Prima Pars
Lecture 80: True and False as Contraries: Opposition and Foundation

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Article 4. To the 4th one proceeds thus, it seems that true and false are not contrary. For true and false are opposed as what is and what is not. For true is that which is, as Augustine says. But what is and what is not are not opposed as contraries. They're opposed as what? Contradictaries, right? Therefore true and false are not contraries. Moreover, one of two contraries is not in the other. But the false is in the true. Because as Augustine says in the book on Siloquis, the tragedian is a false hector. You would not be a false hector if you were not a true what? Tragedian, a true actor. Therefore true and false are not contrary. Moreover in God, there is not any contrariety. For nothing is contrary to the divine substance. God is not in the genus, right? As Augustine says in the 12th book about the city of God. But to God, the falsehood is opposed. For the idol in scripture is called a lie. And he quotes the text of Jeremiah. They grasped the lie. That is idols, as the class says. Which is from Jerome, my book tells me. Therefore true and false are not what? Contraries. But against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of Perihermeneus. And that's the book about statement, right? The second book of logic has come down from the so-called father of logic, right? He lays down that false opinion is contrary to the true opinion, right? I answer. It should be said. That true and false are opposed as contraries, right? And not as affirmation and negation. Now when he says, and not as affirmation and negation, that's another way of saying, and not as, what? Contradictory. Because we express them in terms of affirmation and negation. As some people say. Now, to the evidence of all this, it should be known that negation neither lays down something, right? Nothing real. Nor does it determine for itself some subject. Now he's hinting upon what are two kinds of opposition there. What is he distinguishing negation from? And contrariety. When he says, neque ponid aliquid, he's thinking of what? Contraries, right? Because vice doesn't simply what? Negate. But it posits something, right? A real habit, right? Vice is a real habit. And privation, although it's not, it's an unbeing, it determines for itself some subject, right? So blindness is not simply negation, an unbeing of sight. It's an unbeing of sight in a subject, right? That's able to have sight and shouldn't have sight. Do you follow that? Okay. Or do you see? And an account of this is able to be said both of being and of, what? Non-being. That's not seeing, right? And not sitting. Now, privation or lack does not place something there, right? But it does determine for itself a, what? Subject. He's saying the same thing. We have a number of different words here. For it is a negation in a subject, as is said in the fourth book of metaphysics, in the book of wisdom. Okay? It's an unbeing in a subject. For blind is not said except of that which is naturally apt to see. So the chair is not blind, but if you don't see, you're blind. Because you're naturally apt to see, right? Now, the contrary does two things. It both posits something, right? It's not just an unbeing. It posits something and also determines a subject, right? So the vice opposed to virtue is not something negation or an unbeing of virtue, right? But it's a real, what, habit that's being placed there in the right. And it also has the same subject as the virtue. So if the virtue is in reason, the vice is in reason. If the virtue is in the will, the vice opposed to it is in the will. If the virtue is in the irascible appetite, like courage, then the vice cowardice is in the same subject, right? And, of course, linked with that is the fact, then, that the two contraries are in the same genus. They're species, huh? To go back to logic, huh? For black is some species of color. Now, the false, he says, what? Posits something, right? For the false is, as the philosopher says in the fourth book of metaphysics, from this that something is said or seems to be what it is not or not to be what it is. And there he's taking more of the good and bad, I mean, true and false there in things, right? Just as true has an adequate taking of the thing, so a false taking of the thing is not adequate. Whence is manifest that true and false are what? Contraries, right? Okay, now he's going to reply to the first objection, which is taken from Augustine, saying that the true is that which is. To the first, therefore, it should be said that that which is in things is called the, what? Truth of the thing. But that which is grasped is the true of the understanding, huh? In which first is truth. That sort of truth is primarily in the mind. But good is primarily in things, yeah. That's the famous point that Aristotle makes very briefly in the sixth book of wisdom, you know. Green, he tells the commentator, he said, listen, Thomas, huh? That's the point he makes. Whence the false is that which is not as it is apprehended. There's an apprehension there, right? There's a thinking. Now, to apprehend to be and not to be have, what? Contrarity, as the philosopher proves in the second book of