Prima Pars
Lecture 90: Divine Love: God's Love of All Things and Degrees of Love

Transcript
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So we got through the body of this article and let's look at the objections, right? He says, no passion, no emotion, no feeling is in God, but love is a passion, therefore love is not in God. That's in the first figure of the socialism, right? To the first it should be said that the knowing power does not move us except through the, what? Desiring power. And just as in us, the universal reason moves by reason of the, what? Particular reason. As it said in the third book about the soul. So the intellectual desire, which is called the will, moves in us to the, what? Sensitive desire, right? And incidentally, most of the way these things are named. Apetitus, which is the common word used here for intellectual appetite and the sense appetite, and sometimes they'll speak of natural appetite. But appetite actually has the idea of what? A thing is the word appetite. Desire, right? Okay. Now, and the rasp appetite is named from anger, right? But why is it named from that? Why does that stand out, see? Well, because what Shakespeare says, huh? Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, right? And desire seems to be in wanting, more like emotion. You're seeking something, right? See? Why joy or pleasure is more like being at rest, right? So you speak of something beautiful as restful, right? Because it causes delight, huh? So we name things, yeah. Even though in the divine appetiturist, there's no appetite. Whence the proximate mover of the body in us is the sense desire, right? Whence always the act of the sense desire is followed by what? Some change, transmutatsu, change over, of the body. And most of all around the heart. Thump, thump, thump, thump, thump, thump. You felt that fear sometimes, sure. Which is the first beginning of motion in the animal. Thus, he says, the acts of the sense in desire, it was 11 when we talked about it before, insofar as they have a bodily change, next to them, their meaning, are called what? Passions, see? So the Greek should always speak of a cradling around the heart, you know, but the pump, the fear is marvelous. But not, however, an act of the will, okay? You don't have any bodily thing there. Because the will, like the reason, is what? Immaterial, right? Love, therefore, and joy and pleasure, according as they signify acts of the sense desire, are passions. Or we can say anything as emotions, feelings. But not, however, as they signify the acts of the understanding, intellectual desire. And thus they are laid down to be in God, as acts of will, not as what? Emotions or feelings, huh? Let's see, it's more clear in the Summa Karni Gentiles how the word is being moved, right? That it's being moved by dropping out part of its meaning, right? The material aspect of the meaning and keeping the formal aspect, right? So we'd like to know, my favorite word there, road, right? We speak of a road in our knowledge. Well, I didn't originate that way. Speaking of Greeks, speak of a road in our knowledge, huh? The road? Road, R-O-A-D, yeah. Now, you take the word road and you carry it over to the natural road in our knowledge, say, the first road in our knowledge, you drop out the material aspect, right? The stones or the asphalt or the cement or whatever it is, right? But you keep the formal aspect that there is an order in the road, a before and after, right? And so the before and after in our knowledge is called a, what, road in our knowledge, huh? But that's not the original meaning of road, right? So my son, Paul, was a little boy there and I asked him one day, come back from class, I said, Paul, what do you think of the basic road in human knowledge? And he says, our cars and trucks are. So he's stuck in the first meaning, right? And in a sense, his objection is, you know, stuck in the first meaning. But Thomas gives it because that's where we begin, right? And you say, well, why do we speak of a road in our knowledge? Well, it's because of this before and after. So if I drive to Boston, I'm going to hit Framingham before I hit Boston, right? There's a before and after along the road. I've got to drop out to the interior aspect of it and just keep the idea of the before and after, right? The same way here with these emotions, right? The names of the emotions are carried over, but you drop out part of their, what, meaning. The other famous example of that in the Dianima is the word, what, that passio, applied to what? Sensing and to understanding. Aristoteles' understanding is an undergoing. Because it's acted upon by its object, right? But the first meaning of undergoing involves the body and even something kind of contrary to your nature, right? I'm under the weather a little bit here. My nose, right? That means I've been acted upon by the weather in a way that's not good for me, right? I want to act upon your mind, right? It's for the good of your mind, right? Your mind is being perfected when the teacher acts upon the mind, huh? Although the student might not always know this. This one guy was, you know, talking about his first teaching in college, you know, and looking down at the students and this expression seems to be, why are you doing this to me? Because if you're acting upon them, you know, in a way that's painful to them, right? And perhaps it isn't in the end of the beginning, you know? You know the famous remark of Samuel Johnson, as he was in the 18th century, right? And as the century went