Prima Pars
Lecture 84: The Divine Will: God's Willing of Himself and Creatures

Transcript
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The first, therefore, one proceeds thus. It seems that in God there is no will. For the object of the will is the end, or purpose, and the good. But you can't assign some end for God. Therefore, there is no will in God. Moreover, will is a certain, what? Desire, right? But desire, since it is of a thing not had, designates some kind of imperfection, which does not belong to God. Therefore, the will of God, therefore, will is not in God. That reminds me a bit of Socrates' argument there in the symposium, I guess, where he's talking about the philosopher, and he says that the philosopher is the lover of wisdom. Now, if you love something, then you want it. And if you want something, you lack it. Therefore, the philosopher must be lack of wisdom. And that sounds like a good argument, right? But sometimes I put to a student in class, I say, well, I'll say, John tells us that God is love. But if you love, you want. And if you want, you lack. Therefore, God is lacking, right? There's something wrong with this, right? And of course, in English, if the word want, the word want can designate both desire and lacking something, right? So if I say to the students, you're sadly wanting, I'm not talking about their desire being sad, if that might be true also. But they're simply lacking something they should have, right? Now, what's the defect in Socrates' argument? In a certain way, he said that they have wisdom. They can, yeah. And so we take up even the emotions, and then later on, the acts of the will. We say love is more basic than wanting or joy. But when you love something but don't have it, then you want it. When you love something and have it, then you rejoice. So it isn't necessarily true that what you love you want. There's probability because that's so common in our things, right? But what there is in God is love and joy, but no wanting, strictly speaking. So it's interesting that this group of powers is often called the appetitus, which means wanting or desire, right? And I suppose, going back to what Shakespeare says, things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. And that can be applied kind of in a retirement handis to even the reason and the will. So the act of reason that is so characteristic of reason that stands out, reasoning, is like a kind of motion. And wanting is a kind of what's seeking, too, so it seems a bit like motion. So we're more aware of things like hunger and thirst and so on. So it gets its name from what's more known, but it's not really limited to that, huh? Just like the irrational appetite is named from ira, anger, right? It stands out, but it doesn't involve just anger. Moreover, according to the philosopher in the third book about the soul, the will is a what? Yeah. Why, the good is the unmoved mover. But God is the first unmoved mover, as is proven in the eighth book of Aristotle's physics, or natural hearing. Therefore, in God, there is no will, right? Against all this nonsense is what the apostle, meaning St. Paul, says. I don't know if that's very common, Thomas. What do you call it, figure of speech? Yeah. Terrible word, huh? Romans 12. That you might prove what is the will of God. Now, Thomas gives the basic reason why there's will in God. I answer, it should be said that in God there is will, just as in him there is what? Understanding. For the will follows upon the understanding, just as the emotions what follow upon the sense power. For just as a natural thing has existence and act through its form, so the understanding. When it understands and act, it does so through some understandable form. But each thing has to, what? Some relation, has this relation, you might say, to its natural form. That when it does not have it, it tends toward it. And when it has it, it rests in it. And the same is so about any natural perfection, which is the good of nature. And therefore, this relation to the good in things lacking knowledge is called natural desire. And so you go to the place to buy a plant, you know, and sometimes they say, well, this plant wants a lot of sun, or it wants a lot of water, or it's a big feeder, they say sometimes, you know, about broccoli and so on. But there you're talking about natural desire, right? Whence also the intellectual nature to the good grasped by the understandable form has a similar relation. That when it has it, it rests in it. When it does not have it, it, what? Seeks it. And both of these things pertain to the will. Whence in everything having and understanding there is will. Just as in everything having a sense there is the animal desire, which is the emotions, the feelings, huh? And thus is necessary to be in God's will since there is in him, what? Understanding, right? And just as his act of understanding is his very being, so is what? Will. Yeah. There's no accidents in God we saw before, right? And if his understanding or his willing was not his being, then he would be to his understanding and his willing, his ability is to act and he would not be pure act, huh? So Thomas is very brief there, huh? Now to the first objection he says, although nothing other than God is the end of God, right? Nevertheless, God himself is an end with respect to all the things that come to be from him. And thus, and this through his very, what? Nature or substance. Since through his very substance, he is good, right? In fact, as good as himself. But the end has a notion of something, what? Good, huh? Would it be proper sometimes to translate this type of use of ratio as character? You would say that, I suppose, yeah. See, when they define the good, so as they define the good to the end, they say the good is what is perfect of another by way of an end, right? In this sense, you wouldn't say that God is an end, right? But he is the end of other things, right? So in that way, he still pertains to the idea of end in some way, huh? And so he is something good. Okay, now the second objection was saying that will is a certain, what? Desire, right, huh? That's why it's named. To the second, it