Prima Pars
Lecture 113: Procession of Love in God and Generation

Transcript
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Now, whether this procession of love in God should be called, what, generation, right? The first objection is saying, yeah, it should be. What goes forward in likeness of nature in living things, huh, is said to be generated and born, right? But that which goes forward in divine things by way of love, right, proceeds in a likeness of nature. Because the Holy Spirit also is God, right? And he goes forward, and therefore he's like the one he goes forward, well, then shouldn't this be called another generation? Otherwise, he would be extraneous from the divine nature, and thus there'd be a going forward to the, what, outside, huh? It's kind of interesting the way these sentences, you know, that Thomas commented on in his first years there in Paris, I guess. You know, there's four books to the sentences, right? There's various ways you can divide those four books, but the first two books are about proceeding from God, in a way. And then the last two books are about returning to God, right? So everything proceeds from God in a way it returns to God, right? So it's kind of like a circle, you know? What's the difference between the first and the second book, right? Well, the first book is more about the Trinity, and the second book about the creatures, right? So the first book is about what proceeds from God within God, and then the, what he calls the precession out extra, right, is what the second book is about. That's kind of interesting. So, so he's saying that the one who proceeds by way of God loving himself proceeds having, what, the likeness to God, right, of the same kind. In fact, it is God, it's the same individual God. Therefore, why shouldn't he be called a, what, generation or a birth, right? Then, moreover, the second objection, moreover, just as likeness is of the notion of the word, right, because a thought or word is a, what, a likeness of the thing, so also it pertains to the notion of love. For it is said in Ecclesiasticus chapter 13 that every animal likes what is like itself, right? Remember my talking about the excellence of the English word like, right? I like you because you're like me. Okay, birds of a feather flock together, right? So, the conviction there. If, therefore, by reason of likeness, to be generated or to be born belongs to the word going forward, it seems also that to be generated belongs to the love, with Seelie. Now, this was so getting up with two sons and all easy. But what does Augustine say there in the Dei Trinitatis, you know, that no place. No place is more dangerous to think, you know, than about the Trinity, huh? But no place is more fruitful to find something, huh? But he warns us, you know, I told you that phrase, I love Augustine and Dei Trinitatis. He speaks of those who have an immature and perverse love of reason. It's, you know, it's a beautiful phrase. I've never seen it anywhere else, anybody else, you know, that he speaks of an immature and perverse love of reason. Now, I see Augustine say also, you know, intellectu valdeam, love very much to reason, right? You should love reason, it's, you know, a very special part of it. But, not a good love of reason is, but, hey, there can be an immature and reverse love of reason. What does that mean, you know? Well, my old teacher there at the Surik there used to give us a little passage from Albert the Great, right? And Albert the Great said that if you study things for any reason other than to understand God, unless you be forced to it by, you know, practical necessity, right? You have a perverse attitude, right? Okay? So, everything we think about, unless those things are very forced, but, you know, for practical reasons, how we get this tire fixed or something like that, we should think about so that we can eventually think about God, right? So, St. Thomas says in a particular passage, I think about the body, he says, so I can think about the soul. I think about the soul so I can think about the angels. And I think about the angels so I can think about God, and that's it. I don't think about God so I can think about something else. And if you get to the vision, right, that's what you'll be doing. You'll be a pillar in that temple and not go out there longer. So, people use their reason to know all kinds of silly things, and unimportant things, and sometimes bad things too, but if you don't think about the lesser things for the sake of thinking ultimately about God, then their whole reason is reversed. You don't know what the reason is for ultimately. Ultimately, for knowing the beginning of all things, the first cause. But what would be an immaterial of a reason, huh? Well, I think you have to realize how weak reason is, huh? How easily deceived reason is, huh? And the disagreement of opinion among thinkers and even scientists and so on, right? Historians, right? I remember when I was in history class and in college, and the professor says, now he says, if you're, you know, can't take criticism or, you know, disagreement, don't become a historian, right? You need to tell the story, use a paper, you get, you know, objections to this guy, that guy, that guy, that guy, that guy, that guy. And so there's disagreement, you know, which is a sign that all of us, or all the one of us at most, are mistaken, right? And so you realize how weak reason is, right? And so when Thomas spoke here at the beginning of the Treatise on the Trinity, he spoke, for example, of the order of what? Teaching, right? And in the premium to this whole word, the order of learning, right? That's the only part, right, of avoiding an immature of a reason, right? Sure, you should want to use your reason, and you should want to use your reason to think about things, but you have to think about things in a