Prima Pars
Lecture 87: God's Unchangeable Will and Divine Necessity

Transcript
================================================================================

Up to Article 7 here, huh? Whether the will of God is, what, changeable, right? To the seventh one proceeds thus. It seems that the will of God is changeable. You can guess from the starting point that Tom is going to take the opposite of where he starts. For the Lord says in Genesis, the sixth chapter, I repent for me, well, to have made man, right? But whoever repents of what he has made has a changeable will. Therefore, God has a changeable will. Moreover, Jeremiah's 18th chapter, from the person of the Lord is said, I will, what, speak against the nation, right? Against the kingdom, so that I might root it out and destroy and disperse it. But if that nation or that race does penance, right, repents of its evil, I also will, what, yeah, over the evil that I have thought that I might do to it, huh? Therefore, God has a, what, changeable will. Now, those two objections must kind of be solved by something about the way that some things are said metaphorically of God, right? Just like anger said metaphorically of God, so penance should be said. Moreover, whatever God makes, he makes voluntarily. But God does not always make the same things. But sometimes he commands that the legal things be observed, I suppose the Old Testament things. Sometimes he prohibits this, huh? And therefore he has a changeable will. Well, this is a different kind of objection, right? But why can't he command different things to different ages, right? Because I might say to my son, you can't use the car because of his age or his inexperience or whatever it is, right? And another time saying you can, because he's ready for this now. Moreover, God does not in necessity will what he wills, as has been said above, huh? Therefore he is able to will and not will the same. But everything that has an ability for opposites is changeable. Just as what is able to be and not be is changeable according to substance. And what is able to be here and not to be here is changeable according to place. Therefore God is changeable according to his, what? Will. So God could will that I be and will that I not be, right? But against this is what is said in the book of Numbers, chapter 23. God is not like a man, that he lies. Nor like the son of man, not the son of man, but that he, what? Change, huh? Okay? God, no change, huh? Variety is not the spice of God's life. From the time I was a little boy, I was here, you know, just coming down to my grandfather, you know, variety is the spice of life, you're here to my mother, you know, and it's the truth about human life, right? And they would not eat the same thing every day or something like that. Same meal all the time in heaven there. I answer it should be said that the will of God is altogether unchangeable. And about this it should be considered that it is one thing, huh, to change your will, right? And it's another thing to will the change of some things. I notice that. Are you saying the same thing there? Say, I changed my will, and I will to change. The average person might think doesn't mean the same thing, right? So when I say, if I change my will, you're positing a change in your will, right? You say, I willed a change, you're not positing a change in your will by that fact, but a change in something other than your will, right? Okay. So those are not the same thing, are they? Thomas is pointing out that distinction, you got that? For me to will a change is not the same thing as to change my will, is it? For someone is able, the same will remaining immobile, right? To will that now this come about, and afterwards it comes about something what? Contrary, huh? But then the will is changed, is someone what? Yeah, what before he did not will. Or he ceases to will what he did will, right? Okay. So if I'm going to do the steak on the grill, I'm willing to what? Change the meat, right? Just so it's pink, right? But if I'm willing to change the meat, right, am I changing my will by that fact? Now he says, but then the will is changed. If someone begins to will what he before did not will, right? Or after, or he ceases to will what he did not what? What he did will, right? Okay. So is that true about me in the case of the steak, right? At first I willed it to be uncooked and then I willed it to be cooked? No. Now this cannot happen, he says, unless you presuppose a change, either on the side of knowledge, right, or in the disposition of the substance of the one, what? Willing, right? For since the will is of the good, someone newly, in two ways is able to begin to what? Will something. In one way, thus, that something newly begins to be what? Good for him, which is not without some change in him. Just as coming about the cold, one begins to be good, to sit at fire, right? Which before it was not. Simple example, Thomas, huh? Can you imagine Thomas sitting there for the fire and writing this? Or dictating this? In another way, that what he newly knows, something to be good for him, which before he was, what? Ignorant of, right? And for this reason, we take counsel, right? That we might know what is good for us, right? But it has been shown above that both the substance of God, as well as the science, right, or his knowledge, is altogether, what? Unchangeable, right? Whence is necessary that his will be altogether, what? Unchangeable, right? So this argument here depends upon seeing a distinction, right? That there's two ways in which you can, what? Begin to will something that you did not, what? Will