Prima Pars
Lecture 85: God's Will as Cause of Things and Whether It Has a Cause

Transcript
================================================================================

I'll cover it back here. Okay. Article 4 here. Whether the will of God is the cause of things. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine means, Dionysius is making a comparison between the Son and God, right? Just as our Son, not reasoning or choosing before, right? But to his very being, enlightens all things, right? They're capable of partaking in its light. So the divine good, to his very essence, sends forth the rays of its goodness, right? To all existing things. But everything that acts through the will acts as, what, reasoning and choosing one thing before another. Therefore, God does not act through the will. Therefore, the will of God is not the cause of things. But there's a certain likeness between the two, right? I was thinking about, before somebody came in, maybe, this text here, you know, in St. John, right? Where he's saying that I am the light of the world, right? I am the light of life, and so on. We sometimes call Christ the Son of Justice, S-U-N. Okay? And you say, well, okay, couldn't you kind of say that the Son is the cause of both the enlightening of the world, right? But also of life, right? And so, in that sense, the Son is like Christ, right? But you don't want to overextend that like this, right? As if God naturally, what, bestows these things, just as the Son naturally bestows light. But there's a, nevertheless, there's an enlighteness there. You know, and sometimes, you know, you see this in the Church Fathers, too, that the Son enlightens the earth before it warms it. And so God enlightens the mind with the light of faith before he warms the heart with charity. So like in Dave Erwin there, you know, that quote from St. Augustine, by believing we might come to hope, and by hoping we might come to love, right? So there's a certain light that's there, right? Nevertheless, God giving us the gift of faith, it's a gift, right? Or the love of God is unlike the Son, which naturally produces light first and then warmth. There's still a metaphorical lightness there. So, again, the lightness is a slippery thing, as Plato says in the Sophist, I think it is. And it's a dangerous thing, right, because lightness is the cause of, what, deception, right? And that's why the imagination is said to be the cause of, what, deception, because imagination is taken up with the likenesses of things. Who was it? Shelley, I think it was, in The Art of Poetry, you know, he says reason likes the differences of things, but, you know, the imagination likes the likenesses of things. And, in fact, what is the poet making but a likeness of things, huh? And his favorite thing in the speeches is the metaphor, which is a likeness, huh? So, years ago, when I was first looking at the four tools of dialectic, Aristotle puts the tool of difference before the tool of likeness. So, my idea was, well, likeness without seeing difference is a cause of deception, right? So, he puts the tool of difference for the tool of likeness. Which wants to be out of like that he's that observation, my part. But, it is kind of striking that he does that, huh? Yeah. So, you might misunderstand the likeness here, the great Dionysius here. More of that which is through its essence, huh? Is first in each order. Just as in the order of things fired up is first what is firing through its very essence, huh? Okay. Now, that's, of course, almost like the old principle that what is so through itself is before and the beginning or cause of what is through another, right? So, if the sugar is sweet to itself, right? It's before the coffee which is not sweet to itself, right? And it's a beginning or a cause of the coffee being sweet, huh? But God is the very first agent. Therefore, he is acting through his very essence, right? Which is his nature. He acts, therefore, through his nature and not through his, not through will. Therefore, the will of God is not the cause of things. I say this principle here is that what is so essentially is before what is so by partaking, right? So, reason can be reasonable without the emotions being reasonable. And emotions are reasonable only by partaking of reason in some way. They've been habituated, disposed to follow reason. Moreover, whatever is a cause of something, through this that it is such, is a cause by nature and not by will. But fire is a cause of what? Heeding because it is hot. But the artist is a cause of the house because he wants to make it. But Augustine says in the first book about Christian doctrine that because God is good, we are. But God, therefore God to his own nature is a cause of things and not to will. Moreover, of one thing there is one cause. But of created things, the knowledge of God is a cause. Therefore, the will of God ought not to be laid down to be the cause of things. But against this is what is said in that interesting book called Wisdom, the 11th chapter, verse 26. In what way could something remain unless you willed it? I answer it should be said that it is necessary to say that the will of God is the cause of things. And that God acts through will and not by necessity of nature, as some have estimated. Which appears, or can be made to appear, in three ways. First, from the very order of agent causes of makers. For since both understanding and nature act on account of an end, as is shown in the second book of the physics, right? The second book of natural theory. It is necessary that for an agent acting by nature, both that the end be predetermined, right? And the means necessary for that end, that both of these be determined by some, what? Superior understanding. Just as the arrow is predetermined, its end, in a certain mode of it, by the, what? Archer, right? Whence it is necessary that the one acting by understanding and will is before the one acting by, what? Nature. Nature doesn't know the end, right? And