Prima Pars
Lecture 78: Falsity in Things and the Senses

Transcript
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Justin says in the book of Syloquies, that the tragedian is a false, what, Hector, huh? Was Hamlet Kempere, you know, the actor was weeping, you know, what's Hector about him, you know, he's weeping and tears are coming down, so, he's falsely, but contrary-wise, each thing can be called true according to that which, what, yeah, it's fitting for it. Another way, by way of cause, this is a moral common sense, in this way, a thing is said to be false, which is apt to make a false, what, opinion about itself, huh? So that's what you call false teeth, right? Why do you call them false? Well, if they're really well-made, they seem to be, what, the real thing, right? And because it's innate in us, to those things which appear on the outside, to judge about things, huh? In that our knowledge begins from the, what, senses, huh? We've talked about that before, we've talked about the natural road, right? So we tend to know things in an outward way before anything. And the senses, which first, in per se, are of the outward accidents, right? Therefore, those things which, in their exterior accidents, have some likeness of other things, are said to be false by those things, just as what? What's Phil? Yeah, it's a false honey. And ston, what's that? Tin is a false silver, right? Silver, right. Okay? Where you speak of fool's gold, right? Because it appears to be gold. I don't know what's so rich! Now, now, buddy, this isn't gold. You know, or what's the, I think it looks like a diamond there. Not a diamond, but a cheaper stone. Rainstone. Rainstone. I can't remember the name of it, but. The Irish Christians couldn't tell them apart, you know, from a diamond, huh? You know, by a big thing, I go, oh, how much do you pay for it? It's not a... So, a woman has her diamond ring, you know, adjusters like that. You know, the guy, you know, puts in all these other stones in there, you know, and you don't discover until later on, then there's all kinds of problems. And according to this, Augustine says in the Book of Syloquies that we name those things or call those things false, right? Which have a likeness, right? We apprehend as being like something else. And the philosopher, huh? And that's the, what? Antonia Messiah for Aristotle, right? And the philosopher says in the fifth book of the metaphysics that those things are called false, which are apt to what? Appear either as they are not, right? Or what they are not. And in this way also, a man is called false, who is a lover of false opinions and speeches and so on. This guy comes out from the travel agency, right? To talk about, you know, the details of the trip, you know. And when you get on the Lithuanian airline, he says, What? You just get a reaction on people, you know. Because you're going to Atlanta, you know, which is nice. They're like, what? You know, before, but first he said, you know, Lithuanian airline, you know. Like, say, you know, the Saudi Arabian airline. You know, what's the travel, that guy over there. But let's say these false things, you know, and you can react to other people, huh? And I guess there's some people who like to go around, you know, saying false things and making them sound kind of, what? Incredible, right? I told you about when I was out in the ball there. And this priest I knew, he comes up and he tells me, Your old teacher, Kassarik, is going to Russia. And, you know, Kassarik had gone to the ball as an older man, you know, I've been older than most students. And we first got up there and he told Deconic, you know, if you teach philosophy the way it's been taught to me down in the States, I just get up and leave your class. And Deconic's just fine. And they, but they used to kill each other, you know. So, Father Jerome, they told me this. So he says, I told Deconic, you know, about it. And Deconic says, I hope it keeps his mouth shut more over there than it does here and never get out. And so I walked away and he thought, now that's when I realize it's April Fool's Day, right? And I said, gee, you know, did I fall for that? Because that's exactly what Deconic would have said if someone had told him that, right? You know, they would have some kind of remark like this, you know. But actually, he ended up, he was going to Russia, in fact. So, I was nothing to see, but I thought, you know, for a while when I realized it was April Fool's Day, people, you know, playing these tricks, and you know, he made it so credible, you know. And so if you want to, you know, say that something happened to somebody, and you know how a person would react and you tell it, it's very similar to it, huh? So there's a virtue in ethics, which Aristotle calls truthfulness, where a man shows himself in his words and deeds as he is, huh? Not, however, from this that he is able to, what? Imagine them, right? Because thus also the wise and those who are no would be called false, as is said in the fifth book of metaphysics. So, Thomas has made those distinctions, right? Okay. Now, let's go back to the first objection, huh? Augustine is saying, what? If