Prima Pars
Lecture 89: The Five Signs of Divine Will

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that there are placed five signs about the divine will. You should go up there and be worried about five, right? Yeah. Prohibition, preceptor command, counsel, right? Operation, and what? Permission, to use the Latin words here. For those things which God commands us, right? Or counsels us, in us sometimes are what? Done. And those things which he prohibits, sometimes he permits. Therefore, they ought not to be divided one against the other. Moreover, God does nothing without willing it, as is said in the Book of Wisdom, chapter 11. But the will of the sign is distinguished from the will of, yeah, complacence. Therefore, operation or doing ought not to be comprehended under the will of the sign. Third objection. This gets more to how we're going to divide the five, right? Moreover, operation and permission pertain commonly to all creatures, because in all of them God does something, and in all of them he permits something to come to be. But command, counsel, and prohibition pertain only to the rational creature. Therefore, they do not come suitably in one division, since they are not of one order. That's the reason for separating the two, I guess. Moreover, the bad happens in many ways than the good. So there's only one way to hit the bullseye, as they say. Many ways to miss. Above, below, so on. Because the good happens in one way, but the bad in all kinds of ways, huh? As is clear through the philosopher in the second book of the Ethics, and through Dionysius in the fourth chapter about the divine needs. Therefore, it's unsuitable that with respect to the bad is assigned one sign only, prohibition. But with respect to the good, two signs, counsel and command. I answer it should be said that these signs of the will are said by which we are accustomed to demonstrate us to will something. Now one can declare himself to will something, either through himself or through another. Through himself, insofar as he does something, either directly or indirectly and by happening, huh? Right, she does. Directly, when he does something by itself, in regard to this, there's said to be the sign of operation or doing, huh? Indirectly over, insofar as he does not impede an operation, for the removing, removens, prohibens, huh? The one removing the thing, preventing it. It's said to be a mover, parachidens, as it's said in the eighth book of natural hearing, the eighth book of physics, huh? So when Samson there pushed the pillar, and the thing came down, right? Is he causing the roof to come down? Procedent, as it's said, right? He's removens, prohibens, huh? And removing the pillar that holds up the roof, right? Okay. So he says that's the distinction between operation and permission. That's what you're doing yourself, right? Or what you're doing directly, and as such, and what you're doing indirectly, yeah. Okay. But to another, one declares himself to will something, insofar as he orders the other one to doing something, right? Either by a necessary induction, huh? Which comes about by commanding what someone, what he wishes, huh? And prohibiting the what? Contrary. Or by some persuasoria induccione, huh? Which pertains to, what? Consul, huh? So what does St. Paul says, huh? You know, Samson says, I have no command here, but I have a consul, right? Okay. So the church is picked up in that word, right? And when the young man comes to Christ and says, what must I do to be saved? And Christ starts to do the right to be man, son. And then he says, well, I've done all that. And then he says, you know, go sow everything you've got and come follow me, right? But he's not saying it's a necessity to be saved, right? But he's counseling him, right? This is the better way, huh? So he says, perus fazorio induccione. Now, it's interesting the words that tell us there, right? Because induction and introduction and inducement, right? They all have the idea of something that's not forcing you, right? So an induction is an argument. Does a conclusion follow necessarily? They cut up on a hundred frogs and they all have a three-chambered heart. And I conclude that all frogs have a three-chambered heart. I think that's correct. But do I know necessarily it's so? No. If I lived in darkest Africa, I might, by induction, say that all men are black, right? Or rights might say by induction that no man is pink or green, I'd say, right? But if someone finds green men on Mars, I'd be surprised. And I didn't really know for sure, right, that there's no green men, right? But it's a problem. Inducement, huh? What's an inducement? Inducement force you to do something? I want you to buy this car I'm trying to sell, you know? And you're kind of hesitating. You say, well, yeah. So in a, you know, no charge, a four-loop TARDIS. Or we'll change your oil, you know? Get on the radio. Change your oil, you know, for the derange to the car, right? For free, you know? Well, this is what kind of inclined me, but that forced me to buy your car, right? Okay. So often people will do that, huh? They'll go low. And the word persuasion comes from what? The word sweet, huh? Yeah. They're sweet in the deal, you know? Make it more. Yeah. We help, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. The book I had about how to give a cat a pill. It's a very hard thing to do, you know? Yeah. So you make these little meatballs, and you put the pill in one of those meatballs, you know? The little tangles, you know, cat-sized meatballs. You toss them. And before you toss the one that's got the pill