on, they didn't beat the boys so much, right? So he says, but they're not learning as much either. So he says, but they gain a one in, they lose at the other end. So, love and joy and pleasure, according as they signify acts of the sense desire, are passions, emotions, feelings, right? Something bodily. Not over, according as they signify acts of the intellectual desire. And thus they are posited in God. Whence the philosopher says, and that's the way he often refers to Aristotle, by Antonio Messia, right? He's the philosopher. Whence the philosopher says, in the 7th book of the Nicomachean Ethics, that God rejoices by one simple operation. Enter into your, what? Toward your master. And the same, and for the same reason, he loves without, what? Feeling. It's kind of funny, because the great C.S. Lewis there, right? He's trying to describe the love of the angels, right? And if you say that the angel, love, he has no feeling of his love. It seems kind of, you know, weak to us, right? Because of our way of knowing. But C.S. Lewis trying to overcome that, says that the love of the angels is ferocious. You have no idea how strong he is, right? That's kind of interesting, because in the angels, there's not this dichotomy of the sense desire and influences are, which in us are often some kind of conflict, right? And so the angel goes, the whole angel goes, right? You have no idea of how much he goes, right? And he either goes towards the good, and that's it, or he goes towards the badness, and so on. But we are kind of pulled back and forth. The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak, you know? There's this conflict in us. So it's not that the love of the angels is without feeling, it's because I'm weak. It's much more ferocious and strong than anything we've got, you know? I mean, our love ideas were... Where's the title there, right? That's what John Paul II said in his cataclysmical lectures on the angels back in the years ago. The angel loves the full force of his being. And therefore they see that the angels' position in the order of grace is proportional to their position in the order of nature, right? Because they go with the whole thing to that scene. While we, it's different because we can fight against our body more or less, right? And therefore, by efforts, we can, you know, Washington can be above the bishop or somebody, you know? Because she's overcoming more. Okay. Now the second objection here. I'm just going to go into it a little bit more, like what I can assume of the Contagentians. To the second it should be said that in the passions or emotions or feelings of the sense-desire, you can consider something, as it were, material, right? To wit, the bodily transformation or change. And something, as it were, formal, which is on the side of the desire. Just as in anger, this is a common example, as is said in the first book about the soul, what is material is the, what? The kindling of the blood around the heart, right? Or something in the side. Okay. But the formal thing is the desire for what? Revenge, right? But again, on the side of what is formal. In some of these is designated some imperfection. As in desire, right? Which is of a good not had, right? And in sadness, which is of a bad thing had, right? And therefore, there's the same reason about anger, which presupposes what? Sadness, huh? But some, in their formal aspect now, right, designate no imperfection as love and what? Joy. Because love is just about the good. It doesn't involve imperfection to be inclined to the good. And joy is about the good had, right? And since, therefore, none of these belong to God according to what is material in them. That's the first thing that Thomas points out in the Summa Cajitilis. But also those things which imply imperfection in their formal aspect cannot belong to God except metaphorically on account of a likeness of the effect that has been said above. But the things that do not imply imperfection are said of God properly and those are just two of those eleven. Amor and love and Gaudium, right? I mentioned in the Summa Cajitilis it's a little more developed, right? Because you have a chapter on the joy of God, right? And then you'll reason from that among other arguments to there being love. But nevertheless, this love and joy in God are without, what, passion, without any bodily change. So it's bad, which is about the persecution. Yeah, love and joy, yeah. Okay, now this distinction he's going to make here, the third, is something he does when he talks about love in the Prima Secunda, in other words, the treatise on love. Kind of the fundamental treatise I know about love. Love is a power that unites and concretiva, kind of making things, you know, but God's simple and so on. He says, Third, it should be said that the act of love always tends to two things. To wit, in the good which someone wishes to another and in the one to whom one wishes good. For this is properly to love something to wish good for it. So, if I love you, I will or want good things for you, right? So, to some extent, both you and the good I wish for you are not just by love, right? And sometimes they call one the love of wishing well, the love of friendship, the one to whom you wish something good, and the love of wanting for the good that you wish for this person. That distinction made more explicitly in the Prima Secunda. Whence in that someone loves himself, he wishes good for him, right? And thus, that good one seeks to unite to oneself insofar as one is able to do so. And to that