the Prairie Hermeneus. Thomas is very much the student of Aristotle, as you can tell. That to this opinion that the good is good is contrary, the good is what? Not good, huh? Now, you have to be kind of careful with what you're saying there, right? If I say, in the Prairie Hermeneus, if we say that two is half of four, and two is not half, you take those two statements. In the Prairie Hermeneus, Aristotle would say they're opposed contradictorly. So the contradictory of two is half of four is that two is not half of four. Now, it gets a little more complicated in there because if you have a universal subject, right, you can have every or some, right? And so Aristotle would say, you know, what's the contradictory of every man is an animal? Is it no man is an animal? No, because both of those could be false. In this case, they happen to be one, two, and they're false. But if I say every man is, let's say, white, and no man is white, well, both could be what? False, right? And then some man is an animal. And some man is not an animal. Are they contradictories? Let's see, the two particulars. They might both be true, huh? Like some man is white and some man is not white. But it's the diaginals here that are contradictories, huh? Okay. Now why is he saying that they're contradictories, right? Well, let's go back to some example up here. We would say in logic that two is half of four and two is not half of four are contradictory statements. But if I think that two is half of four and you think that two is not half of four, then we're both thinking something else. So it's not simply that you're not thinking that two is half of four because you might be ignorant, not thinking that, not thinking period, but you wouldn't be mistaken, right? Mistaken. But if you think that two is not half of four, you are mistaken, right? But it's not simply that you're lacking the truth, but you're positing something. There's a real thinking in you, right? So they would seem to be then opposed as what? Contrary. And notice, it isn't necessary, you know, that you think one or the other, is it? That's what contradictories are, right? You have to be one or the other. And see, if I take contradictories, either you think that two is half of four or you don't think that. But strictly speaking, say you're thinking those as contradictories. To not think that two is half of four is not to think that two is not half of four. You follow me? Yeah. I think he's a good man. I don't think that. Or you probably take that to mean, I think he's what? He's not a bad man. But strictly speaking, what have I said? You say, I think he's a good man. And I say, I don't think that. He's not a bad man. But he is. But here, if you say, I don't think that, you could imply any help you or not take it to me. I think he is a bad man. Yeah. Yeah. But have I actually said that? See? See, I might not know anything about the man, right? So I don't think he's a good man. I don't think he's a bad man. I could say both, right? I don't think he's a good man. I don't think he's a bad man. I don't think he's a bad man. Do you see? It's like I used to get the students going, and I'd say, if the professor says, you know, he's asked by the students, did we pass? And he answers, some of you passed. What do the students take that to mean? Yeah, yeah. They may have only corrected half the exams, and the ones they've corrected have all passed, right? The second half of the exams, I haven't corrected, right? So all I know is that some have passed. I haven't said anything about the rest. Okay? Or if I say, some women are beautiful. You haven't seen all of them. Yeah. You must understand me. You don't think I'm beautiful. But no, sometimes, because of custom and this sort, we take this to mean something more than it does mean, right? Okay? So I have to explain to them in logic that when we say some men are animals, right, we're saying some men are animals. We're not saying some are not. Now, someone might say, you know, why would he say that if he didn't think some are not? But the point is, what have I said? Right? I said some men are animals. So, either I think that two is half of four, or I don't think that two is half of four. They're actually opposed to hell, those two. Well, you see, it's got to be one or the other, right? Because I'm either saying that you think this or you don't think this. So that's like contradictories, right? There's no, you see? So everybody in the world thinks there are nine hierarchies of angels, right? Or nine choirs of angels, rather. Or they don't think this. One of the two. But does everybody think either that there are nine choirs of angels, or there are not nine choirs of angels? Do they? No. Some have no opinion about this at all, right? Okay? How many chambers does a frog's heart have? How many chambers does a frog's heart have? That's about a rock star. What? I guess it's three, isn't it, or something? But everyone either thinks that they have three chambers, right? Or doesn't think that. They've got to be one or the other. But not everybody thinks either that they have three, or they do not have three. Now why is it that the one is, it's got to be one or the other, but not the other? That's a sign that in the one case you're taking