Prima Pars
Lecture 100: Foreknowledge of Merits and Divine Predestination

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less happy than they were before they won the money. And they won the crazy things, they got divorced, you know, they started doing crazy things, and now they're more miserable than they were before they won the money. And most people think, you know, if I get that money, I'd be happy for life, you know. It's not so. When I was in high school, the professor was saying, you know, money isn't everything, you know. And the class sitting there said, you know, well, that's true, but what it isn't, they'll buy. You know, that's the idea. You see, these people end up being unhappy, you know. So, the second objection, yeah. That when the will of the one choosing is provoked, to choosing by the good already existing in the thing, right, then it's necessary that choice be of those things which are, right? Aristotle in the books on friendship talks about true friendship, you know. You choose your friends, right? It's not just a matter of feeling, right? You choose them, right? As happens in our choice, right? But in God, there's otherwise as has been said, right? And therefore, as Augustine says, God chooses those things which are not. But neither does he what? Her, huh? Who chooses, huh? And the third objection is taken from God wishes all men to be saved, right? Well, this goes back to the distinction between the antecedent and the consequent will. To the third, it should be said, it has been said above, that God wishes all men to be saved antecedently, right? Which is not simply to will, but sequent and quit, huh? Not however, consequently, which is sempliciter to will. So it's again that distinction between simply and sequent and quit, huh? And if I was back at college, I'd probably say to students, you know. And to see them who I want you all to pass the course. But after I correct the exams, if I will, may not be that you all passed. So simply speaking, I don't will you all to pass. You're skipping class and you're, you know, you're in a sleeping class and so on. Okay, this is nothing. The next article is too long to go into that. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas and Jellic Doctor, and help us to understand the longevity of the Father and the Son. So we're up to Article 5 here in Question 23, where there are four knowledge of merits as the cause of predestination. So to the fifth one proceeds thus. It seems that four knowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says, and that's St. Paul, Romans 8, whom he foreknow, these also he foredested. And the gloss of Ambrose, on the ninth chapter of Romans, I take mercy on the one that I take mercy on. He says, I give mercy to that one whom I foreknow will turn with his whole heart towards me. Therefore, it seems that four knowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. More, predestination, divine predestination, divine predestination includes the divine will, which cannot be unreasonable, like the Pope was telling us. Since predestination is the proposal of taking mercy, as Augustine says. But there can be no other reason of predestination except the foreign knowledge of merits. Therefore, the foreign knowledge of merits is the cause or the reason for the predestination. Third objection. Moreover, there is no iniquity before God. I suppose iniquity comes from the, what, no injustice, no inequality, right? As it's said in Romans chapter 9. But it seems iniquitous or unjust that equal things, unequal things, are given to those who are equal. But all men are equal by nature and by original sin. But there is an inequality to be noted in them, according to the merits or demerits of their own actions. Therefore, God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating them and reprobating them, except an account of the difference, except an account of the knowledge of their different, what, merits. So you're convinced by the opposite side? That's pretty good, that last one. Not quite. But against this is what the Apostle says in Epistle to Titus. Not from the works of justice, which we do, but according to his mercy, he saves us. But just as he saves us, so he predestines those who will be saved. Therefore, a foreign knowledge of the merits is not the cause or the reason for the predestination. So Thomas is going to answer now. I answer, it should be said, that since predestination includes the will, this has been said above. Thus, to inquire about the reason for predestination is like when one asks about the reason for the divine will. But it's been said above that one cannot assign a cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing. So, why not? Yeah. And God's act of will is his own substance. So if there is a cause of the act of the will of God, then there will be a cause of God himself. But one can assign, or is possible, to assign a reason on the side of the thing's will, insofar as God wills this to be on account of that. No one, however, was of such insane mind, he hasn't seen that in the 21st century yet, but who would say that merits were the cause of the divine predestination on the side of the act of predestinating him. But this comes under question. Whether on the side of the effect, predestination has some cause. And this is to ask whether God foreorders himself to give the effect of predestination to someone on account of some what? Merits, huh? Now, there are some who said that the effect of predestination was foreordered to someone on account of merits pre-existing in another life. And this was the position of Origen, original democratic, who laid down that human souls were created from the beginning. And on account of the diversity of their works, they obtained diverse statuses, united in this world to, what? Vibers, huh? But this opinion the apostle excludes in Romans chapter 9, saying, that when we are not yet born or done something of good or bad, not from works, but from the one calling has been said, that the greater the older will serve the lesser. Jacob and Isa, I guess. Now, there are others who said that merits pre-existing in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians laid down that the beginning of doing good is from us, but the consummation is from God. As opposed to that psalm I was