Prima Pars
Lecture 94: Divine Providence and God's Foresight

Transcript
================================================================================

Who, Ignatius now? Isidore. Isidore, that's Isidore, okay. Okay, okay, Isidore, okay. You guys mixed up. Isidore's coming back? Eventually, yeah. Okay, let's begin here, question 22, on the providence of God, right? Now, let's stop in that word from a providence of God. What's the English word corresponding to providence? Forsythe, right? Forsythe, yeah. And if you look sometime at the secunda secunda, where Thomas takes up prudencia, as it's called in Latin, and there's a question on the integral parts of prudence, right? And one of the integral parts of prudence is providence. And the objection, when the objection is the same, it is an integral part of prudence, is the word providence and the word prudence are really the same word. And if you study etymologically the word prudence, it's really a contraction of it. So how can, it's the same word really, how can one name the integral part among eight integral parts of prudence, huh? It's like saying, foresight is the integral part of foresight. The proper English word to name this virtue is foresight, right? But Thomas replies that it's named from its chief or principle, what? Part, right? Okay? Now, I noticed one time in reading Churchill a lot, you know how Churchill would tend to use the word foresight, right? And in a sense, to a man who has political foresight like Churchill did, to kind of foresee what's going to happen, right? Can foresee the consequences of different courses of action, right? Or a man who has military foresight, like MacArthur or somebody, can foresee the results of the Incham landing and so on, right? He's the man that's prudent, right? The man that has a virtue. So it's kind of interesting the word foresight, huh? And of course, it also fits in very well with what the great Shakespeare says, right? That reason is the ability to look before and after, right? Because foresight is taken from the word before, right? And so the article, I suppose, or the question could be entitled on the foresight of God. You wanted to use an English word to correspond to it, right? Although we often use the word providence. Now, I'm kind of dumbfounded here by Thomas' premium here. Having considered those things which pertain absolutely to the will of God, like the love of God and the mercy and the justice of God, we're not to proceed to those things which regard together the understanding and the will, right? Now, he refers you back to, all the way back to, what? Question 19, when he was first coming into his party, right? Let's just look for a moment back at the premium at the beginning of question 19. After the consideration of those things which pertain to the divine knowledge, right? Jesus finished in the 18th question there. We're not to consider about those things which belong or pertain to the divine will. And then he divides this consideration into three parts. So that there first is a consideration of the will of God, right? Secondly, of those things which pertain absolutely to the will of God, right? And that was things like love and mercy and justice. And then that those things which, what? Pertain to the understanding in order to the, what? Will. And that's question 22 is the beginning of that, right? So this is the third of three parts, right? Okay. So he calls that in a sense, huh? In the beginning of the premium here to question 22. Having considered about those things which pertain absolutely to the will, but not to proceed to those things that regard together the understanding and the will. And of this sort is foresight with respect to all things, huh? Predestination and reprobation, huh? And the things which follow upon them with respect to men in special, right? In particular. In order to their eternal, what? Salvation, right? Okay. Now, the next thing is kind of striking here because now and after the moral virtues like justice, right? In moral science, one considers about, what? Prudence, right? To which providence would seem to retain, right? Now, in the Nicomachean Ethics, you see, for it back to right, Nicomachean Ethics, in the third book, the second half of the third book, you begin to talk about the moral virtues, right? Justice, or courage, and temperance, or moderation. And then in book four, the rest of the moral virtues that pertain to the passions, and exterior goods, and evils, and so on. And then in book five, you talk about justice, right? So, three, at least the second half of it, and four and five are all about the moral virtues. And then comes book six, where you talk about foresight, or prudence, okay? And so, he's comparing his order here to that, right? Now, in the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas gives two reasons why the moral virtues are considered before the virtues of reason. And one is that they're more known to us. And the other is that by the moral virtues, we're disposed for the virtues of reason, especially for foresight. Your passions are all wacky, you don't have that much foresight in your life, right? Okay. I say, what strikes me here, this Isidore, this Isidore, you're late for class, Isidore. I want to say, am I learning your name? Okay. But now, I