in it, down it goes. Not our cat. Not our cat. Yeah. You've got to force it. Yeah. So, no, so Thomas does that. He divides the five into what? Two and three, right? He divides them into two, and then one into two, and one into three. So he's not violating the rule of two or three, is he? Because, therefore, in these ways, he's declared something to will something, right? Either what he does himself, right? Someone else, right? He tries to do. On account of this, these five names sometimes are named sometimes by the name of the divine will, as were signs of the will. Now, that command, consul, and prohibition are sometimes called will of God. He's clearly through that which is said in Matthew chapter 1. Amen. Amen. Amen. 6 verse 10, that will be done, as in heaven, so also on earth, right? So he says that's referring to those three, right? So, honor your father and mother and don't kill your neighbor, right? But also he puts counsel into that, right? It's interesting. So God, in a sense, Christ there has brought the young man to, what, sell everything and come follow him, but he's not quite up to it. Okay? It's not sweet enough to him. He has to be two by twelfth or something. But that permission or operation now, right? The other two, are called the will of God, is clear to Augustine, who says the ingredient, that nothing comes about unless the omnipotent one wills it, right? Either by doing it or by allowing it to come about, okay? Okay? Synendo, huh? With fiat. Okay? That's the fundamental explanation. Or it can be said that permission and operation refer to the present, permission to the bad, right? Operation to the good, but to the future, what? Prohibition with respect to the bad. With respect to the necessary good, the precept or command. With respect to the, what, superabundant good, counsel, right? So the church distinguishes usually, what, three counsels, right? Okay. And they refer to what? The, yeah, yeah. But it goes back, you know, to Socrates' division, right? The Greek philosophers, right? The exterior goods, the goods of the body, the goods of the soul, right? So by the vow of poverty, you're giving up the exterior goods. Chastity, the good of the body. And then by obedience, your own will, right? Okay? That's the way Thomas sometimes explains the articles of faith about Christ. It was like in the Te Deum there, right? He became man, right? Through Mary, right? And he intended to die on the cross, right? And as the Te Deum says, after he died on the cross, then he opened the gates of hell, right? But by what? By his descent into hell? By his resurrection? And by his, what? Ascension, right? And Thomas ties it up with the three goods, right? Because when he ascended into hell, he, what, gave the great vision to the, what? Prophets there. Resurrection, most openly, is the body, right? And ascension is the proper place. That's exterior good. So he divides according to the three goods of man. Okay? So you have the council taken up with those three, right? Do you remember that in the Psalm 8 there, when he attributes the Son of Man there, and he says that he rules over the, what, the beasts and the birds and the fishes? And he takes, you know, the sheep and the oxen as the good, right? The small ones and the big ones in the church, right? And then the bad, right? But how does he divide those according to what St. John says? All that's in the world is the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes or the pride of life. So the birds are the proud ones, right? And you can see that way Shakespeare does that in the Henry plays, right? You know, with the proud men, you know, watching their birds, you know, and one's trying to get above the other one, you know? And so it's reflection of it there. And the fish, I like the money, right? Because of the importance of the sea for trade and so on. And of course the beasts are the ones who are into the lust of the flesh, right? So divisions into three there, right? Okay. Now, the first objection was saying, well, these things seem to overlap sometimes, huh? The first therefore it should be said that nothing prevents about the same thing for some would do in diverse ways to declare it to will something, just as there are found many names signifying the, what, same thing. Once nothing prevents the same thing from, what, being subject to command and consul, right? In operation and prohibition or, what, permission. The second objection says, God does nothing except willing it. But the will of the sign is distinguished from the will of the, what, complacent son. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended under the will of the sign. And Thomas says, to the second it should be said that just as God is able to, what, to be signified metaphorically, to will that which he does not, what, will by will properly taken, so he is able metaphorically to signify willing that which he properly wills, huh? Whence nothing prevents about the same thing for there to be the will of bene placite, right? And the will of the sign. Just like that example of anger, right? You know, we can speak of God's justice, and then we're speaking properly, and we speak of God's anger, and then we're speaking of, what? Yeah, but the same thing, right? Whence nothing prevents about the same there being a will of complacence and the will of the sign. But operation is always, what, the same with the will of, what, complacence. Not, however, command or counsel. Because this is about the present and that about the, what, future. And because this is per se an effect of the will, that through another, right, that