Prima Pars
Lecture 86: Whether God's Will Is Always Fulfilled

Transcript
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Now we come to Article 6. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled. To the 6th one proceeds thus. It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. So Thomas is going to take the opposite side, right? For the Apostle, that's the, what? St. Paul by Antonia Masia. Incidentally, in this same issue there. Do you get that? No, I don't get the rip-outs. My mother sent me. He had an interesting quote there. Newhouse, not the editor. Newhouse. Yeah, Newhouse, yeah. He had an interesting quote from the Scottish Journal, Theology, I think it was. Some non-Catholic, but no, Christian. And talking about how the evidence is pretty good that both Peter and Paul died in Rome. The ones, you know. So I got to think about it. He says Apostle here because he's referring to one of these guys, St. Paul here. For the Apostle says in the first epistle to Timothy that God wills all men to be, what? Save. And to come to a knowledge of the truth. That's interesting. But this doesn't always come out. Therefore, the will of God is not always, what? Fulfilled, huh? Now, before we look at the reply to the objections, you might notice that reply to objection one is, what? Lency. Yeah, it's two or three times greater than the other reply to the other two objections, right? It's longer than the art, it's longer than the court, I think. Yeah, yeah. That's a very important objection, it seems to me, huh? Moreover, second here. Just as knowledge has itself to the true, so the will to what? The good. But God knows everything that is true. Therefore, he wills every good. But not every good comes about, huh? For there are many goods that are able to come about, which do not come about. Therefore, the will of God is not always, what? Fulfilled. Now, I would guess, you know, before looking at the answer to this, that you're not seeing exactly the way in which these two are alike, right? I mean, you can say that true is to the understanding as the good is to the will, because it's the object of it, right? Okay? But you've got to realize the distinction between the good and the true that Aristotle points out in the sixth book of wisdom, or the sixth book of first philosophy, sixth book after the book's of natural philosophy. And that is that the good is primarily in things, huh? And the true is primarily in the mind, huh? And therefore, the perfection of the divine mind requires that he, what? Know everything that is true, huh? But it says the good is in things. The perfection of the divine goodness, or either the perfection of the divine will, doesn't imply or require that he, what? For everything to be in itself, huh? And in fact, as we saw before, he wills freely, right? Anything else to be, huh? Because his goodness doesn't depend upon them, right? And they don't add anything to his goodness, huh? The goodness of the creature added to God, to use a geometrical comparison, is like a point added to a straight line. Now, how much longer is the line for a point added? Or like a line added to a square, right? How much bigger is a square, huh? Well, it makes us pretty insignificant, right? But we'll see how Thomas answers it. Moreover, the will of God, since it is the first cause, does not exclude middle causes, as has been said in the previous article. But the effect of the first cause is able to be impeded through the defect of the second cause. Just as the effect of the moving power of the soul is impeded in account of the, what? Weakness of the... Shins. Yeah. Therefore, the effect of the divine will can be impeded in account of the defect of the second. Weakness of the divine will can be impeded in account of the second. there he causes. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled. But against this is what is said in Psalm 113. All things whatever that he willed, whatever God willed, he has made. Let's look at what Thomas says to say first of all, before we take up the tremendous first objection. I answer it should be said that it is necessary that the will of God always be what? Fulfilled. To the evidence of which it should be considered that sense in effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, in the agent's form, there is the same reason in agent causes which there is in formal causes. In forms it can be thus that although something can fall short from some particular form, nevertheless it cannot what? Fall short from a what? Universal form. For it is possible for something there to be something that is not a man, for example, right? Or it's not living. But it is not possible that there be something that is not a being. It's possible for something not to be a man or living and not, is it possible for something not to be something? Because that's completely universal something or a being, that's right? That's fairly easy to see, right? Thomas is using that likeness there to say, whence also the same thing is necessary for the same thing to happen in agent causes. For it's possible for something to come about outside the order of some particular agent cause. But it is not possible for something to come about outside the order of some universal cause, or most universal causes, under which all particular causes are included. included, huh? Because if some particular cause fails from its effect, this is an account of some other particular cause impeding it. But that other one is, what? Contained under the order of the universal cause. Whence the effect cannot, can in no way go out from, right? The order of the universal cause. In fact, my old teacher could say, you know, willy-nilly you're going to do honor to God. If you repent and are forgiven, you will glorify his mercy. If you don't repent, you will glorify his justice, right? So willy-nilly, you can't escape giving glory to God, huh? You can't escape the order of divine causality. And this also, Thomas says, is clear in bodily things. For some star can be impeded so that it does not, what, bring about its effect. But nevertheless, whatever effect from a, what, follows from some bodily cause impeding it is necessary