think I mentioned before that in the Secunda Secundae, Thomas takes up the virtues in particular. He takes up faith, hope, and charity first. And then he takes up foresight, or prudence, and then justice, and then courage, and then temperance last, right? And in a way, it's reverse order of the ethics, huh? Because in the ethics, courage and temperance are taken up first in Book 3, then justice in Book 5, and then prudence or foresight in Book 6. Now, if you ask me, what is the reason for the order in the Secundae Secundae, right? I would say, well, you're not in philosophy anymore. You're in theology, right? And theology is about God. So what is closer to God, huh? He's taken up before in theology, right? Because God is what you first talk about in theology. And other things are talked about when in reference to God. So he talks about faith, hope, and charity first, because these are the theological virtues. They have God as their object, right? So obviously, they're closer to God than prudence, justice, courage, fortitude, temperance, right? Okay? But now, prudence and justice are closer to God than fortitude and temperance. Because fortitude and temperance are moral virtues that are about emotions, and God doesn't have emotions. Why justice is in the will, and God is a will. And our prudence is in the reason, and God has mind and reason, right? But just as we took up the mind of God, the knowledge of God, before his will, it makes sense to take up prudence before justice, right? But the order is just the reverse of the ethics, yeah. But now, in this transition, at least from what we just talked about, which was to some extent moral virtues, right, in the will, like justice, now he's taking up what seems... See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. to be like, let's take it up in the sixth book of Nicolaiic Ethics, right? So, reference to God. And he's kind of comparing it to that, right? And thus, after the moral virtues, for in moral science, right? After the moral virtues is considered about prudence, to which providence seems to what? Damn, yeah. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, providence comes up in the third volume, right? The third volume is about, it's three parts. In the first part, he shows, like chapters 1 through 63 almost, he shows that God is the end of all things. And then he takes up the providence of God, whereby he directs things to this end, right? In general. And then the third part is providence over, what, rational creatures, like us in particular, right? Maybe a little different here, right? Here, providence is part of the consideration of God and his operation, right? Which is done more in the first book of the Summa Concentiles. Okay. Now he gives the division of it. About the providence of God, four things are asked. First, whether to God belongs, what, for Satan? The question, unasked, is it so? Or does it exist? It comes first, right? So we ask before whether God exists, before we ask what God is, right? So we ask whether providence belongs to God before we go. Now the second question, now the second one is, the second, third, and fourth are, could be divided against the first, right? And the second one is, whether all things come under the divine providence, huh? So it's my stubbing my toe to fall under divine providence, huh? Losing hair when I comb my hair in the morning, huh? Now, the third article, whether divine providence is immediately about all things, huh? Well, something, people just thought that kind of God, in a general way, he extends to all things, but he leaves details to everybody, right? And the same way that the president can't attend to all the details on it, but he kind of sets the whole picture a bit, right? Yeah. And so in some extent, the president's in charge of the whole executive branch, right? But he doesn't intend immediately to everything. But does God intend immediately to our conversation right here? Everything we're doing today? The leaves falling off the tree? Because he's saying in the gospel that a bird doesn't fall to the ground? Losing the hair to the head. Yeah, yeah. And that's really getting down to the details, right? Okay. Now you can see how the third one follows after the second one, right? Okay. But now the fourth one. Whether divine providence places necessity upon things that he's providing for. Well, if you answer that God's providence extends to all things and even down to all the details, right? Isn't he imposing necessity upon all things, huh? Well, no, he's not. It's a little hard to understand, huh? So let's look at the first article, right? To the first one, who sees thus? It seems that providence does not belong to God. For providence, according to Tully, and that's Cicero, right? Sometimes it's come up in reading the Gospels there, you know. Who is Nathaniel? See, is he Bartholomew or not? Yeah, I thought Thomas had said somewhere else that he was. But anyway, I was reading the commentary on John and Nathaniel in the beginning of the Gospel, he appears, and Thomas seems to see that Nathaniel is not one of the Apostles, right? And then the question is, why doesn't he choose Nathaniel as an Apostle? Well, he's too learned a man. And Christ doesn't want to have the success of the Church be attributed to the power