Prima Pars
Lecture 76: Divine Simplicity, Knowledge, and the Order of God's Attributes

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So to see, as you go down from God to the angels down to us, you require more and more thoughts, right? And more and more truths. And, you know, I was reading in the Summa Cantu Gentiles, there were these arguments against there being a composition and division in God, right? Because there had to be a different composition and division in which truth you knew, right? And you really have all this multiplication of thoughts in God. It wouldn't be simple anymore. Or, that's what we are, right? So, if I put together man and animal, and I put together two and a half of four, these are different thoughts in me, right? And I can't express it by one. You heard my little poem now, which again is, you know, God the Father said it all with one word. No wonder when that word became a man. He spoke in words so few and said so much. He was the brevity and soul of it. It's not bad, huh? It's almost got a meter, you know, to it, huh? Well, you might say, but we require what? You know, as you go down the angels, they have more thoughts, but they understand less. As you go up the angels, they have fewer thoughts, but they understand more. I was reading Thomas was, was one of the arguments he's giving in the chapter on the, does God know infinity of things, right? And he has 11 arguments in that chapter in the Summa Cognita. One argument, I think, strikes me as kind of interesting in this regard. He says that the better a mind is, huh? The more it sees from one thing. So you see that in all the sciences. I mean, Einstein might see something, right? And he sees many consequences of this one thing. Other people don't see all those consequences of the one thing, you see. And so he says, the greater the power of the mind, the more it can see from one thing, right? Of course, the power of God's mind is infinite. And therefore, from one thing, its own substance, and through one thing, he can see an infinity of things, right? And Father Bloday used to like to talk about that, right? You know, to see a beginning in philosophy, and then to see it as a beginning. And you can see what is a beginning without seeing all the consequences of it. It's like when you begin geometry, you see these beginnings because you don't realize everything's going to follow from them. But the greater the mind is, the more it sees from one thing, many things, huh? But the divine power is infinite, so it can see from one thing, two things. It's kind of interesting the way he did that particular argument. When I was first starting the Summa Kahn Chantile, you know, I kind of read the chapter, and then I, you know, maybe a little later I tried to see if I could recall the arguments, you know, or add it to them for a while. I mean, I require, you know, let's just say six arguments. I recall four of them, you know, and then come back and say, which one did I forget, you know? And then, oh yeah, that's an interesting one, you know, each of them is something, you know, to savor on. They really make these arguments, huh? To savor them. When I come back to the Summa Kahn Chantile, you usually have less arguments, right? Even the question is disputatio, have less arguments than the Summa Kahn Chantile, right? A lot of times Thomas would give, like, three is enough, you know? They give three arguments in the disputat questions, why in the, you know, like the infinity of God or something like that. And here you didn't have, you know, nine or eleven arguments, you know? But in the Summa Kahn Chantile, you have more, you know? And usually they're already in this, they're already there, you know, gathered together. But occasionally you'll maybe find one somewhere else that isn't in the Summa Kahn Chantile. Or say they stay a little bit different, you know? So it brings out something. The order is interesting, you know, because I notice here in Summa Theologiae, he takes up the life of God after he takes up the understanding of God, right? And before he goes to the, what, will, right? But the Summa Kahn Chantile is he takes up the life of God after he's done both the understanding and the will. And of course, what he's going to be bringing out there at the end there is that, you know, God's eternal life and God is blessed in his life. His blessedness exceeds the blessedness of any creature and so on. But it's kind of interesting, the order there. I gave him a talk one time at the PMR conference there on the order in which the substance of God is considered in the two works. And there's some differences. And then I didn't try to say one was better than the other. But I tried to show that you get something in both orders, right? And you get something in one order you can get in the other order, right? I know now when I was talking about the use of the first book of natural hearing in theology, I always go to the Summa Theologiae to illustrate how important it is to showing that God is unchanging. But I can't do it quite as nicely to the Summa Contra Gentiles because of the order in which it is. Because in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he shows that God is unchanging before he shows that God is simple. And part of the reason for that is that the argument for the unmoved mover