quoting last time, he gives to his beloved in sleep. This is, no. The Pelagian is saying he gives to his beloved in their waking up. No, no. Scripture says he gives to them when they're sleeping. Right? So God is entirely before any activity. And thus, from this it happens that to someone is given the effect of predestination, not to another. Because one gives himself a beginning, right? By preparing himself and not another. But this is against what the apostle says in the second episode of the Corinthians. That we're not enough to, what? Think anything from ourselves, huh? As it were, from ourselves, huh? As I mentioned last time, Aristotle himself said this in Edenian Ethics, huh? The beginning of this, huh? It's from outside from God. But no beginning before can be found than what? Thinking, right? Cogitatsio. You can see why St. Paul, you know why St. Augustine, who was much taken up with refuting the Pelagians, right? Spoke about the importance of St. Paul, right? For his understanding of these things. And you can see that in Augustine's works. Whence it cannot be said that there is some beginning in us that exists that is the reason for the effect of predestination. Whence there were others who said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reasons for the predestination. That therefore God gives grace to someone and foreorders it to be given to him because he foresees that he will use the grace well. Just as if a king gives to some soldier a horse whom he knows or use that horse well. But these seem to distinguish between that which is from grace and that which is from free will or free judgment, right? Which cannot be the same from what? Both of them. In a sense, when they use in Latin there, free judgment for free will, right? It's kind of almost a naming by cause. It's because we have free judgment that we have free will. If our judgment of what is good and bad was determined by nature, then we would not be free. But because, at least about means, our judgment is, yeah, then we have freedom of will. So he says, These seem to distinguish between what is from grace and what is from free will, as if the same thing could not be from both. You can distinguish between those two things, but not in the sense that something has to be from one and not from the other, right? Or this is from that and not from the other. For it is manifest that that which is of grace is the effect of predestination. And this could not be laid down as the reason for predestination. Because this is, in fact, included under predestination. If, therefore, something other on our side was the reason for predestination, this would be something outside the effect of predestination. But it is not, however, distinct what is from free will and what is from predestination. Just as it is not distinct what is from what? Yeah, yeah. Okay. So is this thing being moved by the mug or by me? Oh, yeah. For divine providence produces its effects through the operations of the second causes, as has been said. And predestination is a part of the providence. Whence that which is through free will is also from what? Predestination. So, it should be said, therefore, that the effect of predestination we are able to consider in two ways. In one way in particular, right? And thus nothing prevents some effect of predestination being a cause and reason for another effect of predestination. The posterior of the before, the after of the before, according to the reason of final cause. But the before of the posterior by reason of a meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of what? Matter, right? You know how I asked the question about the Hail Mary, huh? You say, Hail Mary, full of grace, the Lord is with thee. Let me take those second words there. Full of grace, the Lord is with thee. And I asked students, they're talking about causes. Is she full of grace because the Lord is with her? Or is the Lord with her because she's full of grace? Or is it a bit of both, right? You see? But the Lord being with you is like the efficient cause of her being full of grace. And her being full of grace would be like what he says here. The disposition of the matter, right? So that she's a suitable temple in which the Lord can dwell fully, right? So there can be two different kinds of causes involved there. Well, here he's talking about what? One's merits, right? Can be, in a sense, a cause of one's what? Yeah. As it were, what kind of cause? It's a material cause, but in the process, the disposition, or by your who. But your being saved is a cause of your merits in the sense of what? The end. Yeah. That's the sake of which. Just as if we say that God foreorders, huh? He's going to give someone glory from his, what? Merits, huh? And then he foreordered he would give someone grace that he might merit glory, right? So, grace is a cause of glory in what sense? Yeah. Parca. But glory because it was given grace in the sense of the end. Yeah. So you can, in that sense, say one thing is a cause of life. Another way, one can consider the effect of predestination in general. And in this way, it's impossible that the whole effect of predestination in general has some cause on our side. Because whatever is in man ordering him to salvation is comprehended or included under as a whole under the effect of what? Predestination. Even the very being, very preparation for grace, huh? For neither this can come about except through the divine aid, huh? So he gives to the beloved in sleep. That's one meeting I was giving to that. Right? It's beautiful. Psalm 126. But here Thomas quotes not that but but lamentations, huh? Convert us, Lord, to you and we will be converted. But predestination has in this way on the side of the effect for a reason the divine goodness, right? To which the whole effect of predestination is ordered as to an end and from which it proceeds as from a beginning first moving us towards the sun. So as you say in the last book there, I am the alpha and the omega, huh? Those Greek letters have got a lot of mileage, huh? But I know it's said about three times, you know, something like that at least in the book Apocalypse Revelation. But finally you'll say, you know, I am the alpha and the omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the what? The end, yeah. Of course beginning refers