or the intelligence, the wisdom, the learning of the men that he has. So he's going to choose fishermen rather than learn Nathaniel. But then I noticed in the last chapter of John, Nathaniel is one of those that are present in the last account there, you know, when they draw the fish out. So I don't know. I don't know. But notice here, it was customary sometimes to give a different name to somebody, right? So here Thomas refers to him, Tullium, like what's common to do, right? But it's another name for what? Cicero, right? My text gives it his word, his book de invencione, right? For providence, according to Tullium, is a part of prudence. Prudence, however, since it is bene conciliativa, takes good counsel, according to the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics, is not able to belong to God, who has no doubt, right? Once you have to take counsel. Therefore, providence does not belong to God. So Aristotle, in the sixth book, he says that there's really about like three parts at least of prudence, right? And one is taking counsel, right? Deliberation. And then judgment. And then finally clang, right? When you go and do it, huh? My brother Mark, that's a joke, you know, about he and two of his friends here in Quebec, huh? And one guy was very imaginative and could think of all kinds of things to do. But he had no judgment as to which of these things could be done, right? My brother Mark was not imaginative, couldn't think of all kinds of things to do, but he had judgment as to which of these possibly should be done, right? But being philosophers, they're both a bit lethargic to get going. The other guy would then get them going, you know, and get the canoe or whatever it was for the thing. So they divide among themselves the three parts of prudence, right? Well, now his first objection is saying this part taking counsel, you know. You know, it's like someone says, you know, well, what can we do? Well, you could do this or you could do this or you could do this. You know, and then that's the first part, right? And the second part is, well, it's better to do this than to do this or this, right? For this and this reason. Not a story, you know? Okay? And I guess Churchill had most of all the third part there, right? He really got people going in a kind of annoying way sometimes, but he would do that. So the first part of prudence doesn't belong obviously to God because he doesn't have to deliberate about what should be done, right? Okay? So the president called all kinds of people in to say, what do you do now about Iraq, you know? And finally he made a judgment, right? And then they come in. Moreover, whatever is in God is eternal. Second objection. But providence is not something eternal, for it's about existing things which are not eternal, according to Damascene. Therefore, that's the philio orthodoxa. Therefore, providence is not in God. Moreover, nothing composed is in God. Because God is all together simple, right? But providence or foresight seems to be something imposed. Because it includes in itself will and what? Therefore, foresight is not in God. Against this is what is said in the book of Wisdom, chapter 15. You, however, Father, govern all things by what? Foresight, providence. I guess the book of Wisdom is what? In Greek, isn't it? We don't have, that's the text, right? Yeah. So if you don't know what Greek, you'll look up chapter 15, verse 3. Answer. It should be said that it is necessary to place providence or foresight in God. For every good that is in things is created by what? God as has been shown above. But in things there is found good, not only as regards the substance of things, but also in things as regards the order of them to an end, and especially to the last end, which is the divine goodness. I think I mentioned before how this comes up, probably in the Summa Contra Gentiles, my favorite book, right? It comes up in the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? As I said a little bit earlier, the first part of the third book shows that God is the last end of all things. And then the second part shows that God has providence over all things, directing them in some way to this last end, which is himself, right? And this is in harmony with that. But notice the distinction he's making between the goodness that pertains to the substance of things and then that regards their what? Order, which is more in what they do, right? So in the Summa Contra Gentiles, you should take up the substance of these things and the goodness of them and God's creating them, right? But providence will come in the third book, yeah? So he says, this good of order, existing in created things, is created by God. Sense over, God is the cause of things through his understanding. It's important to see now. And thus is necessary for the, to pre-exist in him, right? The reason of each one of his, what? Effects. As is clear above. And this is the way he reasons in the Summa Contra Gentiles, too. It is necessary that the reason of the order of things to the end pre-exist in the divine mind, but the reason of ordering things to the end is properly, what? Foresight, huh? Okay. So military foresight is, what? The way of achieving your end, right? Which is victory, right? No substitute for victory, right? That's what