before, right? Either because something begins to be good for you, that was not good for you before. And that supposes some change in you, right? Or because you discovered that something is good for you, or it wasn't even good for you. But you just discovered that it's good for you, right? Okay? So I discovered that logic was good for me. I discovered that Thomas Aquinas or somebody was good for me, right? And so I began to will this, right? That was a change, right? Or as they got older, Well, they're right. Maybe some things that were not good for me as a child became good for me as a what? As a man, right? Okay. Some medicines now for me are good for me that would not have been good for me at another age. Not sure if they're good for me now either, but you see what I mean? That's due to a change in my condition, right? Okay. I know people, they take what they call the atomic cocktail, you know? Because they have an overactive thyroid. And sometimes the effect of the atomic cocktail is to give you an underactive thyroid. So then they have to give you some medicine too, you know? So, a change in you, right? Makes something good for you that was not good for you before, right? Okay. So, neither the substance of God nor does his knowledge ever change, right? So, how can he begin to will something he didn't will before? Can something begin to be good for God who was not good for him before, right? Now, the first two arguments, at least the first one anyway, is going to be in terms of this being a metaphor. To the first, therefore, it should be said that that word of the Lord is to be understood metaphorically, huh? You can see why he had an article on metaphor there in the first question, right? The scriptures use metaphors. According to a, what? Our likeness, right? For when we repent, we destroy what we have made, right? Although this is able to be without a change of will, right? Just as when some man, without a, what, change of will, sometimes wishes to make something, intending at the same time afterwards to, what, destroy it, make a sandcastle or something, right? Something that's fun to knock down, you know, after you. Thus, therefore, God is said to, what, repent, according to a likeness of doing, insofar as, what, man whom he made before, he wipes out from the face of the earth by a deluge, deluge, huh? Okay? Except for Noah, right? And his family. Now, Thomas, in the Summa Contra Gentilis, will talk about penance, too, and a number of reasons why it's not, what, said properly in God, right? But there's a general reason that penance is a kind of sadness, and sadness is due to some, something bad has happened, right? And nothing bad can happen to God, so it can't be any kind of sadness. But penance also implies it's change, and there can't be any change in the divine will. So it must be understood metaphorically, right? Well, sometimes you meet a Christian, you know, and sometimes the fundamentalists, you know, for whom God really, what, does get angry, right? And they can't understand this metaphorical use of the word, huh? I suppose it puts the fear of God into you more. He's really angry, huh, to fall into the hands of an angry God. The way the preachers used to do, right? I don't know how they understood it. Do you, I mean, the Massachusetts here, that they get the people? I don't know how they understood it, but I don't know how they understood it. So, I doubt if you made a distinction anyway, huh? I doubt. Edwards was it Edwards? Yeah. John was it Edwards? The second objection was taken from Jeremiah's son, where he's talking about first destroying something, and then what? If they do penance, he will do penance himself, right? To the second, it should be said that the will of God, since it is the first and universal cause, it does not exclude the, what, middle causes, as, say, what's in between the effect and end, in whose power it is that some effects be, what, produced, right? But because all middle causes do not equal the power of the first cause, there are many things in the power and knowledge and the divine will which are not contained under the order of the lower causes, as the raising up of Lazarus on the 12th chapter of John. Whence someone looking towards the lower causes is able to say, Lazarus will not rise, but looking towards the first cause, the divine cause, is able to say that Lazarus will rise. And both of these, God, what, wills. To wit, that something, sometimes, is in the future according to a lower cause, right? Thus, therefore, it should be said that God sometimes pronounces something future according as it is contained in the order of lower causes, as, for example, according to the disposition of nature or of the merits of the person at hand, which nevertheless does not come about because it is otherwise in the divine higher cause. Just as he foresays to Ezekiel, dispose your house because you will die and not live, as it's had in Isaiah. This is another text out there, it's a similar one. But nevertheless, this does not come about because from eternity it was otherwise in the knowledge in the divine will, which is itself, what, unchangeable. On account of which Gregory says, God changes the sentence, but not, what, he doesn't change his counsel, the counsel that is saved as will. What he says, therefore, I would do penance, right? This, again, to be understood, to be said metaphorically, huh? For men, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened, are seen to what? Yeah. So the first two ones are basically being solved the same way, but the second one is no more involved by the fact that some things are announced according to