to the mover although in some sense the end is the beginning too but a lot of times the beginning is restricted to the causes that are prior to being to the mover. Okay, now the first objection taken from this text of Paul in the clause of Ambrose. The first effort should be said that the use of grace foreknown is not the reason for the, what, bestowing of the grace except by reason of, what, the final cause. What does that mean now? What is he saying there? The grace is given in order to bring about the final cause of holiness and union with God but not on account of any goodness in the thing. Yeah, yeah. That's the grace is given. But God foresees that you're going to use the grace well and therefore achieve the end so he's already to that end. Somebody else might not use the grace well, right? Because you're reprobated. Okay, now the second one is talking about the objection here from the 16th, right? The will of God cannot be unreasonable, right? As he said in the region burden. The second should be said that predestination does have a reason, right? On the side of the effect in general which is the, what, divine goodness. In particular, though, one effect is a reason for another, right? That's a distinction made in the body of the article and he's applying it to the objection that says there wouldn't be reasonable what God is doing. When in general there is a reason for all he does and that's the divine what? Goodness, huh? Custin says because God is good we are. Because God is good we're predestined if we are, right? And by particular one thing can be ordered to another in predestination. now the third objection now the third objection now the third objection now the third objection now the third objection now the third objection now the third objection now the third objection to the objection I think it's hard for democratic things. I think I mentioned before that there are three major sources of the modern world and its customs. And just to review those for a second here, because one of them is relevant to this. The first major source of the modern world and its customs is the mercantile origin of the modern city in the late Middle Ages. And that gave a kind of mercantile, a commercial stamp, you might say, to our cities. And that took place in the late Middle Ages. The cities were not that important yet. But they were founded by merchants as opposed to the Greek cities, which were founded by aristocrats. And so the world historian McNeill says that the difference in the origin of these cities covered the whole civilization. The word civilization comes from the word city, Chibitas. And so in a subtle way, he colored the whole civilization. He said even the most active commercial cities of ancient times, right, the aristocratic stamp was never entirely lost. And the second major source of the modern world and its customs is the mathematical union of natural science and technical science in the 17th and 18th centuries. Of course, this changed us in an outward way, obviously, with everything that came from this. Everything that runs electricity without the air, et cetera, et cetera. But it also, as the great physicist Heisenberg said, it changed man's attitude towards nature from a contemplative one to a practical one. What can you do with nature and so on? And you know how it's very important. I happened to be at the dentist on Wednesday. And I picked up a copy of the National Geographic there. And I guess they must have had an article in there in the last issue, the previous issue, where some scientist was talking about his belief in God or something like that. And the thing was filled with a whole bunch of letters, you know, say, how can he be so superstitious? You know, how can a man who's trained in science possibly say these things, you know? And long back in the Middle Ages, you know, these superstitions. I was kind of struck by that, you know, in National Geographical Theater being quite that humanist magazine or something like that. But I mean, they really, you know, lay into this sort of thing. Now, the third major source of the modern world and its customs is the democratic revolutions and the social condition of relative equality, right? As opposed to the hereditary inequality that you had in ancient times and medieval times. And de Tocqueville's book, Democracy in America, especially the second volume, right, is the single most important work to understand this. And in that second volume, de Tocqueville talks about the influence of democratic customs upon government, upon our feelings and our manners and our government and so on. He talks about its effect on the whole life of the mind. And he says all kinds of interesting things, like, for example, he speaks about aristocratic times. He always contrasts the aristocratic times. They look to the past for their poetic inspiration. So the greatest poet there of antiquity there, Homer, right? He looks back to the Trojan War, which is the way in the past that men were, you know, something more than they are nowadays, you know? Why we think of Star Wars, something like this. We always look at 1984, you know, which is the future when it's first read. Brave the World and so on, all these science fiction things. They're all set in the future, you know, some kind of a... You go out as a president to the future rather than the past, huh? It's curious, huh? But you can study the Trojan War for some time to see some of this. He says democracy especially encourages pantheistic ideas in religion. That's only true, right? And he points to this in German philosophy in the 19th century. If you go through the... In creating symbol armor or something with official church texts, you'll see that Rome is always correcting some German theologian for his pantheistic ideas. And Karl Rahner and Jung and so on. Kogler, rather. They had, you know, they had a pantheistic notion that more orthodox was in the pantheistic notions and this sort of thing, huh? So, it seems to be not democratic, right? So democratic customs makes it especially hard for us to understand this aspect of divine foresight, divine predestination, yeah. So, to the third it should be said, that from the divine goodness, huh, can be taken the reason of the predestination of some and the reprobation of others, huh? For in this way, God