is much more developed in the Summa Contra Gentiles than in the Summa Theologiae. Two of the five arguments in the Summa Contra Gentiles are from motion. Only one of the five is from motion in the Summa. And in the Summa Theologiae, one argument has one middle term for each of the premises, right? Why in the Summa Contra Gentiles? Three reasons, three reasons, you know? So it's much more developed, right? So it's kind of natural when Thomas gets through with the existence of God to go to his being, what? Unchanging, right? Unchanging and eternal in the Summa Contra Gentiles. But in the Summa Theologiae, where this is not developed so much in the Adamic mover, he doesn't bring out that God is unchanging until after he's talked about the simplicity of God. So he can reason from the simplicity of God to his being unchanging, among other arguments, right? But in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he can't reason that way because he hasn't shown that God is simple yet. And so I'd always make use of the Summa Theologiae when I was teaching the first book of natural hearing because there Aristotle brings out that whatever changes is composed. And once you know that, you say, well then, if you show in theology that God is not composed, then you can see he can't change, right? And that's one of the ways he argues in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Summa Theologiae because of the order, right? So there are subtle differences, you know? And then in the Compendium Theology, the order is a little different, right? And he actually takes up the infinity of God and then goes into the protection of God. Kind of strange, huh? But, you know, following the old rule of two or three, right? If you wanted to reduce the five parts of the consideration of the divine substance, the five basic attributes, to three, how would you do it? In Summa Theologiae, there are simplicity, perfection, unchangeable, excuse me, infinite, unchangeable, and then one, right? Yeah, simplicity and one would go together, right? And then, which other one would you put with which one? Yeah, yeah. And it's very clear, you know, especially in the Summa Contra Gentiles, it takes up the infinity of God that it's, what, based on his, what, perfection, right? You see? And he had that famous quote from Augustine, those things that are not mole magnusund. To be meus means to be meleus. To be more means to be better, yeah. So it's always tied up with the perfect, right? And what's interesting, in the compendium, the unity of God comes right in the middle of the simplicity. So it's just kind of a sign that makes some sense, you know? And the infinity is taken up with the, you know, the perfection of God will be the day afterwards, you know? But one nature kind of leads into the other, right? And in the Summa Theologiae, he takes up the perfection of God, then it's infinity, right? So, yet Thomas, you know, will always divide this into two Summas, you know, which kind of major works, into those five, you know? I apologize for interrupting your train of thought, but while I had a chance, I wanted to ask you if you knew about this God delusion book that is supposedly a bestseller. A scientist? What is the basis of that? What is his argument? Yeah. I just know from the reviews, you know. What's the name? By the English scientist, was it? God delusion. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Yeah. You know, he's not a guy who knows much about theology, that's what I told, you know. I just think that, I think, in the latest issue, are the first things I think they were talking about, you know. I noticed that Newhouse has quoted my colleague there, Mahoney, the political scientist, and that's all the thing he has in the back. He's got some nice things here. Yeah. But Mahoney's done a thing on Solzhenitsyn, too, you know. He has a book on Solzhenitsyn, and then he has another book that's come out recently, another guy that's a Solzhenitsyn reader, you know. But it's got kind of a stamp of approval, Mahoney's interpretation of Solzhenitsyn from the Volzhenitsyn family, you know, from the man himself. So he's worked on him for some time. By the way, he's being quoted for it. This is talking about the Neokhanza song, according to me, in this, how the institution came with the first things, I don't know if you get that here, right? They're talking about his poverty, his knowledge of theology, right? You know? And he compared to somebody who would be talking about science knowing the Guide to British Birds, only. I think this guy's British, I think, or something. I think he's an English, you know, something. And it's, so. You know, these things come and go, you know. I mean, nobody talks about the Da Vinci Code too much anymore. You know, I'll tell you, the books that come an alley on this, you know, you get something infinite about air, you know. But no perfection. Yeah, yeah. The time used to joke, you know, he'd teach us how to, how to, you know, air-producing machine, you know, how to make it, you know. But it was basically overlooking the distinction, you know, the simple, you know, the Perseanian branched ends. And in a sense, that's what Marx is doing, right? It kind of starts with, you know, Kant, they're saying, we know only by making, huh? I kind of, you know, once you say