extent, love is said to be a, what? Uniting power kind of from us. But also in God, but without, what? Composition. Because that good that he wishes for himself is not other than himself, who is through his very, what? Substance or Essence or Nature, good, huh? You've heard the famous conversation between Christ and St. Thomas. Thomas is supposed to have taken in the Terziaparis of the Summa there where he's writing about the Incarnation, about Christ. And he asked God, is this, you know, for the crucifix? And the crucifix answered, you've written well, Thomas. And I went to the College of St. Thomas, so they had the statue of St. Thomas there kind of between the two main buildings and they had the Latin of, you know, vini scriptisti, tova. You've written well, Thomas, right? Okay. Oh, I want to finish that, yeah. And so, and Christ said, you've written well, Thomas. What will you take as your reward? Thomas says, nothing but you. You alone, you know? that's the good that God wills for himself, right? In this offer that someone loves another, he wishes good to that person. And thus he uses the other one as if he were himself, referring the good to him as to himself. And for so much, love is said to be a, what, concrete power, because it, what, it gathers to itself, right? Having itself to the other as to itself. So the second commandment of love is said to love our neighbor as ourselves, right? And thus also the divine love is a vis concretiva without composition, which is in God, right? In so far as he wills, what, good to other things. When I would teach that, those two kinds of love, what they call amor contibusentia and amor amicitia, I'd say now, for the candy, you have only the love of wanting. Because candy is not the one to whom you wish good. Yourself is the one you wish good to. And candy is the good you want for yourself, or the wine, right? But you're going to consume the candy, you're going to consume the wine. So it's not the good of the wine, it's your good. Okay? For yourself, you have only the love of what? Wishing well. Now for another human being, you can have what? Either one, yeah. That's the trick, right? See? In the second commandment of love, you're said to what? Love your neighbor not as you love wine or candy, because then you be loving them as only as something good for you, right? But you should love them as you love yourself. Let's say, you should wish good to them just as you wish good to yourself. And that's kind of the key thing, right? And so I used to always, you know, appeal to the gentleman in class, I said, now, when you go to the mixture, what kind love do you have for the girl out there? She's beautiful, she'd be good for me, right? Delightful, I have this. So you begin by having the love of wanting, you see, and that's not enough, right? To have the love of wanting, huh? But people enter into marriage having only the love of wanting maybe for another person, right? And if you don't have the love of wishing well to this other person, maybe your marriage will not last, you know? Remember our girl's student saying, you know, reflecting on these things, saying, you know, reflecting upon the stability of her parents' marriage, you know, she came from a couple that were stably married and so on. But she realized that they really did wish well to each other, you see? Why, if, for the man, if the woman is just the good that he wishes for himself, he's not really wishing well to her, right? Okay, we'll come back to those things that get to the previous opinion. So there is love in God then, right? I think we are never going to go on next time with Article 2 Whether God Loves What? All Things, huh? In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, bring from the lights of our minds, order to illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up to question 20, article 2, whether God loves all things, huh? To the second, one proceeds thus. It seems that God does not love all things. First, because according to Dionysius, in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names, love puts the one loving outside himself, and transfers him, in a way, into the thing he loves. But it's unsuitable to say that God is placed outside himself, transferred into other things. This is what one of the attributes, or one of the effects of love, he talks about in the treatise on love, ecstasy, being outside yourself. Therefore, it's unsuitable to say that God loves things other than himself, huh? Second objection. Moreover, the love of God is eternal. But the things which are other than God are not from eternity, except in God. Therefore, God does not love these things, except as they are in himself. But according as they are in him, they are not anything other than from him. Therefore, God does not love things other than himself. As you see in the second objection there, that seems like it's positive by some modern philosopher, right? Well, all you know is these motion pictures in your head, right? You don't know if there's anything outside there corresponding to these motion pictures going on in your head. Moreover, there's a two-fold love. Now, Thomas will talk about that distinction in the treatise on love, on the Prima Secundae. And one is called the amor concupiscentia, right? The love of wanting. And the amor amicitiae, the love of friendship. Which could also be called the love of what? Wishing well, right? And Thomas would begin that text by saying, by quoting the philosopher, saying that to love somebody is to want good things for that person, right? And