Prima Pars
Lecture 99: Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Choice

Transcript
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You're up to the second article of the 23rd question. To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that predestination places something in the one predestined. For every action from itself infers some kind of being acted upon or passion or undergoing. If therefore predestination is an action in God, it is necessary that predestination be an undergoing in the one predestined. Moreover, Origen says, or in the text of Romans 1, who is predestined and so on, that predestination is the one who is not, but destination of the one who is. And Augustine says in the book on predestination of the saints. What is predestination except the destination of someone? And therefore predestination is not except the someone existing. And thus it places something in the one predestined. Moreover, preparation is something in the one prepared. Preparing dinner is something in the food, right? But predestination is the preparation of the benefits of God, as Augustine says in the book on the predestination of saints. I remember reading these books of Augustine when I was in high school. My cousin Donnelly had a couple of volumes of Augustine's works there. They really know this stuff is difficult stuff. Moreover, the temporal is not placed in the definition of eternal. But grace, which is something temporal, is placed in the definition of predestination. For predestination is said to be the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future. Therefore, predestination is not something eternal. And thus is necessary that it not be in God, but in the predestined. For whatever is in God is eternal. This is eternal. But against all this is what Augustine says. That predestination is the foreknowledge of the benefits of God. But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the one foreknowing. Therefore, neither is predestination in the predestined, but in the one predestined. So Thomas says, I answer. It should be said that predestination is not something in those predestined, but in the one predestinating. For it is said that predestination is a certain part of providence. But providence is not in the things foreseeing, but is a certain reason in the understanding of the one foreseeing, as has been said. So that's the syllogism, isn't it? But the execution, the carrying out of the providence, which is called governing, is passively, or being undergone, in the ones being governed. But actively, acting upon, it's in the one governing. Whence it is manifested, predestination is a certain reason of the order of things, to eternal salvation, that exists in the divine mind. I get your definition of predestination. But the carrying out of this order is passively, or undergone, in the ones predestined. But it's actively in God. For the carrying out of the predestination is the calling and the magnifying. That's what Mary said, my soul magnified is the Lord. According to that of the apostles, whom he predestined, these also he called. That's the governor, right? And whom he called, these he also magnified. And he's great. Now, this predestination, then, says the... The predestination has to do with the will of God, well, providence... Well, it's a reason of the order, right? So it's more in the divine mind, but it kind of presupposes the will, right? It's a will of the end. So then, okay, then... See, it compares it to what Aristotle says about foresight and the ethics, right? But presupposes the goodness of the will, right? But it's more in the understanding itself than the foresight. Okay, that's what I was wondering when it says in the mind, but then... Yeah. But then... The reason looks before and after. You see the connection between that and foresight. Okay, yeah, now help me with that connection, then, with foresight and then predestination, then. So... Well, predestination is a part of foresight. Yeah. See, foresight extends to... We said to all things, right? Okay. Predestination only to... To what's going to be eternal. Yeah, those ones... Okay, yeah. I see. So that's why he argues that it's kind of socialism, that if predestination is a part of foresight, and foresight is only in God, right, then predestination is only in God, right? Okay, but the governing or carrying out of this is actively in God, but passively in the creature. So, you know, if I kick you, I'm actively kicking you, and you're passively being kicked, right? Okay? So am I kicking you as something, not just in me? But my plan to kick you... It could just be in me, right? And on me nose to you, I plan to get a good kick at you. But when I actually kick you, though, then that's in you, passively, and actively in me. Yeah. By kicking you, in a way, you're being kicked. Okay, now the first objection, right, says that every action infers some passion, so on. Okay. The first effort should be said that actions going out into an exterior matter, transitive actions, infer from themselves some undergoing, you know, outside thing, as heeding a thing or cutting it, right? But not actions that remain in the, what, doer, as are to understand and to will, and also in us, like the sense, right? Okay, to imagine. And such an action is predestination, right? Why does he have an article or a question here on predestination, not on gubernazio, right? Yeah, well, in a sense, he's talking about God in himself here, right, in his part of the summa. Later on, he'll be talking about God's acting upon things. And such an action is predestination. It's one that remains within the, what, doer. Whence predestination does not place something in those predestined, but the carrying out of it, which goes out to exterior things, places in them some