the true is that which is, right? Then one would what? Yeah, yeah. To the first, therefore, it should be said, that things compared to the understanding, according to that which it is, is called true, but according to that which it is not, is called false. Whence a true tragedian is a, what? Hector, as is said in the second book of the Solicies of Augustine. Thus, therefore, in those things which are, there is found some non-being, right? So, also in those things which are, there is found some, what? Some kind of falsity, yeah, some notion or some definition of falsity. Okay, second objection, Augustine says, well, things look like they're supposed to look, right? God, paraphrase them. To the second, it should be said, the things as such do not, what? Deceive, right? But, Karachigans, right? But, they give the occasion of, what? Yeah. Insofar as they, what? Bear the likeness of those things, of which they do not have the existence of the nature of. So, there really is fool's gold, right? And there are things that resemble something other than there. Okay, the third objection. Moreover, true is said in things in comparison to divine understanding. But, each thing, insofar as it is, imitates God. Therefore, each thing is true without falsity. He says, to the third, it should be said that in comparison to the divine understanding, things are not said to be, what? False. Which would be for them to be false simply. But, in comparison to our understanding, which is for them to be false in some way, right? And that was a distinction he made in the body article there, right? Where he said the same thing about comparison to the divine mind, huh? So, there's no false teeth of God's mind, huh? But, for us, there is false teeth, and there's fool's gold, right? But, you know, fool's gold for God, huh? Now, it's going to be probably to the other side, right? It's kind of a sign of the distinctions in the body article. But, again, this is what Augustine says in the book on true religion, that everybody... That everybody... That everybody... That everybody... That everybody... That everybody... is what? A true body and a false what? Unity. Because it imitates unity and is not unity, right? Okay, maybe the same thing we said about the goodness. To this fourth that is objected on the other side, it should be said that likeness or a deficient representation does not induce the notion of falsity except insofar as it gives us the occasion of a false opinion. Whence not everywhere there is likeness is a thing said to be false. But wherever there is such a likeness that is apt to make a false opinion, not to anyone but for the most part, then you're deceived. Nerstau begins the book on sophistical refutations and on the fallacies and the magic, right? They talk about likeness, right? And how likeness is what? A cause of deception. Plato said this in the sophist I believe it is, that likeness is a slippery thing, right? And Serstau says, some men, you know, are really strong, others are, you know, all these things a woman has to make their breasts, you know, see more than they are or something like that. But these are, what? It's not really so, right? And so he's kind of bringing out the general idea and how one stone, you know, resembles another stone sometimes and appears to be something it isn't. And so he's kind of introducing the idea that likeness there can be a cause of what? Deception. And therefore, when you get to arguments, you can have something that appears to be a good argument that fails, right? You see that, if you're a professor there, you can see that a lot, that students are easily deceived by the most common kind of mistake, you know, which is the fallacy of equivocation, right? But how easily they're deceived by this, easily deceived. Sometimes when I get through teaching the first reading there and the physics there, Aristotle is showing that the general is before the particular, because we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly, right? And the general is not as distinct as the particular, so we know things in general before we know them particular. And then sometimes I'll pay the sophist enough, and then I'll say, well, but Aristotle says that our knowledge begins with our senses, and the senses know only particular things, and it's reason that generalizes. So therefore, the particular comes before the general. So Aristotle has, what, contradicted himself. They all think he has done that, right? But they don't see that the word general in particular have two different meanings, huh? When Aristotle says the general is before the particular, he means the more universal before the, what, less universal. But when he says that the particular is known for the general, he means the singular before the universal. So what he's saying as a whole, but not in one place, right, is that singulars come before any universals in our knowledge, just as the senses come before the use of reason, huh? But among universals, the more universal comes before the, what, less universal. Well, since we use the word particular both for the singulars and for the less universal, but they don't see that distinction, right, then