the, what, and some according to the lower causes, yeah. I guess he tells the prophet to go to this guy and tell him, you know, dispose your house, you're going to die, right? And the guy repents or something, and God repents. Maybe a related text is St. James. Some of you will say, well, we're going to go tomorrow, we're going to go and get this money, we're going to do this business, whereas you should say, if God wills. Because it's within your power to do that, in a certain way, or in nature, you're predicting I'm able to do that, but maybe God doesn't will. I think it's the same way. I think in some other cases, described by Thomas elsewhere, you know, more at least, you know, and because the question of whether the prophet's ever saying anything false, right? And if he reveals something, this is the way it is according to the lower causes, he will later on reveal what it is going to the higher causes. So the prophet is really not, what, lying about or saying something false about this person, right? Because he's saying what is going to take place by reason of the what? Yeah, because then you can say, if these conditions persist, there's a problem. Now the third objection is saying, well, God sometimes commands us to slay the lamb, other times he prohibits us, right? My dad-in-law, she brought this thing there with the shape of the lamb, you know, she'd make a lot of cake, then we'd eat the cake, you know. Oh, for Easter. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. You get a coconut frosting. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. now to the third it should be said that from that reason one is not able to conclude that God has a change of will but that he wills change but those two things are not saying the same thing right it is the same thing for me to will a change and to change my will an example there the stake right I will to change the stake right but there's no change in my will the text in the Old Testament where our Lord speaks of the priesthood and Aaron being forever what happened so I suppose maybe there was a condition placed on that and I know many times he would speak of the kingdom or the king the success of David as long as they're faithful you know but sometimes Thomas would say you know that he's um say something about David in so far as he's a figure of Christ right when they say his kingdom will be forever right the same with Solomon many things said Solomon weren't fulfilled in Solomon or in one way just get a cat or as a friend of mine says there's six ways you can take out a gold now the fourth objection is a little different right he's saying if God can will that something be and not be then why can't he change his will right okay and there the distinction he makes in this summa kind of gentiles but more at length to the fourth it should be said that although God to will something is not necessary absolutely right nevertheless it is necessary from ex supposizione right in other words God having willed something can not not will it because his will against eternity an account of the unchangeableness of the divine will now to us it looks like you know confining right because uh if we will something we could not change our will we'd be in quite a a mess because so often you know the circumstances change something is no longer seen as good you know or we realize something new so we we have to change our will right but God doesn't have that it's kind of frightening in some sense to think you know that God can't change his will right stop if he will is your salvation you know or he will is your damnation I mean it's it's he's he's uh he's committed yeah it's interesting very interesting yeah you got it put her oh yeah sure Okay, to the eighth one proceeds thus. It seems that the divine will imposes necessity upon things willed, right? Now you might think that because his will is unchangeable, right? That's what Einstein would think, right? Gets that from Spinoza, right? For Augustine says in the Inchiridion, that must be the Inchiridion on faith, hope, and charity, that no one becomes saved except the one whom God wills to be saved. And therefore, one should ask that he will, right? Because it necessarily will come about if he wills it. When you think about that, is that the way you pray? May our prayers be instruments of your divine providence. We're not praying that his will could be changed, are we? Moreover, every cause which is not able to be impeded produces of necessity its effect, because nature always does the same unless it be impeded, as is said in the second book of Actual Hearing. But the will of God is not able to be impeded. For the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 9, who is able, who resists his will, right? Who can resist his will? Therefore, the will of God imposes necessity upon the thing's will. Moreover, that which has necessity from the before is necessary absolutely. As an animal to die is necessary, because he is composed from contraries. But created things, the things created by God, are compared to the divine will as to something before them, from which they have necessity. Since this conditional statement is true, if God wills something, it will be. Or it is. For every true conditional statement is necessary. That's what you see, I think it's the end statement, right? The end part has to follow necessarily of the if part. It follows, therefore, that everything that God wills is necessary absolutely. But against this, all good things which come about God wills to come about. If, therefore, his will imposed necessity upon things willed, it would follow that all good things