effect. The second objection is from the words of Augustine there, and Augustine also. What is predestination except the destination of something, right? To the second, it should be said. The destination is sometimes taken for the real, what, sending of something to some end. And thus, destination is not except of that which is. Another way, however, is taken destination for the sending, or the mission, which someone can seize mentally, right, or in his mind. According, as we are said, to destine what we propose firmly by our mind. And in the second way, it is said in the second, that Eleazarus destined not to admit illicit things on account of the love of life, right? And in the second way, it is said in the second way. And in the second way, it is said in the second way. And in the second way, it is said in the second way. And thus, destination is able to be of that which is not. Nevertheless, predestination, by reason of the antecesionis, the coming before, which it implies, is able to be of that which is not, whichever way destination be taken, a little problem, a destination. Okay, now the third article is taken from the use of the word preparatio, right? And again, Thomas distinguishes two meanings, huh? There's a two-fold preparation. One is that of the, what? Undergoer, that he might undergo. And this preparation is in the preparer, right? Another is of the agent, so he might act. And this is in the, what? Agent. And such a preparation is predestination. Insofar as some agent who is understanding is said to prepare himself to, what? Acting. Insofar as he preconceives the reason for the work he's going to do, huh? And this God, from eternity, prepares by predestinating, conceiving the reason of the order of some things to their, what? Salvation. Anybody's going to influence you for good or for bad in this world, right? And so it comes under God's plan for you. Now, the fourth objection is taken from the statement of this being a preparation of grace. To the fourth, it should be said that grace is not placed in the definition of predestination, as it were something existing in its very nature, but insofar as predestination implies a relation to grace as a, as a cause, as a relation to a, what? Effect. And an act to its object. Once it does not follow that predestination is something temporal, right? So I was reading there in St. Alphonsus there, you know, where he's talking about, quoting something to say, you know, it's better go to Mary than to go to Christ. Because her intercession is so powerful, right? Let me quote someone else and saying, you know, and she is displeased when you don't come to her. So I got a double reason to go to her, right? You know, why didn't you ask me, you know? Sometimes you see that in ordinary human beings, right? This idea that you, if you'd asked me, I would have done it for you, you know? And he's never asked me, so that's kind of interesting, you know? So God, you know, has, in his plan, that you're going to get grace through Mary or some other way, right? And, but that's because, what, I think grace is part of the definition of this, but it's an effect of the foresight, or it's an object of it, huh? Now we come to this difficult Article 3 here, where there's God... Reprobate, son. Some man. I don't think there's a better word to use than reprobate. Jecks. To third one proceeds thus. It seems that God reprobates no man, right? For no one reprobates the one whom he loves. But God loves every man, according to that of the book of Wisdom 1125. You love all the things which are and you hate none of those things that you have made. Because you didn't make sin though. Therefore God does not reprobate. Therefore God reprobates no man, right? Moreover, if God reprobated some man it is necessary that thus reprobation would be to the reproved as predestination to the predestined. Now what does Plato say? That likeness is a slippery thing. Especially when you have a likeness between things that are far apart. A likeness of ratios. So it seems that reprobation is to the reproved as predestination is to the predestined. It seems, right? Yeah. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore, reprobation would be the cause of the loss of the reproved. But this is false. For it is said in the prophet O.C. Your perdition, your loss, Israel is from you. From me only is your aid. It's a beautiful text there. Therefore God does not reprobate anybody. Moreover, to no one should one impute what he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates someone, he cannot avoid that he's lost. For he said in the book of Ecclesiastes, chapter 7, consider the works of God that no one is able to correct him whom he despises. Therefore it should not be imputed to men that they perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate somebody. You know there's a problem with Calvin, people like that, right? Probably got on the wrong side of some of these questions here. But against this is what is said in Malachi. I loved Jacob, but I had Esau. I answer it should be said that God reprobates some. Now it has been said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now it belongs to providence to allow some defect in things which are subject to providence as has been said above. So it doesn't belong to divine providence to eliminate all evil from the world, right? For a number of reasons. Whence, since through divine providence, men are ordered to eternal life. It belongs to divine providence that he permit or allow some to fail from the sin. And this is said to what? Reprobate them. Thus, therefore, just as predestination is a part of providence with respect to those who are divinely ordered to eternal salvation, so reprobation is also a part of providence with respect to those who fail from this end. For