Prima Pars
Lecture 81: Life as Being and Self-Motion

Transcript
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Right? After the consideration of the knowledge and divine understanding, we ought to consider about his life. And about this, four things are sought. And notice the first two are about life in general and the last two are about, what? The life of God, right? So though it's a distinction of four articles, yeah, to understand what he's doing there, right? He did the same thing with things like the good or one, sometimes in the same question, sometimes in different questions, but kind of a general consideration, right? He's very considerate to you students, right? You know? Instead of saying, you know, well, go to the Dianemar, go to the metaphysics to get this, I'll give you a little bit of this again, you know? Okay? Nice guy that way. The first, then, he proceeds thus, it seems that it belongs to all natural things to be alive. That's kind of strange. Who's going to argue this? For the philosopher, that's Aristotle by Antoinette Messiah, made by Antoinette Messiah, for as the philosopher says in the 8th book of natural hearing, the so-called physics, that motion is as a certain life, right? By nature existing in all things. But all natural things partake motion. Nature is defined by motion, right? Nature is the, what, beginning and cause of motion and rest, and which it is. Worse as such, not by happening. Recall the definition. So if motion is a kind of life, right? Then all natural things partake of life, right? Sometimes when I ask you in some class, what is life, they'll say motion. Well, motion is common to all natural things, you know? You know, the rest is universe to take Max Bohr in the book, right? Moreover, plants are said to live insofar as they have in themselves a beginning or cause of the motion of growth and decrease. But local motion is more perfect and prior by nature than the motion of growth and decrease as is proven in the 8th book of physics. Aristotle will show when he takes up the different kinds of motion that change of place is presupposed to change of quality. Because you have to bring bodies together to have a change of quality. But you can have change of place without changing your quality. But when the sun changes its place, if it does, you have a change here from, what, cold to warm, right? Or when it goes further down, it changes back to cold or something. And you have to have a change of quality before you can have a change of, what, growth and so on. So in that sense, change of place is the fundamental one, right? Since therefore all natural bodies have some beginning or cause to change of place, local motion, it seems that all bodies naturally, what? Live, huh? Moreover, among natural bodies, the more imperfect ones are the elements. But to them is attributed life, for we speak of living waters. Therefore, much more other natural bodies have life that are even higher than these simple bodies or what they thought was simple. But against all, this is what Dionysius says, the sixth chapter about the divine means, that plants, according to the last, what, resounding or echoing, right, of life, have life, from which it can be taken that the last rate of life is obtained by the plants. So my wife is looking at these plants, you know, and trying to decide what plants to buy. Each one of these, I tell him he's got a soul. And they do. But inanimate bodies are below plants. Therefore, of them there is not what to live. Now, Thomas replies here, The answer should be said that from those things which are manifestly alive, we are able to take of what things there is life and of whom there is not life, right? Now, this is the key thing. You've got to be very careful here. To live belongs manifestly to what? Animals, huh? So, it is said sometimes that life is hidden in the plants, right? Okay. And sometimes you're not sure whether a plant that hasn't been watered for a while or something is still alive or not, right? You say, oh, it's revived, you know, we've got to water it. But sometimes it doesn't revive. It's lost its life, right? But life in the animals is what? Manifest, right? That's interesting because the word for soul, in Latin, is what? Anima, right? And the meaning of the word soul is that it's the first cause of life within a living body, right? So, the fact that animal is named from anima, right? Is a sign that life is more manifest in animals than in what? Life, huh? Even though we might use the term here animate matter, you hear sometimes said even of the plants, right? Which means literally matter as a soul. People talk about animus today without thinking of the fact that the word actually rose from anima, right? That's, you know, in harmony with what he's saying here, right? And therefore, in the first book about the soul, Aristotle goes through all the opinions of his predecessors about what the soul is. And some of them investigated what the soul was through the fact of locomotion going from one place to another. Others investigated what the soul was through, what? Sensation, right? But those two things belong to the animals not to the, what? Plants, right? And that's because that's where life is manifest, right? You can see it in the very history of Greece, right? What's marvelous about reading the Greeks is because they're the first philosophers and so they're more apt to begin with what is more known to us. And we're lost because we begin by whoever professor we happen to have when we go to college, whatever book we happen to pick up, and they could be talking about anything, right? And not beginning with what is most known. But those who first philosophize were apt to begin with what was more known to us. And so when they began to investigate soul and life, they began with those things that pertain to the animals, right? Which is a sign, you know, but it's more known here. We've got to stop pretty soon? No, I... You