that, then there can't really be any life of the mind apart from making, right? He didn't take, didn't take too good care of his family, you know. They say he liked Shakespeare, though, so I don't know. His kids feed Shakespeare, so. He's buried in London, isn't he, in Hyde Park. There's a monument. He did. He used to work in the British Museum, right? In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise God. And help us to understand all the truth of it in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. You thanked God recently for your guardian angel? Have you thanked God recently for your guardian angel? Well, it's a good thing to do here. I ran across this verse here. I thought it would fit me very well. It's verse 20 there in chapter 40 of Sirach, or Physiasticus. So I've got the official text out here to make sure that I have the whole thing down. Oinas. I know what that is. Wine. Oinas, kai musika. Musika is music. So wine and music. Uphraenusin, the gladden, rejoice, and the cardian, the heart. Kai and upair above, Amphoterra, both of these, Agapaces, the sophias. So I enjoy wine, right? I enjoy musika. Maybe rejoice, my heart. But above both of these, the love of what? Wisdom. I got thinking about the Greek word there. Agapaces. Now you've probably seen that book of C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves, where he discusses, you know, the four different words in Greek, right? Four different kinds of love. And the Greek word that's used for charity, right? Karitas. Is agape, right? This is like that, isn't it? It's agapesis. It's got the same first part of the word, huh? And that's actually the word Aristotle uses at the beginning of the 14 books of wisdom. Where he speaks about the agapesis of the senses, right? Of men, you know, love the senses not just in order to do things, but just in order to see things. Especially the sense of sight, because that most of all reveals things. And so you had that same word, agapesis, huh? So, but it names, you know, more... Well, actually, I looked at it in the big Greek dictionary. Agapesis, they had the idea of choice, too, huh? And if you ever do the treatise on love there, there's one kind of love that's called amor, which is more the sense love, although it can be used in other ways, too. And then you have dilexio, which is more the love of the will. But it comes from the Latin word for, what, choice. And so I sometimes translate the word dilexio there, not just by love, but a chosen love, right? And this agapesis has something of that sort, right? It's a chosen love, it's a love of the will, it's not a, what, emotion, right? I told you about this little Polish professor of philosophy, he says, Mr. Breckis, do you have any emotional attachment to the syllogism? So I was trying to get into the syllogism, and I said, well, I said, I would have an emotional attachment to a girl, but I would have to do the syllogism. I love it, I love its rigor, you know, its conclusion-following necessarily, but I don't have quite that emotional feeling for it. It's called a Polish joke, right? Yeah, yeah. You'd argue this guy's first in a while, and then he'd run to the board and start doing some symbolic logic on the board. I got into the conversation there. So we're up to Article 7 here in Question 16. Where the created truth is, what, eternal, right? And the other one, obviously, is eternal, right? That's truth. For Augustine says in the book on free will, we'd call it free will, but the Latin says de debereo, what, arbitrium, free judgment, that should be the root of our freedom, that our judgment is not, what, altogether, what, determined, right? And so I can see something in some way good, even in the bad, right? And therefore my will can be inclined even to bad things, huh? So people aren't exactly sure, but they're kind of afraid to translate it to accurate the Latin says. Libero, this is in the adjective, I guess, libero arbitrio. The liberum arbitrium, they'll call it. They usually translate it free will, but it doesn't have the word will in there, but judgment, judgment, huh? Where the cat or the dog is kind of determining their judgment, son. He knows how the cats, you know, despite the fact that they were, they knew me pretty well, I was being on their side, right? You give them a little aggressive, you know, behavior, you know, and they really get kind of, you know, the cat, they can't help but judge, you know, you know, even though they have enough experience of you as a friendly sort of person who feeds them every day or something like that, but, yeah. Okay, so Augustine says in the book on free judgment, huh, free will, that nothing is more eternal than the ratio, the thought or the definition of the circle, and that two and three are what? Five. But the truth of these things is a created truth. Therefore, created truth is eternal. Moreover, everything that is always so is eternal, but universals are everywhere and always. Therefore, they are eternal. Therefore, also true, which is maxime, most universal, it's one of the most universal things we saw before, that being and one and so on. So, when did man, now I have a beginning in time, somewhere back in 36 or 35, I guess you found the time in the womb, and I could have an end, right, in time, you know. But when does man begin, when does