the order of things to the end. So it has to get its end from some superior understanding and will, huh? That knows, right? And determines the end. Whence, since first in the order of agents is God, is necessary that through understanding and will he, what? Acts, huh? Secondly, right, from the very notion of a natural agent, to which it pertains that it produce, what? One effect. Now this is the famous distinction that Aristotle points out in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, when he distinguishes between active ability and passive ability, right? And then he distinguishes among active abilities between reason or will on the one hand and nature. That nature is determined to what, right? That nature is determined to what, right? That nature is determined to what, right? Why reason or will is open to opposites. And this is because nature is acting through the natural form, which is one. And it's making something like that. But reason and will are acting through knowledge, and there's the same knowledge of opposites. So if I possess the medical art, I know how to maybe save your life and how to end it. And nobody better than the doctor knows how to end your life. Quickly and without any thing, you see. So he's open to opposites, right? And Shakespeare himself talks about this in the Coriolanus, right? Nature not being able to be more than one thing. And that's why customs like nature kind of determines you to one definite thing. Therefore, it's an endangering custom, right? It strikes me, you know, nowadays, and I was just talking to a friend of mine who was a chemist and so on, but it's a common opinion, you might say, among all scientists, that every thought is an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences. And probably they go along also with Einstein that every hypothesis is free to imagine, right? So in that sense, there's no stability at all in the life of the mind. There's nothing that you naturally know. There you see the force of custom, the custom that comes from modern science. So secondly, from the notion of a natural agent to which it pertains to produce one effect, right? Because nature in one and the same way acts unless it be, what, impeded, huh? And this is because, according as it is such, so it acts. Whence along as it is such, it does not make except such. For everything acting by nature has determined being. Since, therefore, the divine being is not determined, but contains in itself the whole perfection of being, it is not possible that it act by, what, necessity of nature. Unless, perhaps, it were to cause something undetermined, infinite in being, right? Which is impossible, as it is clear from the things above. It does not act, therefore, by necessity of nature, but the determined effects proceed from the infinite perfection of it, according to the determination of its will and its, what, understanding, huh? Okay, third, from the relation of effects to cause. For in this way effects proceed from an agent cause as they preexist in it, because every agent makes what is like itself. But effects preexist in a cause according to the way of the cause. Whence, since the divine being is a divine understanding, they preexist in its effects according to an understandable way. Whence, in an understandable way, they proceed from it. And thus, consequently, by way of the will. For the inclination to acting, what is conceived by the understanding, pertains to the will. The will, therefore, of God is the cause of things. Aristotle makes it a bit more clear there in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, where he says that since there's the same knowledge of opposites, right? In effect, you can't proceed naturally from knowledge, right? Because then you'd have, what, the doctor making you healthy and sick at the same time. And his knowledge enables you to do either one. So something other than the knowledge, yeah, he wants to heal you. So he makes you healthy. Or he hates you and he wants to finish you off. Or he's in the KGB or something. And so then he says, now there's another way, right? While nature's already, what, determined to one or two opposites. So in the presence of paper, the fire wouldn't actually just burn, right? It can't cool it, right? But the patient or the man, in the presence of the doctor, the doctor's knowledge is open to doing both of these things, right? So it has to be determined by the will to do one rather than the other, right? So Aristotle saw that, right? Now the first objection is taken from Dionysius' comparison of God to the Son. To the first, therefore, it should be said that Dionysius, through those words, does not intend to exclude choice from God simply, but secundum quid. I haven't surprised you should bring that distinction here. Insofar as, what? Not to just some things alone does he, what, communicate his goodness alone, but to all things, right? Insofar as, what, choice implies some kind of, what, discretion, right? So he makes his reign to fall on the just and the unjust, right? Christ is talking about how you're supposed to pray even for your enemies, right? You're going to take God, right? So, is he saying that God's goodness is indiscreet? In some ways, I like this there, you know? That God seems to bestow good things upon, you know, opposites, right? It doesn't, the last judgment may be a little bit different, but... Divine indiscretion. Yeah, yeah. But you also say, I think this is like a metaphor, right, to compare God to the Son, right? But there's a certain likeness there, right? In some way, they must be alike. So many guys even like a stone. The metaphor is always based upon likeness, huh? But there is considerable difference between a stone and God. Okay. Second objection said, Moreover, that which is, through its essence, is first in each order. Okay? What is so essentially, right? It's before what is so by participation, huh? But God is the first agent. Therefore, he must be acting through his own essence, which is