and necessity come about. And thus would perish free will, as Einstein says, and counsel in all things of this sort. Yeah, you know, there's the indetermination that comes from the matter, and the indetermination in our will, right? And Einstein was opposed to this indeterminism that came up in the Copenhagen interpretation there. But here it's taken something even more known, even. This is a very subtle thing, so let's see what Thomas says. A lot of people get mixed up on these things. This matter in particular. I answer it should be said that the divine will imposes necessity upon some things willed, but not upon all. The reason for which some want to assign from the middle clausism because those things which he produces through necessary clauses are necessary. And those things which he produces through contingent clauses are what? Contingent. Now, as Thomas said, this is correct. Well, this does not seem to be sufficiently said, Thomas says, huh? On account of two things, yes. First, huh? Because the effect of the first clause is contingent on account of the second clause, from this that the effect of the first clause is impeded through the defect of the second clause. Just as the power of the sun is impeded through the defect of the plant, so it doesn't germinate, right? So I put the seeds in the garden there, and sometimes something comes up, and sometimes it doesn't. Sometimes it flowers, sometimes it doesn't. Same sun shining upon both, huh? But no defect of a second cause is able to impede, but that the divine will will produce its, what? Effect, huh? Secondly, because if the distinction of the contingent from the necessary are referred only to second causes, it would follow that this is outside the intention and the divine, what? Will. Which doesn't fit together. What's that for a translation of inconvenience? And therefore, it can be said better that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. Now, this is the point that Thomas makes every time he discusses this question. For when some cause is efficacious, what it does, for acting, the effect follows the cause, not only according to this that had come about, but also in the way it comes about, right? Or in the way it is. For from the weakness of the active power in the seed, it happens that the son is born unlike the father in certain accidental things, which pertain to the way of being, right? Since, therefore, the divine will is most efficacious, not only does it follow that those things come about which God wills to come about, but in the very way they come about, in which God wills them to come about. For he wills some things, God wills some things to come about necessarily, and other things to come about, what? Contingently, huh? He wills some things to happen by chance even, right? Okay? Which makes life much more interesting. Yeah, yeah. He used to compare sometimes the poet, right, huh? Where in his play, he has some things happen by chance. And the poet's a little bit like God there, right, huh? He arranges some things to take place by necessity, but some things to take place by chance, huh? And so he's saying the tragedies and the comedies and so on. There are many events that take place by chance, yeah. But the poet arranges them, right? So he, in a sense, is to the events in the play, like God is the events in the real world. So he wills some things, God wills some things to come about necessarily, and some things in a contingent way. And that there might be order in things, right? For the completion of the, what? Universe, huh? And therefore, for some effects, he renders apt necessary causes, which are not able to, what? Fail, from which effects follow a necessity. To some, he adapts defectable, huh? Failable, contingent causes, huh? From which effects come about in a contingent way. It is not, therefore, an account that the effects willed by God come about contingently, because the practical causes are contingent. But an account of this, that God wills them to happen contingently. He prepares contingent causes for them, huh? Put down your pipe and smoke it, huh? God's causality is so efficacious, that not only what he wants to take place does take place, right? But also that it takes place in the way he wants it to take place. Some things by necessity, and some, what? By contingent, right? And so he prepares for the some necessary causes, and for the others, contingent causes, yeah. And people go, you know, to areas in both directions, right? And some, you know, want to make everything contingent, because they all depend upon the will of God, as if that was a contingent cause, which God is not. And others want to go to the other thing, and make everything necessary, right? And leave no room for contingency, right? And Thomas, following Aristotle, right? Goes to the middle ground, right? All my reports go with the modest truth, Shakespeare says. Nor clipped, or more nor clipped, but so. Makes the world much more interesting, huh? Yeah, that comes under, yeah. That's not the only one. You read Shakespeare's comedy of areas, you see a lot of... Yeah. Yeah. Chancy events, huh? But in the same way, the tragedies, right? But in a sense, in history, and in biography, of course, you know, you have to talk about chance events, huh? Because they can change the whole, what? World, right? You know? If you hadn't gone there on that day, at that time, you would not have had so-and-so. He didn't go there to meet you, and you didn't go there to meet him, but they changed your whole life, huh? I told you when I first came to Boston, and I told you that, and I thought, well, gee, first came to the