contradictories, huh? Okay? This is a dog or it's not a dog. It's got to be one or the other. This is a virtue or it's a vice. You can't say that about things, right? Everything is either justice or injustice, right? That makes sense, doesn't it? Because justice or injustice are not opposed as contradictories, are they? If I say everything is either justice or it's not justice. Notice what he says here in that reply to the first objection. To apprehend something to be and not be has contrariety, right? As the philosopher proves in the second book of the Periharmoneus, that to this opinion, you see, topical opinion, right? You're thinking that good is good, right? It's contrary to this thinking that good is not good, right? Okay? But if you just took good is good and good is not good by themselves, they'd be as contradictories, right? It's affirmation and negation, right? You see that? I'll take a more concrete example. Either a dog is a dog or a dog is not a dog. So they're contradictories. Either you think a dog is a dog or you think a dog is not a dog. Well, maybe you don't think either one. Never thought about a dog. Okay. Now, the second objection is one that comes up with all the most universal things. Because one seems to be in the other, right? And Thomas says, and he talks about the good, often he has a chapter or article, whether the subject of the bad is the good. Just like even the nature of the devil is good. So the subject of the bad is good. Well, Thomas is going to reply to that problem. To the second it should be said that false is not founded in the true which is contrary to it, just as neither bad in the good which is contrary to it. So injustice is not injustice, right? The virtue is not in the vice, right? But the vice is in the will. And the will is something what? Good that God gave us, right? And this happens in both of these because true and good are what? Yeah, meaning the most common, right? Okay. And that's what he says, and they're convertible with being. Whence, just as every privation or lack is founded in some subject which is being. So blindness is in something that is. So blindness is in something that is. is, like a man, right? Even though blindness itself is a non-being, right? See how the sophists could play around with this, right? But blindness, which is an unbeing of sight, is not in sight, which it's supposed to, right? But it's in the man, right? Who should have sight, huh? And he's not a lack. Whence just as every lack is founded in a subject that is being, so everything bad is founded in something good. That's one of the reasons why Thomas would say there's no bad itself. There's nothing that is badness itself, like God is good as itself, you know. Manichaeans had badness itself. Bad can only be in the good as in the subject. So something can't be totally bad. Get close to it, but it can't be entirely so. So just as every lack is founded in the subject that is being, so everything bad is founded in something good, and everything false in something what? True. So the false Hector, right? Is a true tragedian. Now the third objection was taken from God, not having a contrary, right? To the third, it should be said that because contraries, right, and things that are opposed privatively, are apt to come about in the same thing, right? Therefore God, considered in himself, there is nothing contrary. To God, considered in himself, there's nothing contrary. Either by reason of his goodness, nor by reason of his what? Truth. But in our understanding, there can be some what? Falsehood, right? Excuse me. But in his intellect, right? There's not able to be any falsehood, huh? But in our grasping, there has something contrary. For the true opinion about something is contrary to the what? False opinion. Okay? And thus the idols are called what? Lies. Opposed to the divine truth. In so far as the false opinion about idols is contrary to the true opinion about the unity of God, right? The true and the false opinion are in us, right? Okay. So. Come back a little bit to the peregrimanias here. Aristotle speaks on. Every man is an animal, and no man is an animal, seem to be opposed, right? But Aristotle says they're not opposed as what? Contradictories. Now if you had a singular, Socrates is an animal, Socrates is not an animal, they would be opposed as contradictories, right? Because one must be true, and the other must be what? False, right? But every man is an animal, and no man is an animal. They could both be what? False, right? Universal, affirmative, universal, negative. And still there's a kind of opposition between them, and Aristotle calls them contraries, right? And that's because they seem to be furthest apart, right? So if one man thinks that every man is an animal, and some man thinks that some man is, and some man is not, and some man thinks that no man is an animal, the man who thinks every man is an animal, and no man is an animal, seem to be the furthest, what? Apart, right? Okay? But there are some kinds of plays that are in between tragedy and comedy. So these seem to be the furthest apart, right? But in terms of truth and falsity, you've got to be more careful, right? Because they could both be false, right? Just like some men are good and some men are bad could both be