Prima Pars
Lecture 104: God's Infinite Power and Divine Omnipotence

Transcript
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Whatever I have, if I have some help, I guess I still get some help, I don't know. Is that me? I have some strength I can still, you know, lift my cups and so on. But is that strength me? Oh, I'm not sure if that's fine. If I have some knowledge, right, I have some geometry in me, as you can see once in a while, a little bit of digging out. But is that me, my knowledge, my geometry, a little bit of logic, you know? Do you find my logic? And God, his wisdom is himself, right? But we still can't just say that God is wisdom because then we kind of leave out of the picture the fact that he's wise. So we can't overcome our human way of knowing, right, in talking about God in this life. Just like we say, you know, we have some thoughts about the substance of God and some thoughts about the doing of God that he does, right? But we realize that this distinction is not, what, in God, right? It's the same thing in God. But there's a distinction in our knowledge, you know? This is a little bit of an aside because I was kind of reading recently about the incarnation there of Christ and the Word. And, you know, we say on the one hand that the Word was made flesh, right? So we get the word incarnation, I guess. And then we say that the Holy Spirit overshadowed, right? Mary, right? Now, when you say that the Holy Spirit overshadowed Mary, how's that being said? I think it's being said by procreation. In other words, is the incarnation an effect of the Holy Spirit and not of the Father and God the Son? Or is that an effect of the whole? Yeah. But it's appropriate to the Holy Spirit because the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love. And this becoming man is especially a, what, sign of the divine love for us. So it's appropriate to the Holy Spirit. Just like in the Creed, we say, I believe in God, the Father Almighty, creator of heaven and earth, right? Well, is he alone Almighty? Is he alone the creator? No. But it's appropriating him because of what personally characterizes the Father, right? But now when you come to the Word was made flesh, right? The Word became man. Is that appropriation? No. There you don't mean that God became man, God standing, you know? Because then the Father and the Holy Spirit would become man too, right? No. There, it's the Word of God is distinguished from God the Father and God the Holy Spirit. And so they did not become flesh, right? So there you're not speaking by appropriation. You say the Word was made flesh, right? It's not as if God, you know, in his divine nature, and somehow became flesh, and then we appropriated the Son because of some flesh. Or is it? No. No. See? So even in those things, you've got to see that distinction, right? Because the Word was made flesh insofar as the Word is really distinct from the Holy Spirit in front of the Father, right? But when we say that the Holy Spirit overshadowed Mary, right, and is the cause of this incarnation, right, we don't mean that the Holy Spirit insofar as he is really distinct from the Father and the Son. He did this, right? So the one is said of the Word insofar as he is really distinct from the others. The other is not said of the Holy Spirit as he is really distinct from the others, but said of him because of an appropriation. That'll come up in the Treatise and the Trinity, you know. The things are not very often said very precisely, but that's really the difference, huh? I think when the average person says that the Holy Spirit overshadowed him, they probably just think of, what's the Holy Spirit did, right? Okay, you know, well, you've got to be careful, right? That'll get you into trouble, right? But vice versa, it'll get you in trouble if you said the Word was made flesh as appropriation and you're really in serious trouble, you know. Really in serious trouble. This comes out, as I say, very much in the question of disputatio di potencia, right? The power in God. Secundum rem is a beginning of the, what, effect, right? Okay, but not of the, what, operation, right? It's only the beginning of the operation of God. Secundum rem is a modern intelligence, right? So, you know, if we say these things about God, we say, does God have a will? We'd say, God's got a will, right? Not my will, but thine be done. So, he tributes will to God, right? Our Lord himself, that's right. And, but now, the will is the source of will, right? But now, is the will of God really the source of his will? Is there a real distinction between the two, right? No, there's an axiom in philosophy, right? But nothing is the beginning of itself, like the axiom of before and after, right? Nothing is before or after itself, right? So, if nothing is the beginning of itself, and the divine will is the beginning willing, that from which the willing proceeds, right? Then the divine will would not be the divine willing, right? You're in serious problems here. You're in serious trouble now, right? You see? Very serious trouble. So, can you speak of the divine will as the beginning of the divine willing? Well, not really. Not secundum rim, right? Perhaps, forte. Yeah? He says, you know what he does. Nisi forte. Unless perhaps. Forte means perhaps, I guess, right? Unless perhaps. Secundum modem intelligently, right? What does that mean? Well, it means that we start from ourselves, right? To think about God, right? And