serious side, I go down to Boston, yeah, but interesting, yeah. And finally I get kind of thirsty, right? So I go into one of the hotels there, and go into the bar, and sit down over here, right? And this other man sits down next to me, you know, and so on. See, he's got a book of poetry, so I figure he must be some academic type, you know? So I strike up a conversation with some big shot from Canadian University, right? And he's down thinking, of course, at Harvard and the district, and something like that. And so we get talking back and forth, and so on. All right, so it's a cigarette, I said. And he says, I smoke only gofles, he says. Now, this is the only pack of cigarettes I've bought since I've been in Massachusetts, right? And I don't in the hills, I can never get the helix, you know, but that's why I have any things. So he's spreading down his name and address, you know, on the job, you know? That's the story a friend of ours told us. His son was a young boy, he was learning how to play the piano, and he was really bad at it, but he knew how to learn one song. Well, he plays some Ricky Dinkum tune, right? Yeah. And so they decided that maybe we should pay for him to get some instruction. So they invite the instructor over, and she sits down next to him, he's just a boy, and with the confidence of a real Irishman, he's an Irish kid. He goes, what do you want to hear? And she says, how about this? And it was the one song that he knew. She was impressed, he could play just what she asked. He doesn't do that. I told you this thing happened to Boulay, like the sun, so he goes down to Florida, right? He's laying on the beach there, so he's talking to the guy next to him on the beach, right? And the guy gets so impressed with what Boulay's saying, he wants to hire him for a job. Like he didn't need it. But that's what happens, these things, right? Chance events, for the good or for bad, right? And people are getting shot every day, you know, he's in the wrong place, and a stray bullet or whatever it was. Okay. So, now, let's look at the reply to the objections here, the first objection. No one is saved unless God wills him to be saved, right? And therefore, when Adda asks that he will, because it necessarily will come about, he wills it. Now, to the first, it should be said that through that word of Augustine, there should be understood necessity in things willed by God, not absolute, but what? Conditional. For it is necessary that this conditional be true. Yet God God wills this, necessarily this will be, right? Now, what's the, the, the, uh, the, uh, Teresa LeSue, right? She wanted to get, uh, there was a Biel 13th to, uh, allow her to enter the, uh, convent at the age of 15, which is earlier than, I guess, the mission thing. What did he say to her? I can say that God wants it. Yeah, he was like, yeah. Yeah. He gave the conditional, huh? He didn't say, I think I approve you for this, right? And, of course, uh, God pulled it, right? So she got in. Okay. If he hadn't pulled it, she wouldn't have got in. At that age, anyway. Moreover, every cause which is not able to be impeded of necessity produces its effect, because nature always produces the same unless it be impeded. But the will of God cannot be impeded, for the apostle says in the Romans, who can resist his will. Therefore, the will of God imposes, what? Necessity upon things willed, huh? It's the way Spinoza talks, right? Influencing Einstein. He admits his indebtedness to Spinoza, right? For Spinoza, you know, everything follows from God like it follows him being a triangle that you have your interior angles going to do right angles, right? Everything follows this necessity. To the second, it should be said, from this fact that nothing is, what? Resists the divine will, it follows that not only do those things come about that God wills to come about, but that they come about contingently or necessarily, because thus he wills them to come about. Okay? So if God wills something to happen by chance, it must happen by chance. And for a reason. Yeah. There's a book, a deconix that was out of print, and we all wanted a copy of this book, right? And we would, you know, sold our soul to get the, you know. So this friend of mine, you know, he's invited down in the city of Quebec to dinner. It's, you know, some guy. He gets down there and something will come up and the guy can't go out to dinner with him or something. Oh, yeah. I don't know what the hell I'm going to do now he's down there, so. Oh, here's a little book shop. Here's a book shop. He looks in there. There he is right there in the book. I'm sure you didn't dare show it to anyone else. That'd be too risky. That's the very way Thomas turns us around on the person, right? Yeah. In a sense, he's saying, yes, it is so true that nothing is just the will of God, right? Not only that it will happen, but that it will happen in the way he wants it to happen. If by necessity, it will happen by necessity. If it's by luck or chance or contingently, it will happen that way. So whatever way he wants it to happen, it will happen. Okay, now the third one here, huh? He's talking about the conditional. I suppose this is in some way connected with the first one, too, because what does this conditional necessity mean? To the third, it should be said that the things that are after have necessity from what is before, according to the way of the things that are before. Whence those things which come to be by the divine will have such necessity as God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional only, right? And thus, not all things are necessary, but absolutely, right?