certain order to really understand them, and if you think about things out of order, your mind will be out of order. And I used to say to the students, you know, the machine doesn't work, they think of a sign that says, out of order, right? Well, I say, you know, with the modern mind especially, you know, the mini mindset, I think of a sign, out of order, right? I see. And, you know, Albert the Great, when he's commenting on the logical works of Aristotle, it's called The Father's Logic, right? And he says that the early philosophers made many mistakes because they didn't, what, no logic, right? So, you have to consider things in a certain order, you've got to know the way of going forward, right? You've got to spend time in logic and so on, right? Now, that's not the ball. The two best teachers know to teach, what, logic and natural philosophy, right? The fundamental things. Not even the highest things, right? But because you haven't done those things first, and then you can go on to the more difficult things, right? So, that's what physics means after natural things, or after the books of natural philosophy. But logic teaches you how to think, right? So, reason needs all these, what, helps, right? And you also need, what, great teachers like Thomas Aquinas and so on. And, you know, when I read Heisenberg a lot, the great physicist there, and some people say Heisenberg was probably Nick Steinstein, the greatest of the physicists in the 20th century. But, you know, almost always, Brexit comes back to the influence that Niels Bohr had upon him as a teacher, and his first conversations with Bohr and so on. I think there's a book I saw recently, too. I don't have a copy of it, though. Encounters with Einstein. But the way you're dependent upon good teachers like that are good minds. So if you're thinking, I don't need logic, I don't need to study things in any particular order, I don't need any minds that have thought better about these things or longer about these things than I have, you know. I'm Mr. Self-Sufficiency. I have immature, you know. The man just says, you know, gee whiz, when a problem comes up, you know, I think, well, the old guy I've done, you know. How would he approach this, you know, you see. But that's having a somewhat mature view towards reason, huh. So that warning about immature and perverse love of reason, though, is given by Augustine in the De Trinitante. So how easy it is to be mistaken about these things. The third objection. Moreover, that is not in the genus, that is not in one of its species, huh. You know, you're going to know what logic is, what this objection is saying, right. Because the genus is a general kind of thing, huh. Like quadrilateral, say, in geometry, right. It's a general kind of thing. And under it has particular kinds of things, like square, oblong, rompus, rhomboid, trapezium, and so on. Or number is a general kind of thing. Under it has odd numbers and even numbers, right. Or animal is a general kind of thing. Under it's got dog and cat and horse and so on. And government is a general kind of thing. And it's got monarchy and oligarchy and democracy and so on. So can you be in a genus without being one of the species? Can I be an animal and not be either a dog or a cat or some other particular kind of animal? No, obviously not. If, therefore, in divine things there is a going forward of love, it's necessary that, apart from this common name, it has some, what, special name. But there is no other name to give except generation. Therefore, it seems that the going forward of love in divine things is generation. There's no name for this going forward of the Holy Spirit. It's kind of a shocking thing, isn't it? Now, if you had studied Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, he's talking about the moral virtues. He explains how the moral virtue is between two vices, one of which is in excess and one is in defect. So, for example, courage or fortitude is between cowardice and foolhardiness. So, in Coriolanus, Shakespeare touches upon that, right? But now, I mean, as Romans, you know, will stand when they should stand and fight, and they'll retreat when they should retreat, right? They're neither foolhardy nor cowards in there. They're neither foolhardy in their stands nor coward in their, what, drawing back. You know how Hitler lost the war against the Russians because the Germans would get so far, and then the German generals realized they had to retreat a little bit to get a good place to withhold the Russians. And Hitler says, no, we're not going to give up any land that we've gone forward to. So, you know, he was foolhardy, right? And then, of course, the Russians came in and started to turn the war around, and that's where the yin came about. But anyway, going back to what Aristotle says, when he gets to the virtue of temperance, right, he says, well, there's a name for the excess, the man who goes to excess in pursuing sense pleasures, like the glutton or the drunkard or the, you know, but there doesn't seem to be a name for the man who doesn't pursue sense pleasure enough. And Aristotle says, well, there's a reason for that. It's so rare. But, you know, sometimes we, you know, find what it's like, you know, how women tend to have this disorder sometimes and not eating enough, you know, with this emphasis upon being slim as rails or something. And I guess they have a name, bulimia, I don't know what they call these things. Yeah, yeah. But see, we don't have a name, or we could invent a name, maybe for the man who doesn't pursue sense pleasure enough and call them a puritan or, you know, but there seems to be, you know, because the thing is so rare and unknown that people don't seem to have a name for it, right? So it may be that the reason why there is not a name for the kind of going forward that you have in the Holy Spirit is because