have to... Yeah, I mean, if you look to the body... The body, the secret injections, okay. Once, according to that, once is necessary to distinguish living things and non-living things according as animals are said to, what? Be alive, right? But this is that in which life is first manifested and in which it last remains. For we first say that the animals live when it begins to move from itself, right? Quickening, they call it that. And so long an animal is judged to live, so long as such motion appears in it. When it does not have from itself any motion, but it's moved only by another, then the animal is said to be, what? Dead. The defect or failure of life. From which it is clear that those are properly living which move themselves according to some species of motion, right? Now he's going to make a distinction here, right? Whether we take motion properly, and this is the definition of motion in the third book, Natural Hearing, that motion is the act of the imperfect, right? The act of what exists in the potency. Or whether we take motion more loosely insofar as motion is said even for the act of the what? Perfect. Insofar as what? To understand and to sense they said to move from. As I said in the third book of the soul. And thus, those things are called living which what? Act themselves, you might say, to motion or to some what? Operation like understanding or sensing them. Those in whose nature it is not that they bring themselves to some motion operation cannot be called living except through some kind of metaphorical likeness. So we'll come back to that article a little bit next time and then go to the reply to the objections. that's on. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. So the first is a little text of Aristotle there, the first objection, where he compares the, in the older physics there, the motion of the, what? Heavenly bodies and so on as a kind of, what? Life, right? So on. To the first, therefore, Thomas says it should be understood that that word of the philosopher is able to be understood either about the first motion, namely that of the heavenly bodies, right? Or about motion in general. And in both ways, right? Or in either way, motion is said, as it were, the life of natural bodies, huh? There's some likeness there. To a likeness and not property, huh? Okay. For the motion of the heavens is in the universe of natural bodies, something like the motion of the heart in the animal, right? And of course, as you know, there's a circulation of the blood. Of course, it seemed like the circulation of the heavens was causing motion in the universe down below, right? So we're still making a kind of comparison, right? And the same thing can be said about motion in general. Likewise, every natural motion has itself, in some way, to natural things, as a certain likeness of what? Fight operations, right? As if you said to fall the stone to the ground, it's the life of the stone, right? Not very elevated life, but falling to the ground, huh? Not elevated to the thought. Yeah, yeah. But we fall to it, aren't we? Okay. Once, if the whole bodily universe were one animal, right? Then this motion would be from an intrinsic, what? Mover, right? As some lay down. According as motion would be the life of all natural bodies, huh? That's fairly easy to solve, huh? Now, moreover, the second objection. Plants are said to live, insofar as they have in themselves, a beginning or cause of the motion of growth and decrease. But locomotion, change of place, is more perfect and before by nature than the motion of growth and decrease, as is proven in the Eighth Book of the Physics. Since, therefore, all natural bodies have some source of their locomotion, it seems that all natural bodies, what, live, huh? So when Aristotle, you know, takes up in the Eighth Books of Natural Hearing, he takes up motion in general, right? And then the fifth book, he distinguishes three kinds of motion, change of place and change of quality, and then growth, a change of quantity. And then he takes up each of those in particular. In the four books on the universe, he takes up change of place. And then in the two books on Generation Corruption, change of quality. And then in the books on life, he takes up growth and so on. But in order to have growth, you've got to have what we call chemical change, right? So chemical change, in that sense, is before growth. There can be chemical change without growth, strictly speaking, right? But there can't be growth without chemical change of food and so on. But again, chemical change won't take place unless you bring things together. So change of place seems to be, in a way, a cause of change of quality, and that a cause of change of what? Of growth, right? And it used to be that even a biology major would take his freshman year, you know, more chemistry than biology. And it's because of that. But also you can say that since change of place is not affecting you intrinsically, right? You're more actual when you change your place than when you're growing, because you're growing, you're acquiring something internally. And when you're being qualitatively changed, you're acquiring something intrinsically. And therefore you're more in potency, you might say. By the thing that moves in place is already fully an act, right? Okay. So the second Thomas says, it should be said that it does not belong to heavy and light bodies to be moved, except when they are outside the, what? Disposition of their nature. As when they are outside of their own place. Yes, that's the older idea of how it's happening there. But when they are in their own and natural place, then they, what, rest, huh? But plants and other living things are moved by a living motion according as they are in their very natural disposition. Not, however, in exceeding to it or in receding from it. Rather, according as they receding from such a motion, they receding from their natural disposition. You