you're demanding of. Now the third objection is interesting because he said, well, some of these seem to pertain to all creatures and some only to, what, irrational creatures. It says, to the third, therefore, it should be said that the rational creature is the lord of his own, what, act, huh? And therefore, about him, there are signs, special signs of the divine will. Insofar as God orders or directs the rational creature to doing voluntarily things, right? And to himself. But other creatures do not act except as move from the divine doing. And therefore, about other things, there's no room except for, what, operation and permission. Now the fourth objection here. Bad taking place in many ways and so on. To the fourth, it should be said that every evil of guilt, although it happens in many ways, nevertheless, they all come together insofar as they are, what, discordant from the divine will. And therefore, one sign with respect to bad things is a sign, namely, prohibition. But the good things have themselves in diverse ways to the divine goodness. Because some things there are, without which, what, the enjoyment of the divine goodness, we cannot attain that. With respect to these is precept, right? So what does St. Paul say? The man who marries off his daughter, he does a good thing, right? The man who puts him in the convent, he does an even better thing. But some things there are, by which we more perfectly, right, attain the divine goodness. 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Consul, right? In a sense, the consuls are removing the impediments to the perfection of charity, right? And St. Alphonsus would say, or the Doctor of Divine Love would say, right? St. Francis de Sales, perfection consists in charity, right? But the consuls are removing impediments to the perfection of charity. Or it could be said that consul is not only about what? But also about avoiding the lesser evils, huh? But St. Francis de Sales makes a point about cultivating the little virtues. Yeah. And I would like to say, that's the world of avoiding the little slices. Yeah. That's one of the very famous priests that used to go out of assumption there. You eat between meals? Well, I don't know if that excludes you from heaven eating between meals, but... It's de minoribus malis mitandis, right? Brother Richard used to say to me, no, it's not only, you know, us English candy. And he says, what do you got all that candy for? I said, there's nothing wrong with any candy, is there? He says, if you can't say no to the things that are okay, you'll never say no to the things that are not okay. That's a good advice, I think, you know? Okay, should we take our break between that and the next question, you know? We'll see you next time. We'll see you next time. We'll see you next time. We'll see you next time. We'll see you next time. We'll see you next time. Okay, just get a little bit here from the Summa Kabbalah Gentiles. You get in the Prima Secundit, the Summa here. The distinction of the emotions and the names of the emotions. And Thomas, following Aristotle and Plato and so on, will distinguish about 11 different emotions. We can subdivide some of these, but there's basically 11 different emotions. But they're divided into two groups. One group is called in Greek, Epithumia. But in Latin they call it the concubiscible appetite, right? Naming it from this wanting or a sense desire. The other group is called in Greek, Thumas. It's an O and S there. And in Latin they'll call it the Erasca appetite. Naming it from one of the passions and emotions that stands out, ain't it, right? Now, what is the basis for the distinction between these two groups of emotions? Well, the concubiscible appetite arrives from what is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses. So, if something is agreeable to the senses, then you like it or love it, then. Now, if you don't have what you like or love, like you don't have any candy, then you want some candy, right? But if you get what you like or love, you get some candy, now you have joy or pleasure, right? One of my grandsons was saying, what great days was, and my wife said, why? Oh, the jelly beans? So, liking or loving is the fundamental emotion there, right? And it gives rise to wanting or desire in the absence of the good that you like, and to joy or pleasure in the possession of the good that you like or love. Now, there are three other emotions, when something is, what, bad, in the sense of painful or disagreeable to the senses. So, I hate sound, okay? Now, I try to avoid it, I turn away from it, right? But if I'm forced to eat it, I'm sad and gloomy right at the table, okay? I find something fishy about fish, you know? Sometimes it's good, okay? So, there's six different emotions, right? In the Kibsapotai, right? Now, if there was no difficulty ever in getting what is pleasing to the senses, or in avoiding what is painful or disagreeable to the senses, or in getting rid of something that causes pain to the senses, then the Kibsapotai emotions would be all the animal would have. But, sometimes when you want something good, it's hard to get, right? And then, there are two emotions that can arise, right? If you think you can overcome the difficulties of getting what you want, right? If you think you cannot, then it gives rise to despair, right? So, hope and despair are concerned with the difficulty about getting what you want, right? And whether you can overcome that or not, right? Now, aversion, which is turning away. I don't really have a good, concrete word in English, but just turning