true. But every man is good and some man is not good, and it cannot both be true, it cannot both be false. One must be true, the other must be false. So if you look at the statements by themselves, you might speak a certain way, but then you talk about the man who thinks the statement is true, and the man who thinks some other statement is true, then you could say the contrariety in the two opinions. So if one man thinks the soul is immortal, another man thinks the soul is not immortal, their thinking is what? Contraria, yeah. Because they're both thinking something, okay? So one is not just lacking the thinking of the other, but he's thinking something other, right? If he just took the statements by themselves, the soul is immortal, the soul is not immortal, right? Then we'd speak of those as being opposed as affirmation and negation, and that would be contradictions, right? Sometimes Aristotle calls the opposition of contradiction, affirmation and negation, right? So that's interesting, right? Being and non-being are opposed contradictorily, and perhaps something and nothing in the same way. But we look back at one and many, and they're opposed as what? The nine and many. Yeah. And now he's saying that true and false are opposed as what? Contraries, right? And we talked a little bit about good and bad, right? But primarily, good and bad are opposed as what? Yeah, yeah. So I say when Augustine speaks, you know, a little bit hyperbolic to them, he says, sin is nothing. And the man who sins becomes nothing, right? Thomas probably quotes that sometimes, but he doesn't speak exactly that way, right? You know, because he's still more careful than Augustine sometimes. But Augustine doesn't have the same background as Aristotle that Thomas has. And is sin nothing? Or is sin a real act that lacks something it shouldn't have? My example in class was always, you know, the house is on fire. So I run in and get my books, and then I go back and get the baby. Is that good? You're so happy, please. Well, what's wrong with that? Yeah, but why is it bad? Yeah. And the question goes before and after, right? You get the baby before you get the books. And so it's a disordered act. Now, if I paid myself in the corner, that's a bad act, too. Not as serious. But I should have begun in the corner and paid my way out to the doorway. You know? So, I mean, it can be, you know, more important or less important in order. But there's always some lack there. That's bad, right? And reason is, as you know from the definition of Shakespeare there, that reason is ability for large discourse looking before and after. It's very much characterized by ordering things, right? But also it's characterized by what? Measuring things, huh? Actually, this word mens in Latin is to have a mensura, measure. So those two things seem to characterize reason, measuring things and ordering them. And so, for man, since he's an animal that has reason, that is good simply for man. That is what? Reasonable, right? So what is pleasing to his senses is not good simply, but, not simply, but in some imperfect way, right? Um, but what, pursuing what is pleasing to my senses is not good simply unless it's reasonable. And sometimes it might be reasonable for me to pursue something pleasing to my senses. In another case, this extra drink, you know, even though it's pleasing me, is going to interfere with what I should be doing, right? And so it's too much, too much of a good thing. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. Okay, got a little time left here? We'll go on to the question 18, De Vita Dei, right? Now, I love the two Summas, and there are little differences in the two Summas, in the order in which things are considered a bit, and sometimes you see something in one you don't see in the other, right? I think I mentioned that in the Summa Contra Gentiles, because he takes up the life of God, not right away after the mind of God, the understanding of God, but after he takes up the understanding of God, and the willing of God, the will of God. As you know, if you look for a second there at question 19, the will of God is starting to be taken up in question 19. So, the life of God is here in the 18th. Now, should, is there a reason to do both? Now, why, what reason could you give why the life of God should be taken up after both a consideration of his understanding and his willing? And what is the reason for taking up the life of God after his understanding and before his willing? You know, see? Because, as I mentioned before, I went and gave a paper on the five attributes of God and the order of them, the two Summas, right? And I thought it would be presumptuous and false to say that one order is correct and the other is incorrect, right? Or even maybe to say that one is better simply than the other, right? That because one was later in time, he was, you know, saying this is a better order. But, as I studied it, I saw that you can see something in one that you don't see in the other, but vice versa, right? Okay? So, can you see any reason why he might take up the life of God in a different place here, huh? In one case, before the willing of God, in the other case, after? Can you see anything of that? Going back to your profound study of the third book, the