should be said that the will in us pertains to the desiring heart, which, although it is named from desire, right? Nevertheless, it doesn't have this act alone that it desires what? What it does not have. But also that it loves what it has and that it, what? Delights in it, huh? As I mentioned before, in Greek, you know, when they talk about the emotions, they divide them into two. Epithumia, in Greek, and thumas, right? And these are translated into Latin by the concupisal appetite and the erascial appetite, right? But they're both named from the emotion that kind of stands out to us, huh? So when you're hungry or thirsty or very hungry or thirsty, you're very much aware of your, what? Need, your condition, yeah. And when you're angry, you're very much aware of this, right? So it's named from the emotion that stands out, right? But it's not limited to that particular emotion, okay? Just like you might say, reason is named from the act of reasoning, right? But it also involves understanding, right? And not just reasoning. And as it regards loving and delighting or joy or pleasure, will is positive, he says, in God, right? Okay? So there's three acts here, basically. The basic act in us is to like or love something, right? Now, if I like candy but don't have it, then I want some candy, right? If I like candy and I get some candy and I'm eating it, mmm, then I have joy or pleasure, right? You see? But out of these three acts, only the first, love or liking, and what joy can belong to God, right? The middle one of wanting can't belong to God because he doesn't lack any good. He contains all of it. He said to Abraham, I'll show you every good, right? Meaning, himself. As regards this, will is posited in God, in regard to Homet, and the elitator, who always has, right, the good which is object, since it is in no way different from his very, what, substance or nature. You see, coming back to Socrates there, both of the chief philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, make it very clear that the beginning of philosophy is wonder, right? And wonder is basically a desire to know one, especially to know the cause, the unknown cause of some effect, just going to eclipse the sun that's the cause of this. But the philosopher is not named from wonder. He's named from the love of wisdom. Now, why is it appropriate that the philosopher be named from the love of wisdom rather than from wonder? Wisdom is the end? It can be there at the end, yeah. I can love wisdom whether I have it or don't have it, right? Okay. If I desire, wonder, wonder, when I say twinkle, twinkle, little star, how I wonder what you are, I don't know. Big friend, right? So the love of wisdom can be found when you don't have wisdom, but even after you have wisdom, and in fact, as Augustine says, you can love it more after you know what it is than before, right? And that's the same reason why charity, say, remains in heaven, right? Because charity is basically love, okay? And you can love God when you don't have him, but when you have him, when you see him face to face, you're going to love him more than you ever did in this life. But hope is going to what? Yeah, hope is something you don't have yet, right? So hope is going to disappear, right? Faith is going to disappear too, because you're going to have this clear vision of God, right? But love is going to remain. And so, it's more appropriate to name the philosopher from the love of wisdom, huh? Doesn't imply that he's necessarily wise yet, right? But as he starts to acquire some wisdom, he doesn't love wisdom less, but he loves it more. Why, the wonder, in a sense, is diminished, right? Once you start to see the reason why things are so, right? The desire. They've been satisfied, huh? So wonder is like a hunger or a thirst, they say, right? A hunger or thirst for knowledge. Well, when you get the knowledge, then the hunger or thirst disappears, huh? It's more appropriate to name the philosopher from the love of wisdom than the other. So God doesn't have any desire for wisdom. He doesn't want wisdom. What's wrong with him, see? Yeah, but he's wisdom itself, right? So he loves wisdom and he rejoices in his wisdom, huh? What's his happiness? Now, the third objection was saying, well, that the will is a moved, mover, right? So the good moves the will and then the will moves us to do something. To the third, it should be said that the will whose chief object is a good outside the will is necessary that it be moved in some way by that. But the object of the divine will is his own goodness, which is his very, what? Nature. When, since the will of God is his very nature, his very essence, it is not moved by another from himself, but by himself only, right? This is not even the strict sense of motion, right? In that way, speaking in which to understand That into will is said to be a, what, emotion, huh? And according to this, Plato says that the first mover moves itself, right? He knows and loves himself. He's very, very nice to Plato when he defends him and says these things, huh? Now, second article. Whether God wills something other than himself, right? The second one proceeds thus. It seems that God does not will things other than himself. For the divine act of will is his very being. But God is not other from himself. Therefore, he does not will something other than himself, huh? Kind of a strange argument that tells him it down there. Moreover, the thing willed, the object of the will, moves the will as the desirable desire, as is said in the third book about the soul. If, therefore, God willed something other than himself, his will would be moved by something other than himself, which is impossible. Moreover, to whatever will suffices something willed, it seeks nothing outside of itself. But to God, his own goodness suffices. And his will is, what, satiated from his own goodness, huh? Therefore, God does not wish something other than himself, huh? I can answer those objections, huh? Moreover, the act of the will is multiplied according to the thing's will. If, therefore, God wills himself and other things from himself, he would follow that the act of his will was