away. Okay, sometimes you think you can, well, there's no problem, right? If I step on an ant in the house here and I step on it, that's no big deal, right? But sometimes, you know, if I'm bullied or something, some things you want to avoid, but it's difficult to avoid. Well, then there can arise fear, if you think you might not be able to avoid it, or boldness, if you think you can overcome it, right? Okay? So, fear and boldness arise from aversion. There's a difficulty in avoiding what you're turning away from. And hope and despair arise from wanting, when there's a difficulty in getting what you want. Now, anger arises from what? Sadness, huh? When you think you can get rid of what is causing the sadness, but with some difficulty in getting rid of it, right? So, if you're stepping on my shoes, and I say, do you know you're stepping on my foot? Then you say, so what? That probably calls you some anger, right? Get you off my foot, right? But if you don't think you do it in your body, it's just going to have more fear, right? But nothing in your asses will arise from joy, because joy or pleasure is satisfied, right? Okay? So, these are the 11, what? Emotions, right? Now, you can distinguish each of these emotions sometimes, but they're objects, right? Okay? Like melancholy. Loneliness, right? Envy, right? All three kinds of sadness, but the basic distinction is in these 11 emotions. Now, this distinction of the emotions is important for, obviously, understanding yourself and other people, right? And understanding even the animals, right? It's very important for, what? Understanding fiction, right? Aristotle says that tragedy, what? Purges pity and fear, right? Pity being a form of sadness, right? Fear and comedy, right? Purges what? Joy and hope, right? Okay. Very important for understanding music, and in classical music, the major keys are used more for love, wanting and joy, and hope and boldness, right? But the minor keys are used for hate and aversion and sadness, and for fear, and for despair, and for anger. So, Mozart represents anger in the, what, C minor piano concerto, and the D minor piano concerto, right? In the minor key, right? And sometimes, Mozart will develop the concerto, hope returning to despair, and the melody will come back, but in the minor key now. And, you know, fear, right? Which is often divine, and the Dianjivani, and so on. This is also very important for rhetoric, right? Because Aristotle mentions how people are persuaded by emotional appeals, and so on. So he talks about a number of these emotions that are important in the courtroom, and so on, and how to arouse those emotions, and how to calm them down, right? And so, if I'm feeling anger or hatred towards the man who's on, what, trial, I'm more apt to find him guilty, right? I'm more apt to punish him more than I would. If I feel pity for him, and I like the guy, and so on, I might overlook what he's done, or leave him a lesser penalty. So, these have got a lot of things, huh? Now, they're also very important in ethics, because a number of the virtues are concerned with these emotions, right? So the first virtue you take up in ethics is courage, right? And courage is concerned with fear and boldness, right? And then you take up temperance, or moderation, that's concerned with what is pleasing to the senses. When you take up. When you take up. Magnity, right, which is concerned with hope, and then mildness, or meekness, but mildness is very better right now, that Christ has learned me find meek and humble heart, that's concerned with anger, right, mildness, so you can see that to understand these emotions is useful for understanding music, right, for understanding what, fiction, right, for rhetoric, right, and so on, for ethics, right, you have to know that in order to understand what some of the virtues are about, patience is more concerned with sadness and things of that sort, and one of those things. Now, Thomas, in the first book of the Summa Cana Gentiles, before he talks about the love of God, he mentions how the names of some emotions are carried over, right? The words themselves, and apply it to the acts of the will, and you can distinguish in the emotions a bodily aspect, right, and there's no body in the will, the will is not a body, and that's dropped out when you carry the word over, right, but then there's a formal aspect, right, then, there's an object, or a way of having an object, and so on, and that can be carried over to the will, right, so as a Christian, you've heard of fear of the Lord, and you've heard of theological virtue of hope, for example, right, you speak of charity, and a kind of love, and so on, right, well, these are not emotions, but the name of an emotion has been carried over, but part of the meaning is dropped out, namely the bodily aspect of it, the passion aspect of it, then, the bodily change goes on, right, from, from, from, from, for fear, and so on, right, but still, the will will turn away from some things, right, that are difficult to avoid, right, so then Thomas would do a third thing there in the super conscientious, and he'll say, now, can any of these 11 names be carried over to God, properly speaking, some, like anger, are carried over by a fourth thing, but can any be carried over properly to the divine will, and he says, well, some of them cannot at all, because they have, what, an object that is something bad, right, and nothing bad can happen to God, right, so these emotions, like hate, diversion, sadness, cannot be found in God, except that's not for it, right, that's in God, properly, some, like wanting, although