man cease to be? Well, what man is, he needs to be always. So, it's eternal, right? Moreover, that which is true in the present was always true to be in the future. But the truth of a statement about the present is a created truth. Therefore, the truth of a statement about the future. Therefore, some created truth is, what? Eternal. Moreover, everything that lacks a beginning and an end is eternal. But the truth of inunciable, sounds, things that are able to be stated, lacks a beginning and an end, because if truth began when before it was not, it would be true that truth was not, right? And therefore, by some truth, it would be true. And thus, truth would be before it began to be, huh? So, truth couldn't have a beginning in time, would it? Because then it wouldn't be true that there was no truth before that. Or if it is true that there was no truth before it, then there would be truth before truth was. And likewise, if one lays down that truth has an end, huh? It would follow that after it, it would be after that it ceased to be, right? For it would be true that truth no longer is. Therefore, truth is, what? Eternal. Reminded a little bit of what I mentioned before. I think we studied it. In the first reading there from the second book of wisdom, Aristotle takes up how man is towards truth, huh? And his beginning statement is kind of marvelous, right? He says, the knowledge of truth is in one way difficult, in another way what? And I used to always, you know, say to students, if you went down and knocked on each professor's door down the hall and asked that professor, is the knowledge of truth easy or difficult? They'd always say, it's difficult, if not impossible. It's kind of sketchy, too. But if he knocked at the last door, and it said Aristotle in the door, right, and he asked him, is the knowledge of truth difficult or easy? He would say, well, in one way it's difficult, in another way what? Easy. Okay? Then he goes on to explain both of those, right? But I also point out that if he had a modern philosopher talking about this, he'd probably begin with the question of whether a man can know truth, huh? But do you see a little difficulty in trying to seriously investigate that question? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That's what I reminded me of when he says this. Because on the one hand, I mean, there are things, there are truths that we obviously know, like four is double of two, or the whole is more than the part, and nothing is before or after itself, and so on. But apart from that, if a man was not able to know the truth, he could never know the truth of that statement, huh? And so, in kind of, in an investigation, you're trying to find out, right? You kind of assume that you can know the truth, huh? So, now against all this is that God alone is what? Eternal. Now Thomas says, I answer. It should be said that the truth of things that are enunciable or statable is not anything other than the truth of the understanding that we're talking about. For the statable, the statements, you could say, too, is in the understanding and in the, what? Vocal sounds that signify what's inside the understanding. And according as it is in vocal sound, it is called the, what? The statable truth, right? No, no, excuse me. According as it is in vocal sound, the thing statable is true according as it signifies some truth of the, what? Understanding, right? Not an account of some truth existing in the statement as in the subject. Just as urine is called healthy, not from health which is in it, but from the health of the animal that it, what, signifies, huh? That's why it's so kind of amazing when you read Aristotle's book, the second book in logic, the Perihermoneus, which is about the statement, huh? But actually, when he says what the book is about, it's about the statement in vocal sound. And of course, everybody knows that the statement in vocal sound is not the thing of primary interest and it's the statement in the reason, huh? But he has to have a, what? A sensible tool for a man, huh? Okay? Was it here I was raising or somebody was raising recently? Can you pray without words? What would you say? What would you say? Yeah, yeah. But when the apostles ask our Lord, teach us how to pray, he teaches them, giving him the words of the, what? Our Father, right? So, I would not deny that you could, in some sense, pray without words, right? But it's hard to teach somebody to pray without words. And with yourself, you know, am I daydreaming or am I really, you know? Well, it's something like that with thinking, right? Can you think without words? I'm not saying you can't, but can the logician direct your thinking without using words, huh? And it's a little bit like, you know, the reason we give or one of the reasons we give for the sacraments, that grace is given through a sensible sign, right? And one reason we give is that this is a harmony with man, right? That's hard for man to use a sign or a tool that is not in some way, what, sensible, right? And the same way, we want to add or subtract, multiply or divide, we need some kind of a sensible things like these figures, right? And we speak sometimes of how Arabic numerals are better for calculating maybe than the Roman way of writing things were, right? It'd be kind of hard to, I guess the Romans probably had