to be reduced to some, what, middle causes and universal power of the first, what, heavens, huh? Since, therefore, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will does not, what, achieve its effect, huh? Whence what is seen to recede from the divine will, according to one order, comes back under it in another. Like the example I was giving. Just as a sinner who in himself, or as regards in himself, recedes from the divine will by sinning, right? I'm not going to do his will. He falls into the order of the divine will when he is punished through what? His justice. This reminds me of my old teacher, because he got it from this text. I really say, you know, not in this context, you know, but that was his point, huh? So the inclusion of wisdom also glorifies mercy. I glorify his justice, and you can choose in some way between the two, huh? Okay, now we come to the reply to the first, what, objection, right? I notice in this reply to objection here, Thomas gives a number of solutions, right, huh? And, but, yeah, yeah. And the third one is the one he seems to elaborate the most, huh? And I think that's the one that, yeah, the strongest way of answering it maybe, huh? I notice when I go to the catenioria sometimes, you know, the passage you'll give, two or three of them, you know, Augustine and Chrysostom and somebody else, and they have a little different way of understanding the same sentence, and they all make sense, right? And you shouldn't say one is good and the others are bad, but sometimes one seems better than the other. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the word of the apostle, that God wills all men to be saved, right? This is able to be understood in three ways, huh? In one way that it be a, what, accommodated distribution, huh? According to the sense that God wills to be saved all men who are saved, right? Okay? Not because no man is there whom, what, he wills not to be saved, but because no one is saved whom he does not wish to be saved, as Augustine says, huh? Okay? How'd you get in here? Yeah. In a second way, it can be understood that the distribution is for all the kinds of singulars, right? And not for the singulars of every kind. According to this sense, God wishes, huh? From each status of men, some to be saved, men and women, Jews and Gentiles, huh? The little ones and the great ones, huh? But not all of every state, huh? I was reading in the Gospel of John, there were Christ's Latin there. He calls them in the 13th chapter, I guess it was, or 14th chapter. He calls them figlioli, little children, right? Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. And what do you think of those first two explanations, which I don't think are the bestest, but I don't think they make some sense. The second one is similar to what he says in his commentary on John, when Christ says, I draw all to myself. Yeah, yeah. Because he says, that's not all, that's not everybody. He didn't say om, om, ne, he says om, yeah. But he says also, it's just, he'll draw all the elects to himself. Yeah, yeah. He doesn't have to say om, ne. Yeah. Om, ne. That's one way. Yeah, that's good. So this is the kind of distinction that can be applied to other texts that are kind of puzzling, yeah. It seems maybe to be... The first time you see it, it seems like an ad hoc invention almost, you know, but after you see the number of places where it's being used, that same distinction, then it didn't seem so arbitrary, you know? It doesn't necessarily seem arbitrary, but it doesn't seem to get to the, I guess maybe the first intention of the... It just strikes me that way. Yeah. Yeah, I mean, Mozart. Mozart writes well for every instrument. Does that mean that every piece that he wrote for that instrument is great? You know, maybe not, but, you know, you can find a very good piece for each instrument, right? That'd be one way of, you know, kind of saying that, you know. A lot of times you don't really, you know, stop and think about the way we say these things. One thing that kind of, this is a little different from this, but we'll often say that God is the first cause of all things, right? And some might come back and say, well, all things includes God, doesn't it? Never he is what? Yeah, yeah. Well, that's not true. So what do you mean you say God is the first cause of all things? Yeah, yeah. Or else you'd have to say we're using thing now for something that is in its own existence or something, right? You know, in the fourth book of Wisdom, Aristoteles says that wisdom is about being as being, right? And he reasons from what he's shown in the premium that wisdom is about the first cause. Well, the first cause, it's causeal, it extends to all being, right? So you're looking for, it belongs to the same science, you might say, or the same knowledge, to consider being as being the first cause, because the first cause is the cause of all what? Yeah, yeah. But he doesn't say it there, right? So you could say either, we have to understand in this way that he means all beings except itself, okay, but rather than that complicated way of speaking, we just say the first cause of all beings. Or we could say that by being we mean something that has existence, where the have and the have are not the same thing, and therefore he's the cause of all things that have existence. He doesn't have existence, he is existence. But those are two ways of understanding it, right? You know, but sometimes there are ways of speaking that, you know, you could kubble about for a while, you know, but then how do you understand it, right? And these are two ways of understanding it, right? Now, the third one is according to Damascene, right? Now, maybe Thomas is going to give this last because maybe it's the best, right? As soon as he elaborates it more, right? And so he might prefer Damascene in one place than Augustine. Third, according to Damascene, is understood about the antecedent will, right? Not about the, what? Consequent will. Which distinction is not taken on the side of, what? The divine will, in which there is nothing before or after, right? But on the side of the things, what? Willed, huh? Now, he's going to help us to