McCarthy said, anyway. In war, there's no substitute for victory. Well, God says, there's no substitute for the divine goodness. All things are to that, right? Now, notice he plays up with the word here. He says, the reason of what should be ordered to the end is properly providence. For it is the chief part of foresight, huh? To which are ordered the other two parts. And these are some of the integral parts. The memory of things in the past, right? And the understanding of present circumstances, right? In so far as from past things remembered and present things understood or seen, conjectamus, we guess, about providing future things, huh? Okay? So that's what Lincoln said, right? If we knew where we came from and where we are, we could see what we have to do now. Okay? But the ultimate thing is the future now, right? Now, it is proper to prudence or foresight, according to the philosopher. Who's he? I mentioned before how, I guess, some of the famous writers on Thomas' life, you know, they maintain that Urban IV brought together Thomas and Berbicki at Orvieto, you know, the Vatican was involved in the war with Frederick II and so on, the successors. So they were quite rather Orvieto and sometimes terrible and so on. But this time at Orvieto, I guess, and that he brought together Merbicki to do the translations from the Greek, the Archbishop of Corinth, I guess, to make these very accurate translations of Aristotle from the Greek and the Latin and Thomas to common on those things. And he said, well, it's not exactly what it was. But there was a meeting between the two, you know, and Thomas was suddenly encouraging Merbicki to do this, but he was already doing it. And Merbicki had translated a lot of other things, too. As if he was trying to get Aristotle's philosophy into circulation, even though it was still somewhat questionable because of the various and so on. So it's proper to prudence, according to the philosopher in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, to order other things, right, to an end, either with respect to oneself, right, as a man who's said to be prudent, who well orders his acts to the end of his life, right, or with respect to others subject to him, either in the family, right, or in the city, or in the, what, kingdom, right? Now, in the secunda secunde, Thomas will distinguish four species of foresight or prudence. And one is the foresight of the individual, right, whereby he can foresee what is good for him as an individual, right, and what he should do. And then secondly, the foresight of the father of the family. And then the foresight of the military commander. And then the foresight of the king. So he distinguishes four. And it's kind of impressive, right? Now, in practical philosophy, there's only three parts, right? Ethics, domestics, political philosophy. There isn't a part of philosophy corresponding to military foresight. But he puts that, you know, between the foresight of the father and the foresight of the king. So it's a very, you know, elevated thing, military foresight. If you have a man like, say, Douglas MacArthur, he had the military foresight. And some people regard MacArthur's work in Japan after the war as even a greater accomplishment than his, you know. When I was first teaching at St. Murray's College, we had a man who had been to MacArthur's administration. He was a very impressive man, you know. And that's the impressive MacArthur aspect. He really did a good job of putting Japan on his feet in some unreasonable way, right? They're one of our good friends now, in a sense. But here, you know, he doesn't mix in the military, does he, huh? But he does mention, make a distinction between the city and the king, right? But Aristotle, in the book on the poetic, I mean, on political philosophy, he stops with the polis, right? Doesn't talk about the kingdom. But Thomas is so common, right? And of course, the king of France, right, was very active in protecting the monks there, where the mendicant monks in Paris, right? You know, there were some arrows being shot into them and finally, it was the night that the saint had, you know, this round and going to guard it, right? And one of the crucial times. So Thomas is very much aware of the distinction between the king and the city. But Aristotle, in the political philosophy, he quite limits himself to the polis, which is an independent, right? City, right? And kind of an ultimate thing, you know? And for him, you know, Paris is just a kind of a conglomeration, you know? How can you say anything about that conglomeration, that mess, right? In the context of Thomas' writing there, it's natural for him to distinguish between the city and the kingdom. It's interesting how, you know, the Machiavelli, who's not so good for a lot of reasons, but very influential thinker, right? He's writing basically about the city as Aristotle was, not talking about the kingdom so much. So these are different species of foresight, right? At least that of the individual, with respect to himself, the father, the head of the city or the king. According to that way which is said in Matthew 24, 45, faithful servant and prudent, right? Whom the Lord has constituted over his family. In which way prudence or providence, this is almost a synonym, right? But as I