the study of the soul is the doorway to studying the God and the angels and so on. And in us, the will and the willing are not the same thing. And the will is the beginning of the willing, right? Okay? It's the source of the willing, right? And so, we've got these two thoughts in our mind of our will and our willing and they correspond to two different things in us. And then we try to talk about God, right? And we have these two thoughts. We've got to be very careful because the divine will and the divine willing are not two things but are the same thing. So, only in our way of understanding, starting from us, you know, distinction between our will and our willing, in the back of our mind, right? It leads us to use these two words in talking about God and scripture does too. It's not just us, right? Not my will but thy will be done, right? But when you talk about the divine power, right, and the effect, then you have a real distinction, right? So, that's a beautiful axiom, right? Nothing is the beginning of itself. Because the divine will is the beginning of its willing. In a sense, you've got to bring in the will, because if God didn't have a will, could he will? If God didn't have a mind, could he understand anything? But if he had a beginning, wouldn't he be God? Yeah, yeah. At the beginning of anything? Yeah, yeah, yeah. You say, well, that's the way we understand it, right? But that's in our understanding, right? You've got to be very careful with these things, right? And I get that through looking at the summa conscientious and that's long ago, and the Trinity again, and of course. There, he takes up a little more explicitly, you know, the heresies, right? Of course, one of these guys, Titus, I guess, you know, for whom the Father and the Son are the same. The only difference, you know, in our way of looking at things, right? Because he's called the Father in himself, but he's called God the Son because it became flesh, right? Well, now he's denying the real distinction between the Father and the Son, right? That's the most serious mistake, right? And Thomas takes some time to refute that, right? It shows that it's false from Scripture, right? So you've got to be very careful when you're saying there's a distinction there, a real distinction, right? And there's a way of what? But anyway, what's relevant to the case right here is that the distinction between the power or ability of God and the operation of God is not a distinction of things, huh? But the distinction between the divine power and the effect of that power, and the creature like you and me, that's a real distinction, right? I really am an effect of God, and I'm not God. You must know by now. That's beautiful that he's extended there. So just go back to the beginning of that third reply. That power in created things is not only a beginning of action, but also the effect, right? Thus, therefore, in God is saved the notion of power or ability as regards this, that it is a beginning of effect. Now, however, as it is a beginning of action. And later on, he has that little qualification. You know, you should understand this according to the way of understanding, right? So could we understand that God wills without having a will? But to understand that correctly, we have to realize that that distinction is in our thinking and not in God. The first distinction in God, the first distinction in reality is the distinction of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. It's really something, right? Okay, now the fourth objection is a little different here, but it's interesting. Now it goes talking about this and the divine knowledge and will, right? To the fourth, it should be said that the power of God is not placed in God as something different from his what? that knowledge and will, secundum rem, right? But only secundum rationum, according to our thought. Insofar as ability or power implies, right, the thought of a beginning carrying out that which the will, what, commands. And that to which the knowledge directs. Which three things belong to God according to the same. That's one way of saying it, right? Or it should be said that the, what, knowledge or the divine will, according as it is a, what, beginning of an effect, which you can affect, you won't think that, and has the notion of a, what, ability or power, right? So it's like saying, the divine knowledge and the divine will considered as a beginning of an effect can be called the divine power. That's if it's something different. But the divine knowledge and the divine will, as such, don't name this, what, beginning of effect, right? Whence the consideration of the knowledge and the will precedes in God the consideration of the, what, ability or power as the cause precedes the operation and the effect, right? So it makes sense to take up the divine knowledge and the divine will or the divine power, right? Even though they're not different things. So I guess we have to stop here now. We'll go on to Article 2 there. Maybe on Thursday, maybe on Wednesday, maybe a week. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, the odor, and the room, and our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, an angelic doctor. May I pray in your mouth. Help us to understand what you have written. The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. He's giving all the saints with the Eucharist, you know? From St. Francis of Assisi to St. Thomas Aquinas, he says. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Actually, the first quote is from Thomas, you know, but who do they think? It's made for Augustine, you know? Not from Augustine. So we're up to Article 2 here, right, in Question 25? Question 25, Article 2. In the Questiones Disputate Potentia, this is the first question that corresponds to this. It's almost the same article, but in a different order. Where the power of God is infinite. To the second one proceeds, thus, it seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything infinite or unlimited is imperfect, according to the philosopher, in the third book of physics, natural hearing. But the power of God is not imperfect, therefore it is not, what? Infinite. It's interesting how that, when you first use the word infinite, it's used for, what? Quantity, huh? And so for quantity to be lacking its limit is to be lacking in something and therefore it be perfect. So the word infinite is moved a long distance, huh? From something effective to something universally perfect. Moreover, every power is manifested to its effect, otherwise it would be in vain. If, therefore, the power of God were infinite, it would be able to make an infinite effect, which is impossible. So God also used power there. Moreover, the philosopher proves in the eighth book of physics, that if the power of some body were infinite, it would move an instant, in no time at all. But God does not move things in the instant, but he moves the spiritual creatures, Augustine says, through time. Of course, the word time is said equivocally in those two parts of the sentence. Because the time of potties is, what, continuous, and the time of the angels is discrete. According to Augustine in the eighth book on Genesis, to the letter, therefore his power is not, what? But against all this is what Hilary says in the eighth book about the Trinity. And Hilary is the one he quotes the most after, Augustine, Augustine the most, in the treatise on the Trinity, but he quotes Hilary a lot, huh? That God is of a, what? Immense virtutis, living, powerful. Immense is a, what, negative word, right? What does it mean? The table? The table. The table. Anyway, what were we going to say about it? Yeah, it means literally unmeasured, right, huh? Okay? So, Shakespeare often speaks of something being infinite and measureless, right? So, sometimes you see in some of the creeds, one of the attributes of God is that he's immenses, huh? And it's tied up with this being infinite. But everything unmeasured is infinite. Therefore, the divine power is, what, infinite. Okay, I answer, it should be said, that it has been said in the previous article, according to this, active power, not the passive power, right, is found in God according as he himself is an act. But his being is infinite, insofar as it is not limited to something receiving it, as is clear from those things which are said above, when one considered, or we considered, the infinity of the divine essence or substance or nature. So, that was the third of the, what, five attributes of the divine substance. He showed first that it was simple, right? Then that it was perfect and good. And then that it was infinite and therefore everywhere. And then unchanging and therefore eternal. And finally that it was one. But there before, Thomas spoke of two different meanings of the word infinite. And in one way, potency in the passive sense is limited by form, right? And in another way, form or act is limited by the passive potency that's received in. So, when we speak of the first matter as being infinite, we mean it's like, considered by itself, it's lacking all act. After we see this form, it would be this kind of thing, and other form, it would be that kind of thing. But the divine actuality, the divine existence, is altogether simple and not received in any potency. So, it's not limited by potency. And therefore, since it's perfect by its actuality, it's not limited in its, what, perfection. I think if you're going to attach the infinity of God to one of his other attributes, you'd tie it up with his perfection. You mean that he's not, what, limited in his perfection, right? So, for matter to be unlimited is to lack form, and therefore to lack its, what, perfection, right? But for the divine actuality, the divine existence, not to be received in any potency in the passive sense, is to not be limited in its, what, actuality. To not be limited in its, what, perfection. So, he says, according to this, act of power is found in God, according as he's an act. But his being is unlimited, or infinite, insofar as is not limited to something receiving it, as is clear from those things that you said above, when we tweeted of the infinity of the divine essence. Whence is necessary that the active power of God be infinite? For in all agents we find this, that as an agent is more perfect, so the form that it has for which it acts is to that extent more, what, powerful and active. Just as when something is more hot, so it has a greater power to heating things. And it would have a, what, infinite power to heating if its heat were, what, infinite. Whence, since the divine essence or nature or substance through which or by which God acts is infinite, as has been shown above in the Treatise of the Substance of God, it follows that his power is, what, infinite, huh? So, here's another example of how he reasons of what has been shown about the Substance of God to something about his power of operating. That shows kind of the order in which you have to consider these things. Now, the first objection is taken from the philosopher. And that philosopher is somebody, as Deccani could say. Aristotle is somebody. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the philosopher speaks of the infinite, which is on the side of matter, not limited by form. Of which kind is the infinite that belongs to what? Quantity, huh? Thus, however, the divine essence is not infinite in that way, as has been shown above. And consequently... neither is his, what, power infinite in that way. Whence it does not follow, let it be, what, imperfect. Incidentally, when Thomas takes up the infinity of God and the consideration of the substance of God in the summa contra gentiles, the order's a little bit different, huh? And it's the fifth and last attribute of God, question, chapter 43 there. And right before that chapter, he's shown that God is altogether one. And quite a while before that, he's shown that God is altogether simple, right? Now, what is the infinity that belongs to quantity? Well, if you're talking about continuous quantity, like a straight line or a surface or a body, the continuous is divisible forever. And that's shown, you know, in the sixth book of the physics. And that way motion is infinite. And so in the third book of the physics, when he takes up motion, he takes up the infinite, right after it. It falls upon motion intrinsically. But then there's another kind of infinity, a discrete quantity. Because the continuous is divisible forever, numbers can get greater forever. So when he begins the consideration of the infinity of God, the first thing he shows in the summa contra gentiles is that he's not infinite in either of his quantitative senses. Not in the continuous sense, because he's been shown to be altogether simple. He has no parts. And there's no infinity in the discrete or numerical sense, because he's one. So he leaves it until he's shown both of those things. And then he eliminates that sense of infinite, right? And there it goes on to show the true sense in which God is infinite. He's not infinite in his quantitative sense, and quantity is the accident that follows upon matter. He plays infinite in the sense that there's no limit to his perfection. So is he calling that, huh? It's much more explicit in my favorite book, you know? Now the second objection is saying that every power is manifested to its effect. If the power of God is infinite, then he can produce an infinite effect. But that's an impossible thing to have. Now, so isn't there a lot of unused power here, and isn't this in vain then, right? The second should be said that the power of a univocal agent, the whole of that is manifested in its effect. Now, what do they mean when they talk about a univocal agent? What do they mean by that? I think it just can't be had the same name and it's always understood in the same way. But in this case, it's referring to things of the same nature, isn't it? Yeah, yeah. So you're limited to producing something the same in kind as you are, right? Okay? So that dogs produce dogs and cats produce cats and human beings produce human beings, right? And so on. So the whole power, he says, of a univocal agent is manifested in its effect. For the power, the generative power of a man can do nothing more than to generate a man. And the same thing we say for a cat, the generative power of a cat can generate on a cat. But the power of an agent that is not univocal, its whole power is not manifested in the production of its effect. Just as the power of the sun is not entirely manifested in the production of some animal, generative and putrefaction, that's the old, somewhat disproven theory, right? But the sun, in a sense, causality extends to what? Not to produce another sun, but to all the animals and plants in the world that depend upon the sun for their existence, huh? Now it's manifested, God is not a univocal agent. You call him a privical agent. Understand that properly. For nothing other can come together with him in species or in genus, huh? God is not in any genus, huh? So we learned in the question on the simplicity of God. Whence it remains that his effect is always less than his power, right? It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God be made known in the fact that he, or in this, or by this, that he produces a, what, infinite effect. Could show him, for example, that he is, what, creating things, huh? But now that somebody might say, what, does it make this power then unused, huh? Still, yeah. But nevertheless, even if he produced no effect, huh, the power of God would not be, what? In vain, yeah. Because that is in vain that is ordered to an end, huh, which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered to an effect as to an end. But rather, it is the end of its effect. So the divine power is God himself, right? And God is the beginning and the end of all things. So God himself is not ordered to anything like an end. Since the divine power is God, it's not ordered to anything like an end. So you can't say it's in vain because it doesn't achieve its purpose. It doesn't have any purpose. It's kind of a beautiful, it reminds me of an article or an argument that comes up sometimes when I'm talking about the Trinity, right? And there's a very important principle in natural philosophy and natural science, which you find not only in