Prima Pars
Lecture 114: Real Relations in God and Divine Distinction

Transcript
================================================================================

refers to the Holy Spirit. But it could be named, right? You could want to invent a name for it, like Aristotle, you know. He's going to give a name to the device that doesn't pursue sense of pleasure enough, right? He calls it, a Greek word there, meaning lacking in sensation. If you don't like wine, it's either lacking in sensation. If you don't like Mozart, which the Holy Father does, right, you're lacking in what? Sensation, right? But it could be named, what? Breathing, huh? So you can speak of the Holy Spirit. The Father and the Son is breathing the Holy Spirit, huh? I'm going to make a word, you know. Aristotle sometimes, you know, that's a word, because there's no word for this thing he's talking about, huh? You know, in studying grammar there, I used to have a book there, and they had some of the Renaissance writers about plays and so on. There seemed to be a kind of play in between tragedy and comedy, huh? And Aristotle had written the book on the poetic art, which was supposed to be on tragedy and comedy, huh? But the part of comedy has been lost, huh? Although he had some general remarks about comedy at the beginning there. Well, here's a new kind of play, or a play that seems to be between tragedy and comedy. What are you going to call it? And so, in the Renaissance there, they invented a name, they called it tragedy-esque comedy. Okay? And people, we do that, you see people do it sometimes in articles and so on, right? They run two words together like that. Now, in the, say, complete editions of Shakespeare now, the last plays, huh, like Pericles, maybe, and Symboline and Tempest and so on, they call those the romances, huh? Now, the original edition of Shakespeare's plays, you know, the first folio in 1623, you had the tragedies and the comedies and the histories, right? And these plays, they're now called the romances, right? Some of them were at the tragedies, some of them were at the comedies, right? But now they've founded a new name, right? Okay? And how well that name is chosen, you know, because romance has more than one sense, huh? Now, when I name Shakespeare's plays, I see two kinds of plays in between tragedy and comedies. And one of them is called, I call the mercy and forgiveness romances. Which are called some romances in these comedians. And the other, the love and friendship romances, huh? And the love and friendship romances are closer to the comedies. And the mercy and forgiveness are closer to the tragedies. The mercy is like pity, right? If you want to see a good way of comparing things very close together, right? Just take something that appears in each of these four kinds, in one play at least, where a man thinks his wife has been unfaithful, but he's mistaken. And in the Merry Wives of Windsor, right? It's comic, the effect of this, right? And in Othello, it's extremely tragic, right? In the mercy and forgiveness ones, he makes a great mistake, but it's not entirely unredeemable, right? I mean, you know, he eventually records out this way. And in the love and friendship ones, it doesn't get that far, but there's a mistake, and it's more quickly. So if you read The Merry Wives of Windsor and Much Ado About Nothing, and then Symboline or Witch's Tale, and then Othello, right? In all four kinds of plays, you have a somewhat similar situation where a husband thinks his wife is unfaithful, but the way it's handled is quite different, right? You see the difference in the four kinds of plays. It's kind of interesting to see that. But anyway, it's a problem about how would you name these plays in between, right? So this is something that arises in ethics there when you're naming this place, and it comes up when you're trying to name the kind of play, right? It comes up in other sciences too, I'm sure, but it must come to mind. So this is going to pursue us through the study here, right? What do you name the relations, you know? Do you name the father, the son, the breather or something? Well, you could invent a word, but it's a little more, you know, invented, you know? It doesn't have the same tradition. You call the Holy Spirit the breathed one or something you don't. You've got a chance to be a fifth act where you have a good one. so now this is kind of the third part of this question whether there is a going forward within God what is the going forward within God how many going forwards are there is any more besides these two we've seen to the fifth one proceeds thus that word proceed goes a lot of use in Thomas proceeding of our mind the mind is going forward and considering the divine going forward to the fifth one proceeds thus it seems that there are more going forwards in God than two for just as knowledge and will are attributed to God so also power if therefore by understanding and will be taken God too going forwards it seems that there should be a third one taken according to what power yeah more goodness most of all seems to be a beginning of going forward since the good is what the great Dionysius says is diffusible in sui esse right therefore it seems that according to the goodness there ought to be what taken some perception in God more greater is the fecundity right the fruitfulness the power of fruitfulness in God than in us but in God but in us there's not only one going forward of the word or thought right but many I got many thoughts right what's the matter this guy didn't you ide fixe you know it's very fixed about a guy and changing because from one thought in us there proceeds another thought right that goes back to Shakespeare's definition of reason the ability for a large discourse looking before and after and the meaning of discourse that especially defines reason is what coming to know one thing to another right okay so through the thought of a genus through the thought of differences you come to the thought of the species right and through the thought of the major premise and the minor premise you come to that conclusion and so on likewise from one love there arises a what another love okay therefore since God more fruitful than we are in God there are more going forward than just these two gotta have like the Buddhists or something in all these generations after generations and so on yeah yeah you have to think that way right but against all this is the fact that in God there are only two ones going forward to it the Son and the Holy Spirit therefore there must be only two what going forward now Thomas recalls at the beginning of the response that these going forwards have to be ones that what remain within the doer right I answer it should be said that the going forwards in God cannot be taken except by those actions or doings which remain in the one doing it right this is the distinction we saw in man right between this table went forward from somebody right and this image goes forward and the image goes forward remain within the one imagining right but the one building a house that goes forward from him something outside of him maybe the house or the table or whatever he's building but actions of this sort in the intellectual nature and the divine one are only two kinds to wit to understand and to what will right for the one that was gave there of imagining right which also seems to be an operation in the one sensing right is outside the intellectual what nature right so the imagination is a bodily thing right it's an