multiplied, huh? Like, to be one act whereby he wills his own goodness and then no one wills your goodness or my goodness, huh? And consequently, his being would be multiplied and would be composed, huh? Because that's his willy. But this is impossible. Therefore, he does not will things other than himself, huh? But against all this is what the Apostle says, huh? He's the Apostle, St. Paul, 1 Thessalonians, huh? Chapter 4. This is the will of God, your sanctification. So Thomas says, The answer should be said that God not only wills himself, but also things other than himself, which appears in the likeness before introduced, huh? For a natural thing not only has a natural inclination with respect to its own good, so that it tries to acquire it when it doesn't have it, or it rests in it when it does have it, but also that it, what, diffused, spread out its own good to other things, according as is, what, possible. Whence we see that every agent, insofar as it is an act and perfect, makes something like itself. Whence this also pertains to the notion of the will, that the good which one has, he communicates to others, according as it is possible. And this especially pertains to the divine will, from which, through a certain likeness, is derived every good perfection. Is that, um, when you said, like, will, divine will, is that, uh, and, and, and the notion of will, but that's, uh, really, this text is bonitas, do you have that? Uh, like, And this especially pertains to the divine will, from which, through a certain likeness, is derived every perfection. They say goodness, you mean? Oh, yeah, you, you, you, you, you have will there? Yeah. Okay. First part, yeah. Then it says derivata omnis perfectio. But we saw a connection between perfection and good there, back in the, the articles on perfection and good. Whence, if natural things, insofar as they are perfect, communicate their good to other things, much more does this pertain to the divine will, and that it communicates its own good to other things by way of a certain, what, likeness, huh? In the way that is possible, right? Thus, therefore, he wishes both himself to be in other things. We're now a little difference here, right? But he wills himself as the end, huh? Other things as towards that end. But, insofar as it is befitting the divine goodness, also, that other things particulate. It's like that evil, not a fucking weird joke, and how much more. Yeah, yeah. That's how that argument is. Yeah. Okay, now the first objection is saying, well, the divine willing is the divine being, and the divine being is another than self, self, and will, something else, right? Now, this is something very important that Thomas will often point out, talking about God. Now, we have many thoughts about God, and no thought is adequate to expressing God, right? But something about God is brought out of one thought that's not brought out of another thought. So he says, to the first, therefore, it should be said that although the divine act of willing, the divine to will, is his being in the thing itself, huh? Nevertheless, they differ in their, what? Yeah, in their definition, yeah. Okay. Now, this goes back to the teaching of Aristotle in the Periomenes, right? That words signify things through, what? Thoughts, okay? And as Thomas pointed out back here, these many words said of God, although they signify the same thing in God, they don't signify it through the same thought. And therefore, they're not, strictly speaking, synonyms, right? So although the divine being and the divine willing are the same thing, the words, the being of God and the willing of God, differ in their meaning, right? And one brings out something and the other one doesn't bring out, huh? Okay. That's a very important distinction that we've met before, but it comes up again and again. According to a diverse way of understanding and signifying, right? In this that I say God to be, there's not implied any relation to something, right? Else. As there is in this that I say God, what? Will, son. And therefore, although he is not anything other than himself, he will is nevertheless something other than himself, right? Okay? Just like he understands something other than himself, right? Now the second objection is saying, hey, if God will something other than himself, isn't he being moved by the goodness of this thing other than himself? And now he's not the only mover that we thought he was, and so on. Well, of course, the answer is going to be that God doesn't will anything else except in willing himself. To the second it should be said that in those things that we will on account of an end, the whole reason of moving is the end itself. And this is what moves the what? The will. And this most of all appears in those things which we will only on account of the end. who wishes to take a bitter medicine or potion, right? Wishes in it nothing except what? Health. So nothing moves you to take the bitter potion except the what? Yeah, yeah. And of course these, when I had some young, when I was young, and they had these red pills that are like cinnamon, those little cinnamon things. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. And it actually tastes pretty good. Yeah. And I put it in my mouth and... And I went right through there, thinking, oh, what an awful taste of medicine, right? So I didn't try to enjoy it, you know. Well, they shouldn't make medicine taste too good. That's saying the dangers for little boys and little girls, but they don't take it. So Thomas takes the example of a bitter potion, right, where there's nothing in the medicine. They would appeal to a little boy or girl, but they only take medicine. It's different, he says, than the one who takes a sweet potion like Mr. Burkwester. Which not only an account of health, but also on its own sake, right, someone can will, right? You've seen these orange-flavored vitamin C pills, you know? Yeah, they taste pretty good. I kind of like them, you know. And I don't get much candy nowadays, so I'm going to take one of these things. So I'll kind of, yeah. Whence, since God does not will things other than himself, except an account of the end, which