can't see the point he's making there? It's less what? What is it? You might say when a plant is really in its fullness of its nature, it's going to be growing, right? Why, when a stone has what it should have by its nature, it's going to be, what, at rest. Not motion at all. So it seems to be further removed from life, huh? Moreover, he says, heavy and light bodies are moved always by a, what, outside mover. Either the one who generates them, giving them their form, or the one who moves the, what, thing that is holding them back, right? So if you move the pillar and the thing falls down, right? And then you're causing the motion, but you're outside of the thing, right? And thus they do not move themselves as living bodies to them. So the plant seems to, what, build itself up. Now the third objection is taken from this, you know, saying about living waters, right? And not in the biblical sense, right? But in daily life, huh? And, uh, now waters are said to be alive, which have a continual, what, flow. For standing waters, which are not continued to some source, continually flowing, are said to be dead, right? They're stagnant, huh? As the waters are cisterns and ponds, something. And this is said, by way, again, of what, like this, huh? Insofar as they seem to move themselves, they have a certain likeness of life. But nevertheless, there is not in them a true notion of life, because they have this motion, not from themselves, but from the cause, generating them. It just as happens in the motion of, you know, they're heavy and, what, like things, huh? So now you know what life is, right? Yeah. No. Okay? It's basically the idea of move itself, huh? You know, why are you still always given classes? You go for a walk in the woods, and you walk along the stone, and you kick it, and it rolls. Do you see it's alive? No. If you step on something without kicking it, and then you move, it shoots across the path. Ha! It's alive, you say. So it's the idea that something moves itself, right? You can see how people are puzzled. you know the jokes about the first automobiles you know where's the horse like the horse must be inside somehow concealed but automobile means if you move yourself it's really one thing moving another okay now the next uh article might be a little strange to you but um the question of whether life is what the living thing does which is one way to use the word life right or is it also and maybe more fundamentally the very being or existence of the living thing would you say that i'm alive somewhat but um is this what i'm doing that is my being alive or is it the existence of the thing that is able to do these sort of things and if you oppose oppose life let's say to death right um is death simply what the i'm not doing these things and death is more of the what loss of your being so that's uh i can quote the as in my style vivere eventibus esse right okay or is to say that i'm alive is to say i have the being or existence living thing yeah okay that's obviously connected with the fact that i'm going to be a do certain thing so yeah why for example sleep that's not the same as death yeah yeah and you know these trees out here and so on i'd be alive in the winter and sometimes you know so you're not doing anything right but you know people sometimes wonder whether there's been a severe winter and when the plants have survived right and uh and they're not sure right away sometimes whether this plant is still alive and then it starts to blossom and so on okay it's still alive and uh what we call revised right not really resurrection but the life was kind of hidden right so this is the kind of point he's making here so he's going to be arguing against the idea that life is operation fundamentally although you admit that use of the word life too to the second one proceeds thus it seems that life is a certain operation a certain doing for nothing is divided except by those things which of its kind or genus but to live is divided by certain operations as is clear through the philosopher in the second book about the soul who distinguishes to live by four things that we talked about last week remember the four grades of life to use food to sense to move according to place and then to understand so he's going from the lower to the higher right so plants have only the first all animals have the second addition to the first the higher animals have an addition to the third thing right and then man has all three of these except in the lake sloth and in addition to what understand right okay and remember the point i was making last week on that you're distinguishing life by these four and therefore right away when you think about the fact that god understands you could think right away about him being alive right and that's the way the summa theology has where he attaches the consideration of the divine life to the end of the consideration of his understanding as opposed to the summa kind gentiles where he takes up the life of god after the will too because that does pertain to his life too but it doesn't constitute a grade of life you might say and this way of the summa is easier for understanding the words of christ why does he say i am the way the truth and the life right he couples truth and life together right just like they're coupled together here truth and life now being appropriated to the second person because he proceeds by way of god understanding himself right but the fact that he couples those two we can kind of see that from this text right and from going back to the second book about the soul right then it ties in with that food of truth yeah yeah yeah so i mean there's something to be appreciated in both summa right the way he proceeds so he's saying here the philosopher is distinguishing to live by what operations isn't he right that's the objection of course that's the way we come to know these things huh what does descartes say i think therefore i am right he