it's less known that way of going forward. And it's, there's nothing like it in creature, right? Well, in, even in Adam, there's something that we could call a generation, right? And going forward, the word is more known to us. But against this, huh? This should be called a generation. Is that according to this, it would follow the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, that he would proceed as one, what? Generator, yeah. Which is against that of Athanasius, as it refers to the Athanasian, what? The creed. Which, whether it's by Athanasius, immediately or in a more remote way, he's a great defender of the Trinity and so on. Spiritus Sanctus, this is from the Athanasian Creed. A Patriot Fudio, right? The Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, right? None factus, like a creature. And that creatus, right? Nor even genitus, right? Said what? So he keeps the common, what? Name, yeah. Now, that comes under this way of naming things, right? Now, Aristotle and the, I was just talking to the guys in the house last night there, a little bit about chance and luck. And Aristotle says, well, we can speak of chance in nature as well as in human life, right? And now, chance in human life has its own name, which is luck, or Latin fortune. In Greek, 2KM, okay? But chance in nature, it doesn't have its own name. So, what do you call it? Well, they just call it chance sometimes, huh? So chance is used in two meanings here, right? Now, perhaps there's a reason why chance in human affairs has its own name, because it's something much more important to us in our life, right? We always have a name that keeps the common name, right? So, sometimes, you might say, well, you've got procession, the Latin word, procession. You have the procession of the Son, right? And the procession of the Holy Spirit. Now, the procession of the Son has a name, a generation. Sometimes it's called birth, too, right? But the procession of the Holy Spirit has no name. So, keep the common name, right? We call it this procession. Now, you'll find another problem with this, too, because in the order of learning, we speak of the processions and God first, and then the relations, based on these processions, and then the persons who are these stimulations, right? Well, again, the relations won't have a name here. And so, we have to kind of adapt words that really mean something else to name this. Okay? I think I realize the problem is recent has. I think it's been a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit of a bit. Now Thomas says, I answer it should be said that the going forward of love in divine things in God, which is it, ought not to be called generation, right? To the evidence, or for the evidence of this, it should be known that this is the difference. Now this is a very subtle thing here. This is the difference between the understanding and the will. That the understanding comes to be an act, right? Through this, that the thing understood is in the understanding by its likeness. The will, however, comes to be an act, not by this, that some likeness of the thing will is in the will, but from this, that the will has a certain what? Inclination towards the what? Thing will, yeah. This goes back to the difference that the philosopher, Aristotle, brings out in the sixth book of wisdom, right? That the true, is primarily in the mind, but the good is chiefly in things. And therefore, understanding something is a matter of getting something into your mind, but willing is more of a matter of what? Putting your heart into the thing. And so the basic act of the mind is sometimes called grasping. Grasping what something is. In Latin, they speak of simple apprehension, but apprehend is a Latin word for it to grasp. Now, when I grasp something, it's what? Contained in my hand, right? And that's the perfection of your mind. Can you grasp what I'm saying now? See, if you can grasp what I'm saying now, that's good, huh? As far as your mind's concerned, right? But now that you use that word grasping, you know, to name the perfection of your love. Grasping, huh? That's the perfection of your mind, you see. The perfection of your will, huh? You know, there's a kind of a pop song, you know, love is in love until you give it away, right? Or like the other song says, I left my heart in San Francisco, right? It's just the hardest in the thing, love, right? And when someone doesn't want to do something, you know, they'll say, my heart's not in it. I'll do it, but my heart's not in it. Don't be one of the things. And our Lord says that same way, right? He says, you know, pile of treasures in heaven, you know, and so on, not down here. And where your treasure is, there your heart shall be, right? Okay? So, there's a kind of contrariety between knowing and loving. And that's why it's very interesting if you talk about love and knowing in regard to opposites, there's the same knowledge of opposites. So, in ethics, we learn both what virtue is, what vice is, right? And knowing one helps you know the other, right? In the medical art, you learn both what healthy health is and what sickness is, right? And knowing one doesn't prevent you from knowing the other, but it helps you, right? And there couldn't be one medical art about health and one about sickness. It doesn't make any sense. There's one logic about correct reason and incorrect reason. And so, when I was giving an exam of logic, I want to make things difficult for the students, I know it's going to be, look to them, it could be a good argument, isn't it? You know? I know this is a logician, right? I know about bad arguments as well as good arguments, huh? Aristotle in the famous fifth book of the politics, right? It's a book about how to corrupt the government and how to preserve it. He's teaching you both, right? Because it's the same knowledge of hope, right? And