they're all deceived into thinking that he's contradicting himself, huh? When I say that Socrates is a particular man, particular means, say, what, individual, or you are a particular man, or I'm a particular man, right? But when I say that the dog is a particular kind of animal, particular doesn't mean singular, does it? Individual. No. It means something less universal, right, than animal, right? But they have a hard time seeing that, even after you, you know, explain that. If you put it on an exam, there'll still be some students who won't distinguish the senses, But it's very easy, very easy to deceive people by those sort of things. Yeah. Or the other example I give a lot in classes, I'll say, you know, is the whole always more than the part? And then I'll say, well, what's man? Well, he's an animal, but he's not just an animal, right? And I often quote my mother, you know, because she didn't like me to say that man is an animal, right? I said, well, Mom, I don't mean he's just an animal. He's an animal that has reason, right? Okay. So animal is only a part of what man is. So you ought to get into that, right? But animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, and elephant. So what's only a part of man includes more than man. So sometimes the part is more than the whole. Yeah, I guess you're right. Again, there's two different meanings here of whole and part. And one is the composed whole. And the definition is one kind of composed whole. And the definition is composed of more than one of its parts. And then the other sense of whole is the universal whole, but is said of its parts. And the universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts is said of it. And so you say that man is more than an animal. You're thinking of animal as one of the composing parts of the definition of man. And the definition of man contains, besides animal, reason. But when you say that animal includes more than man, you're thinking of animal now as a different kind of whole. It's said of not only man, but other things. It's said of more than man is said of it. So you're confusing two different senses, right, of one part. But if you look at any one sense of whole or part, the whole is either, is always more than the part. It's either made up of more than just that one part, or it's said of more than just that one part is said of it. But they have a hard time seeing that, right? And those are common examples, but it's very easy to lead them astray if you wanted to. But it's the unity of the word there, it's what deceives them, right? Now, if the word was equivocal by chance, it would not be seriously deceived, right? They'd laugh, right? Now, my example there, Roger Murray said, 61 homes with a bat. The bat is a flying rodent, therefore, it's a flying rodent. So nobody's going to be deceived by that, right? But in the case of a word that's equivocal by reason, there's a certain likeness among the meanings, and a proximity among them, and that's why you kind of be deceived by likeness. You know, you heard about this in the radio now, they found some tomb there 27 years ago, you know, that has some guy named Jesus buried in it. Oh, yeah? And so, there's somebody else buried there, but they think it's a woman, you know, so that must be his wife, you know. They're starting this whole thing over, you know. And the Father was saying at Mass this morning, if one could laugh, you know, watch the program on it tonight. Oh, no. But everybody had heard about it, you know. Everybody's kind of laughing at the church, they eat pretty Mass this morning. Oh, no. So, I just, I'll make some money on this thing, you know. I'll be on all the TV stations for a while. Ian Brown, right? Yeah, and then, yeah, so, you know. But here, he happened to have the same name, you know. I guess the name Jesus is fairly common in the end of the day. I was going to say, it's probably some Puerto Rican name. Yeah, yeah. And even Mary, you know, I mean, you know how the crucifixion is. There are three Marys there, right? So, there's a Mary maybe in that tomb too, I guess. And Jesus and a Mary. And Jesus, son of Joseph, so they must be the same guy. That book of the Old Testament, which is quoted, it's Jesus, Ben, and Simon. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Joshua. Then the other one must be, you know, the other one must be Mary Magdalene, and the other one must be the son, you know. So, the flimsy is, you know, like this is the son. Who we're seeing in Toynbee, you know, famous kind of story, right? We had a picture in one of those books there, you know, of the Eucharist, right? And the thing, you know, and kind of, you know, singing legs between that and great worship there in the Greeks and so on. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, these are very superficial things, you know, with the likeness between them, huh? Just to be part of the story so easily. Okay, I'm going to make a time for a little bit of an article. Sure. Okay. Whether there is falsity in the senses. Okay, the second one proceeds thus. It seems that in the sense there is not falsity, or falsity. For Augustine says in the book about true religion that if all the senses of the body announce as they are affected, I don't know what more we can demand from them, right? And thus it seems that from the senses we are not, what? Yeah. And thus falsity in the sense is not in the senses, huh? So you're saying the senses merely tell us how they've been affected. But Morgan, you ask for them. Moreover, the philosopher says in the fourth book of wisdom, the fourth book, metta, after the books and natural philosophy, that falsehood is not private or proper to the senses, but to the, what, imagination. The imagination is a great source of what falsehood are thinking. Imagining things to be what, yeah. So they discover, you know, an accident, you know, when they, if two people see an accident, and they ask them to write down right away what they saw, rather than wait until next week or next week to write down what they saw, there'll be much more agreement between what they saw, but a week later they'll start to emerge more and more. And your imagination takes over, right? And sometimes, you know, you haven't seen something for a while, and you go back and look at it again, and you say, here it is. I've been imagining it other than it is, right? So Thomas often speaks of the, what, on the side of knowing powers, right? False imagination is the main cause of, what, deception, right? And false imagination means what? Imagining things other than they are, right? And sometimes the thing can be imagined, but you're imagining it other than it is. And sometimes, you know, when talking about God or something like that, you may be trying to imagine something that cannot be, what, imagined. So any imagination is false, right? So Waiti says you have to transcend the imagination to think about God. But you have to do that with a lot of other things, too. Even in trying to understand ability, you know, people want to imagine, right? What is in something and ability to be actually in there, right? Like I quoted Weitzschel there, the scientist there, saying that when we imagine something, we make it actually in our imagination. So we try to imagine ability, and then we falsify it, right? There's a difficulty with anoxygenist and with the students of the Almighty Particles. What was it? C.S. Lewis, the one book, you know, describes going down to some part of England he'd never been in before. And he was being picked up at the railroad station wherever it is by his uncle so-and-so, you know, and they're driving down the road there in that place. He makes a remark about, this is not all the way I thought it was going to be, you know, and his uncle turns on, you know, kind of, you know, what did you have to think there was... You know? But, you know, when you go to some place, you imagine it to be a certain way, right? And, you know, even I go to travel to England or somebody should imagine it to be a single thing. And get there is not the way you imagine it to be, right? I often tell the example, you know, when I was in high school, you know, I used to get kind of a little tired of the monkey business of high school, you know, and say, wait till I get to college. And I imagine what it would be like to be in college. That's where the real serious thing is going on. And then to get to college, I found that it wasn't exactly the way I thought it was going to be. I said, wait till I get to graduate school, you know, but I want to study really, you know, and that sort of stuff. And he found graduate school that's not what you thought it was going to be. He said, wait till I get out teaching, you know, do what I want to do, you know. He found out teaching that's not exactly what you thought it was going to be. Nothing in this life seems to turn out to be, you know, the way it is, the way you think it's going to be. But Shakespeare in Midsummer Night's Dream is very good about, you know, imagination being the cause of what? Falsity. So there's a lot to be said to that. It's in the commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, that Thomas goes into this a lot. The chief cause of deception on the side of the annoying powers is false imagination on the side of the annoying powers. The will is what? Pride, you know. And so it goes into how pride is a cause of deception too. Moreover, in complex things, there is not truth or falsity, but only in the complex things. So unicorn, true or false? If I see the unicorns in the woods around here, that's either true or false, right? The unicorn period, no. If I see unicorns are in fiction, my granddad's got a pet unicorn. That's not false, right? The unicorns are in fiction, right? That's true. The unicorns are in the woods probably is false, to the best of my knowledge. But to put together and divide does not pertain to the senses. They don't make statements. Therefore, in the sense, there is no falsity. Good argument. But against this is what Augustine says in the book on the Soliloquies. It appears, what? To us, is it? In all the senses, by a likeness that is what? What's Leno Sinante there? What's the word? Yeah. That did you see, right? So Thomas says, I answer it should be said that falsehood should not be