their object is something good, but it's a good that you lack, for God is all good, so there can't be any wanting in God, properly, right, but God possesses all good, so it makes sense of joy in God, Gaudium, in Latin, and there's joy over something you love, and love can be had for something when you have it, and not just, like wanting what you don't have, okay, that's why it's appropriate that the philosopher is called a lover of wisdom, right, because that doesn't say whether you have wisdom or don't have, right, you can love wisdom in either case, but as you start to acquire some wisdom, you love it even more, so Thomas says, of these six names, of the six passions or emotions in the, in our spiritual appetite, only two can be carried over properly to God, and when they're carried over, of course, they drop out in bodily, changeable aspect, just keep the formal aspect, okay, and of course, nothing's difficult for God, right, so any of these other ones come in for God, anything bad with God is a hard time avoiding, so some of these could hardly be said of even metaphoric than fear, right, okay, or despair, but again, these are for ones that are in the future and don't have yet, right, so they cannot apply to God, and anger for many reasons, right, anger arises from sadness, but there's no sadness in God, there can't be anger in God itself, metaphorically speaking, as Thomas says, and he can. So he concludes that only two of the names can be carried over, right, and in the Summa Papi Gentilis, in the first book, he first shows that there's joy in God, and then he argues, from that as well as some other ways, there must be love of God, right, well all that is not here, right, in his part, although he does take up his love and emotions in the Primus Akundi, because it's appropriate and it's going into the virtues and the emotions which are involved in, the virtues and so on, so he takes them up there, right, but he doesn't go through this that he doesn't assume Papi Gentilis, and I notice now he's going to take up the love of God, but he doesn't really have a question on the joy of God, right, so there's no things in one of these Summas, it's not on the other, right, then we ought to consider about those things which absolutely pertain to the will of God. Now, in the desiring part of the soul are found in us both the passions of the soul, and he mentions now Gaudium, right? Gaudium amour et huius modi. And he perhaps mentions Gaudium and amour because he's thinking about God. And the habits of the moral virtues, right? As justitia fortitude on huius modi. But as Aristotle will say in the ethics, fortitude is about the emotions of fear and boldness. And those aren't found in God. So fortitude is said of God, maybe only metaphorically. But justice is in the will, and it's about the acts of the will and so on. And so justice could be said properly in God. Again, Thomas in the Subacondent Gentilis is more expansive at this point because he'll recall the virtues of the Nicomachean Ethics and which ones can be carried over and applied to God, right? But the ones Thomas is emphasizing here are justice, right? And misericordia, right? Now, misericordia is a kind of interesting word because there, I don't think it's going to be said properly of God, it originally comes from a metaphor, right? Because misericordia is the Latin word for, what? Pity, right? Originally. And therefore, the word for what? Kind of sadness, right? And so, everybody had the Latin word, I mean, the Greek word for this, Kyrie eleison, right? The eleison would go back to the Greek word for pity. But again, it's not an emotion of God, it's an act of the will. He's willing to relieve our misery, okay? Not as having a feeling or emotion about our misery, huh? So he's going to consider in this question 20, huh? The love of God, right? And then question 21, both the justice of God and the mercy of God. This is a little more particular and a little more pleasant to read now than the question of the will of God, right? So, about the first, he says, the love of God, four things are sought, right? First, whither in God there be love. And it's interesting to use the word amor, right? Which is originally taken more from the emotion, right? Rather than the more intellectual word, dilexio, right? Which I translate sometimes as a chosen love, right? Because it's taken from the word choice. So, whither in God there be love, right? And then, whither God loves all things. And third, whither he loves one thing more than another. And whither he loves more than better things. Okay? This is very interesting, huh? I didn't talk about the love of God. Thomas always starts on the wrong side, huh? My male teacher, Chris Rick, used to joke a little bit about how do I recognize your soul in the next world when you don't have your body there, right? Before the resurrection, right? He says, well, some guys, you know, their thinking is always messed up before he gets straightened out. That's how I recognize you, you see. Or if Thomas's soul, maybe before the resurrection, you know, we'll say, this guy, he always thinks of the opposite of what he thinks. And objects to what he thinks is the truth, right? Before he gets into the things. That's how I recognize Thomas, huh? What you see in the Summa Theologiae, though, is an abbreviation of the questionis disputate. Because if you take the questionis disputate that come down to us on Thomas, there might be in an article 10 or 15 objections on one side and maybe 5 or 10 objections on the other side. Right here, you have it kind of condensed to