is his own goodness, right? It does not follow that something other is moving his will, beside his own, what, goodness, huh? And then he makes this good person. And thus, just as he understands things other than himself, by or in understanding his own nature, right? So also he wills things other than himself in willing his own, what, goodness, huh? And God, only in that way, can will us, huh? It's only in willing himself that he can will us. We can will something without, because of, you know, directing it to God, right? But he cannot will something except in willing himself. Otherwise, he'd be somewhat God being moved by something other than himself. And there'd be a multiplicity of acts and so on, huh? Okay, now the third objection was saying that, isn't he satisfied with himself, you see? You know, people think, you know, he got bored there by himself alone, decided to make the universe to play with, you know? Well, this is all nonsense, of course. To third, it should be said, from the fact that his own goodness suffices to the divine will, it does not foul that he wills nothing else, right? But that he wills nothing else except by reason of his goodness, huh? You know what they say about the American consumer, you know? Happiness is always one purchase away, one more purchase away. What you purchase is never enough to satisfy you, right? Okay? What's the famous work of Thackeray there, huh? Vanity Fair, right? But on the kind of last page of Vanity Fair, it kind of sums up the moral of the story, huh? He says, for who in this life ever gets what he wants, he says, or, having gotten it, is satisfied. Okay? So we're always wanting something more because we're not satisfied, right? So the fact that God is completely satisfied by his own goodness, right? Is a sign that he can't will anything else except by willing his own, what? Goodness. And he will these other things as something suitable to his goodness, huh? Okay, now, beautiful proportion now in the reply to the fourth objection. The fourth objection is saying, well, if God wills himself and with something else, aren't there two willings in God and therefore multiplicity? To the fourth it should be said, and Thomas makes a comparison now, going back to what we learned about to understand, that just as the divine understanding is one, right, one act, because he does not see many things except in one thing, so the divine willing is one and simple, right? Because he does not feel many things except through one, which is his own, what? Goodness, right? So he's quite the, quite the, I can't say quite the creature, isn't I? He's quite the being, right? Quite the being, yeah. So God can't understand anything other than himself except by understanding himself, right? And he can't will something other than himself except by what? Goodness. Well, his own goodness, yeah. Yeah. Now, you've got to be a little bit careful about this proportion, right, between the intellect and the will, because, as Thomas is going to point out now in the next article, God, in understanding himself, necessarily understands everything else, not only everything else that he has made or will make or has made, right, but everything that he could make and didn't make. But does God, in necessarily willing himself, necessarily will anything else? The answer is no. Okay? And to me, this is, you know, extremely important to see just for your own thankfulness, right? You know, you realize that, did you ever thank God for choosing you to be? And that's kind of the first thing to thank God for, right? What you realize is choosing you to be was not because you were more deserving to be than all those other people that could have been, right? You know, you stop and think, you know, obviously if your mother and father had not met, you would not have been, right? But even if your mother and father met, you're only one of thousands, if not millions, of people that could have been generated from your mother and father. And I forget, you know, what they say, you know, about the sperm, but there's thousands, I guess, you know. And only one of those would be, lead to you. So, your chances of being are practically nil, even if your parents do need, right? And so, you realize that it's completely free in God's part and purely gratuitous that he chose you to be. It makes you rather humble, right, huh? And it should make you very, what, thankful that he chose you to be, huh? It's very, very, you know, very worth thinking about, I think, you know, that particular thing. Thinking and thanking. Yeah, yeah. Well, they're actually related, yeah. You think, you think. Mm-hmm. Yeah. To the third one proceeds thus, it seems that whatever God wills, he wills for necessity. Thomas is going to take the opposite thing, right? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. going to maintain that God necessarily wills himself, but willing himself, he doesn't necessarily will anything else. Everything eternal is necessary, but whatever God wills, he wills eternity. Otherwise, his will would be changeable. Therefore, whatever he wills, of necessity, he wills. Moreover, God wills things other than himself insofar as he wills his own goodness. But God wills his own goodness of necessity. Therefore, he wills things other than himself of necessity. Third objection. Whatever is natural to God is necessary, because God is necessary to be through himself in the beginning of all necessity, as has been shown above. That was one of the arguments, I guess. The third argument is of God, right? The things we know are able to be and not be, so they don't have existence through themselves, right? Therefore, they must have existence through something that cannot both be and not be, and that's something necessary to be. But as you know from logic, some necessary things can have a cause to their necessity. And what is necessary to another, you suppose that something is necessary to be through itself, and that's God. Okay? So whatever is natural to God is necessary, because that's what God is. What is necessary to be through itself, and the beginning or source of all necessity. Necessary is one of the words Aristotle