so love has, in a way, two objects, right? The one you love, the one you wish well to, and then the good that you wish for that person. And so you're said to have the amor concupiscentiae for the good that you wish for yourself or for another person, right? But you have the love of friendship, or call it better, maybe even the love of wishing well, that you have for the one to whom you want this good to come, right? And when I would be teaching this, and I'd often say to students, for your candy or for your book or something, you have only the amor concupiscentiae, the love of wanting. For yourself, you seem to have just the love of wishing well. The ambiguity comes for another person, right? Is that other person the good you want for yourself? And that's as far as your, that's what your love really is for this other person. Then you have the love of wanting for that other person. But it's possible to have for another person the love of wishing well. And in the second commandment of love, where it says you should love your neighbor as yourself, it doesn't mean as much as yourself. It means in this, by the same kind of love that you have for yourself. That as you have for yourself, the love of wishing well, you should have that kind of love for your neighbor. And so now this subjection is recalling that distinction, and it's going to argue from it. But God does not love irrational creatures by the love of concupiscence, the love of wanting, because he has no need of such things. He has no need of something outside of himself. Nor does he love them by the love of friendship, which cannot be had to irrational things, as the philosopher says. So I don't really wish well to the wine, even though I don't want the wine to spoil. It's Thomas's favorite example, right? But I want the wine not to spoil so that I can enjoy it, right? So I'm wishing well not to the wine, but to me. And of course, when I consume the wine, it's not for the good of the wine to be consumed. But for my good, perhaps. I do it in moderation. So notice the way this army is saying, right? If God loves everything, then he's going to have to love irrational things, like the stones and the trees and so on, right? Because they're included in all things. And if he loves them, it's got to be by the love of wanting them, or by the love of wishing well. And he argues from the authority of Aristotle, you don't have the love of wishing well for these commandments or these irrational things. And he can't have the love of wanting for them because he has no need of them, right? Moreover, it is said in the fifth psalm, you hate all those who do evil, do iniquity. But nothing at the same time is had in hate and loved. Therefore, God does not love all things. Against all this is what is said in the book of wisdom, the 11th chapter. You love all the things which are, and you hate none of those things which you have, what? Hate, huh? So Thomas replies in the body of the article, I answer it should be said, that God loves all things existing, huh? For all things existing, insofar as they are, are good. God, for the being or existence of each thing is a good. And likewise, each, what? Perfection of the thing. Of course, sometimes we show that to be is good because the good is what all want. I'm going back to the original definition of the good. Everything tries to preserve its existence so far as it can, huh? You could also argue from God being I am who am, and God being goodness itself, huh? But other things, insofar as they are like God, are good. And therefore, insofar as they are, they are what? Good. And of course, when you study the bad, the same now as the opposites, you find out that the bad is, what? A kind of non-being, huh? It's a non-being of something you're able to have and should have, but don't have, huh? So strictly speaking, non-being in the sense of a lack, huh? But it does, and kind of exaggerates that. It says that sin is nothing, and a man who sinned becomes nothing. Now, it has been shown above that the will of God is the cause of all things, huh? And therefore, it is necessary that insofar as something has some existence or some good, or to that extent, something has some being or some good, right? As it is, what? Insofar as it is willed by God. To each thing existing, therefore, God wishes some good, at least existence. Whence sense to love is nothing other than to wish good to someone. There's the double object I was talking about, huh? And he quotes Aristotle there to that effect, huh? To amare is very bonum alligui. Okay? It is manifest that God loves all the things which are. Sense? Now, he's going to make a very important distinction, right? Not, however, in that way as we. Because our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but it is moved by the goodness of things. Our love is moved by the goodness of things as by an object, right? In which the good that we wish to someone is not the cause of their goodness, but reverse, their goodness, either their true goodness or what we think is their goodness, right? Provokes the love by which we, what? Wish. Wish. Wish. Wish. Wish. Wish. Yeah, and to be added, the goodness is not that. And for this sake we are, right? But the love of God is pouring in and creating the goodness in things, huh? Now if you ever go through the tutus and the love of God, I don't know if you ever did that, did we? Where did we? You may recall in the Prima Secundae that it was divided into three questions, right? And each question had a number of articles, huh? And the