could have said i think therefore i'm alive then you see the two joined together again right more active life is said to be other from contemplative life but the contemplative are not diversified or don't are not different from the actives except according to certain operations huh so you have martha and mary right right now martha's making dinner and mary's there listening to the words of christ therefore life is a certain operation although thomas is going to kind of argue for a certain priority of the word to live to refer to the existence of the living thing right he's not going to deny that you can use the word life in this other way moreover to know god is a certain operation but this is life as is clear through john 17 3. this is the definition now of eternal life this is eternal life that that they might know you alone the true god so it's not that you might be alone the true god but you might know him so here you're calling eternal life this operation of understanding god loving you but against this is what the philosopher says in the second book about the soul that to live is for living things to be for me to be is to be alive when i cease to be alive i will not be anymore my soul might be but i won't be anymore okay i answer it should be said that just as is clear from the things said our understanding which properly is what knowing of the what it is that terrible word quittitas huh well forgive thomas for using that word quittitas quittity yeah shakespeare shakespeare sometimes makes fun of those quittities you know he makes somebody's got all this language yeah the quittity means really what the whatness of thing right what it is um now of course we sometimes say in general that the proper object the reason's own object is what it is or something and it's but sometimes aristotle's more precise like in the period book about the soul where he says the proper object of our mind is what it is is something sensed or imagined um so our understanding which is properly knowing the what it is of a thing as its own object it takes it from what the senses which don't know the what it is whose own objects are what exterior or outside accidents and hence it is that from those things which appear on the outside of the thing we arrive at knowing the essence or nature that what it is of the thing and so the great heraclitus said what nature loves to hide and that could be said even of nature in the sense of what a thing is but why is it said to hide from us because it's within right and what's on the outside is known to us and that's why i have these beautiful words in english you know where we say you have to think about something usually before you understand it right and the words thinking about kind of apply the idea of going around the thing right not getting inside but when you think something out then you come to understand it but when you think something out it's like bringing it out right and so sometimes you know i'll define definition which makes known what something is i'll say it's speech signifying what a thing is or speech making known what a thing is but sometimes i'll say it's speech bringing out what a thing is and implies that what it is is kind of within for us at first so we have this beautiful way of speaking in english where we speak of thinking about it's the idea that you're knowing things in an outside way at first and then you try to work your way in it has some insight but insight you know really just naming the act of understanding rather than the act of the senses now it's not we'll be on my briefcase here getting some insight as if you're a very limited sense of insight because it's empty right now that and so um this is the way you We know other people, right? In the outside way at first, huh? Okay. And sometimes, you know, we only guess what the inside is like, huh? That's why you need the so-called moment of truth, right? But there's a circumstances that really reveal somebody's, what, character? Now, he goes on then to draw a conclusion about how we name things because we know things in an outside way first, right? Or an outward way. You know, the old definition of sacrament was an outward sign instituted by Christ to give grace, and the old Baltimore Catechism. Well, what did outward mean in that definition, huh? Yeah, it's almost a synonym for sensible, right? The outward appearance of the thing. So now the influence or the effect of this upon the way we know it. And because thus we name something as we know it, that's the principle that Thomas always gives, huh? It is clear from our discussion of names before, right? Hence it is that many times, from the outside properties, right, names are placed upon, right, are imposed to signifying the inward natures of what? Things, essences of things. So, whence these names sometimes are taken properly for the very essences or natures of things, what they are, to signifying they are chiefly imposed, right? Okay. And notice that the word imposed means what? Place upon, right? You want to place it upon, what? The nature of the thing, right? But you take it from something outside, maybe, right? And Thomas always gives the example of stone, you know, and, you know, lapis, you know, and lapidem, and so on. It's maybe a false etymology, but it spritz the foot, you know. That's an exterior to the nature of it, but it's a defect of it is. But sometimes the same names are taken for the properties, right, from which they are placed upon, right? And this muniscropriate, so he's not saying that this is not a correct way of speaking, but that's so. And I think it's an interesting comparison there. Just as it's clear that this name body is imposed to signify a certain kind of what? Substances, right? Namely, those substances that are apt to have three dimensions, right? But then also sometimes this name body is used to name one of the, what, species of continuous quantity, line, surface, and what? Body, right? According