sought in the senses except as there is truth in the senses. Truth is not thus in the senses that the senses know truth in but in so far as they have a true, what? Grasp of sensible things. Which happens in this way when they grasp things as they are. Whence there happens to be falsehood in the senses when they grasp something or judge a thing other than they are. But in this way, the senses have themselves to knowing things in so far as there is a likeness of things in the sense. But a likeness of something is in the senses in three ways. Now he's going back to the distinction which Aristotle made in the, what, second book about the soul, right? And in daily life, you don't realize that people don't see this distinction too clearly, right? Do I see you? Or do I see your color and your shape and so on? What do I see? Do I really see you? Although I seem to in some way know you when I see your color and your shape and your movement and so on, right? But do I see you then really as such? I see your, what, your color and your shape as such, right? Okay? So Aristotle distinguishes between the sensible as such or per se they call sometimes through itself and the sensible by happening or by accident, right? Okay? But the sensible by accident or by happening is known by something other in you when you do sense. I see you're alive, right? You're still alive, I think, huh? But do I sense your life as such? That something else in me recognizes you to be alive when I see you moving and talking and smiling and being amused and so on. Do you see the point? Okay. But then you also see the distinction among the sensibles as such or per se between what only this sense knows like your color is known by my eyes, right? But your shape, for example, could be known by my hand, right? So the shape of your head or something or something. and also by my eyes, right? And so he speaks of the proper or private sensibles, which I know by only one sense, and then the, what, common sensibles, right? And Thomas is going to use that threefold distinction. In one way, first, and per se, as in the sight is a likeness of colors, and of other private sensibles, right? Sometimes they translate proper as proper, but I think it's a sense of, what, private there, private sensibles. In another way, per se, but not first, as in sight is a likeness of shape and, what, magnitude, right? And the other common sensibles, they call it, right? Now, I make use of that distinction there, you know, when I'm manifesting the fact that it's not impossible that, say, philosophy and theology might sometimes know the same thing, but they wouldn't know the same thing in the same way. And you say, was it possible that you can know the same thing in two different ways? Well, you can see it already in the senses, huh? That I can know the shape of this, what, cup? If I had kept my eyes closed since I came in this room, right? I can still know the shape, but I know it through touch, right? Through how far the hardness of it extends, right? Without using my hands, without even touching it, I could know the shape through my eyes, right? So my eyes and my sense of touch both know the shape of the cup, but not in the same way, right? One knows it through color, you might say, how far the color extends, and the other knows it through hardness or something of that sort, right? But the color of the cup is known only by the eye, and the hardness of it only by the sense of touch, right? Okay? In the third way, neither, what, first nor through itself or as such, but by happening, by happening. As in sight there is the likeness of a man, man, not insofar as he's a man, but insofar as to this colored thing, right? It happens to be a man, right? Now Einstein gets all mixed up in this, right? Because as a scientist, he thinks that the actual sensible must be a, what? A hypothesis. And so I make fun of Einstein saying, you know, for Einstein then, the existence of his wife is a, what? Hypothesis. Explaining a series of sounds and spells. Hypothesis. But I'll show you how that gets followed up, you know, by his specialty there, right? And he comes back, he looks upon it, huh? And, you know, the other famous example, I know one of the scientists there in the, used to use the book sometimes, The Introduction to Experimental Medicine, by Claude Bernard, I think I mentioned that. But, you know, what he sees in experimental science is that you have an hypothesis, and then secondly, you deduce the consequence of the hypothesis, and then third, by experiment or observation, to see whether those predictions are verified or not. Well, he says the philosopher, he has hypotheses, and he introduces consequences on them, but that's all he does. So he's missing the third part, right? The theologian, he just has hypotheses and didn't even deduce him. So he sees, you know, experimental science as being completed, as having these three things, right? Three is the first number bump. You say, oh, the philosopher is two of the three, and the believer is just one of the three, right? So he imagines, I mean, the scientist imagines the hypothesis, right? Then he reasons out the consequences of it, and then