that's because the thought of virtue is not really contrary to the thought of vice, but a health to it. But now, what about love? Is there the same love of opposites? If I love health, can I love sickness? It's the same love of health and sickness? No. The love of one contrary excludes the love of the opposite, right? If I love virtue, I can't love vice, right? If I love beauty, I can't love ugliness, right? Because love goes out to the thing in itself, and in the thing itself, one contrary excludes the other, right? But the mind takes contraries into the mind according to the way of the mind. And there, the thought of one is not contrary to the thought of the other. So that's a very important thing here, right? So Thomas is going back to the fact that knowing takes place by, as Empedocles first saw, right? Or spoke about this. By the thing known being in the know, right? Not in its real being necessarily, but at least in its likeness. Why love is more of an inclination towards a thing in itself. So it doesn't have the idea of producing a likeness. So the going forward then, which is to be noted according to the notion of the understanding, is according to the notion of likeness, right? And to that extent, it can have the notion of what? Generation. Because everything, everyone generating, generates something like itself. But the going forward, which is to be noted according to the will, is not considered by reason of a likeness, but more a reason of something, what? Impelling, right? And moving, right? Towards something. And therefore, what proceeds in divine things by way of love does not proceed as generated or as a son, right? But it proceeds more as, what? Breath, right? Which has the idea of, what? Impelling and moving you towards something, right? The spirit will to move. By which name is, what? Designated a living motion and impulse, right? Insofar as someone from love is said to be moved or impelled to, what? To doing something, right? That's a very subtle thing to see, right? That's the reason why what proceeds according to love doesn't have the idea of being a, what? Generation. Even though the Holy Spirit is like the Father and the Son, right? Love doesn't proceed by way of, what? You see, the likeness of the thing, but more by being, what? Impressed by the thing and therefore being inclined towards it, huh? It's a very subtle thing. It takes a long time, you know, to see that. But no, it seems going back to what we were talking about that's more known than the understanding of the imagination, right? When I imagine something, there proceeds from my imagination an image of that. Well, image is just a Latin word for what? Likeness, huh? Okay? And so it's proceeding as a likeness of the thing, what? Known, huh? The thing imagined, huh? But now I get all shook up emotionally about something, right? I like wine or I like candy or something like that. Is that a likeness of candy preceding emotions? I might imagine the candy, but that's annoying again, right? I imagine the candy, and I want some of that. So then I have this, what? Information towards it, right? But that's not the idea of having the likeness of it, huh? The likeness of it is in my sensing, right? In my imagining this candy. I know Mr. Prince Peter, too. But notice, in some way, the thing loved or liked is in the, what? The one like they're loving him. And we use in daily speech, and it's not... that way of speaking, really. The guy goes to a party, and you made a big impression upon her. She made a big impression upon you, right? There's something there. In some way, that person has made an impression upon your heart. It's stuck in your heart, right? That's something different than making a likeness of that person. That's something to do with your imagination or your memory, right? You remember this person, right? Now, the first objection of saying, well, well, isn't what goes forward in likeness of nature, in living things, isn't that to be generated, right? Well, Thomas says this is because whatever is in God is God, right? Not because the Holy Spirit proceeds as a likeness of the Father or the Son or something like that, right? But because God's love is also his being. To the first, therefore, it should be said that whatever is in divine things is one with the divine nature, right? And that's what I was saying earlier today. Whatever God has is God. Now, what is Thomas saying? Whatever is in God, Aristotle, in talking about the word to have there in the fifth book of wisdom, says that for every sense of have is a corresponding sense, it seems, of in, right? So, if I have knowledge, right? You can see there's knowledge in me. If my body has some health, there's health in my body, right? But now in me, the haver and the had are not the same thing. And what is in something and that in which it is is not the same thing, right? But in God, they're the same thing. And we use the words have and in in talking about God, even though they fit the creature in some ways better than God, because they don't have any other words, right? But then we have to realize that whatever God is said to have is God. And whatever is said to be in God is God. Because God is altogether simple. So I was reading Thomas this morning there in my favorite book there, the Summa Kata Gentilas, and he's talking about the virtues that are in God, right? And there's, among intellectual virtues, there's art and foresight, and providence, and there's wisdom and so on, right? All these virtues are in God, right? And among the moral virtues, there's justice in God, right? And there's truthfulness in God, and there's liberality, right? I mean, Thomas, he always quotes Avicenna, you know, he gives him credit, right? Avicenna says, you know, God alone is liberal, right? But when Aristotle talks about liberality, you give somebody something, right? Not in order to get