as body is laid down to be a species of quantity. So that's a famous example, right? Sometimes, you know, we divide substance into material substance and immaterial substance. But the name we give to material substance is body. Okay? But we divide quantity into a discrete and continuous, and then you divide continuous quantity into line and surface and body, right? Book and then time and so on. So, was body there and body in the category of substance being the same thing? No. Yeah. And you kind of identify that kind of substance by what the senses know, which is the length and the width and the depth, right? You know, it's important to make that, to see that distinction, huh? Make this side here again to Descartes. And Descartes identified the substance of material things with their extension. Well, that's going to get you in trouble with the truth, and later on, therefore, with the Eucharist, huh? Because if the substance of the bread and the wine is their extension, that remains. Mm-hmm. You see? Mm-hmm. You see? But it's the substance of the bread and the wine that is transubstantiated, right? Mm-hmm. They come in the body and blood of our Lord, huh? And the body and blood of our Lord is there, not by its own dimensions, huh? But by the dimensions of the bread and wine that were there before, which dimensions are reserved in existence by God. Mm-hmm. Okay? So, I think it's a lot of troubles if you don't make these distinctions, huh? Yeah. So, he's going to make a comparison there between these two uses of the word body, right? And body fundamentally names one kind of substance, right? Okay? I'm just reading this morning in the Summa Congenitiles, that these spiritual substances are not bodies. Thomas gives about eight arguments, you know? Mm-hmm. So, but then, you can also, but let's mean as procre, he says, call this species of quantity body, huh? Well, thus, therefore, it should be said also about life. For the name of life is taken from something outside, right? Appearing about the thing, which is that it, what? Moves itself, huh? But nevertheless, it is not placed upon, the name is not imposed to signifying this, but to signifying the substance, right? To which it belongs according to its very nature to move itself, huh? Or to act in some way to its own, what? Operation, right? And according to this, to live is nothing other than to be, huh? In such a nature. And life signifies this same thing, but in the abstract, huh? Just as this name, chrysus, signifies to run in the abstract, right? Whence vivum is not an accidental part of the kid, but a substantial one. And so we divide substance, and we divide it into material substance sometimes, and material substance. And in material substance, it could also be called body, right? So you divide that into the living and the non-living, right? So the living and the animals and the plants, right? Which you get to us. But it's a, what? Not a pretty contumatio dentale, which would be if it was naming some operation. But substantial, right? But sometimes he says, nevertheless, life is taken, mean is procrease in the same phrase, for the operations of life, right? From which the name of life is taken. Just as the philosopher says in the ninth book of the ethics, that to live chiefly is to sense and to understand. If you're not sensing, listening to Mozart and reading Thomas, you're probably not living, you know? I say to the students, you know, I'm going to live it up this weekend. Oh? What are you doing? I'm going to read about God, you know? I'm going to think about God. That's living it up, huh? Where's the beard? You guys are going to be living it down this weekend. Now, that text of Aristotle can be taken in both ways, I guess, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the philosopher there takes to live for the operation of life, right? Or, it can be said better, right? That to sense and to understand and things of this sort are sometimes taken for certain operations, right? Sometimes for the very, what? Being, right? The existence of things operating in this way. Where it's said in the ninth book of the ethics that to be is to sense or to understand. That sounds kind of a funny way of speaking, right? What does that mean? That is to have a nature for sensing or for understanding, right? So, it's not the same thing as, what? Yeah, because S is not centurion, they're individual in us. God is the same thing, but in us they're not. But Aristotle's way of speaking is interesting, right? And in this way, the philosopher distinguished to live by those, what? Four. For in these lower things, there are four genera of living things, of which some have a nature only for using food. And what falls upon this is like growth, right? Which are growth and... generation. Some further for sensing, as is clear in the animals that don't move from one place to another, as the oysters. There are other kinds of things that are in the body of the ocean, almost like plants, but if you stick them with a pen, they react, so they seem to have sensation, but they don't have the higher senses like sight and hearing because they don't go at a distance, further to moving according to place as the perfect animals, like the cat and the dog, the quadrupeds and the ones that fly around and so on, the ones of this sort. And some further, and that's us now, for understanding as what? Men, right? Now hominess is what? Yeah, yeah. No, I was teaching some guys at the house last night, there. We're doing the periharmineus, right? And we're talking about noun and verb as the parts of the statement. And in my text here, I say, both noun and verb are names as previously defined. So a name is a vocal sound signifying by human agreement, no part of which signifies by itself. Now the noun and verb are both a name, but the verb signifies with time and the noun without time, right? But now in Greek, in Aristotle's Greek, you have the same word for name