understand this distinction. To the understanding of which it should be considered that each thing, according as it is good, so it is willed by, what? God. Now, something is able, in its first consideration, according as it's absolutely considered, to be good or bad, right? Which, nevertheless, when it's considered with something added, huh? Which is the consequent consideration of it, will be having itself in the contrary way, right? Okay? Just as for a man to live is good, right? And for a man to, what? Be killed is bad, according to an absolute consideration, huh? But if it be added about some man, that he's a homicide, right? Or living with danger for the multitude, then it is good to kill him, right? Okay. And it's bad for him to be alive. Yeah. Okay. And, uh... Incidentally, in this latest issue there, again, of the thing, it had the quote from, uh... Benedict XVI when he was part of Ratzinger, right? And it's about the abortion and euthanasia, right? And it's a very clear text that you cannot support abortion or euthanasia and be a Catholic, right? Yeah. You know? You know? You can disagree about capital punishment and war and so on, right? Without being, you know? It's very clear distinction, right? Yeah. You know? Because it comes up in discussing, you know, some of the bishops, you know, are announcing they will not give communion to these so-called Catholic politicians who are publicly supporting abortion and so on. And some people are mixed up, you know, well, you've got to be opposed to the death penalty then, too. Well, there's a distinction there to be seen, right? Okay. Thus, it is good for him to be killed. It is bad for him to live. But, whence it could be said that the judge antecedently wishes every man to, what? To live. But, consequently, he wishes the homicide, the murder, to be suspended, huh? Likewise, God antecedently wishes every man to be saved, right? But, consequently, he wishes some to be damned according to the requirements of his, what? Justice, huh? Nevertheless, huh? That which we will antecedently, right? We don't will, what? Simply. But, secundum quid. Now, here we get that same famous distinction, right? Between simply and secundum quid. And why does he say that what you will consequently, you will simply? And what you will antecedently, you don't, huh? Because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, as Aristotle says. In themselves, however, they are in their particular. Okay? So, in themselves, you don't have man, you have this man. And not just this man, but this man with his deeds and so on, right? Whence simply we will something according as we will that thing, considered all the circumstances that are particular. And this is to consequente, huh? Whence is he able to be said that the judge, the just judge, simply wills the homicide to be suspended. But, in some respect, secundum quid, he wills him to live insofar as he is a man, right? Okay? Whence is more able to be called willfulness than absolute will, right? Okay? And what do you say about our Lord there in the Garden of Gethsemane there, right? Is he will to die or not? Okay. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. He wills to die, but he has a kind of wish of nature to figure it out. Yeah, yeah. You could say simply he wills to die, right? Because this is the will of his father, right? To die, yeah. But in some sense you can say he wills not to die, right? Because of his natural, you see? But considering everything, right? You know, it's kind of striking out. I was reading in the 14th chapter of John, right? The golden chain there, right? Where our Lord is trying to console the apostles for his coming death, right? And all things considered, one of the church fathers and Augustine, one of them says, you know, this is something to letaria, rather than to be sad about, right? I see. And, well, all things considered. You see? Is the death of our Lord on the cross something to be sad about or to rejoice, right? Well, obviously it can be both to some. But simply speaking, it's more a cause to rejoice, right? Than to be sad about, right? Because of the good brought about by this. Only in this way, you know, we could be saved, right? What? If Jesus will die for love, we will all die. We have no right. Yeah. Okay. And thus it is clear that whatever God wills simply, right, comes about, right? Although that which he wills antecedently does not come about, right? He uses the same distinction as explaining an interesting question about guardian angels, where it is. If some harm comes to us, even our damnation, does it make the guardian angels sad? And he uses this distinction as saying, you know, you better need to like God, who wills all men to be saved in this thing. Yeah. He uses the same distinction as that. But considering the circumstances, he uses the example of a man on a ship, a merchant, doesn't want his goods thrown overboard. But considering the fact that he's in a storm, trying to save his life, simply he wills him to be thrown overboard. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's Aristotle's example in the ethics, you know. I was looking at this new biography there of Einstein, right? Oh. And Einstein didn't believe in free will, you know, that we don't really have the ability to choose, right? Kind of a strange position, you know, but it comes from his belief in determinism and so on, right? Did he ever marry that woman or no? Oh, yeah, he's married, yeah. Oh, okay. Yeah, he took twice, I mean, yeah. There's a quote I saw recently from him. It was something like, my punishment for rejecting all authority was to be made an authority myself. Well, they asked him about immortality, and he said, one life is enough for me. What do you mean that, though, you know? It's interesting, you know, Einstein didn't want to be considered, you know, an atheist, just only a Milton atheist, right? Because he had this idea of a greater mind, but kind of a pantheistic notion he had. But it's kind of interesting to see in this particular bibliography that they, I've seen most of these quotes before, but they're kind of quite pretty good, you know, collectively well in the text