he checks by experiment and observation, to see what those things are. So the philosopher, he imagines things too, and, you know, deduces the consequence of whether he doesn't go and check them or not. And the theologian, or the believer, he just imagines things. You can see how he's influenced, right, just by his own way of knowing, right? And tries to understand other things in terms of that. So when Einstein talks about you or me, you're an hypothesis to explain a series of sounds and colors and smells and so on, that doesn't seem to agree with our experience of knowing each other. I've got a whole bunch of, you know, twelve grandchildren, twelve hypotheses. So anyway, now he's going to distinguish, this is an important thing to see, right? And about the private sense of both, the senses do not, as a rule, you might say, have false knowledge, right? Except by happening, and rarely, right? Within pocciori was, right? On account of the disposition of the organ, right? It does not receive the sensible form, suitably, right? Just as other things that undergo, on account of some indisposition, receive in a, what? Deficient way, the impressing of the agent, right? And hence it is, on account of the corruption of the tongue, to those who are sick, sweet things seem to be, what? Bitter, right? Okay. We all have some experience of that, you know, when I was a little boy, my mother said, eat your orange before you eat your candy, you know? And if you eat the candy first, then the orange tastes almost, what, bitter, you know? But I usually, you know, I put an orange, such an orange in the morning, and that's my, my fantasy in the morning. And, and I don't have any candy or cookie or anything like that. I mean, I add an orange, and then I really taste it as it is, right? I've been Sunday at a wine tasting where someone says, well, you know, if you eat this particular thing, then the wine's going to taste differently, you know? And so, a lot of times people want to just have, maybe some, you know, a bit of bread or something, you know, but rather something very fancy, you know? They don't make it, you know, one of these dips, it'll be the hot thing, you know? Then you can't, it may taste good, but you don't really taste the wine as it is, right? So your organ is, is indisposed, huh? And, if you eat a lot of candy, you know, and lemon drops and so on, you can't really taste the wine, huh? So, sometimes your tongue is indisposed, right? Generally speaking, the sweet will taste sweet, and the bitter will taste bitter, and the salty will taste salty, and so on. So you're not apt to be deceived by other sensible things, huh? And the rough will feel rough, and the smooth will feel, okay? So generally speaking, the senses are not deceived about their private sensibles, unless the organ is, isn't disposed, right? Um, but about the common sensibles, and the prachidans, there can be a false judgment, even in the sense, what? Rightly disposed, huh? Because the senses do not, what, directly refer to those things, but, what, prachidans, huh? That's the accidental sensibles. We were talking about that before, right? Fool's gold, right? You don't sense gold as such, right? You sense the color of the gold, right? So if something else has a color of gold, you might, you know, oh, I've discovered gold, right? I'm wealthy. But, or else in the case, the common sensibles, because they're known in the way to be, what, private sensibles, right? I remember one time, an assumption there, they, something I should have done more, but, what they call optical illusions, right? You know? And all these ways people find out when they make lines look longer or shorter or bent or something like that, you know? But, you know, the simplest one is, you know, if you draw two lines like this, and you say, now, they look to be the same, what? Blink, right? But then if you do like this, and I stand back, and the bottom line, to me, now looks shorter than the one on top, right? And apparently, you know, people may have studied the same, there's a whole number of ways to do it, this is the simplest way, you know? But there are ways to make things look longer or shorter than they are, or, I mean, make straight things look bent and things, right? But doesn't that look shorter, you see? But now you're being deceived about, what, common sensible, which is, what, linked, right? And so, these are known through something else, right? Through the private sensibles, through the color, and so on. So there are ways which are more commonly deceived, right? But the common sensibles are about people like private sensibles, right? Not to see... about the color of this here, you know, as far as the link back now, but he's a bit deceived, right? Well, what's kind of interesting about this exhibition was they had the different ways of doing it that had been discovered gradually over time, right? And so it's kind of an art of deceiving the eyes, just as in logic as an art of deceiving reason. Aristology gives them 13 ways of deceiving reason that the sophists can make use of, huh? And, but what's important to know, especially the most common ways, right, and so he has six ways