short, yeah. Decidu. What do they call those three? Deciduous? Yeah. These fall? Whence reprobation does not name foreknowledge only, but it adds something in its definition, sucunum glory, right? So, reprobation includes the will of permitting or allowing someone to fall into guilt and inferring the punishment of damnation for this guilt. See, it's kind of interesting to me the choice of words like as you pointed out that they cheat them and then here they tend to fall are quite the same as the predestination where, in other words, the reprobate, the terms he uses puts it more on the person whereas the opposite is the case for the predestination. He doesn't say predestination is allowing you and I to be saved if we're saved, right? He's actually directing us, giving us the grace and what we need to get there. But in the other case, he used the word allow, right? Right. He's not directing his men to sin, right? Or moving them to sin with allowing them to sin, right? Right. Okay. And then he's going to punish them, right? So it's, how do I say it? It's like these two aren't opposites or there's something a little bit... Well, that's what I was saying about you know what Plato says that likeness is a dangerous thing, right? Mm-hmm. And you remember when I talked about, I go back and take a very, take the most exact proportions there are, the mathematical ones, right? And I say four is to six as two is to three. I say, well, two is to three is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number. Well, then four to six is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number. Okay? That's not in what the likeness consists between these two, right? Okay? Then I say, well, two is a even number and three is an odd number. So two to three is the ratio of an even number to an odd number. So four is an even number and then six is an odd number, right? Obviously, I'm just understanding the likeness of these two. So you have to be very careful when you have a proportion. So in what way is four to six as two as to three? What way do they like? What enables us to say a proportion? What is the likeness there? How would you state it? For both two-thirds and you use much? Yeah. What you could probably say would be four is the same parts of six that two is a three, right? So if you imagine six as having three twos, four is two of those three parts, right? Just as two is two of the three ones in three, right? So even in a mathematical proportion, you have to see what way they are alike, right? And then you remember the famous proportion of Aristotle there in the first book of natural hearing. He says that the first matter is to say man and dog as clay is the sphere and cube. Someone might say, well, sphere and cube are two accidents, therefore man and dog are two accidents. Or clay is an actual substance, therefore the first matter is an actual substance. matter is not an actual substance. Man and dog are two actual substances, clay is an actual substance, but the other two, sphere and cube, are not substances. So what does the likeness consist, right? You see all these differences, right? Well, the likeness consists that just as the clay is able to be a sphere and a cube, but not at the same time. And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other, but if it became the other, it would cease to be the former. So the first matter is able to be a man or a dog, but not both at the same time. And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other. But if it was to become the other, it would cease to be the former, right? That's where the likeness consists, right? So, it's interesting, you know, when Aristotle gives the tools of dialectic, the third tool is a tool of difference, and the fourth is a tool of likeness, but in the third tool, he speaks of the tools being the ability to find the difference. He doesn't say the fourth tool is the ability to find likeness. He says it's the consideration of the likeness, right? Right? And the Greek word is skeptic, so we get the word skeptic. It doesn't have a sense of being skeptical about it, but it means you've got to consider in what way they really are alike. As he points out in the fourth tool, you're especially exercised to see a likeness of ratios, because they're further apart. But then you especially need skeptics, you especially need consideration, in what way are these two ratios alike, yeah? Right? And maybe when you get to the reply to the secularist objection, right? We'll see something of that, right? And maybe it's already clear from the body of the article, but you'll maybe spell it out. Now, the first one is talking about God loving all the things which are, and it's hating none of those things which he has made, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that God loves all men, and also all creatures, insofar as he wills some good to all. Not, however, does he will every good to all. Insofar, therefore, as to some he does not will this good which is eternal life, he is said to have them in hate, or to what? Reprobate them, right? Now, the second objection is the one that's more of a clear, emphasizing here. To the second, it should be said that in another way has reprobation in causing than predestination, for predestination is a cause of that which is expected in the future of life in those predestined, namely glory, and also that which is perceived in the present grace. Isn't there a psalm there, you know, that says God is, titles two together, grace and glory, right? God is the giver of grace and glory. In one of the psalms it says that. But reprobation is not a cause of that which is in the present, namely guilt, but it's the cause of being, what? Abandoned is the word by God, right? But it is the cause of what is rendered in the future, namely