usually about three objections on the side that's, you know, against the truth, right? And then it's kind of a set contract very briefly, using authority, right? The other side. So it's sort of for beginners, right? Kind of a little dialectic, right? But it's Plato who taught us this in the Mino, other dialogues, right? Aristotle, the father of logic, teaches it in logic. To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that love is not in God, right? And that's the first objection. For no passion, on English we call that an emotion, right? Or an undergoing, or a feeling sometimes, right? But maybe emotion is the best word. For there's no passion, no emotion, in God, and no feelings. But love is a what? Therefore, love is not in God. But now it's very important to see this, that the first meaning of amor, right? It names a what? Emotion, a feeling. And that goes back to the beginning that says what? We name things as we know them. And our knowledge begins with the senses. So the other word for emotion there, the feelings, right? Shows it's tied up with the senses. I feel bad. I feel sad today. I feel, you know, angry. Or I feel, you know, I feel fear, right? It's something sensible. So we name the sensible first. And so we often fall back upon the first meaning of a word, earlier meaning of a word, before we, what, get to the meaning we want. So Thomas never hesitates to give that kind of an objection. It straightens us out, and we say, okay, that's the first meaning of amor, but then can it be carried over to an act of the will, see? And I always have a joke there with the little Polish philosopher when I was in college, you know. And I was always using the syllogism, right? The rigorous argument. Syllogism is an argument in which some statements lay it down and others follow it necessarily. So he was getting so frustrated with my syllogism, as he said one day in class, Mr. Berkowitz, do you have an emotional attachment to the syllogism? I said, well, I might have an emotional attachment to a girl, but not to the syllogism. See? But my will is attached to the syllogism, right? Because I understand the perfection of the argument called the syllogism, right? So my will loves that. So the love of wisdom is a what? An act of the will. The love of the girl might be an emotion, it would be an emotion first, anyway. Moreover, love, anger, sadness, right? And things of this sort are divided against each other, right? But sadness and anger are not said of God except metaphorically. Therefore, neither what? Love. They seem to be opposites, right? Moreover, the great Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names. Incidentally, you know, if you ever look at Thomas' commentary on the divine names of Dionysius, he will divide the works of Dionysius about the names of God. And there's one book of Dionysius, which is this one here called the divine names, which is about the names said properly of God. And then there's another book of Dionysius called symbolic theology or metaphorical theology, which is about the names said more metaphorically of God. And there are other books that deal with other names. Or Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the divine names, the love is a power that unites, but this has no place in God since he's simple. Therefore, in God, there is no love. That's got an interesting objection. But against this is what is said in the first epistle of St. John, that God is what? Agape in Greek. The Greeks have many words for a love, right? I used to have fun there with Plato in the symposium because he argues this way, Socrates, that the philosopher is not wise, right? The philosopher is a lover of wisdom. But the man who loves something wants it. The man who wants something lacks it. Therefore, the philosopher must lack wisdom. And then I pick out an assumptionist seminary, you know, that's it. What about God, right? If God loves something, then he must want it. If he wants it, he must lack it. You see? Yeah. Well, notice what Socrates is doing. He's reasoning with probability, right? You might say that just about everything we like or love, we want. We don't fully have the things we like or love, right? But is it necessarily true that the one who loves something wants it? No. If he already has what he wants, loves, then he has joy in not wanting. That's the way God is, huh? Now, I answer. It should be said that it is necessary to place love in God. And this is the key thing he says here now. You notice how Thomas looks before and after, right? Because primus is defined by before, right? For the first motion of the will and of any desiring power is what? Love. For since the act of the will and of any desiring power tends to something good or what? Bad, right? As in its own object, right? But the good, more chiefly and to itself, is an object of the will and of desire. But the bad, only secondarily and to another. Insofar as it's supposed to be what? Good, yeah. It's necessary, therefore, that those are naturally prioris, before, right? The act of the will and desire that regard the good, then actually, what? Before those which regard the bad, okay? As what? Joy more than what? Sadness, huh? And love than hate, huh? That famous picture of Churchill, you know, that's done by a Canadian photographer who's very good at getting pictures of people. And he's got kind of a really tough expression on his thing. Well, I guess the way he got it was to take away his cigar. You've got to read the stubbornness and the, you know, the egg or whatever. Churchill, right? But if I love my cigar, then I'm going to get sad