. If I know what a number is, right? In a way, I know an infinity of things, don't I? That there's an infinity of odd numbers and there's an infinity of even numbers, right? And when I say no odd number is even, I'm making a statement about how many things. Yeah. So in a sense, my mind is open to knowing what? An infinity of things. That's why Shakespeare, you know, we talked about Shakespeare's definition of reason. It's the ability for a large discourse, right? And one meaning of large discourse is a discourse about the universal. And a discourse about the universal can be a discourse about many things, right? When I say man is an animal, I'm making a statement in a way about all men, right? Past, present, future, no matter how many there are, right? When I say no prime number is composite, I'm making a statement about infinity, right? Of numbers, right? When I say something is not nothing, you can't get something from nothing, I'm in a way saying something about everything. So in some sense, the mind is open to knowing everything, right? And so you might say that the mind, therefore, is open to making known everything, and therefore truth in a way extends to what? Everything, huh? Everything in some way is knowable, right? So that in a way, being and knowable are what? Equally universal. About that, huh? Okay. Now, the second objection is kind of interesting. The second objection is saying we can know non-being as well as what? Being, right? That isn't true, more universal. Okay? It might be simple to use that word just knowable, right? Isn't knowable more universal than being, right? Now, what is the great way it says? Nothing is more true than when you say something is itself. What can be more true than a dog as a dog? Or a cat as a cat, right, huh? Okay? So it's knowable both that being is being, right? And non-being is what? Non-being, right? So isn't knowable more universal than being? That's what the second objection is saying, right? That's what the second objection is saying, right? And isn't it true, not only that being is being, but isn't it true that non-being is non-being? Isn't it true that something is something? And nothing is what? Yeah, right? So isn't knowable more universal than something? Isn't knowable more universal than being? Aristotle, of course, you can solve this if you know the fifth book of wisdom, right? And when Aristotle distinguishes the senses of being there, right, it distinguishes not only being according to the figures of predication, substance, and quantity, and quality, and so on, and according to act and ability, but also being according to the truth of a, what, statement, right? And this includes, then, what we call beings of reason. So is nothing something? What would you say? You see? See, when I talk about nothing, right? I say nothing is nothing, right? Am I talking about something or not? Yes. Yeah. So, now you've got a problem here. How can nothing be something, right? Right? See? Well, nothing is nothing in the world, right? So it's a being of reason, right? Yeah. So there's a kind of being there, right? But as being only in the mind. That's a very subtle thing, right? See? And notice, you might say about somebody that he is blind, right? Or he is ignorant, right? Right? Now, is to be blind, is that really to be or not to be? What really is? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But we make an affirmative statement about it. We say he is blind, right? As if to be blind was a kind of to be, right? But in reality, to be blind is not to be something. But the mind takes it as if it were a kind of what? Something. Being, right? Is it or? Right? Okay. Is it or probably points it out in his famous book. Aristotle distinguishes that as another meaning of the word being. But it's being only in the, what? Mind. You know, Professor Kerserk used to joke on, philosophy is the only subject where you can get paid for talking about nothing. But the philosopher does talk about nothing, right? Okay. And so when you say nothing is nothing, what does the word is mean there? Or the mind takes nothing as if it were what? Something. Yeah. Yeah. So he says to the second it should be said that none being does not have in itself whence it is what? Known, huh? But it is known insofar as the understanding makes it what? Knowable, right? Whence the true is founded in being, insofar as none being, right? Is a certain what? Being of reason, huh? Apprehended by what? Reason, huh? Incidentally, this expression here, ens rationis, huh? Ens rationis, which you translate as a being of reason, right? And there's two kinds of being of reason, and one is the negatives, right? Like nothing, right? Blindness and so on. And then there are some relations which are only, what? Beings of, what? Reason, huh? Okay. So it's a very subtle thing, huh? Those two kinds of beings of reason, huh? Negations, and there's some relations. There are some relations that are real relations, right? But others are only, what? Relations of reason, huh? That's a very subtle distinction, huh? The relation of God to creatures is not a real relation. But the relation of the creature to God is real. Those are very subtle things, huh? But here he's saying that nothing, or negation, non-being, is something, what? In reason only. Reason makes nothing to be something to talk about. There's something to talk about over the, what? Mind, huh? Remember, there was a little boy thinking about nothing. Did you ever think about nothing, the little boy? I said, what if there was nothing? Absolutely nothing, you know? You got to think about that, you know? You couldn't even know that there was nothing, because there was nothing, you know, around to know about nothing, right? So it's not true that knowable is more universal than being, right? Because non-being wouldn't be. knowable unless they had a kind of being in the mind. Nothing would not be knowable except what? From the kind of being that it has in the mind. So when I say that you can't get something from nothing, I understand something by the word nothing, don't I? If I didn't understand anything by the word nothing, I wouldn't be able to understand the famous statement, you can't get something from nothing. And then someone might come along, the sophist, right, and