and for noun, which is onoma, right? And then verb has its own name, rhema. So sometimes in Aristotle, says onoma, he means what's common to noun and verb. Sometimes when he says onoma, he means noun as opposed to verb. And so if you read Ammonius Hermaeus, the Greek commentator, among the Greek commentators on the periharmineus, you'll be explaining that as he goes on, right? Now in Latin, you have the same thing, you see. You have nomen and verbum, noun and verb, but nomen also is used to name, name. While in English, we have the word name and the word noun, so we can have a separate word. But then I explained it in regard to human being and male and female. The Latin and the Greek have two words, right? So they have vir as opposed to femina, and then homo is common to vir and femina, a different name. But we don't have that. We're like, like the thing with noun, say, so man is divided into man and woman, right? So we have to explain we're using man as opposed to woman, or man is common. So they have their own separate word here, right? Okay, so that's clearly how to understand Aristotle's text there, right? You can say, he is in a way talking about the operations of life, but he's really talking about the different kinds of living bodies, right? The different graves of living bodies that become known through these different things that they do, right? So when I cut a branch off the tree there that's rubbing against the house and doing some kind of damage, you know, I don't feel too sorry for the tree, and I don't hear any, you know, screaming. Yeah, yeah. You have it in fiction sometimes, huh? But, yeah. But if you cut off a, you know, a leg or a thing of a dog or a cat, you'd get quite a reaction to that, yeah. Sometimes you don't even have to go that far. Now, the second objection is taken from talking about the act of life and the attempt of life. The second should be said that the works of life are called those things whose, what, sources are in the ones doing them, so that they, what, lead themselves to such operations, huh? Now, that can happen that not only are there natural beginnings, right, of things done in men as in actual powers, but also some things, what, added above as habits inclining one to certain genre operations, which act in the manner of nature, right, and make, therefore, these operations delightful. So when you get habituated to something, it's pleasant to operate according to this. And from this, it is said, as a word to a sin and likeness, that that operation which is delightful to a man, and to whom, and to which he is inclined, and which he spends his time, and orders his life to it, that's his life, right? Right? So when you see you now talking about teaching, you know, you're going to start teaching. C'est ma vie, he says. C'est ma vie. It's my life. When some are said to lead a, what, luxurious life, huh? Some, a honest life, right? And in this way, contemplative life is distinguished from the act of life. And in this way also, to know God is said to be, what, the eternal life. Of course, God's eternal life is his own, what, existence of it, right? That's so often. So this is a distinction, in a sense, in creatures, right? Between the being of the creature and its operation, right? And both can in some way be called life, but in God they're going to be the same, huh? Just stop on that a second, this last sentence. So when we read this scripture about that life, it's to know... Yeah, this is eternal life, yeah. So that's a less proper definition. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. The substance is what's primary, right? Okay. But I mean, I think it's important, you know, it's important to realize that there's a distinction in the use of the word life, right? Yeah. They can name the being or existence, right, of the living thing, right? And also name its, what, operations, right? Yeah. But the first name is the being, right? But in terms of our knowing, we come to know that through the operations, right? You know, like, for example, the question arises about the existence of the human soul, you know, does the human soul continue to exist after death, right? And, uh, Sarasota says in the beginning of the three books about the soul, he says that this question depends upon whether the soul does something not in the body, right? If the soul does something not in the body, then its existence is not just in the body, right? So you're coming to know the kind of existence the soul has, right, from what it does, right? But in things, you can say the reason why our soul does something not in the body is because there is an existence that is not just in the body. You know, the way they express it, you know, it's kind of interesting. They say that the existence of the soul, um, or the soul itself is not completely immersed in the body, right? And so you kind of, you know, imagine something floating in the ocean there, right? But part is, is, is, is submerged and part is above the water, right? And so this is kind of a funny thing, the human soul, right? It, it exists in the body, but it's not, what, immersed in the body, right? That's a very strange way to be, but how do you know that's so? Because you do something not in the body, right? You understand, for example, the, what, universal, right? Okay. Why something is received in the body, in the continuous, it's always going to be, what, singular. So, um, even since Descartes is following that order, he says, I think, therefore I am, right? And he could have said, well, besides, I think, therefore I'm alive. So, in a sense, coming to know one to the other, right? Now, what's the famous, uh, remark of, uh, Shakespeare there? Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stir, isn't it? It doesn't say things in existence. The existence of things sooner catch your eye. It's their motion, right? The motion stands out, but, uh, that's not what's most fundamental to things in motion.