Aristotle, but you find it in Einstein and Heisenberg and all the great physicists, huh? And sometimes it's called the principle of what? Simplicity, right? That nature uses no more than is what? Necessary, right? And Max Born got the Nobel Prize in the 20th century and who worked with Einstein in Berlin, right? You can get the correspondents of Bohr and Einstein, huh? What this has just come out, he's in Nassau. But he also worked with Heisenberg and Heisenberg, he's just as Heisenberg, and Bohr and so on. But he says, the genuine physicist believes obstinately in the unity and simplicity of nature despite any appearance of the contrary. So it's something natural, right? Aristotle talks about this and argues about this from this in the first book of natural hearing, the first book of the physics. So, when they come to talk about the Trinity, something that just comes up. They say, well, the fullness of the divine nature is found in the Father. Therefore, the Son and the Holy Spirit are what? Superfluous. Yeah. Good job. Well, how do you think Thomas answers this kind of objection? Yeah, same way. Because, actually, the principle of simplicity is based upon the fact that nature acts for an end. And when less will serve, it serves no purpose to use more than is necessary. So two arms is enough for a man, right? You might be handy to have a third arm when you're trying to open the door of the house and the groceries and so on. But you don't really need a third arm, do you? But you do kind of need two arms. And so, you can't apply this to the Trinity because the generation of the Son from the Father and the proceeding of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is not for the sake of any end. So you can't apply the principle of simplicity to the Trinity. And it's the same way he's doing here, right? I used to have fun when I was talking about this nature act for an end. And in natural philosophy class, we go through the arguments of Aristotle and so on. And I also go through the three main arguments against nature acting for an end. And one of them is trying to show that mathematical chance is enough to explain the good of nature. Therefore, we can invoke the principle of simplicity and say that we don't need it. Thank you. another kind of cause. So the argument is saying that matter, form, and mover, those three kinds of causes, by mathematical chance, are enough to explain the good in nature. Therefore, we don't need a fourth kind of cause to explain the good in nature. Well, I used to tactic mainly by pointing out that mathematical chance is not enough to explain the good in nature. And therefore, you can't invoke the principle of simplicity, right? But then, the other thing that's kind of amusing is that in invoking the principle of simplicity, you forget that the original reason for the principle of simplicity is that nature acts for an end. Like even Newton says, nature is a piece of simplicity. In fact, it's not the proper, superfluous causes, right? It would serve no purpose if nature used more than a physicist. So in a sense, you're saying that because nature acts for an end, it doesn't act for an end. But then you've got to remember that, you see. Once you see it's based on that, right? Then you can't really apply it to Trinity if the Trinity is not for the sake of some end of that itself, right? In the same way it's applied here. You know, we might say, you know, someone goes to college and he gets a degree in medicine or some other practical thing, right? He never puts this to work. You might say, well, it's in vain that he learned this, right? Because that degree in medicine or something is for the sake of healing people and so on. But this is not true about the divine power. It's not for the sake of preachers, right? Now the third argument is again taken from Aristotle and from his statement there in the 8th book of the Physics that if a body's power were infinite, it would move. To the third argument, it ought to be said that the philosopher in the 8th book of the Physics proves that if some body had an infinite power, it would move in none time. And nevertheless, he shows that the power of the mover of the heavens is infinite because it is able to move in an infinite time. The universe is going around, you know? The sky around us. It remains, therefore, according to his intention, that the infinite power of body, if it were, would move in none time. Not over the power of a what? Bodiless. And the reason for this is that a body moving another body is a univocal agent. Whence is necessary that the whole power of the agent be manifested in the motion? Because, therefore, as the power of the moving body, of the mover, as a body, is greater, so it moves faster. It is necessary, then, that if it were infinite, it would move faster than any proportion, which would be to move in none time. That's also because nature is kind of determined to one, right? So it moves with its whole power. But a bodily mover is an agent that's not difficult. Whence is not necessary that its whole power be manifested in its motion, that it move, therefore, in no time. And especially because it moves according to the disposition of its what? Will. That's another point that makes enough time. So God can will this much or that much, right? My natural thing goes by its whole power, right? So the fire burns something with its whole power, right? It doesn't say, I'll do it so much, it's so much. Okay. Okay.