first question was on the nature of love and the distinction of the kinds of love. And the second question was on the causes of love. And the third question was on the effects of love. Now in the part of the causes of love, the first article was whether good is a cause of love. And the answer was yes, right? But he's thinking now of the love of man, maybe of the creature, right? And then in Iran he pointed out how likeness is a cause of love and so on, huh? And knowledge is a cause of love and so on. But God's love of creatures, the good is not the cause of his love of creatures, but rather his love of creatures is the cause of the goodness of creatures. So it's in a sense just the reverse of that, right? Now you may recall long ago when he had the dialectic about the good. And we imitated, what, Socrates there. And we had Socrates asking the little boy, young boy, what is good, huh? And we had the young boy answering like the usual characters in Plato's dialogues by giving not a definition of good, but by giving what? Examples of good things, right? Candy is good, pizza is good, baseball is good, right? Vacation is good, et cetera, et cetera. And then Socrates pointing out like he does in the dialogues that this is not to define what the good is. You're giving me examples of good things, huh? And so Socrates would point out to the boy as he does to Mino or points out to Euthyphro in the dialogues and Theotelus and other people. You're not giving me a definition of good. You're giving me examples of this, right? Okay? So instead of telling me that a man is a two-footed animal that has reason, I'd say, well, here's a man, here's a man, here's a man, here's a man. Okay? And he's actually has a little child, but it's a circle. He wouldn't give you a definition of circle. He'd point to whatever is circular in the room, right? And so, but there's a way from examples of a thing to the definition, and that is to compare the examples, separate out what they have in common, and leave aside their differences. Now, if the little boy had to try to see what all these things, like vacation and candy, you know, you can't eat them all, bicycles, baseball, what they all have in common, whereby he calls them all good, right? He'd probably come up with something like, what Aristotle says is the first definition of the good. Well, these are the things I want, huh? So he comes up with the first definition of good, the good is what all want. And this is the way Aristotle begins the famous work, the Nicomachean Ethics, and he gives a kind of induction, and then he says, then they say good or well, but the good is what all want. And then what do we do next, right? Well, then we imitated Socrates in the great dialogue there, the Euthyphro, to ask a question of before and after in the sense of cause and effect. And you say, well, is it good because we want it, or do we want it because it is good? Socrates in the Euthyphro asks about the definition of the pious. The pious is what pleases the gods, or the pious is what the gods approve of. And Socrates says, well, that may be true, but is it pious because the gods approve it, or because it pleases the gods, or is it the reverse, that it pleases the gods because, yeah. So Socrates has shown us how to ask a very basic kind of question. And I've often mentioned, you know, how in, I think it's in De Vero Regione, where Augustine quotes the common definition of the beautiful. The beautiful is that which pleases when seen, and being a Platonist to some extent, Plato, a follower of Plato, Socrates asks the Platonic or the Socratic question, is it beautiful because it pleases my eyes, or does it please my eyes because it is beautiful? And having a good mind, Augustine says, I have no doubt that it pleases my eyes because it is beautiful. So in a way, you're defining the beautiful by its effect upon our eyes, which is not to know intrinsically what the beautiful is, but it's a place where we naturally start because the effect is more known. Well, same question here about the good. The good is what is wanted, but is that the cause that makes it good, right? Well, if it were, then we'd be like God, right? You see? Am I good because God loves me, or does God love me because I'm good? You see? Well, if God loved me because I'm good, I'd be the cause of God's love, and since God is love, I'd be the cause of God. Wow! You see? That's presumptuous, obviously, by far. But likewise, it's presumptuous to say that something is good because I want it, because then, in a sense, you're saying, I'm like God, right? My will, willing something, makes it good. See? When actually it's reverse, huh? You know? And the good is arousing my desire for it. So there's an enormous difference between my loving God, let's say, and God loving me, right? There's a lot of differences, obviously. But, I mean, a very basic difference is that God's goodness is a cause of my loving him, right? As I think St. Bernard of Clairvaux there says, you know, the reason for loving God is God. I think it's well said, right? Okay? But I'm not the reason for God loving me. But God's loving me is the reason why I am and why there's any good, if there is any good in me, right? He's a cause of it, right? So this is what Thomas points out in this text is the second paragraph, right? And that's a very important, what, before and after, you know? The great Shakespeare, you know, said that reason is the ability for a large discourse looking before and after. And the counting sense of before and after is the cause before the effect. So you have to see that in us, basically, I love something because it's good. But in the case of God's loving something in the creatures, it's just the reverse. It's good because he loves. That's the amazing thing, right? And you have to see the before and after and the distinction in those two. Never forget that, huh? Okay, now the first objection was taken from one of the effects of love, which Dionysius talks about, and it's one of the articles in the third question on love, in the treatise on love, that one of the effects of love is ecstasy, right? Being outside yourself. But you can kind of maybe understand that in too material a way or too sensitive a way. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the one loving thus comes to be outside himself, translated or carried over into the one loved, insofar as he wishes good to the one loved and acts through his providence as he does for himself, right? So in a sense, you know, like in the Second Commandment of love, to love your neighbor as yourself means to wish well to him just like you wish well to yourself. So you're wishing good to him as if he were yourself, so you seem to have gone out into him, right? And you're now acting for his good as if you're acting for your own good. And so Aristotle often quotes the Greek proverb there, or states it, a friend is a... Another self. Who were we at from that old Greek study? Hophilos esten allus autos. A friend is another what? Self. And I've seen Shakespeare call a friend sometimes a second self. So it doesn't mean that God is actually right outside of himself, right? But in this way of speaking. Whence Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the divine names, went out to dare and to say this for the truth. That what? He, the cause of all things, through the abundance of his loving goodness, comes to be outside of himself, right? Providing for all existing things. Usually he talks about the sweetness of God in terms of being a metaphor, right? Now I think I mentioned before that the best explanation I've seen of the metaphor sweet is in the coming to end of the Psalms, really explaining how sweet is the Lord and so on. But what he says there about sweet could be applied to the, you know, the romantic use of sweet and, or even Shakespeare's thing where he speaks of your sweet form, a metaphorical way of saying your beautiful form. But he sees three things in the sweet, right? And the most obvious thing, of course, is the sweet is pleasant. And then the second that the sweet is, what, restful, it quiets you down, right? And then the sweet is, what, refreshing, okay? And I've noticed that when people speak about the beautiful, right? Obviously the beautiful is that which pleases them in scenes, so it's pleasing. But I hear people say about something, when they see a beautiful scene, oh, how restful it is here, you know? You look out over the beautiful scene, you know, and they say, how restful, huh? So the beautiful is restful. And then we have the expression about a girl, she's a sight for sore eyes. And, therefore, it's refreshing, the beautiful is refreshing, huh? And so those three things enable you to give the metaphor sweet to the beautiful. So Shakespeare speaks of your, instead of your beautiful form, which you'd be speaking properly, he says your sweet form, right? Okay? When you say sweetheart or something like that, well, it's pleasant to be loved, huh? By this heart, but it's also, what, restful, right? Okay? We can rest in the hearts of those who love us, by those who hate us, you know? You kind of have a feeling of, you know, a restless feeling when you realize someone doesn't really like you at all, you know? And it's something refreshing, right, huh? You know, to be loved by somebody, right? Okay? So you have those three elements in the mind. So sweet is a beautiful metaphor. But you shouldn't take this being outside yourself in a simple, spatial sense, right? But insofar as I act for you as if you were myself, I seem to be in you, right? Now, the second objection is the one from the modern philosophers. To the second, it should be said that although creatures from eternity were not except in God, nevertheless, to this, that they were in God from eternity, they were known eternally by God in their own, what, natures, huh? And for the same reason, he, what, loved them in their own natures. Just as us, through the likeness of things which are in us, know things existing in themselves. So I don't just know my image of you, right? But through the likeness of you in me, I know you out there. Unless you're a modern philosopher and you're... Yeah. We don't know things, we only know him and his. Yeah, yeah, that's the modern position. And he justifies it by references and comments and mixes up the words. I didn't know he was that bad off. Yeah, I put some of the moderns, yeah. See, especially in Berkeley on the polar form. Now, the third one is talking about the two kinds of love. And does God have one of these kinds of love for the, what, rational things? To the third, it should be said that friendship is not able to be had except to rational creatures, in which there can be love in return and community in the doings of life, right? And to whom there happens something well or bad, according to fortune and happiness. Just as to them properly, there is, what, benevolentia, wishing well. If you look at St. Francis de Sales, too, there's some love there, right? You'll see him talking about benevolentia, right? There's an integral part there of