there. Interesting that he says there, nevertheless, about the greater mind. But he's influenced by Spinoza, right, who has this kind of pantheistic notion. But he also got from Spinoza the idea that the soul and the body would do the same thing. Oh, wow. So. What did you name the bibliographer? Well, actually, one of the former editors of Time, you know, Yeah, I got interested in Einstein, and so. First of all, it would be kind of a popular thing, and I saw this guy being interviewed on, you know, Charlie Rose, or Charlie Rose, yeah. And then I saw it in BJ's. Oh, I spent my time getting the groceries. I'd be looking at this thing, you know. Maybe I'll buy the book, you know. But it had, you know, some interesting quotes. I have most of them, but they're kind of brought together, you know, things. And I was reading the various accounts there between him and Heisenberg and Bohr, you know. And he gives you a time, you know, the famous time when Einstein was objecting to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. And he had these, he posed his objections, right? And I guess the last objection he gave was, you know, kind of shook up. And he was Bohr, and he was Bohr going around, there's no answer to this, you know. You know, physics is going to be destroyed if this objection is. You know, and I had a picture in one of my other books, you know, of them leaving the conference together, you know, and Einstein looking pretty, you know, confident, and Bohr, you know, this word of his face, you know, and so on. And I knew what happened afterwards. You see, Bohr stayed up, and he found the defect in Einstein's objection. And the defect was due to Einstein not applying his own theory of relativity to his example. So this kind of finished Einstein, right? So I was looking at this guy's account of it in this new book, you know, and of course, you know, hoisted his own petards into the old idea, you know, his own theory being used against it, right? And that's kind of interesting. And then they caught his conversation with Heisenberg, you know, where Heisenberg, you know, was, you know, speaking of Einstein's theory, you know, from what he thought people had said, right, about it, and Einstein said, well, maybe I didn't say that, but that's really all nonsense, this isn't really the way it is. It's kind of a controversial thing, it's where Einstein, you know, says that it's not really true what they say about the theory, that he was only going to take into account what can be observed, right? And the theory's going to fit just what can be observed. It's actually the reverse, he says, you know. Theory determines what you can observe. But there's apparently some truth to that, exactly what that means, you know. It's kind of a striking thing. Okay. Now the second objection, I think, is going to be solved along the lines I was guessing, you know. As knowledge is to the truth, so the will is to the good, but God knows everything that is true, therefore He wills everything that is good. To the second, it should be said that the act of the knowing power is according as the known is in the knower, but the act of the desiring power is ordered to things, according as they are in themselves. Aristotle says it very briefly, as I mentioned many times in the sixth book of Wisdom, right? But Thomas unfolds the words of Aristotle there, right? Or as a nitwitz, or dimwitz, I should say. And that's extremely important that Aristotle saw that, right? So whatever can have the notion of being or of true, all of this is virtually in God. But the whole does not exist in what created things. And therefore God knows everything that is true, but nevertheless He does not exist in what will every good, right? Except insofar as He wills Himself, in whom is virtually, what, existing every good, right? He's not willing every good in itself, right? So if you just think of your parents, you know, and what they say about eggs and sperm and so on, right? How many different people could have been generated from the same parents, besides you and me? And all these people, we're not part about, are they, right? And it's not because we were more deserving to be. It's something we have to thank God for. But you can see that He's not willing every good that could have been, right? All these other people that could have been besides you and me, you know? And praise God, hundreds or thousands or millions, I guess. You know, it's a huge number, I've heard the scientists say, you know. But I mean, only one of these could have led to you or me, you know? So God is obviously not willing every good that could be. And not just any one. Yeah. Just one of them. Yeah. And he had this awful weather here for a week or so or more here. And he could have led to, you know, quicker into this bad weather, you know, but he didn't. So he's obviously not willing every good that could be, right? Yeah. He's not very critical in the Super Bowl. He's got this new pitcher in the Boston Red Sox from the Japanese, right? From Japan, then. And he's quite a good guy, you know. But his first two games, he's lost, right? But he didn't get really, you know. The first game was like 2-1, something like that. So he should have really won. He wasn't getting runs not given by the rest of the team, right? So, you know, but certainly that the good of his winning could have been arranged, you know, with a few little help from his teammates. So there's a lot of the good there that could be that God is not willing. Okay, now the third objection was saying, well, God is the primary cause. Couldn't there be things not taking place because of the defect of the secondary causes? To the third, it should be said that the first cause can be impeded from its effect through the defect of the second cause when it is not universally, right? First. Not completely universal. And by that he means what? Containing under itself all causes, right? Because in this way, the effect in no way is able to evade its order. And thus it is about the will of God. It's not even Hitler or Stalin avoiding the will of God. Take a little break now before we go on to it. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.