second book about the soul, right? I've seen one way to take up life after both understanding would be to consider the whole of, you might say, to consider the parts of what a fullness of the living is being with understanding the will. Yeah. That strikes me as the most obvious thing. So, you can say, in the Summa Conscientilis, because the life of God consists not only in understanding himself and other things, but also in loving himself and loving other things, right? Then it makes some sense to take up the life of God after that, right? Okay? Well, then what about the Summa Theologiae? Why does he do this? Going back to now the three books about the soul, which have been supposed to all of this issue. I doubt I know. Well, let's go back to something we learned in our profound study of the three books about the soul. I told you how a dichotomy could get through with one of these books and say now, it says, you think you've understood everything here. That's a sign you've understood nothing. And, you know, these are the kind of books that you read over and over again throughout your life. You never start reading these books. You know, like C.S. Lewis said about the great works of fiction, you know, he asked somebody, if you read that, oh, yeah, I read that. You know, like once in... Been there, done that, I need an expression, you know? You see? And he said, what do you do with such a person? He's lost, I mean, as far as the higher things are concerned. So, you may recall in the 3, 4, 5 we talked about in the study of the soul, he talks about five genera of powers. He talks about four grades of life. And he talks about three kinds of soul. Remember that? And the question is, why is there a discrepancy in the numbers, right? Because we know the soul through its powers, right? But there are five genera of powers. Why are there only three kinds of soul, or even why is there only four grades of life, right? Isn't there a life for each kind of power, right? Well, let's go and talk about those five genera, right? You have the, let's call them the vegetable power, if you want to know what that means. You have the power to what? Digest food, right? The power to grow. The power to reproduce yourself. These are the three powers, right? Thomas goes back to that, when he talks about the, what, sacrifice some. Because baptism is like generation, right? And Eucharist is nourishing. Confirmation is growth, right? Okay? So, like this. You have the vegetable powers, which are shared by the plants and the animals, too, and even man, right? And then you have the, what? Sense powers, yeah. And then you have the powers of, what? Understanding, right? Okay. And then you have the powers of desiring. Desiring powers. Then you have the power to move from one place to another. A locomotive. This is actually Orbitur style citizen, right? The beginning of the second book, after he defines the soul, takes up the vegetable powers, right? Then he takes up the sense powers, then the powers of understanding, and then he takes up the desiring powers, and the minds of a locomotive powers. Because knowing and desiring are involved in locomotion. Now, there are five general powers. Why are there only four grades of life? Well, everyone who has sense powers also has vegetable powers, but not vice versa. Okay, so that's obviously a discrepancy, right? Um, different grades, right? Everyone who has sense powers doesn't have understanding. But everyone who has understanding, like you and I, has got sense powers. That is another thing, right? Now, desiring powers follow upon sense powers in what? In understanding, right? So if you have sense powers, you have sense desire, right? Emotions or feelings. Because the animals have as well as us, right? But if you have understanding, you have will, and so on. So desiring powers don't give you a separate grade of life, do they? See? So the grades of life are tied up with these first kinds, right? Okay, now, the locomotive powers, well, that's kind of in between here because the lowest animals are almost like plants. They don't move from one place to another. And Aristotle was a marine biologist, right? So on the floor of the ocean, there are animals that have sensation. You prick them, you know, they live in the ground. They live in the ground. They live in the ground. But they don't move from place to place. Their food comes to them in the oceans of the ocean, right? And they seem to have only the sense of what touches, or maybe taste of some sort, but not the senses of distance, sight and hearing and smell and so on. Because their food comes right to them, right? Okay. So, there's only four grades of life, right? So you can say, those are the vegetable powers, but not the sense powers, right? There are those who have the sense powers, but not the locomotive powers. There are those who have the vegetable powers, the sense powers, the locomotive powers, but not the understanding powers. So they have four grades. But there's no grade corresponding to the, what, desiring powers, right? They follow upon the knowing powers, right? You see? Now, why does Aristotle speak to just basically three kinds of soul? Well, the soul, you're starting to, what, rise above matter a bit, right? And so, the plant, to some