what? Yeah. But guilt comes from the free will, right? Through judgment, of the one who is reproved and is deserted from grace. And according to this is verified the saying of the prophet, it's your loss, Israel is from you. So there he's pointing out the difference in those two. That sort of makes sense, the word reprobator, if you're reproved, because then you have guilt because you're reproved and you fell short. So in a sense, if you're damned, it's the kind of you, you're reproved and then you fell short. Yeah, yeah. You could say that reprobation is to punishment more like predestination is to glory, right? But as far as, you know, the present, it's not a lot again. Sorry, can you do that one again? Well, I'm going to say what he's saying here in the thing here. Yeah. Is that reprobation is more a cause of the punishment in a way like predestination is a cause of glory, right? But as far as the present is concerned, right, the good deed, right, predestination is a cause of that, but reprobation is not a cause really of the, yeah, yeah, might be a cause of abandoning us, right? I was reading the thing in the Summa Contra Gentilis on the Holy Spirit and, you know, in the Summa, the Summa Contra Gentilis, Thomas goes more into the heretics, right, and into the scriptural texts that they use, deny things. And one of the reasons for denying that the Holy Spirit is God is that one of the, St. Paul, don't sadden the Holy Spirit, right? If he has saddened the Holy Spirit, he can't be God, you know, and so on. And what Thomas explains, this is a metaphor, right? And just like when you say God is angry, right, the likeness consists not in his having his emotion, but in the effect, right? Now, when you're angry with somebody, you've got to punish them. And so when God punishes us, he's metaphorically said to be angry with us, right? But what is the sadness, right? Well, if you sadden me in your company, if you make me sad, you know, I'm going to leave you. And so when God leaves or abandons somebody, right, he's said to be, what, saddened at the time they've done, right? Now, I know, you know, technically, the total kid's in the grade school or something, you know? You know, don't make God sad, and probably the kid understands this. Like, maybe your daddy's sad, right? Maybe your daddy is sad when you don't behave or something, right? But it's not that way with God, right? Isn't that really sad? But the effect of being sad by something, you give it up, right? As I can see as a student, right, if someone doesn't, or Shakespeare says, you know, he's talking about philosophy and so on. If you take no delight in what you're studying, you're not going to get any profit on it, right? So if you are saddened by the study of economics or something like that, then you've got to give up the study of economics or whatever it might be, right? Do they call it the dismal science or something? No, that's the clown. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But if you take no delight in it, you see, you give it up, right? And so if God abandons you, he said, for it to be sad, right? Because he does something that is like the effect of sadness in us. Now, the third objection is saying, well, if God reprobates me, then he's responsible for my damnation, right? To the third, it should be said that the reprobation of God does not take away anything of the power, right, or ability of the one reprobated. When it's said that the one reprobated cannot attain grace, right, it should not be understood according to an absolute impossibility. But according to a, what? A condition, yeah. Just as it's said above that the predestined is necessarily saved by a conditional, what? Necessity. Because it does not take away the freedom of the will. Whence, although someone is not able to attain grace, grace, who is reprued by God, nevertheless, in this, sin or that, he, what? Falls, right? And this happens from his own, what? Free will. Whence, he merits, right? That reputed to him, in, what? Guilt, huh? Okay? I really haven't studied Calvin, but I think he got a little off of this, didn't he? Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. He probably exaggerated the likeness of reprobation to predestination. That's probably the problem with what you talk about, right? You do want him to reject this idea of determinism, right? Because he's a great believer in human liberty. Goebenau was at one time his secretary, right? Goebenau went off with crazy ideas about races and so on and became very popular with the anti-Semitic circles around Wagner and so on. He goes all the way down to Hitler, you know? And to talk was very angry with him, you know? He finds his ideas very dangerous, you know? But a person obviously doesn't understand this whole teaching here, you know? And think that reprobation is saying that God is the cause of your damnation, right? Pratizio extai, from you. I always have a lot of fun with that. I say, you know, if you do good, you should thank God for it, right? But if you do something bad, you should blame yourself, huh? It seems unfair, right? That you have to take responsibility chiefly for the bad you've done. And you can't take responsibility chiefly for the good you've done. Someone else gets the credit for it. But that's the way it is. I don't think most people could accept that. They find it hard to accept, right? If I'm responsible for the bad I've done, then I'm going to take credit for the good I've done, right? That's a very, that's missing the point. Missing the truth. You take credit for it, but you have to benefit from it. That's what I always thought. Grace is kind of like an I.O.U. from God. He gives you the I.O.U., but he's telling you. He's going to pay you something in the first place. You don't deserve it. Do you get a chance for one more article here? Yes. So article four. Whether the predestined are chosen by God. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For as Darnitius says in the fourth chapter of the divine name, just as the bodily sun emits its light, not choosing, right? Among them, but it emits its light upon all bodies, right? So God is goodness, huh? That's another good example. Like this big and slippery thing, right? Because in what way is God extending or bestowing goodness upon things like the sun shining upon bodies, right? Everything that is gets some kind of goodness from God, right? There's a certain likeness there, but maybe you're what? Yeah. But the divine goodness is communicated especially to some according to the partaking of grace and what? Glory. Therefore, God, like the sun, without choice communicates grace and what? Glory, huh? Which pertains to what? Predestination. One question that can't strike me up. Why this question or this article? Or maybe it's coming back to that where I was kind of playing with this. Maybe this is now where we're coming into the will. Is that? Yeah, choice names more of the act of the will, you know, although it involves a reason too, but it's usually taking its naming more of the act of the will. And so, therefore, the reason why this would come after the other ones, because of the will follows. I think God would will to reward us what he would say. Once he's foreseeing to say, he wills to say. In a sense, he's, I don't know, asking is choice a cause of the predestination, right? Moreover, he says, second section, choices of those things which are, but predestination from eternity is of those things which are not. Therefore, some are predestined without what? Yeah, maybe he's thinking a little bit too much of our choice, right? Moreover, choice implies a certain discretion, discrimination. But God wills that all men be saved, as is said in 1 Timothy chapter 2. But predestination, therefore predestination, which foreorders men to salvation, is without what? Choice, huh? But against this is what is said in the Epistle to the Ephesians. He chose us in himself before the constitution of the world. That's a beautiful quote. So you've got to thank God for choosing you to be, to begin with, and then for choosing all kinds of other things too. Now, trying to answer for this question here. The answer should be said that predestination, in its what? Rationum, maybe that's a definition or meaning, presupposes choice, right? And choice presupposes love. The reason for which is that predestination, as has been said, is a part of providence. Providence, however, as prudence, is a reason existing in the understanding that is commanding, right? Of the order of the order of things to an end. But something is not commanded to be ordered to the end, except there be a will of the end. Whence a predestination of some to eternal life presupposes by reason that God wills their what? Salvation. To which pertains choice and love. Love, insofar as he wills for them, this good of eternal salvation. For to love is to will good to someone. The Bible says, right? But choice, insofar as what? He wills this good to some before others. Since some he, what? Yeah. But choice and love are ordered otherwise in us and in God. For in us, the will of loving does not cause the good. But from the pre-existing good, we are incited or aroused to loving. And therefore, we choose someone whom we, what? Love. And thus, choice precedes love in us. Now, it's interesting that, of course, it knows a lot in the word there here. A lot of texts are galactio, right? It comes from the word, what? Choice, right? And so, you know, in the text, in the treatise on love there in the pre-ma secundi, he had the word amor, which we translate by love sometimes, right? How do you translate galactio, right? But sometimes they translate it by a phrase. They call it chosen love, right? But in God, it is reverse. For the will of him, by which he wills good to someone by loving them, is the cause that that good is had by him before others. And thus, it is clear that love is presupposed to what? Choice. In definition, and choice to predestination. Whence all those predestined are chosen and what? Loved, huh? So what does he say? He's saying that because... God loves us and has chosen us, therefore he has, what, predestined us, right? Now, the first one there is the text of Dionysius comparing God to the Son, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that if one considers the communicating of the divine goodness in general, without choice, right, he communicates his goodness insofar as there is nothing that does not partake something of his, what, goodness. But if one considers the communicating of this or that good, he does not give it without, what, choice. Because some goods he gives to some, which he does not give to others. He tells a much better mind than me. And thus, in the bestowal of grace and glory, one should pay attention to what? Choice, right? So he chose her to be the mother of God, right? It was a colatio, grace, and that's why she's full of grace, right? Okay. So in some way, God is like the Son, in some ways he's not, right? Yeah. So he chose her to be the mother of God, and we said that love comes before choosing, right? So he loved her. Yeah. I was just, that's it. Just trying to get it down in my mind. So he loved our lady first, and then he chose her, gave her the grace to be the mother of God. He chose her as a consequence. Notice that text, you know, that they have, it was in the Article 3 there in the first section. The legis omnia quesunt, right? You wouldn't say, he chose all things which are, so much, right? That implies a certain discretion there, right? You give to one which you don't give to maybe