takes up in the fifth book of wisdom, and it's in the first of the three parts. And sometimes I like to kind of imitate Aristotle's famous fragment. You know, most people don't realize that Aristotle wrote dialogues just like Plato did. And we know the titles of some of these dialogues, but they've been lost. And Plato gave lectures in the, what? Academy, right? In addition to the dialogues he wrote, huh? And some people say the dialogues were written to be read by people who were hoping to get into the academy. And they would read them under the direction of the student already in the academy. And if they got interested in these things and made some progress, they might be admitted to the academy and the lectures in the academy, right? So it's kind of a paradox that Plato's dialogues have come down to us, but his lectures are lost, although there's some, you know, reference to them in Aristotle, right? While in the case of Aristotle, what has come down to us seems to be a concise form of his lectures, right? But the dialogues have been lost. So you get kind of an unbalanced view of these two guys, right? It's like Homer's comic book has been lost, right? And Shakespeare's tragic works have been lost, and this is comedy's. You get a very unbalanced view of Homer and Shakespeare, both of whom could write tragedy and comedy that they've excelled in the book. So I think in Cicero, you know, says that Aristotle's dialogue is even greater than Plato's, right? But there's a famous frame that has come down to us, many forms there from the dialogue in philosophy, and it goes like this. Either you ought to philosophize or you ought not to philosophize. What do you think? If you say you ought to philosophize, then do so. If you say you ought not to philosophize, then you're going to have to philosophize to show why not. So he's a case of us to philosophize, huh? Okay. I remember seeing a conversation there between two famous scientists there, and the one scientist was saying, well, of course, my philosophy is to avoid philosophy. Because I know it's a trap, he says, I know it's a trap, see? And so the scientist said, well, yeah, then you've got to bring in philosophy even as a scientist. And, well, sometimes I do that with the word necessary, right? Is it necessary to understand the word necessary? What would you say, Isidore? If you say it is necessary to understand the word necessary, you'd better try to understand it, right? If you say it's not necessary to understand the word necessary, right? You're going to have to think about the word necessary means to show why it is necessary. So in any case, or either case, you must, what? Consider the word necessary, huh? It's a very important word. Okay, so we're in this third objection there, right? Whatever is natural to God is necessary because God is necessary to be to himself. And he's the beginning of cause of all necessity. This has been shown above. But it's natural, what? It is natural to him to will whatever he wills. Because in God there is nothing apart from nature, as is said in the fifth book of wisdom of Aristotle. Therefore, whatever he wills, of necessity he wills. Moreover, what is not necessary to be, and to be possible not to be, these are equivalent, then. Go to God. If therefore it is not necessary for God to will something of those things that he wills, it is possible for him to not will it. And it is possible for him to will that which he does not will. Therefore, the will of God is contingent, right? It's what we speak of our own will, right? So, as opposed to the contingency that you have in nature, where for the most part it does something, but sometimes rarely it fails, right? So for the most part in nature, it produces a man with two arms and two legs, but occasionally a man is born with an arm or leg or something like that. But the will seems to be, what, kind of equidistant from me, to eat steak or not eat steak, to eat candy or not eat candy, right? So, if God is contingent, he would be something imperfect, right? Because everything contingent is imperfect and changeable. You've got a lot of objections to this particular article, right? It's a very important one. Moreover, from that which is to both, right, does not follow any action except it be inclined by something else to one of them, as a commentator says in the second book of the physics. If, therefore, the will of God, the commentator, who's the commentator, by the way? Verily? Yeah. Because he seemed to have commented on all of Aristotle's works, and some of you have a double commentary, you know, a short one and a longer one and so on, so he got the title of the commentator, right? But I think, you know, we can seize it from him and say, Thomas is the commentator. Thomas still follows the customary way of referring to him as a commentator. Sometimes you'll call me Verily, sometimes you'll call me a commentator. If, therefore, the will of God, in some things, has itself to either willingness or not willingness, right, it follows that he would be, what, determined by something else to one of these effects, and that should have some prior cause. Now, the sixth objection is, what, overextending the likeness there between the understanding and the will. Moreover, whatever God knows, right, not only himself, but other things, of necessity he knows, right? But just as the divine knowledge is the divine essence, so also the divine will. Therefore, whatever God wills, the necessity he wills, right? Or you could develop, like I was saying, you could say, what, God knows things other than himself, by knowing himself. Likewise, he wills things other than himself, by willing himself, right? But in knowing himself, he necessarily wills things other than himself. Therefore, in willing himself, he necessarily wills things other than himself. Well, that's, what? I would as Plato say, likeness is a dangerous thing. It's a stupid thing, you know? In the sophist, that's a damn, I'll call this half and stuff properly, right? And so, in understanding, as we said before, a likeness, a ratio, a proportional likeness, you have to consider it to see exactly in what way they are alike. Remember