to take my cigar away, right? Or angry, right? You can see those passions about the bad that kind of arise from the passions about the good. So even joy is more, what, fundamental than sadness, right? And love than, what, hate. And then he gives the principle there. This is an axiom, right? Always what is through itself is before what is through another. And sometimes he'll say, you know, that the through itself is before the through another and a beginning or cause of it, right? So, using the sensible, right? Sugar is sweet through being sugar. So sugar is sweet through itself. The coffee is sweet. Yeah. So it's not sweet through itself, but through another, right? Now the sugar can be sweet without the coffee being sweet, but not vice versa. So it's before the second sense of before. But it's also a beginning and a cause of the sugar being sweet, right? And that's a fundamental principle which he's using here in talking about the acts of the will, right? But we apply it, you know, in logic and philosophy to knowing. What is known through itself, the per se nota, as he says in Latin, is before what is known through another. And it's a beginning and a cause of our knowing the other things, right? We're known through another. If A was known through B and B through C, and nothing is known through itself, would anything ever be known? Right? It would be infinity things you'd have to know before you could know anything. You couldn't begin to know anything. I take a simple example sometimes. Are there some words whose meanings are known through other words? And you may be too lazy to go to the dictionary, but if you go to the dictionary, you learn the meaning of one word through other words, right? Now, is the meaning of all words known through other words? See the problem I'd have? I'd go and look up a word in the dictionary and use some other words to explain that one. I got to learn what those words mean. Look those up, and I got to look up the words that are used to explain those. This will go on forever, right? Would I ever learn anything that way? Furthermore, I come into this world knowing no words, right? So the first words I learned, can I learn through other words? Of course, I used to have a little tape there of my firstborn, Paul, you've ever seen in the high chair. I'm getting him to see the word cookie. Yeah, do you want a cookie? You see? Now, he, you know, likes the cookie, right? And so without any prompting after a while, he'll say someday, cookie, right? Like after his meal, cookie. So how did he learn the meaning of the word cookie? Do other words? Yeah. So the word was not learned through other words, right? And it's those words we know, but not through other words, through which we know all the other words we know. What is per se, right? Known to itself is before what is known to another. And a beginning or a cause of a knowing of another. You see, the best way to learn a foreign language is not to associate the word with the word in your own language, meaning the same thing, but to associate with the object itself, right? La man, not man, but la man, you know. Uné, you know, like Kate there in Shakespeare's Henry V, right? You know, where she's associated, elbow, you know, kind of say these words, huh? Rather than associate them with the French word. So that's an axiom, right? The what is through itself is before what is through another, right? You know, it's kind of interesting to come back to the first argument for the existence of God, the existence of the unmoved mover, right? Right? Okay? Well, could you apply this axiom? Semper enum quadus per se, preocesque eo quadus per alia. Always what is through itself is before that which is through another. So, you could say a moved mover, and there's something like a moved mover, right? Like if I move that briefcase by this book, right? The book is a moved mover. So, no question about to be a moved mover in this world. But a moved mover, is it a mover per se or per alia? Yeah. So, there must be before it a mover per se. And that would have to be a mover, an unmoved mover. One that moves other things without being moved itself and not to be moved by another, right? So, you could apply that to all kinds of things, huh? But here he's applying it to the acts of the will, right? Or even the emotions, huh? And pointing out how the emotions that regard the good are more fundamental than those that regard the, what? Bad, right? But then among those that regard the good, he goes on in the next page of my text here. Again, what is more common is naturally, what? Before. Whence the understanding, before, has an order to the common true, then to some, what? Particular truths. It goes back to what we learned at the beginning of natural philosophy, right? That the general is a part of particular, right? Now, there are some acts of the will and desire regarding the good under some special condition. Thank you. as gaudium, joy, right, and pleasure, right, which are not about the good period, but about the good present and had, and desire and hope, which are about the good not yet achieved. But love regards the good in general, whether it be had or not had, right? Whence love naturally is the first act of the will and the desire. Okay? So, wanting candy, what? It's not just that candy is good, but you don't have the candy, right? Pleasure eating candy, you've got to have the candy to get that pleasure. But liking candy, well, that can be what? Whether you have it or don't have it, right? It's more fundamental to like candy. If I didn't like candy, I wouldn't want it when I don't have