say, well, how can nothing be something? Well, he's confusing two senses of the word being, right? The being that is in things and the being that is only in what? Reason, right? And so in things, nothing is nothing. It's not there. It's an unbeing of something, but it's something in the mind, right? And then the contradiction disappears, right? Because we're not saying that nothing is something in things, okay? But the same is true even about things like blindness and ignorance, right? Is ignorance something in me just like my knowledge is in me? I have knowledge in me and then I also have this ignorance in me. Is that something in me? No, it's really the absence of something in me, right? What is ignorance in me? Is it something in me? I'm ignorant of a lot of things, you know, see? And Aristotle speaks of this in the fifth book of wisdom as being in the sense of the truth of a statement, right? Because it's true that I'm ignorant of many things, but is that ignorance in me something in me, really? It's an unbeing of something, right? Yeah. But reason takes ignorance as if it were something to talk about, right? We talk about your ignorance or my ignorance and sadly wanting and all sorts of stuff, right? So ignorance is something in the mind, not only in the mind. In that sense, you can say that the, to be in the mind is in a way more universal, right? Than to be in things, right? But so there is a kind of being there. And so we say nothing is nothing. So we use the word is. It's kind of, there's some kind of isness there, right? Some kind of being there. Nothing is nothing. But Aristotle calls that the being according to the truth of the statement, right? Because you can't say that nothing is not nothing. That's what it is. So what kind of isness is that? What kind of being is that? It will be in the mind, right? As opposed to man as an animal. That's not just in the mind. Man is an animal, right? That's a very subtle thing. Now the third objection was saying we can't know being without what? It's being knowable, right? And therefore being true. So isn't that before? To the third it should be said that when it is said that being cannot be grasped without a knowledge of true, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, thus, that being is not grasped unless the notion of true follows upon the grasping of being. And thus the way of speaking has truth. In another way, it could be understood that being cannot be grasped unless the notion of truth is grasped or true is grasped. And this is false. But true cannot be understood or grasped unless the notion of being is grasped. Because being falls in the definition of true. And it is similar if we compare the understandable to being, right? For one cannot not understand being without being being understandable. But nevertheless, but nevertheless, being can be understood without its understandability being understood. And similar, being understood is true, but not an understanding being is true understood, right? So, something can't be known without being knowable, right? But you can know something without knowing that it's knowable. And you can see how people like pedicrees have difficulty understanding how something is knowable, right? And they thought that the thing had to be in you the same way it's in itself, right? And it's actually in the knower in a kind of immaterial way. But, so he didn't really know its knowability, did he? But still he couldn't know it without being true that it was knowable. So those are very subtle distinctions, you've got to think about those for a while before you get a hold of them, right? But you have to admire Aristotle back there in the fifth book of wisdom when he takes up the word being, the most common word of all, and the first man to understand the word being fully. The difference between is when you say, I am, right? And when you say that nothing is nothing, right? Aristotle saw that distinction. So, they're convertible, right? You can consider that though, to use the word sometimes, something too, right? You know, it's interesting in Greek, you know, the Greek word for nothing is ouden, which means not one. But our word is nothing, right? It kind of shows you how both thing and one are very universal. They take it from one and we take it from the gate thing and the gate, right? In English, if you said no one, you'd think, you know, more particular, you know, person, right? I don't really know why that should be so, right? In fact, is someone home? Is there someone in that room? What does that mean? Person. Yeah, you think you're a person. It's kind of strange, huh? Because in that chair, there's one chair in there, so there's some one thing in there, right? But you wouldn't say, if there's a chair in the room and no person in there, that there's someone in the room, would you? I can't really explain that except that's just the peculiarities of our way of speaking, right? But the opposite of something for us in English would be what? Nothing. Not no one. Mixed up these languages, huh? Mm-hmm. You know, in the Church Fathers, you know, the famous thing was, you had the word, in Latin here, you had the word, substantia, that top of the community. And in Greek, you had the word hypostasis, okay? And hypostasis in Greek came to mean the same thing almost as person, right? Mm-hmm. Although it could be used for any individual substance of a rational nature. But hypostasis and substantia are etymologically the, what? Same. To stand under, right? But substantia in Latin can also mean the nature of a thing, the substance of a thing, right? So, when they're translating this from one to the other, the Greeks would say three hypostasis, right? But if you translate it and say then there are three substances in God, then you're saying there's three natures, right? And so, what's his name? Jerome says, you know, there's poison of his word, right? But it's the problem, right? So, we're not accustomed now, it's not our custom to speak of three substances in God, because we associate this word too much with the nature of the thing. So, we say three persons. But the Greeks can say three hypostasis, right? But we carry a word over and you get that problem of heresy, right? So, let's see how we get to the Trinity if we get that far, eventually.