in speech and seven ways outside of speech, you know, pretty much quite a discovery, right? There's something like that for the eye, right, with these things. So Thomas will make this distinction, and when the moderns, you know, attack the senses, they don't make this distinction between the three kinds of, what, sensibles, right? I see your color, I see your shape, and I see you. But you and your shape and your color our objects are sensible in different ways. Your color and your shape as such, but not you. And, but yet there's a distinction between the way I see your color and the way I see your, what, shape. Because I see your shape because the color extends so far, right? If you had two gases in here, you know, I guess they tell me there's different kinds of gases in the area, but I can't see this where the hydrogen gets off and hydrogen begins or nitrogen and so on because they don't have any, what, color, right? So I kind of know the shape of this table here, even though I haven't really gone around and felt the whole shape all the way around, right? Because the color extends so far, right? And then it gives off. And if I came to know it might shape it because the hardness gives way as I go along, right? You know? It gives in. So I'm kind of going the common sensibles through the private sensibles. When you know one thing through something else, then you don't know it as well as the first thing, right? Now, it's a little bit like, but you're not really reasoning from one to the other, right? You say, you don't really go through the discourse, huh? Reason is the ability for large discourse, right? Reason is the ability to know one thing to another. The senses kind of know them together, you know? It doesn't really... The eye doesn't reason from the color to the shape, right? But in a way, it is knowing one through the other, right? And therefore, it'll be like the reason. But reason is more deceived in the conclusions than in the beginnings. Now, the first thing there, where he quoted Augustine saying, if the senses tell you how they feel, what more can you ask of them? The doctor asks, how do you feel? You feel hot? I wasn't that hot. So the first effort should be said, for the senses to be affected is for them to what? Sense. Hence, by the fact that the senses thus announce things as they are affected, it follows that they are not deceived in the judgment by which they judge themselves to sense something. But from this, that the sense is otherwise affected sometimes, and the thing is, it follows that they announce to us sometimes a thing to be other than it is. And from this, the senses are, what? Deceived, though not about the sensing itself, right? Okay? Of course, you notice that people are in the same room as somebody that's kind of cold in here. I don't feel cold. Maybe they've been sitting there, you know, doing nothing and their body and the temperature has, what, gone down and they're, you know, feeling the thing in a way that a person has been doing some work or something doesn't feel it, right? We used to know this was up at Laval there when we would in a cold, you know, afternoon, you know, and the best professors, like, once in Indiana get to class at five in the afternoon, right? So you come out, you've been sitting in the classroom for three to six or something like that, you know, and you get out of the classroom and out into the cold Quebec weather, you know, and then we go to the place where you pay ten cents and get your trunks and your hot shower and then you swim for half an hour and then you take a hot shower and then you come out and go, you know, you feel nice and, you know, warm and your circulation is going, you know, so the way your body is disposed, right, in one case or another, will make you feel the coldness more or less, right? But you have to distinguish between the way you deceive more by the accidental sensible and the common sensible, like up there, than by the private sensible. But even the private sensibles and the senses can be, what, deceived if they've had, what, you need hot things and try to taste the wine. Yeah. I know when I talked with the Christian brothers there and they had their wines, you know, sometimes at the dinner, you know, faculty and so on. But in those days, if you didn't smoke or something, but maybe you're at the blah, blah beforehand and someone offers you cigarettes and you're smoking with them, that's going to affect your judgment, right? Your tasting of the wine, right? And more so for a person who didn't smoke regularly, right? Because in other ways you get to kind of know these things, right? A person who smokes regularly they kind of adjust to that, right? But for someone who doesn't, you know, it might destroy your sense of taste. cigar before you taste the wine. Well, it's 4.30 I guess you got to stop, huh? Isn't that time we stop? You'll start jumping up around 4.30 don't you? It's time we stop. Okay. So we're not going to find out whether there's falsity in the understanding and how true and false are opposed, right? But we can't find out next week because I'll be in London, England. It'll be false if you wouldn't. Yeah, yeah.