it, and I wouldn't take joy when I didn't get it. Like, when Christmas there, my brother was over in Italy, and they sent us a box of these chocolates, you know, with the real liquors in them. Not just the, you know, imitation, you know. You couldn't get out of the States in those days, right? So these are really good. And I remember my friend Jim comes over, you know, and he says, oh, that's not real. He says, he talks a couple in his mouth, and... So I said, I think I'll put a couple of these up to one scene and beyond, you know. And he said, no, he doesn't have any sweet tooth, you know. Because you've got to like candy, right? We're going to rejoice to get this, right? He said, you know, waste it on him. So, love regards the good in general, whether it be had or not had, right? Whence love naturally is the first act of the will and desire. And in account of this, he says, all the other emotions of the desiring power presuppose love or liking, right? As a first, what? Root. For nothing, for no one desires something unless it be a good that they love or like, eh? Nor does someone rejoice except about the good love that he now has. Hate is not except about that which is contrary to the good, what? Love, eh? So, I didn't love truth, I wouldn't hate falsehood, right? And likewise, sadness, right? And others of this sort. Manifestly refers to love as to its first, what? Beginning, eh? Whence in whatever there is will or desire is necessary that there be love, right? For if you remove the first, you remove all the others. It has been shown, however, that in God there is will. The previous question is about it. Whence is necessary to posit or place in God love, eh? Okay? Now, just for a minute here, just use the word love and like it, you know? And I think in English, right, this has been an example of how the common name is kept by one of the particulars and a new name is given to one. So, if I'm a lover of wisdom, do I like wisdom or not? But sometimes you divide liking against loving, right? So, my dad was saying about some food, I don't like this, I love it. Okay? Well, then, you're in the institution, you need it too, right? And so, as a professor, you're not going to have time to be careful. I say, I like the student. When I get in trouble, I say, I love the student. I get in trouble, right? So, what is loving as opposed to liking? Yeah, there's a certain intensity, right, then? Okay? You see that? While liking, the weaker one, doesn't add anything to the thinking, right? Now, you have something like that with knowing, it's the same before, too. Now, sometimes we'll say to somebody, do you know that's so, or do you just think it's so? Okay? Now, if you ask me who's going to be the next president of the United States, I might tell you what I think, right? But if you pin me down and say, now, do you really know who's going to be the next president? I'd say, no, I don't really know. But now, if you ask me about something that I really know, like, I know that two is half of four. I don't just think that. But if I know that two is half of four, do I think that two is half of four? Yeah. So, thinking can be used, right, to knowing as well as the thinking that is, what, opposed to knowing, right? So I would say, I think so-and-so is going to be the next president of the United States, but I don't know what it two is half of four. But I also think it does half of four, right? So, why does knowing have the meaning? The difference, yeah. Yeah, it adds something noteworthy, right? Maybe the idea of being sure or certain, right? Okay? Why, this keeps the common name, right? Because it doesn't add something noteworthy, right? We've talked about it before, right? So, sometimes we divide animal, and we get a separate hanging one between man and beast, right? But sometimes, instead of saying beast, we keep animal for the beast, right? And we divide man against the what? Yeah. Why does man get the new name, and the beast keep the common name, see? Yeah, because man adds something noteworthy, namely that he is what? Yeah, yeah. When I philosophize, I'm doing something. Maybe people would have to wear it. They're doing something, right? See? Now, when I make a chair, I'm doing something, too, aren't I? But I might give a new name now to this dude called making, right? Because in the case of making it as a product, right? You see the chair or the table, I get through making it, right? I get through doing my philosophize, and you can't see anything. But I have to show for it. What's off of my head, right? Even though this doing is a better doing than that doing, right? But here there's something that it has in addition. That there's a, you know, a pietas there in Rome, right? And I kick the bucket, and it won't be the pietas pointer, right? So, thanks to the way, liking and loving can be distinguished, right? So, loving is an intense liking, right? And therefore, it gets a new name. I don't know if you have that exactly in Latin, though, right? I don't know what words you'd use. So, Thomas, in this Prima Secundi, would distinguish between amor and dilexio, right? Because amor names more the emotion, right? And dilexio comes from the word choice, dilexio. So, I sometimes translate dilexio by a chosen love, right? But, you know, the love that's in the will, we call it dilexio there, right? But here he keeps the word love, right? And Dionysius talks about that, the Greek word eros, right, you know? Which, originally, he's very much this sensual meaning, right? But it's applied to God, right? It's the intensity of the word, right? That makes it good, huh?