mentioned, if you look at the question on the integral parts of prudence, right? Prudence, providencia is one of the eight principal parts, right? But kind of the chief part. That's why Thomas says that prudence is really named from that part. Um, Then he takes up the subject parts, which are the prudence of the individual, the father, and so on. In which way prudence or providence is able to belong to God, for in God there is nothing that is able to be ordered to an end, since he is the ultimate end, right? So what does he mean there? He's saying that the providence of God is not like the providence of an individual man, where I have to, what? If I direct my actions to the end of my life, right? God is the end of all things. God has to direct himself to his end, but he directs other things, right, to the end, which is his own, what, goodness, right? For in God himself, for in God there is nothing able to be ordered to an end, since he himself is the last end. So the ratio, the order of things to the end, then is named providence and God. Whence the great Boethius, in the fourth book of Consolation, Consolation of what? Philosophy, the last work of the great Boethius. That's a great work where you get the definition of eternity comes from that, and the definition of providence comes from that, and other things. It's a really magnificent book. So, there is, if you look up the, they probably have it in the end of R.I., but there's a commentary on it, right, which is not by Thomas, but it's kind of, you know, mixed up with his works, but it's pretty good, you know. I looked at it, and I know my brother Mark, that was pretty good. He uses it sometimes in his teaching. The providence is what? The divine reason constituted in the, what? The beginning of all things, right? Which disposes, or orders, huh? All things, huh? For the disposition, huh? It's able to be called both the reason of the order of things to the end, as well as the reason for the order of the parts and the whole, right? Sometimes Thomas would distinguish those two, right? That the order of the parts to each other is an account of the order of all of them to the end, right? So the order among the parts of the chair is an account of the order of the whole, to the sitting, right? And so the order of creatures among themselves is an account of the order of all of them to God, right? But the divine disposition, the ratio of the order, is both the order of all things to him, but the order of them to each other is an account of the order to him. Okay. But doesn't have any foresight for himself, huh? Doesn't mean anything, right? He's the last end, huh? But it's much more universal than the foresight of the king, right? It extends to all things. Now, going back to the first objection, which spoke about consul, right? And of course, in human foresight, consul is something you should take, right? Get a second opinion, they say, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that according to the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics, that's the book devoted to the virtues of reason, prudence or foresight properly is receptiva, kind of commanding, right? Of those things about which Eugulia rightly takes consul and cynicists rightly, what? Judges, right? To get a different name to those three parts, right? And so it's really that last culminating part that is most of all called prudence, right? Whence although to take consul does not belong to God, according as consul is investigation or inquiry about doubtful things, nevertheless, to command things that should be ordered to the end, of which there is right reason, it belongs to God, right? According to that of Psalm 148, he has laid down the precept and will not pass away. And according to this, there belongs to God the ratio of foresight and providence, huh? So when you carry these names over to God, you have to, what? Drop out whatever is of imperfection in them, right? So our foresight is a habit and a disposition, right? An accident and so on, you have to drop all those out, right? And you drop out and it pertains to the imperfection of these things, like taking of consul, right? But notice, as he points out there with Aristotle's words, it's that last part that most of all is called prudence, huh? And not the first part you bully on. That good consul, I guess. Synthesis. Judgment, right? Sensible man, right? Although, it can also be said that the, what, reason of things to be done is called consul in God, not on account of the investigation, but on account of the certitude of knowledge, right? To which, what, those taking consul arrive by their investigation, right? So, what did McCarthy do on the way to the Inshon Landing? No? He called up the second command and he went over the thing and that has to be it, huh? It's such a, right? It's a thing to do, right? Then he picked up his Bible and made his Bible. Okay. Now, why does Thomas bring this second distinction? Well, because of the text that comes up here from Ephesians, right? Whence it is said in Ephesians 1, who does all things by the counsel of his will, right? That's kind of a daring way of speaking, right? But, it's not the deliberation, but the certitude that comes from deliberation that is the, what, called counsel, right? And that's not just because