the example we had when Aristotle was talking about the first matter? The first matter is to what? Man and dog, like let's say clays to sphere and cube. Well, sphere and cube are two accidents, so man and dog are two accidents. Or clay is an actual substance, so the first matter is an actual substance. No. That's not the way in which these two ratios are alike. They're unlike in those ways, right? But they're alike in that just as the clay is able to be a sphere and a cube, but not both at the same time, and when it becomes one of them, it remains able to be the other, but it became the other, but it ceased to be the former. So likewise, the first matter is able to be a man or a dog, but not both at the same time. And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other, but if it became the other, it would cease to be the former, right? So you've got to think about that, right? I took the simple example from math, right? Four is to six is two is to three. But two to three is what? An even number to an odd number. So four is to six is an even number to an odd number, right? Or two and three are what? Prime numbers, right? So four and six must be prime numbers too. Well, you're misunderstanding the likeness, right? In what way is four to six like two to three? Yeah. Four is the same parts of six that two is the three. And if you have a hard time seeing that, just think of four as being two twos and six as being three twos. So four is the same parts of six, right? It's two of those three parts that are twos, just as two is two of those three parts that make up three. Okay? So you have to see in what way they're alike, right? Okay? But there may be some important differences. And so what's very important here is to see the likeness, right? That in some way God willing things other than himself is like his knowing things other than himself. He wills things other than himself in willing himself, right? Just as he knows things other than himself in knowing himself. But the difference is that he necessarily knows things other than himself in knowing himself, but he doesn't necessarily will things other than himself in willing himself. And you have to see what is the reason for that, right? Okay? And it goes back in a way to the difference in part, that's not the whole explanation of it, but the difference between knowing and what? Willing, right? Because knowing extends to the thing in itself. Why willing does. Why knowing is in the knower, right? So if there is something that God didn't know, there would be some ignorance in God, right? Some defect, right? But there'd be no defect in God if he didn't will anything other than himself. Well, those things outside wouldn't be though, that's all. There'd be no defect in him. Because then there's no obligation to will them, right? No necessity. And, you know, God's willing, I mean, these other things, do they add something to God's goodness? Well, Thomas says the creature has no goodness except by partaking of the divine goodness, right? And then he gives a little likeness there, huh? Just as Dwayne Berquist and the arm of Dwayne Berquist are no more than Dwayne Berquist, right? Or this book and page 109, you know, is no more than this book alone, is it? Because 109 is just a part of it. So God in creatures is no more than God alone. And then the other way Thomas sometimes leads us by the hand, right? He points out that there is a, what? Infinite distance between the divine goodness and us. And therefore, our goodness is to God's goodness, not like a shorter line is to a longer line, which would add something to the length of that longer line, but like a point is to a line. And he had a point to a line, and how much longer is a line? Nothing. So our goodness added to God's goodness is no more than God alone, right? And you really realize how, how bituitous his creating us was, right? Because he's not really making things better, more good than he did create us. We really added nothing to that. It's something really to think about, to be thankful for. But against this is what the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Ephesians, chapter 1. Who does all things according to the counsel of his, what? Will. Now that's kind of almost metaphorically to speak of counsel in God, right? But the things that we do from the counsel of the will, we do not will of, what? Necessity. Therefore, not whatever God wills, does he will from, what? Necessity, huh? Now, Thomas is going to point out some things about the word necessary here, right? There's many reasons why it's necessary to understand the word necessary, huh? Now, I answer, it should be said that something is said to be necessary in two ways. To wit, absolutely, and by what? Supposition, huh? Now, something is absolutely necessary, is judged absolutely necessary, from the relation of its terms, huh? As because the, what? Predicate is in the very definition of the subject. Just as necessary for man to be a, what? Animal, right? Or because the subject is of the definition of the predicate. As is necessary for a number to be odd, or, what? Even, right? But thus it is not necessary for Socrates to sit. But once it is not necessary, absolutely, but it can be necessary, what? From a supposition. For supposing that he is sitting, is necessary for him to sit when he sits. But, absolutely speaking, he is necessary for him to sit, right? So I'm necessarily sitting when I'm sitting, right? But I'm not absolutely, necessarily sitting. Now, about the divine thing's will, this should be considered. That something God wills is necessary absolutely. But this, nevertheless, is not true about all the things that he wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to its own, what? Goodness. Which is its own, what? Object, right? Whence God wills of necessity his own, what? Goodness, huh? Just as our will of necessity wishes be attitude or happiness. So you don't choose to be happy rather than miserable. Although sometimes I speak that way, you know, that somebody is, because, as Thomas says, virtue is the road to happiness and vice is the road to misery. And every day you pick up the newspaper, you can see