extent, is rising above matter. When you get to the senses, they're very significant, rising above matter. Because even the senses have a kind of materiality. They receive the, what, shapes of other things in their environment, right? And the colors of other things, but in a kind of material way, right? Okay, my eye takes on your shape of the shape of the chair, but my eye doesn't become like a chair, right? Okay? And the understanding is even more material, right? So that's why there's three kinds of soul, but not, what, four kinds of soul, right? Okay, so, a little refresher course there. Does that suggest any reason why you might talk about the life of God after you consider the understanding of God and before you consider the willing of God? Yeah, more fundamental than the willing, right? The willing proceeds from it, huh? It's because, as we'll see when you take up the willing, it's because God is understanding his will, okay? And that's more clear on us, right? It's because we have understanding that we have will. It's because the animals don't have understanding that they don't have will, right? So understanding is more fundamental in understanding this kind of life, right? So that's a little bit of a reason maybe why it makes sense to talk about the, what, life of God, right? You've got a grade of life, you want to use that, right? But not really a grade of life, but much higher of life, right? Because understanding is much higher than ours, right? And so, just as you, in distinguishing the grades of life, might not bring in the emotions or the desiring powers at all. Because they don't constitute a grade of life, right? But now, the thing that kind of delights me is to think about the words of our Lord now, right? Because, in the famous passage in St. John, where he's asked, is it by Philip? I think it is. Well, where are you going, and how do we get there? He said, well, you know, see? What do you mean? I am the way, the truth, and the life, right? Now, when Thomas comments on those words, right? Christ is answering two questions. One is where you're going, what the goal is, right? And how you get there. And, as Thomas will explain, Christ as God is the ultimate goal. And as God, he's truth itself and life itself, right? But as man, he's the road to himself as God. And the Greek word is very concrete. You see in the word Aristotle, it's the road. Hodas, huh? I am the hodas. So, if you look at the tertia paris there, the summa, where Thomas takes up the human nature of Christ, he says, De Christo, qui secundum quat homo, is the via, right? It's the Latin word for hodas road, the road to God, right? Okay. Now, coming back to those words of our Lord, I am the road, the truth, and the life. As man, he's the road, as God, he's the truth, and the life. But now, are truth and life private or peculiar to the second person of the blessed Trinity? No. A truth and life, as we've seen here, we'll find out that he's life itself, as well as truth itself. We've seen already his truth itself. But this is in the treatise on the unity of God, right? So, this is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Each of them is truth itself and life itself, huh? But could you say that what we'll see in the treatise in the Trinity, what is called appropriation, right? Could truth and life be appropriated to the Son? Just like goodness or love, is the Holy Spirit alone goodness itself? No. Because God is goodness itself, and the Father is God, and the Son is God, so the Father and the Son are goodness itself. And as we'll find out, the God himself is love. St. John tells us God is love. So the Father is love, the Son is love. But there's our reason for appropriating goodness, which is the object of love, and love to the Holy Spirit, and truth, which is the object of understanding, right? And life. To the Son. Because he proceeds by way of what? God understanding himself. What? God to God. Yeah. But he proceeds as the Word of God, right? Okay, the beginning was the Word, and it was towards God. And that same text, St. John says, this is the light that enlightens every man that comes into this world. But it's like the Logos is the light that enlightens every man into the world. But does that mean that the Father doesn't enlighten us? Mm-hmm. Does it mean the Holy Spirit doesn't enlighten us? No. But these are appropriate to the Son, because he proceeds by way of understanding, and light refers to understanding, right? Do you see? So the fact that truth and life are coupled here together helps us to understand the appropriation of those two to the, what? Second person, when he says, I am the way, or the road, and the truth and the, what? Life, right? Okay. Makes sense? So I kind of get that out of this, right? That life is coupled with understanding here, right? Okay. Just as in the books on the soul, right? So understanding gives you a new kind of life that the animals don't have and the animals don't have and the plants, say, for its theory, don't have. Do you see? Okay. So I love this. The other is good for the other reason, right? Yeah. You know? And so he says, because to understand is of living things. And so he says, and so he says, and so he says, and so he says, and so he says, and so he says, and so he says,