ways we don't know too well to do these things, but they couldn't be as easy maybe as Roman ones, right? And so we need those sorts of things. So he's making a distinction here, though, but it's like, you know, we order our thinking by ordering our thoughts, and we order our thoughts. There are thoughts by ordering the words that signify those thoughts in some way. So what's in the vocal sound is for the sake of ordering something in the mind, but you can't get that very directly. And Aristotle's books are actually about that. It makes it crystal clear when he defines the statement there in the beginning of the peri-humanus. So he's making comparison here to the urine there, which doesn't have any health in it, but it's a sign of the health, right? Likewise, it has been said above that things are denominated true from the truth of the understanding. Whence, if no understanding were eternal, no truth would be what? Eternal. But because only the divine understanding is eternal, in it alone does truth have what? Eternity, right? Nor, on account of this, does it follow that something other is eternal than God, because the very truth of the divine understanding is God himself, as we've shown before. Now, in reply to that thing, there's an objection drawn from Augustine. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the definition of circle, and that two and three are five, has eternity in the divine mind. Second, can be turned in my mind, because my mind was not always, huh? Just as doing breakfast was not always, huh? And the second one is, if you look back there for a second, the second one, that's the one drawn from, what, the universal, right? Okay. The universals are ubiqui, everywhere, and always, right? To the second, it should be said that for something to be always and everywhere can be understood in, what, two different ways, huh? In one way, that it has in itself, whence it stretches itself out to every time and every place, just as it belongs to God to be where, everywhere, right, and always, huh? In another way, because it does not have in itself that by which is determined or limited to some place or to some, what, time, huh? Just as first matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, as a man is one, for the unity of his one form, but by the removal or the absence, right, of all forms distinguishing it. And in this way, each universal is said to be, what, everywhere and always, insofar as universals abstract from the here and the now, right? But from this, it does not follow them to be eternal, except in understanding, if this understanding is eternal, which, of course, is only the divine understanding. Okay, to the third, this is the one about a statement always being true. To the third, it should be said that that which is now, from this was future before it came to be, because it was in its cause, right, that it might be. Whence, taking away its cause, it would not be future for it to come about. But the only, only the first cause is, what, eternal. Incidentally, you know, Thomas has a famous work on the eternity of the world, right, where he objects, where he considers the arguments for and against, and argues that, although some of them have maybe some probability, none of them are demonstrative, they show necessarily that the universe always was, or always, was not always, right? And so he says we know it only by, what, faith, right? Like the heaven beginning of Genesis. In the beginning, God made heaven and earth, right? And we think Aristotle, you know, thought the universe was eternal, right? But his reasons are not necessary reasons, huh? It's sort of interesting that in the book on dialectical reasoning, probable reasoning as opposed to demonstration, Aristotle gives an example of where the universe is eternal now, something we'd love to know, as if Aristotle recognized that he didn't have a, what, a demonstration, right? But, you know, Thomas is not sure what Aristotle is doing sometimes. He may have taken it as being probable that the universe was eternal, right? But he might also have been doing something like we know Euclid did. When you go through the theorems of Euclid in geometry, sometimes a geometrical theorem requires a number of cases, they call that, to be distinguished. And the great commentators like Propos and so on will distinguish these cases, huh? But what Euclid has done is take the most difficult case and show it. And these are the easier cases for us nincompoops to come afterwards, right? And so when Aristotle is going to demonstrate that God exists, huh? He does so, assuming the more difficult case in which to show it, namely the case in which you say the universe always was. See, if the universe was not always, then it's clear that something had to bring it into existence. If the universe always existed, it had to have a cause too, but it's not so clear. And Aristotle brought that out there, right? So like Euclid, he's taking the more, what, difficult case, huh? So that's another way of looking at what Aristotle's doing there. Although they also, in addition, have thought it was more probable too, but I mean, it doesn't seem so far-fetched to think when you see that this is what Euclid does all the time. And I mean, Heath, he will talk about that, right? You know, it's contrary to the custom of Euclid, to