of the text there in Ephesians. We had something like that when you talk about the shensi of God, right? Shensi is a Latin word that they translate episteme by, right? When you read the posture analytics, episteme is an effect of the demonstrative syllogism, right? And the demonstrative syllogism is defined by Aristotle as a syllogism making us know the cause, that of which it is the cause, that it cannot be otherwise, right? So it's a suritu gotten by reasoning, by a syllogism of a particular kind, right? When you carry the word science over to God, do you mean that he syllogizes and reasons? No. But he certainly knows what is the cause, and now which is the cause of God otherwise. Now if you look at that definition there, you can see you drop off the genus and keep the what? Difference, right? And if Father Bollet you know, drove anything into us, it's often in the carrying over of a name from creatures to God, you drop the genus and keep the what? Difference. Now as Aristotle points out, the genus in material things comes from what is material. the difference comes from what is formal and what is actual. So the difference is more able to be carried over to God whose pure act, divina substantia forma est, as the great Bwethius says, and the material part is dropped. Okay? So if you go back to then, you know, what's really the substance of our sciencia, what's the demonstration we have, right? Teaching these guys logic last night and doing one of the theorems in Euclid there, showing how it involves the different kinds of syllogisms, right? So you drop out that idea of the genus, right? What is our epistemi? Well, it's a syllogism making us know the cause and that of which it is a cause and not otherwise. I can't carry over syllogism to God if we understand syllogism doesn't have to syllogize. I drop off that genus and just keep the difference. But I don't carry over the dialectical syllogism to God. Because neither the syllogism nor the conclusion, you know, some probable conclusion that God has some probability there in his knowledge. Yes. Yeah. Yeah. Okay, now the second objection, whatever is in God is eternal, right? To the second, it should be said that to care, two things pertain. One is the reason of the order, which is called providence and disposition. And the other is the carrying out of that order, right? Which is called governing. Of which the first is eternal, and the second, what? Temporal. Interesting, the way he solves it here. Now to the third, there's nothing composed of God, right? It wasn't providence-involved composition anymore. Aristotle talks about choice, you know. Choice is thoughtful, willing, or, you know, it involves both. Providence is in the understanding, but it presupposes the will of the end. For no one commands about things to be done in account of the end, unless he wills the end. Whence prudence, or foresight, presupposes the moral virtues through which the desire has itself to the good, as is said in the Sixth Book of the Ethics. You see, we need to define moral virtue in ethics. It's defined as a habit, with choice, existing in the middle, towards us, as determined by right reason. That means foresight. So it presupposes, right? Something in the appetite, huh? So I want to eat and drink moderately. And what would be the moderate amount of meat that you can drink today, right? And then reason comes in and says, well, you've got to give a class so you don't want to get drunk before you go to class. But you've got to operate on somebody, right? So, on the other hand, if you're just getting together with your buddies, you're going to talk and talk, you might drink more, right? But reason has to consider the circumstances and what would be suitable at this time, right? How much should I eat? I'm going to sit around and go out and, yeah, yeah. So you might be a different amount, right? Okay, that's the one way of answering it, right? And nevertheless, if providence were exequality, equally, right, to regard the will and the divine understanding, this would be without detriment to the divine simplicity. Why? Because the will and the understanding of God are the same thing. Well, I guess I have to stop now. So, now we know God is foresight. Now we've got to see what's subject to his foresight, huh? Whether his foresight, you know, is like President Bush's, right? Read these details, huh? Now, I was reading, you know, about the German army, I guess, you know. One of their successes in the Second World War was that they gave a certain freedom to the subordinate officers, right, to act according to the circumstances that they were in, right? And that's because we can't foresee what the circumstances are going to be once the battle starts, right? Because they always keep on changing, right? Is that the way God is, you know? It's kind of, you know, plainly. He needs the creatures, you know, the details of his plan, carrying out his plan. But is he all the way down to them? It would be interesting to find out what it is. It would be interesting to find out what it is. It would be interesting to find out what it is. It would be interesting to find out what it is. It would be interesting to find out what it is. It would be interesting to find out what it is. It would be interesting to find out what it is.