his nature, huh? He acts, therefore, through nature, not through will. To the second, it should be said that the essence of God is his understanding and his will, right? And from this, therefore, that he acts through his essence, it follows that he acts by way of understanding and will. Although, you know, like, cast upon us by the Trinity, right? Because God the Son proceeds from God the Father by way of nature, rather than by way God doesn't choose to generate it, or something like that. And again, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. That's not per moda naturae, right? In a way, huh? Because God naturally, what, wills his own goodness, huh? Okay? And so in that sense, huh, something natural is before something, what? You know, a sense of, voluntary and a sense of chosen, right? Okay? Now, you've got to be careful, too, about this distinction between nature and reason or nature and will, right? Because there is something of nature in the reason and something of nature in the will. But there are some things we naturally understand and some things that we naturally, what, will, right? And, of course, the second person of the Blessed Trinity proceeds by way of what God naturally understands, right? And the Holy Spirit, by what he naturally wills. The weak was seen by what he doesn't naturally will, but freely wills, huh? Now, the third objection is taken from Augustine's says, because God is good, we are, right? How is that to be understood? To the third, it should be said that the good is the object of the will. And therefore, to this extent, it is said that because God is good, We are, insofar as his goodness is to him the reason for willing all other things, right? So we're not saying that it's proceeding naturally from the divine goodness. The divine goodness just naturally breaks out into the creature, right? It can't help but overflow itself, right? But because the divine goodness is the primary object of his will, right? So in loving his own goodness, he chooses, right, to spread it around so far as possible in us creatures, right? Fourth objection. Of one thing there is one cause, but of created things, the analogy of God is a cause. Therefore the will of God ought not to be laid down as a cause of things. But obviously these two, although they're the same, they're order in a certain way, right? To the fourth, it should be said that a one and the same effect, even in us, right, is a cause, knowledge as directing, right? Of which has conceived the form of the work and the will as, what, commanding, right? And so when Aristotle talks about choice, he says, well, isn't it, you know, deliberative will or is it willing deliberation, you know? I mean, it involves both. And that'll come up here when you get to this, to the third part of this, to this on the will, right? And Aristotle talked about that too in the, what, in the, at the angle, right? So in a sense he's saying the first cause is the good, right, at the end of the board, and then it's known by reason or by the senses, and then through that it moves the will over the other part. So there's a unity there, right, of order there among the causes. For the form, as it is in the understanding, is not determined to this, that something be or not be in effect, except through the will, right? That goes back to the fact that it's the same knowledge of opposites, right? So if I possess a knowledge of grammar, I can say you are my students or you is my students, you know? My knowledge of grammar is to speak correctly and incorrectly, right? Opposites, right? Open to opposites, right? I, I, is your professor and you are my students, right? I can say it just as well, right? And so it depends upon my will whether I want to speak correctly or incorrectly, right? Grammar enables me to do both. And I can come into class and teach, or I can come into class and deceive, right? Because my knowledge enables me to do both, right? When I give you an exam in logic or something like that, you know, I want to try to catch the students. And so I know what kind of an argument will convince them, right? You know, I'll give you an example where I say, every mother is a woman, no man is a woman, therefore no man is a mother, right? Is that a good argument? How about this? Every mother is a woman, no man is a mother, therefore no man is a woman. Is that good? So most students will think that's good, right? Because it's true that every mother is a woman, and it's true that no man is a mother, and it's true that no man is a woman. And there's some connection between the fact that no man is a mother and no man is a woman. But that's the conclusion to actually follow. But I know they'll think it follows. But if I give an argument in the same form, like this, and I say, every dog is an animal, no cat is a dog, therefore no cat is an animal, they wouldn't be deceived by that. I know that. So I give you an example where the premises are true, and the conclusion is true, but yet the conclusion doesn't follow. So I know that from my knowledge of logic, right? You said you're familiar with deception. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Mozart has this piece of music that you can buy. It's called a musical joke, right? And it has some obvious musical mistakes in it, right? But then there are more subtle ones that Mozart is pointing out. So he's showing you how not to write music. It's, you know, it's very high. It's in the 500s, you know. It's called a musical joke. That's pretty interesting for the people to play it. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's one piece that Mozart I haven't bought yet, although I've heard it, you know, on the radio. It's that quick, though. I think it's kind of a nice piece in some ways, you know, but he's got subtle mistakes in it, you know. So Mozart knows how to do that, right? Shakespeare sometimes, you know, over in the place, you know, he makes a little bit of fun of amateur actors and so on. So he knows the bad as well as the good. He can do both ways in his great heart. So everybody, probably the third objection there, right? Oh, down to the fourth objection. Whence the speculative understanding says nothing about doing, right? But the power is the cause is carrying out because it names the immediate principle of operation. But all of these in God are one, right? But even in us, where there are many, they can still be what causes or one effect, because of the order that's among them. So the order is taught by Aristotle in the third book on the soul. He takes up the moving powers, huh? But then you talk about how they're all united around the good, right? Because the good as known moves the will or the desiring power to desire that good, and then that moves the arms or legs eventually, right? So they have an order, therefore they can all be causes of one effect. But if it's the order of God, these can be because they're one and the same thing. So the will of God is the cause of things, huh? Can you talk about another article or what? No, I think I'm going to wait because we'll be meeting next week. Critical five, huh? Okay. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our mighty man, guard ye an angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, order in the room in our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. Help us to understand what you're doing. Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So article four was on whether the will of God is the cause of things, right? And now the fifth article was on whether there can be some cause of the divine will assigned them. To the fifth, one proceeds thus. It seems that it is possible to assign some cause of the divine will. Gee, Tom's going to take the opposite side, I guess, for that. For Augustine says in the book on the 83 questions, Who dares to say that God unreasonably constituted all things? But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason for what he does is also the cause of his willing. Therefore, the will of God has some cause. Of course, if you say the will of God has some cause, since the will of God is God, then God would have some cause. And even the act of the will is the same thing as a divine substance. So, got a little problem here, huh? Moreover, second objection. In those things which come about from the one willing, who wills something, but not on account of any cause, it is not necessary to assign some cause except the very will of the one willing. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been shown. If, therefore, of his will there is no cause, it would not be necessary in all natural things to assign any cause except the divine will. And thus all sciences become superfluous, which attempt to, what? Assign the cause to some effects, which seems to be unsuitable. Therefore, it is necessary to assign some cause of the divine will. So, why are my teeth in front of a different shape than my teeth in back? Instead of saying to bite as opposed to chew, say, because God so will. That's true. Yeah. Moreover, what comes about by the one willing, but not on account of some cause, depends on his simple will. So, if, therefore, the will of God does not have any cause, it would foul that all things which come to be depend upon his simple will and do not have any other, what? Cause. Which doesn't, is not fitting. But against this is what Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions. For every efficient cause, every mover maker, is, what, greater than that which it affects, but nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore, some cause of it should not be what? Satan. Not pretty clear there from Augustine, huh? I answer that it should be said that in no way does the will of God have a cause. To the evidence of which, it should be considered that since the will follows upon the understanding, in the same way there can happen to be some cause of the one willing that he wills, as there is of the one understanding that he understands. In the understanding, however, it is thus that if apart, one considers the beginning or the premise, and apart the conclusion, right, the understanding of the beginning or the premise is the cause of the knowledge of the conclusion, right? So our style defines a demonstration as a syllogism, making us know the cause and that of which it is a cause, and it cannot be otherwise. And the premises of a syllogism are in a way the cause of conclusion. In one way, the maker of the conclusion, in another way, the matter of the conclusion. Okay, we've talked about that before. And this is very true in the case of our discoursa. You may recall when we talked about Shakespeare's definition of reason, the ability for a large discourse looking before and after. What was the definition of discourse? Well, it's coming to know, or in some cases, guess, right? Something from something you already know or accept. So one is the cause of the other, right? But there's no discourse in God, neither in his understanding nor in his willing. But there's only one act of understanding, one act of will, whereby he understands and wills himself, and in understanding and willing himself, he understands and wills other things. But the difference, though, is that he wills other things freely, right? Well, he doesn't understand other things freely, but necessarily understands other things. We've talked about that before. But Thomas goes on to point out, but if the understanding, in the very beginning of its knowledge, already saw the conclusion, right? It already clicked upon the conclusion. By one insight, grasping both, right? In such a one, the knowledge of the conclusion would not be caused from the understanding of the beginnings, because the same is not a cause of itself. Nice axiom there. More general axiom is what? Nothing is a beginning of itself. But nevertheless, he would understand the premises to be the causes of the conclusion. See, the distinction he's making there, right? It's one thing where your knowledge