give all the cases, he just takes the most difficult one. And these for us nitwits or dimwits, to supply the other cases. Whence it does not foul that those things which are were always true that they would be in the future, except insofar as in the eternal cause it was that they would be, what, future. Which cause God alone is. Okay, now the fourth one here about truth always was, right? To the fourth it should be said, because our understanding is not eternal, neither is the truth of those statements which are formed by us, that are put together by us, eternal, right? So the statement that the whole is more than a part, wasn't always made, huh? Because God doesn't know it by putting together whole and part, and before there was a mind to put them together, it wasn't put together. So that truth of that statement didn't exist. But at some time he says it, what, began, right? And before, huh, this sort of truth was, it was not true to say that such truth was not, except by the divine understanding itself, in which alone truth is, what, eternal. But now it is true to say the truth then, what, yeah. Which is not true except, what, by the truth which is now in our understanding, not through the truth which is on the side of the, what, thing. Because this is a truth about non-being. He's going back to this whole thing about non-being. Non-being, however, does not have from itself that it be true, but only from the understanding, what, grasping it out. Sometimes in English it's easy to see the idea that nothing is not something except, by the mind it takes it as something. But something and being are almost the same thing, and nothing and non-being are the same thing. Whence, insofar as it is true to say, whence to that extent it is true to say that truth was not, insofar as we grasp the non-being of it as preceding its, what, being, right? But we still have to be there to grasp it. We're not always there to grasp it. So, Notice you can reason, like Socrates does sometimes, you can say. And Socrates gave one of the arguments for the immortality of the soul. He argues that, uses the place that if what is less apt to survive death, survives death, then what is more apt to survive death will survive death, right? And then he says, now, in my body, or through my body, I'm in contact with this chair, which I can see and feel, right? And this chair that I can see or feel is obviously corruptible, obstructible. But through my soul and through my reason, I'm in contact with what a chair is. Now, can you destroy what a chair is? So the soul, through its reason, is in contact with what is indestructible. The body, through the senses, is only in contact with what is destructible. Now, that by itself doesn't show yet that the soul is indestructible, right? But it does show that the soul is closer to the indestructible than the body, right? So, the soul is more apt to be indestructible than the body. Well, then he points to the fact that, in a way, the body does survive death, at least the bones, right? And he mentions down in Egypt, you know, the flesh is, to some extent, preserved. But at least the bones, you know, like in Hamlet, there, when they're digging in the grave, you know, and they run across, you know, Alas, poor York. That was like a guy who made all these jokes to the table. And so, if the body, then, which is less apt to survive, doesn't in some way survive death? Well, then even more so, the soul, right? Then you can come back upon the same beginning and say something else, though. You can say, this chair is destructible, right? But the soul knows this chair in knowing what a chair is. And what a chair is, as we said, is indestructible. So, what is destructible has become indestructible insofar as it's in reason or known by reason. Now, does what is destructible become indestructible in the soul because of the thing you're knowing? No, that's destructible. So, it's a sign that the soul is something indestructible, that even destructible things become indestructible, in a way, in the soul, right? Because what is received in something is received in it according to the, what? Character of the receiver, right? Okay? You know, if I put, there's a certain shape now that the water's taken on here, right? But if clay took on this shape, it would hold it longer than the water, right? So, the shape of the cup, however, is received differently in clay and water, right? And since it's the same shape being received in both, the difference must be due to the difference between clay and water, that the one holds the shape somewhat and the other one easily loses it, right? So, it's interesting that destructible things become indestructible as they are known by our reason, right? And that's a sign of the nature of reason as something indestructible, right? Socrates doesn't develop that argument, actually. I think people are coming back upon that now to see that as an argument. But a lot of times people can misunderstand what Augustine is saying, right? Like in that first argument there. Because Augustine is thinking there about the fact that there's something in a way indestructible about what a circle is, or what a sphere is, although this material sphere is indestructible. But even what a chair is, it's indestructible about that. 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