that, what, people are miserable because of their vice, right? But does one choose to be miserable? No. Strictly speaking, one chooses something that will lead to misery, right? Or one chooses something that will lead to happiness, right? But you don't, strictly speaking, choose happiness or what? So you don't, strictly speaking, one chooses something that will lead to happiness, right? So you don't, strictly speaking, one chooses something that will lead to happiness, right? Necessarily and naturally will happiness, huh? Just as any other ability or power has a necessary relation to its own and chief object, as sight to what? Color, right? Because it's of its very definition that it tend towards that thing. But things other than himself, God wills, insofar as they are ordered to his own goodness as to a, what? End. Now this is the key thing now to see why he doesn't will the other thing necessarily. Those things which are for some end, or directed towards some end, we do not will necessity in willing the end, right? Except such things without which the end is not able to be. Just as we will food wishing the conservation of our life, right? And the boat wishing to go across, huh? But not thus of necessity do we will those things, without which the end is able to be. Just as the horse to what? Taking a journey. Because without this we are able to go, and there is the same, what? Reason of the things, huh? Whence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and is able to be without other things, since nothing of perfection is added to him, right? From other things. It follows that things other than himself, he wills, but not by, what? Absolute necessity, huh? And nevertheless, they are necessary from supposition. What does that mean? Supposing that he does will them, right? He is not able not to will them. He can't change his will. His will is one act, right? So he can't will me not to be not, see? But, yeah, yeah, yeah. But that's necessary from supposition, right? Having willed me to be, having chosen me to be, I don't know why. I mean, you see, all these people who could have been, right? And your parents could perhaps have married someone else, right? And then other people would have been born, right? Not every. Am I more deserving to be these other people? That would be kind of presumptuous part to say that, huh? Or that I had made, you know, better use of my gifts, and other people would have made use of their gifts, right? You know? I don't think that, huh? So it's very free in this part, right? But having chosen me, he can't, what? Yeah. Of course, there will be an article later on, that the will of God is changeable, but it's right. Now, the first objection is saying, everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, he wills from eternity. Otherwise, his will would be changeable. Therefore, whatever he wills, a necessity wills. Well, Thomas says, well, in one sense that's true. But some by absolute necessity, namely the divine goodness itself, right? Others by necessity from what? Supposition, right? Now, second objection. God wills things other than himself insofar as he wills his own goodness. But God wills of necessity his own goodness, right? Therefore, doesn't he will other things of necessity? To the second, it should be said that a goal God of necessity wills his own goodness. Nevertheless, a necessity doesn't will those things which he wills on account of his own goodness. Why? Because his goodness can be without them, right? Okay? So that's a simple principle, right? In willing the end, you don't necessarily will everything that is ordered to that end, right? If that end can be without that. Do you see that? You can see that even in our own will, right? Third objection. Whatever is natural to God is necessary. Because God's very nature is to be perissade in a chesse, right? Necessary to be through itself. To the third, it should be said that it is not natural for God to will something of those other things which he does not will of necessity. But nevertheless, it's not unnatural either. Or against nature, or against nature, but it's what? Yeah. So the voluntary is something different from the natural and the what? Unnaturally. Okay? And Aristotle, of course, had already talked about that, huh? That the will and nature are different causes. Of course, Shakespeare says nature cannot choose its origin. Distinction between nature there. Choice them. Now, the fourth objection. What is not necessary to be is able not to be. If, therefore, it is not necessary for God to will something of those things which he wills, it is possible for him not to will it, right? And it is also possible for him to will that which he does not will. Therefore, the divine will is contingent in both sides. Therefore, it's imperfect. Everything contingent is imperfect and changeable. Now, I was going to get out of this. To the fourth, it should be said that sometimes some necessary cause does not have a necessary relation to some effect, which is an account of the defect of the effect and not an account of the defect of the cause. Just as the power of the sun does not have a necessary relation to something of those things that happen contingently, not an account of the defect of the power of the sun, but an account of the defect of the effect, not necessarily going forth from its cause. And likewise, that God does not, in necessity, will anything of those things which he wills, does not happen from the defect of the divine will, that's not made up yet, so is it, but from the defect which belongs to the thing willed, according to his very notion. Because it is such that without it, there can be, what? The perfect goodness of God, which defect follows every created good. So when we see God as he is, we'll realize how superfluous we are. So it would be good to see, yeah, the superfluous creature, right? To see God as he is, right? How can one be satisfied with something superfluous, right? Myself or other creatures for that matter, right? To the fifth objection, now. But you need something outside to determine you to which one you choose. To the fifth, it should be said that the cause that