of one is a cause of your knowledge of the other, right? In that case, both your knowledge of one is a cause of your knowledge of the other, just as one of these things is in itself a cause of the other, right? But the one who sees in knowing the beginning or in knowing the cause of that matter, who knows, in knowing the cause, the effect at the same time, he knows one to be the cause of the other, but his knowledge of one is not a cause of his knowledge, of the other. Is that clear? Yeah. Quite in the case of a mind like ours, especially, which is discursive, it's knowing one thing is a cause of its knowing another, right? And when we kind of contrasted, you know, our reason with even the senses, you know, sometimes when they talk about discourse, you know, they say what discourse means, in general, going from one thing to another, right? Well, I can go to the art museum and look at one painting and then look at another painting and then another painting, right? Or put on one piece of Mozart and then put on another piece of Mozart and so on. But I don't see one painting through seeing another painting. I don't hear Mozart's Jupiter Symphony through hearing Cus i Van Tutte, the apple, right? But reason not only goes from one thing to another, but by knowing one or through knowing one, it comes to know the other, right? Okay. But in God, there's only what? One act, huh? It's altogether simple. No discourse in God, neither in his understanding nor in his will. Now, it's like this, he says, on the side of the will, about which the end has itself to those things which are to the end, as in the understanding the beginnings or the premises to the conclusions. Now, this is the comparison that Aristotle has made. This is Aristotle's proportion. He's saying that the premises are to the conclusion like the end is to the what? Means, huh? Okay? And in the case of us, you can know the premises without yet knowing the conclusion. Okay? So I'm kind of a mage, you know, with something very clear like Euclid, you know, he could take something I already know and bring out something else I didn't know. Mm-hmm. But bring it out in some way of what I know already, right? And sometimes in willing a certain inn, we, what? Don't necessarily will the means to that inn, right? But when we discover the means to that inn, right? Then you want to go there, right? So I might have as an inn to get some wine, right? But then my sister-in-law tells me that at BJ's you can get it cheaper than other places. You don't even need a BJ card. And now all of a sudden, what? My desire to have wine is a cause of my desire to go to what? BJ's, right? But in my desiring wine at first, I didn't desire to go to other places. By God, in desiring or willing, I should say, anything other than himself, he does so only in willing himself. So he's carrying the comparison out here now, that he had in the understanding to the will. Whence is someone by one act, wills both the end, and by another act, those things which are to the end, right? His will in the end will be for him. The cause was willing those things which are for the end, huh? So if I want to understand God, I might want to read Thomas, right? I might find out that he's a good guy to this, huh? So my willing to know God is a cause of my willing to read Thomas, huh? But if by one act, huh, he wills the end, and those things which are to the end, this would not be, what? Possible one is a cause of the other. Because again, for the same reason, that the same thing is not a cause of itself, right? So God's willing the end, and God's willing something for that end, one cannot be the cause of the other, because it's the same willing. And so it would be the same thing being the cause of itself, right? The more general axiom is, nothing is the beginning of itself, right? But nevertheless, it will be true to say that he wills to order those things which are for the end, the things that are the means, right? He orders them to the, what, end, huh? God, however, just as by one act he understands all things in his very essence or substance, so by one act he wills all things in his, what? Goodness, huh? Whence, just as in God, to understand the cause is not the cause of understanding the effect, but he himself understands the effect in the cause. So, his willing the end is not for him the cause of his willing those things which are for the end. But nevertheless, by this one act of his, right, he wills those things which are for the end to be ordered to the end. For he wills this to be an account of that, but not an account of this busy will of that. That's a very interesting distinction that Thomas makes there, right? Summarize it again now. For us, very often, most often, a knowledge of the cause takes place by itself without a knowledge of the effect. More often, we have a knowledge of the effect without a knowledge of the cause. And then what do we do? To find out the cause. Yeah. And our knowledge, in one case, our knowledge of the cause is a cause that we're coming to know the effect. Like in geometry, right? Okay. So you might know what a triangle is and it has three sides and so on without knowing that the effect of that is to have angles equal to right angles. When you go through Proposition 32 in Book 1, you've done it. Some of you have gone through the first 31. Then you will see your knowledge of what a triangle is and your knowledge of some other things will be a cause of your coming to know the equality of the angles inside to right angles. And vice versa. When we are reasoning, say, to existence of God, we know the effects first of God, right? Without knowing God. And then we reason from the effects of God to existence of God and even to some things we can say about God. So that our knowledge of the effects of God is a cause of our knowledge of Him. Like St. Paul says there in Romans 1, verse 20, is it? The one the church quotes in Vatican I, right? That the hidden things of God are made known to the things that