is said to make all things an account of his goodness, so that in things, divine goodness might be, what, represented, huh? But it's necessary that the divine goodness, which in itself is one and simple, right? And those are three of the attributes here, the divine substance, right? It's perfection or goodness, but there's one and what's simple, right? It must be represented in many forms, huh, in things, huh, on account of this fact that created things are not able to attain to the simplicity of God. And hence it is that for the completion of the universe are required diverse grades of things, of which some are high and some hold a high place and some a, what, yeah, infamous, infamous. In the universe, huh? As opposed to, what, the original Democrat, their origin, right? He said, you know, well, they're all equal in spiritual substances to begin with, right? And some turn to God, more or less, and some turn away from God, more or less. And that's how God is diversity, right? As if that was not intended by God, right? Why, the order of the universe is really the greatest thing in creation, huh? And among other things, you felt that diversity, you couldn't have, what, the order of cause and effect, huh? Therefore, nothing like God is being a cause, huh? And that this multi-formness, huh, of grades, huh? As many forms of grades be conserved in things, God even permits some bad things to, what, come about. Lest many bad, many good things be impeded, right? So the lion wouldn't have any dinner if he didn't have the death of the, yeah. And it wouldn't be the, what, the ability of the martyrs without the savageness of the persecutors and so on. Thus, therefore, if we consider the whole race of men, the whole human race, as the whole university of things, huh? If we compare them, right, let's see the same. God wishes in men, as regards some whom he predestines, to represent his goodness by way of, what, mercy. Taking pity on them, right? As regards others whom he reprobates by punishing, to represent his goodness by way of, what, justice. Now, I said, well, I was just teaching their historic there. You're going to give glory to God no matter what, he says. If you repent, you're going to give glory to his mercy. If you don't, you're going to give glory to his justice. But you can't avoid it. He's going to win out anyway, so. Glory stuck in my mind, you know, how true there was. Can you say that? Roman Kassari, my teacher of philosophy that I worked very closely with when I was at the College of St. Thomas in 1854, 1858 at that time. He's gone now, he's dead. And this caused the Apostle signs in Romans chapter 9, saying, God wishing to show his anger. That's a metaphor for his, what, justice. And to make known his power. Sustains, that is, permits in much patience. Sustains, these vessels, then you're right, apt to perish, right? Sustains, these vessels, then you're right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right, apt to perish, right So he might show the glories, the wealth of his glory in the vessels of mercy, which is prepared in glory, right? And 2 Timothy. In a great house, there are not only gold and silver vessels, but also wooden ones, clay ones, some in honor and some in what? Yeah, okay, chamber pots. This is before he benched to the flushing toilet, right? But wherefore he chooses these in glory and reprobates them, right, has no reason except the divine will. Once Augustine says, on the greatest work there, on the Gospel of John, wherefore he draws this one and does not draw that one, I do not wish to, what, judge, huh? I do not wish to judge, to you not to judge. If you don't want to, what, be mistaken. Just as also in natural things, one can assign a reason, huh? Since the first matter as a whole is in itself uniform, right? Wherefore one part of it is under the form of fire, which is the most noble of the elements in the ancient chemistry, and the other under the form of earth, so constituted by God in the beginning. You say there's a reason for this. So there might be a diversity of species in what? Natural things. But wherefore this part of matter is under that form and the other one under another one, that depends on the divine will of the symbol. Just as it depends upon the simple will of the artist, that this stone is in that part of the wall and this one in that part of it. Although the reason of the art has it, that some should be here and some should be there, right? Nevertheless, on account of this, there's not iniquity in God, right? If unequal things, he prepares for ones that are not unequal. For this would be against the reason of justice if the effect of predestination was rendered from death, as if there was odas, right? And not was given from grace. Unless it was gratuitous, it wouldn't be from grace. It's a simple of this. But in those things which are given freely or from grace, one can, for his what? Desire? Give to whom he wishes, right? More or less. So long as he subtracts from no one but is owed him, right? And this, therefore, is without the prejudicing justice. And this is what the father of the family says in Matthew 20 in the parable. Take what is yours and go. Listen to me what I will to do, right? That's hard for the democratic mind to kind of fully accept. But those who are reprobated are not done so without justice, right? That he gives to some more abundantly than others. There's a reason why he does that in general, right? That's maybe this diversity. But why this one, in particular, that depends upon his simple will, right? Just like an artist, you know, is going to make a beautiful statue out of this piece of metal and something else is going to do something as a post or something, right? And it's just as good marble, maybe, the other one, right? But can the marble complain, right? Or St. Paul has the one about the clay, right? He fashioned some vessels that are going to be used for honorable things like freaking wine or something and others that are used for unmentionable things and so on. Well, can the clay say it's not right? So that's a tough lot, huh? Well, can the clay say it's not right? Well, can the clay say it's not right? Well, can the clay say it's not right? Well, can the clay say it's not right? Well, can the clay say it's not right? Well, can the clay say it's not right?