is from itself contingent, right? It is necessary that it be determined by something exterior to an effect. But the divine will, which has from itself necessity, determines itself to which it has a relation that is not, what? Necessary, huh? Okay, now the sixth objection is taken from the likeness between... The fourth objection is taken from the likeness between the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness of the likeness is knowing other things by knowing himself, right? And is willing other things by willing himself, right? To the sixth it should be said, that as the divine being in itself is necessary, so also the divine willing and the divine knowing. But the divine knowing has a necessary relation to what? The things known. Not, however, the divine willing to the things willed other than himself. Now what's the reason for this? Which is because knowledge is had about things according as they are in the knower. But the will is compared to things as they are in themselves. Now that's the distinction that Aristotle brings out in the sixth book of wisdom. It's very brief, you know. You look at the text there in the last reading of the sixth book. But the true and false are primarily in the mind, he says. Good and bad are in things. And that's a very important distinction, huh? Okay? We talked about that before, right? One result of that we talked about before is that there's the same knowledge of opposites. So if you know what virtue is in ethics, you can also do that, know better what vice is. And the reason why we have black and white is because opposites are better known together, right? So it's a famous thing, and Socrates talks about it in the symposium, that there's the same knowledge of opposites. Can I know what abnormal blood pressure is, is that I'll know what normal blood pressure is? But, is there the same love of opposites? If I love health, I can't love sickness, right? If I love beauty, I can't love ugbeness, right? So why is that, that the love of one opposite excludes the love of the other opposite? Why the knowledge of one opposite doesn't exclude the knowledge of the other opposite, huh? As I say to my students, you know, I know your ignorance better than you know it yourself. So I know knowledge and ignorance at the same time, right? I know, in knowing blindness, I know sight. But you can't, what? If you love knowledge, you can't love ignorance. If you love sight, you can't love blindness, right? Well, it's because in things, one opposite, what? Excludes the other, right? But in knowing, one opposite doesn't exclude the other. It's a help to it, right? So knowing is primarily getting a known into the mind. And that's where opposites can be together. But in will, it's going out to things themselves. Well, one opposite excludes the other. That's just one example of this, right? I used to say to students, you know, I quote Aristotle there in the premium to the three books about the soul, where he says, all knowledge as such is good. And I'd say, well, is that true about love? Is all love as such good? Now, why is all knowledge as such good, but all love as such is not good? Well, it's interesting that even knowledge of the bad is good. But love of the good, or the bad, is bad, right? Because love of the bad attaches you to the bad in itself, right? By knowledge of the bad doesn't attach you to the bad. And as Boyacus says, you have to know the bad to avoid it, right? So even in logic, we study the various kinds of mistakes, so we can avoid them, right? Okay. So Thomas is bringing out this famous distinction that Aristotle, which is what a student he is in Aristotle, which is because knowledge is had about things according as they are in the knower. And that's why we mentioned before that the first act of the mind is sometimes called, in Latin there, simplex apprehensio, simple grasping, right? You grasp what I'm saying, you know? But that means that you, what, contain it in your mind, right? When I grasp something with my hand, it's contained in my hand, right? When I grasp something with my mind, it's, you know. But does that describe love grasping, you know? Think of the average man or something like that, you know. But the will is compared to things as they are in themselves, right? Because therefore all other things have necessary being according as they are in God, right? But not according as they are in themselves do they have absolute, what, necessity, right? So that they are to themselves, what, necessary. An account to this, whatever God knows, of necessity he knows, right? Absolute necessity. But not of whatever he wills, does he of necessity will, right? So if God didn't know all other things annoying himself, then he would be necessarily, what, ignorant of some things, and there would be a defect in God, right? He wouldn't be knowledge itself. But in willing himself, he doesn't have to will other things. Because in willing other things, he's willing something outside of himself, right? In willing something outside of himself, it adds nothing to his goodness, huh? And there's no way necessary to his goodness. Do you see? That's a very important difference, huh? This is part of understanding the divine will, right? You know, when Thomas is talking about the great question of whether the world is eternal or not, right? And he argues, you know, that the philosophers argue on both sides. But really, by natural reason, you can't determine whether the universe is always there or not. And by faith, we know that it has a beginning. And Thomas said, the one reason why it had a beginning is that this manifests the divine independence of the world, huh? If the universe had always been, you might think, well, he had to do it. You know, just like the way Spinoza talks, right? You know, the universe follows from God, like it follows from a triangle that has interior angles to the right angles. It's kind of an absolute necessity, you know, that follows, huh? And that's not the way it is. So you realize the absolute independence that God has of things. It's a very independent person. Our person listens to that. Yeah, OK, so let's take a little break now. Let's...