have been made. But in God, this is not true, right? So in seeing the cause, God, in seeing the cause, sees the effect. So he knows the effect is the effect of the cause. The cause is the cause of the effect. But his knowledge of one is not a cause of his knowing the other. There's only one knowing in God, only one acting in God. And the same thing, then, he's saying is true here about the will, right? For us, we often will, you know, all these high school kids now, their end is to get to college, right? But they're not sure what college to go to or who's going to accept them and so on, right? Okay. But eventually they will, maybe to go to this college or that college, especially if they get accepted in a number of places, right? They have to choose. So they're willing to go to college is the cause they're willing to go to Virginia Tech where we're at college. Can't happen in the next four years. So in willing to go to college, one doesn't necessarily will to go to this college, right? But one is the cause of the other, right? But God is going to be one act willing that you go to college and to this college, right? And he's willing, you know, you're going to that college to get that, what, degree, right? Okay. Or to meet that professor, whatever it might be. Yeah, yeah, some other catastrophe. Okay. Now, how's the reply to the first objection, which is taken from the great Augustine there, huh? Who would dare to say that God unreasonably, right, or without reason, huh, has constituted all things? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the will of God is reasonable. Not that something is to God the cause of willing, right? But insofar as he wills this to be on account of that, huh? Okay. That's reasonable, right? Now, the second and the third objection is somewhat similar there in terms of what is due to other causes, right, huh? To the second it should be said that when God wills the effects to be thus, that they, what, come about from certain causes, that there might be observed, what, order in things, huh? Okay. Since, I should say, since God wills the effects thus to be, what way to be? That they come about from certain causes, right? In order that there might be order in things, huh? It is not superfluous, even with the will of God, to seek other causes, huh? It would be superfluous, right, if other causes were sought as something first, right? And not as something depending upon the divine, what, will. So, and thus, Augustine says in the third book about the Trinity, huh? It was pleasing to the vanity of the philosophers, that's me, I guess. Also to, what, other causes to attribute contingent effects to other causes, when altogether they were not able to see the cause superior to all other ones. That is to say, the, what, will of God, right? Yeah. Puh-puh-puh. So it's not really contrary to say that something is, what, from the will of God as a very first clause, right, and from something else as a secondary clause or as a proximate clause. Now the third one checks the same. What comes about from the will, not on account of some cause, depends upon, what, the will alone, right, eh, simple will? Look, if therefore the will of God does not have some cause, it would follow that all things that come about depend upon his simple will, and they do not have any other cause, right? So if there's no cause or reason why my teeth in front have a different shape than my teeth in back, they kept the will of God, see? To the third, it should be said, that since God wills effects to be an account of their causes, eh, whatever effect presupposes some other effect do not depend on the will of God alone, right, but upon something other, right? But the very first effects depend upon the divine will alone, eh? Whence, if we say that God wills man to have a hand that it might serve his understanding, right? That's a famous example, right? You know, the great Anaxagoras said what? Man is the most intelligent of the animals because he has a hand. And Aristotle says, no, it's reverse. Because he's the most intelligent of animals, that's why he has a hand. So this is like the tool of tools, right? And it will serve reason and its infinity of what? Operations, right? But the other animals might have instead of a hand a claw or something, right? Because they have limited things, right? You need a claw to catch the prey or something, yeah. Well, once if we say that God wills man to have a hand that might serve his understanding by doing what diverse works, right? And he wishes him or wills him to have an understanding that he might be a man. Reason more than anything else is man. And he wishes him to be a man so that he might enjoy God himself or that he might complete the universe, which is not, what, to reduce beyond the universe there any further to any other, what, created ends, huh? Whence these things depend on the simple will of God, but the others from the order also of other causes, huh? Okay. So to say that there's no cause of the divine will is not to deny that the divine will wills some things to be for the sake of other things, right? So he willed my stomach so I could eat my food, right? And get my nourishment and so on. And, uh, uh, but his willing that I should eat was not a cause of his willing that I should have a stomach. But he did will one in order to the other, right? But his willing one is not a cause of his willing the other. You get the subtle distinction that Thomas is making there, right? You don't see what it makes me when I'm doing something. I start to do this and think, oh, I have to do this first. Yeah, yeah. But I'll see that this is. Mm-hmm. And people are confused and they say, I don't know where to begin. You know, they have to figure out the means to the end, right? So the willing the end can be without the willing the means. And, uh, it can be a cause that they're eventually willing the means when they come to see the connection between the two. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.