love. Now, irrational creatures cannot arrive at loving God, right? So it can't be ridavatio. It can't be love in return, right? Nor can they arrive at a community of, what, of understanding and of the blessed life by which God lives. Thus, therefore, God, properly speaking, does not love irrational creatures by the love of friendship, but by the love, as it were, of, what, wanting, huh? Now, in what sense does he have that? In so far as he orders them to rational creatures, right? And also to himself, not as if he needs them, but an account of their goodness and our, what, usefulness, huh? For we want something both for ourselves and for others, right? So God doesn't have the love of wanting irrational creatures in the sense that he needs them, right? But he wants them to be had by us, right? And maybe he wants them for the, what, affectionate universe and so on, huh? But not because he needs them, right? Like, I need the food. No, I'm wanting the food or wine. I think I need them anyway. Now, the fourth objection was saying, well, God hates those who do evil, right? So, to the fourth, it should be said that nothing prevents one and the same thing by something to be loved and by something to be had in, what, hate, huh? For God loves sinners insofar as they are certain what nature is, huh? For thus they also are and are from them. But insofar as they are sinners, they are not. And they fall short from being, huh? And this is in them, but not from God, right? And according to this, they are said to be had by him in, what, hate, right? Okay. Now, we don't, we don't go into talking about hate, but if you speak of God as hating, is that said properly or metaphorically? Well, he loves something else more, right? And something maybe that requires him to punish somebody, something like that, sorry. Okay, let's go on now to the third article, whether God equally loves all things, huh? And here again, the necessity of a distinction. Friend in need is a friend in need. For he said in the book of wisdom, the sixth chapter, equally is there care for him about all things, huh? Which seems to imply some kind of equality of love, right? But the providence of God, for he cares for things, which he has about things, proceeds from the love by which he loves things. Therefore, he loves all things, what, equally. As you know, Thomas will have a distinction in there, huh? We'll see that when we get there. Because in one way, he's going to deny, in the other way, he's going to affirm, right? We'll see what that distinction is when we get there. So there's a part of truth in what is being said in this first objection. Moreover, the love of God is his essence, huh? Was it St. John, isn't that one of the main texts? God is love, right? Okay. But the essence or nature or substance of God does not receive more and less. Is there more God today or less God today? Therefore, neither does his what? Love. Therefore, he does not love some things more than others, right? Now, the third objection. Moreover, as a love of God extends itself to created things, so does the knowledge of God and the will of God. But God is not said to know some things more than others, nor to will some things more than he wills other things. Therefore, neither does he love some things more than what? Others, right? That's kind of interesting objection there. But against this is what Augustine says. It's homilies on John. God loves all the things which he has made, right? And among them he loves more rational creatures. And among those, more those who are members of his only begotten. Those members of the mystical body, I suppose. And much more, he very what? Yeah. St. Alphonsus says he loves Mary more than all the rest of us put together. Okay, so. He loves some more than others. It's pretty clear for Augustine, right? Mm-hmm. That's a lot. Huh? Yeah. Now Thomas is going to... We all think... What? It's like a logic thing, though. Yeah. But he's going to make an important distinction about this. I answer it should be said. That sense to love is to will good to someone, right? For two reasons is possible that what? One is loved more or less. In one way, on the side of the act of the will itself, which is more or less, what? Intent. And thus, God does not more love some than others. Why? Because he loves all by one simple act of his will. And an act of the will that always has itself in the same way. So he can't love one more intensely than others than others. Because of them all by one and the same, what? Unchanging, simple act of the will. In that sense, he can't love one more than another. Another way, on the side of the good that he wills to someone, what? Loved. Or to the loved. And thus we are said to love more the one to whom we will a greater good. Even though not by a more, what? Intense willing. And in this way, it's necessary to say that God loves some things more than others. For since the love of God is the cause of the goodness of things, one would not be better than another if God did not will to it a greater good than to the other, right? So does God love Thomas Aquinas more than us? Well, he willed to him a greater mind than he willed to us, huh? In that sense, he loves Thomas more than us, right? But he's not more intensely willed a greater mind than he willed to Thomas, than the little mind he willed to us. I'm just saying. So God loves us after or before? What? In different... Well, no, God's love is eternal, so, you know, he loved us before we were. And how about after? How he loves us? How he's loved us? One? Yes. To the