something back from him, but just because of the goodness of giving somebody something. And God gets nothing out of giving us all these things, huh? And not even a good act, right? Which we get out of giving somebody something, right? So God is the only one who's perfectly liberal, right? God's generosity, it's amazing, right? And it makes you kind of, I got to think again about Shakespeare's famous play there, The Timon of Athens, a man who's kind of foolish in his giving people, but, you know, he's so generous, you know? And there is, Thomas says at the end of this business about the divine virtues, that all the divine virtues that are property in God, not as far as what is defective in them, but what's perfect in them, that these virtues are the exome parts of our virtues, right? So in some sense, Timon of Athens there, you see, in being over generous to people, you know, you're all coming to dinner tonight, you know, and not only have you got a wonderful meal, but, you know, a little prison for you, you know, a little prison for you, you know? And of course, the stewards, oh my God, you know, and what do you mean you run out, you know? And of course, what happens in the play is that eventually he goes broke, you might say, and there's no problem I can borrow from any of these good friends I have, but you're kind of a fair-weather friend, and you all have some excuse, you know? You know, one guy says, oh, why don't you come sooner, you know? You know, I just, you know, and obviously there's an excuse without giving you money now, and then he becomes a great, like, misanthrope, you know? But, but in the first part, he's trying to be like God in a way maybe that's, you have to admire him in some ways, not in other ways, he's, he's foolish, but, I had to think about that. God is the exemplar. He gets through talking about, you know, Avicenna, quoting Avicenna, and saying, my gosh, that's the exemplar for the virtue of Tim in there, but the trouble was it wasn't with any wisdom, you see? So, whatever is in God is one with the divine nature, right? Whence on the side of this unity, that whatever is in God is God, right? One cannot take the, what? Private or particular definition of this or that procession in particular, according as one's distinguished from the other. So they both, as both processions give rise to something in God, right? The Son and the Holy Spirit, right? And whatever is in God is God, right? More than like God, right? Is God. And so, that's not going to be the basis for distinguishing these two ones. But it's necessary that the, what, particular definition of this or that going forward be taken according to the order, right, of one procession to the other. and this order should be noted according to the, what, notion of will and understanding. Whence, according to, what, the proper notion of each of these, each procession in divine things gets its, what, name, the one thing gets named, that is placed upon it to signify its, what, particular notion, proper notion. And hence it is that the one proceeding by way of love both gets the divine nature, right, takes the divine nature, and nevertheless it is not said to be, what, born, because he doesn't proceed in particular as a likeness of the one from which he proceeds, but as a kind of, what, breadth and inclination towards it. And also as I say in the way we speak and this is good, I think, and I say, one of my grandchildren, she makes a real impression upon me, right, and her name is Isabella Rose. Well, I call her Isabella the Rose. And Isabella says, no, I'm Isabella Rose. I call her Isabella the Rose, right? So she makes a great impression upon my heart, right? Okay? Now, if someone or something makes a big impression upon your heart, in a way they're in your heart, okay? But, are in there as a likeness? Because they made an impression upon your heart, and your heart was out to them, inclined towards them, right? So their being in your heart, in particular, is different from the way in which they are in your memory, right? They go forward in your memory as an image, right? as a likeness of them, right? They don't go forward in your heart as an image or likeness of them, but in a different way. It's kind of obscure, but it's not the same way. And therefore, it shouldn't be called a generation or birth, because that's to go forward by way of a likeness of that in which it is born, right? Now, the second objection is saying, but likeness doesn't have anything to do with love, right? I like you because you're like me. To the second, it should be said that likeness pertains in a different way to the word or thought and another way to love. For it pertains to the word insofar as it itself is a certain likeness of the thing, what? Understood. Just as the one generated is a likeness of the one, what? Generated. Incidentally, when you get to take up the... second person of the blessed trinity right thomas will say i'll speak of three names of the second person and one is he's called the son of god right another word is he's called the word of god right and then the third one he's the imago dei the image of god right we see all those things tie together right because both as son and as word he's what proceeding as a likeness of the one of which he is a son or a likeness of the one of whom he is the thought right and therefore the third name imago kind of fits the first two both of them right but none of those are said properly of the holy spirit but likeness pertains to love not that love itself is a likeness but insofar as likeness is the beginning or cause of loving right now i was mentioning how thomas in the questions in the secundae primus clinde the questions on love right the nature of love the kinds of love the cause of love the effects of love well the first article on the causes of love is whether good is a cause of love second