another, right? Yes. You know, kind of these famous things of origin, you know, where he thought that all creatures were created equal to begin with. And then some had to sin, and some sinned more than others, and some turned more to God, and so on. So then they got stationed. Why, the truth is that God, you know, chose creatures to be unequal, right? And partly so there could be order among them, right? And partly so there could be cause and effect, right? And so creatures could partake of, what, causality, right? So if we all knew the same things, there wouldn't be any teaching, right? And, uh, huh? Yeah. And Thomas says, you know, that the order of causes is even better than the order of effects. Because the cause is better than the effect. So if you didn't have causes, you'd have the misalience of order of causes, huh? When you read Aristotle's text, there's some books, like the metaphysics there, the 14 books of wisdom. Where would I put out Thomas' commentary, you know? Yeah. You know? He's stumbling around, and you see these modern, you know, what's the point to these modern scholars, you know, trying to work on their own, you know, and they can't understand the text of Aristotle, right? So you need kind of an order there, right? Yeah. To proportionate, huh? You know, you read the first commentators in Aristotle, and all they do is kind of paraphrase him. And they don't even paraphrase him accurately, you know? You know? And then it takes a long time for it to build up, you know? If I get to Thomas, the guy who fully is capable of understanding Aristotle and explaining him to us. But then you need people like Deconic or Monsignor Dian, you know, to proportion Aristotle and Thomas to them, you know? Deconic will go through the text of Thomas, you know? So I'm just teaching how to read Thomas, that's all. And then you can go out to some extent and read them on your own, you know? But you have to realize how carefully you have to read these people, huh? Did St. Thomas use that to read them out of sin in order to learn from them? Learn things in them, yeah. But he also sees sin and mistakes in them, too. And, I mean, for that matter, you know, Albert the Great and Thomas will say that Plato and Aristotle are the chief philosophers, but Aristotle, that doesn't mean that Thomas makes them equal, right? Because he calls Thomas the philosopher by Antonio Masia, as Aristotle calls Homer the poet, right? But if you read Plato's dialogues, you can see how much Aristotle learned from Plato, right? Even though some things he disagreed with, right? And had reasons for disagreeing with them, you know? There's a story told of Plato coming into the academy and just Aristotle was there one day, and he said, the mind of the school is here. It's quite a thing, you know? You've heard me talk about that now. If that's true, there's no envy in Plato recognizing his pupil as being superior to him. And then, you know, Albert was supposed to have arranged a conversation with himself and Plato there for the students. And, of course, Thomas excelled. And he said, this guy you call a dumb ox, he's got to be right around the world. And then Albert, who lived much longer than Thomas, at the end of his life, you know, they say, went down to Paris to defend the teaching of Thomas, you know? And then I take a beautiful example of, you know, Haydn and Mozart, right? Where Mozart, you know, excelled Haydn, and Haydn recognized it. There's no jealousy there, no envy, you know? But when you read this thing about envy in the Gospels there, you know, you realize this is behind the rejection, you know, of Christ by the Pharisees and so on. You know, it's a terrible thing envy is. It's diabolical. It says in the Book of Wisdom there, is it? In the devil, death came into the world, sinned in the world. You know, I used to have some text there from some of the English novelists, you know, who were somewhat perceptive about human beings and saw that envy is a great thing, you know? But men are more apt to have the fault of envy than not to be merciful, right? Like, you see it in America, right? You know, when somebody gets injured or something and people kind of come to their help, you know, and they'll contribute money to a stranger, you know, who's in need, you know? It's in generosity of Americans, you see? That's not our most common fault in the lack of generosity or lack of pity. But in a sense, you're leading somebody who's below you, in a sense, because of what's happened to them and so on. And so they need you, right? But one of the novelists, it's quite so funny, it says, they say it's hard for a man to bear a good fortune well, you know, you get that, you know, you know, but he says it's even harder for his friends to bear his good fortune well. And some of them see it as that biblical, which it is envy, you know? And, you know, I see it as a philosopher in the history of philosophy, you know, I think, you know, it's envy, you know? When you read David Hume and he talks about Aristotle, you know, oh, he's nothing now anymore, you know, nobody reads him anymore, you know? Yeah. Even today, you know, I mean, in the crazy way we live in, you know, I mean, there's more, you know, papers than Aristotle or Plato than anybody else even now today, you know, despite the confusion that goes on now, not that they're very good for the most part, but they still, you know, and, you know, if you look at introductions to philosophies, the most common work would be the Apology of Plato, right? I mean, you just can't get away from these guys. But they don't really, you know, sit down and learn from these guys like they should, you know? So. But everyone else in Canada, you know, they made a study of people who had won these large sums of money. Yeah. And they're all just about...