same. Yeah. One hand. Yeah. But... But he can will many goods to us. But he may will a greater good to you than the good ones to me. So in that sense, it comes to you because of your will. No, because you really don't. No, no, no. So notice, I can will, to say, my children, a lesser good than to someone else, right? But will it more intensely, right? Okay? But God used to have one way that he can be said to love this more than that, because it's a greater good that's willing to this than to that. Okay? So, interesting distinction, right? As a professor, when I was giving grades, right, sometimes you're like one student a lot, but his exam doesn't justify getting an A. So, but the more intensity of love I'd give him a B than this other son of a gun. It's annoying to be all semester. But I give them an A because they deserve an A, right? Yeah. Yeah. Okay? So do I love more than the student that gave the A than the one to B? What if I tell you the intensity of love? No. The more intensity of love I gave the B to this person than the A to that person. But I gave a better grade to one than the other. Well, that distinction, right? That'd be, you might say, be a question of justice, right? I'm not going to put my grandchildren in charge in Iraq or something like that. Because then, that's, keep up with that. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that God is said to have equally care about all things. Not because he dispenses equal goods to all in his care, right? But because from an equal wisdom and goodness he administers, what? All things, huh? Now, the second objection is very important for the distinction we saw in the body of the article, right? The second article, the second objection was saying that the love of God is his essence, and the essence of God does not receive more or less, right? He says, to the second, it should be said that that reason, or that argument, proceeds from the intensity of love on the side of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills to the creature is not the divine essence, huh? Whence nothing prevents it from being more or less, or being intense or more. We must say, okay? Okay. So in the Bible article, he said we can distinguish in love of these two creatures, right? Of the intensity of the love, right? And the good, the greatness of the good being will, right? In God, the intensity is always the same. It's the divine substance, which is never more nor less, right? So God doesn't love the greatest saint more intensely than he loves the least saint, right? But he wishes a greater good to the greater saint than to the lesser saint, huh? In that sense, ultimately. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, God is said to love the greater saint in the sense that he wills to them a greater good. Not that he wills that greater good more intensely. He wills the lesser good just as intensely as a greater good, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. You see, when we as a young man, our love goes in the act. Mm-hmm. Like, my mom, she loves me because I do good things sometimes for that. If I do bad things, she fits me. She fits me in the act. Sometimes she said, she loves me more than my brother. Sometimes she said, oh, my younger brother is better than me. So, you know, like, we humans, we love and we act like we're not like God. Our love is caused by the things we want, but God, no, no, no, yeah. God loves me. One example I know as a parent, you know, you very quickly sympathize with someone whose child has been hurt, right? And how this could happen to your child and so on, right? Mm-hmm. And so, you will good to the other person's child just as you will good to your own child. You get, you're going to be much more effective if this accident happens to your child than to them because you will the same thing much more intensely for your own child, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, I don't want the neighbor's kid to get hit by the car. I want him to avoid being hit by a car just as I will that my child avoid being hit by a car. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Than my neighbors, right, huh? Mm-hmm. And so, I'm more saddened by my child although I'm saddened by my neighbors, too, you know? Mm-hmm. But in God, there's no more intensity that way, right? Yeah, there's no strength. There's no... Yeah. Because his love is a substance and his substance is never more nor less. Okay? So, I suppose one reason why you won't be envious in heaven, huh? Because God loves you just as intense as he loves the apostles, right? But he did will to them a greater good. That's right. Yeah, it's kind of interesting to say that is. Now, the fighting third objection says we don't speak of God willing more or knowing more, right? One thing or another. Why, then, do we say love? And Thomas points out, To the third it should be said that to understand and to will signify only, what? Acts. Not, however, in their meaning is included some objects from the diversity of whom one could say that God more, what? Knows or wills. As it is about love, right? If you say love, following Aristotle, is to what? Will good to someone, right? Okay, so, what am I willing to so-and-so? And that can be greater or lesser, but I'm willing to somebody, right? Well, willing doesn't bring out the aspect of the object so much, right? I mean, it's kind of interesting objection and reply. It's a little hard to see right away, but there's a kind of interesting difference there between willing, which is more abstract, right?