one is where their knowledge is third one is where the likeness is a cause of love and i think i mentioned how when i taught love and friendship i would sometimes take this uh weathering heights right but the woman is attractive to two men right but one man because of his good qualities the other man because he's like her and it's kind of interesting fictional example to use to illustrate this right because obviously you could like someone both because they're good qualities and because in some way they resemble you right but here it's divided among two people right and the question is um that kind of interesting she raises there although it's not making an actor which of those causes is stronger right are you drawn to somebody more because you know the goodness you see in them or because they are what like you right and of course she concludes that she'll be more drawn to a man who's like her right i think that's interesting uh maybe it may be true right you might see the on there you know talking about teacher one time say you know how you're sometimes drawn to a teacher because he's like you right that means maybe things other than what he actually knows right but the teacher is good because you know something nothing you know and it's a little bit like you know my mother's stories warned me about doctors you know don't go to the doctor because um you're like his personality right huh which is like the doctor's personality and somebody maybe like you in some ways or something like that and uh but he's not uh what yeah yeah yeah yeah it kind of what i teach is i said it's from suric to deconic to dion right huh and probably i was most like the suric and then more like deconic dion you know but but each guy was wise of the guy before him right huh yeah and uh so you gotta you know okay but anyway that's kind of getting a little more into detail of that but thomas is saying in the second objection is saying well likeness pertains to love right thomas is not in the same way as it does to thought the thought is a likeness of the thing thought about but love is not a likeness or a likeness of the thing that you love but your likeness to that thing you love is a cause you're loving it okay that's interesting you talk about the love of god see um why in a sense um why should one love god well one reason is he's good and and you know he's good right okay so that's one reason to love him right but no reason is that you're made in the image and likeness of god right and those are really not exactly the same reason right although they may be connected right so the more we become like god the more we love him right now they say you know i understand that passage right you know and christ says you know no one greater born than john the baptist right but he who's lowest in heaven is greater well maybe the meaning of that is that once you see god as he is the known you know way that's so much better than the way you know him by faith that um if the good is known as a cause of love you're going to love god more in heaven than you ever loved him on earth but also you'll be more like him right you know say john says in the uh epistle there when he appears we shall be like him right we shall see him as he is well then we'll also love him more than we did in this life because we'll be more like him than we were in this life so why should you love god yeah yeah because he's good and you know you have to know he's good in a sense and because you're like him it's interesting they're not exactly the same region are they now see they're united in this novel right her attraction to these two men is is uh is divided right now it's kind of interesting i don't know how often that happens in life but something like that people sometimes hang around people they don't recognize as being so good because they're they fit their own thing you know yeah yeah but that's uh you gotta be careful about that that's per seo project you know but you know when aristotle's talking about the highest kind of friendship it's between those who are somewhat equal in virtue right so they have two reasons for loving each other right and that is virtue which is something good and because they're alike in virtue because they're like each other right like two bad men so to speak right they're alike in their badness so they have reasons like each other right but uh they're alike in something that is is bad so there's a certain camaraderie there right they can't love each other as well as the as the two virtuous people can love each other yeah you might seek to be more like somebody you like you know that's what the yeah but you finish that second i guess the last part there that uh the thing generated is a likeness of the one generating right but it pertains to love not that the love itself be a likeness of the thing but insofar as likeness is a principle meaning a cause of loving right they gave you a reference there to the treatise on love there which i think is kind of the most basic fundamental treatise on love you know once it does not follow that love be generated but that the one generated is the beginning of love right because likeness is the cause of love right one generated is a likeness or something now the third objection was more drawn from the name right there's no name to this thing to the third therefore should be said that we are not able to name god except from creatures that before and because in creatures the communication of nature of these living things is not except by way of what generation right the going forward in god does not have its own or special name except that of what generation whence the going forward which is not a generation the second one we're talking about right remains without its own what name you see how thomas is following the order of learning right you have to talk about the going forward of the word