internal sensory thought right so God doesn't have that doesn't have a body doesn't have senses nor is sensing we take the exterior senses we call them exterior senses wholly remote from the genius of actions which are to the outside for to sense is perfected through the acting upon and the sensible upon the senses right so since there's only two actions that remain within the doer right understanding and willing it remains that what there's no other going forward possible in God except that of the word and what love and also he names the second one of love but love really names the action right you don't have a name for what goes forward there so this is why he rejects the first objection there that there should be a third going forward from power right to the first it should be said that power is the beginning of acting in another going back to Aristotle's definition in the ninth book of wisdom whence by God's power one takes an action to the outside outside of God and thus according to the attribute of power one does not take a going forward of the divine person but only a going forward of the creatures so we can say to God hey I went forward from you to the Holy Spirit and the Son I went forward from God just like you did yeah but then the difference was I went forward on the outside and he went forward inside and what's in God is God so I'm not God but I didn't go forward from him right now the second objection was saying well goodness is diffusive of itself as the great Phoenicians say now to the second it should be said that the good as Boethius says in the book the great mind that it pertains to the what the essence the nature the substance of God and not to his operation except as perhaps as an object of the what the will right whence since the divine processions must be taken according to some actions then according to goodness and other attributes of this sort one does not take other processions in addition to what that of the word or love because all those are according as God what understands and loves his essence his truth and his what goodness so notice the essence of God and the goodness of God are taken up in consideration of what his substance right and then you take up the operation of God whereby he loves and he loves and knows his essence and he takes up the Trinity right it's in the order of learning these things but goodness or truth may more the object of activities than activities themselves right they don't give you another activity of which there could be another proceeding and therefore another person so on now what about this lack of fertility in God to the third it should be said that it's been had above in the treatise on the what operations of God that God by one simple act understands all things so how he puts one and simple together right very similar right God understands all things and similarly by one simple act he wills all things right whence in him there cannot be what a procession of a thought from a thought right nor of love from love right because then he wouldn't understand everything by one activity right and love everything by one but there is in him only one perfect what thought and one perfect love and in that is perfect fertility I could keep on multiplying my thoughts because of the imperfection of my thoughts right if I could think one thought whereby I would know everything and express everything that would be nice right but I can't a lot of time yeah yeah it's unlikely to be a vision right you see in seeing God as he is you will know everything you naturally want to know right all at once you'd be partaking of eternal life right before and after that's what I thought of it that's why with human beings male and female you get the general because human is a person is efficient I was thinking too about something less of this but still comparable you know how they had this heresy you know that when scripture says that Christ was her first born right you know this implies that she had other children afterwards right because superfluous having had that child right you see you say well I know a woman's got you know 12 children or something right you know you know and but since Mary's fertility is greater than a woman who has 12 children because that one child is more lovable than all children together right even for it's the or in God himself you know he's the son right you know the reason she didn't want to go back to that that reminds me In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly St. Thomas Aquinas' angelic doctrine. Praise for us. And help us to understand the eligibility. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. I got through rereading the compendium of theology of Thomas there, and I was looking at one of these little minor works that you have there in Marietta. Replied to 108 questions of the Superior General there, the Dominicans, or Master General. But they're taken from someone who was critical of Peter Tarentes. Do you know him? I said, I didn't know who Peter Tarentes was, I didn't really know. And his commentary on his sentences of Peter Lombard, there's 108 questions there. But generally, Thomas is, you know, favorable to what Peter is saying there. So I looked him up again, and he became Pope, huh? He became Innocent V, the first Dominican to become a Pope. But he had a very short reign, about half a year. His dates correspond almost exactly to Thomas' son. It's 1225 to about 1276, Thomas died in 1974. But he also was famous for giving this eulogy on St. Bonaventure when he died. The council. Yeah. Or the council. The council, yeah. He was there at that point, Peter, so he became Pope, so that's interesting. But the Dominican singing the phrases of St. Bonaventure. Well, there was this friendship between the Dominicans and the Franciscans, huh? That, you know, on each other's feasts they would tend to come together, you know, for a little bit of refreshment. So, the treatise on the Trinity is divided into two or three parts. It's got to be one or the other. Three parts, yeah. And Thomas says, according to the order of teaching, right, because the divine persons are distinguished by relations of origin, right, of origin or one proceeding from another. So, in the order of teaching and also the order of learning, you could say, we have to talk about the processions first and then about the relations based on them and then finally about the, what, processions. So, the 17 questions that there are in the Trinity, the first question, which we looked at last time, or finished last time, for our first meeting, was on the, what, procession, right? And now the one we're going to be looking at today, the 28th question is on the relations. And then the remaining 15 questions will all be on the person's end. So, the order there is pretty clear, right? Okay. Now, just to recall what we saw last time, although there were five articles in the question on the proceedings, of course, you have to, to understand, divide it into either two or three, right? And you could divide those into three. First is, well, there is a going forward in God, right? Then, secondly, what is that going forward? And finally, in the last article, how many going forwards are there, right? So, the first article is about whether there is a going forward in God. The middle three ones are about what is that going forward? And there's one going forward that could be called a conceiving, a giving birth, a generation, huh? And then there's another going forward besides that, huh? That's the third article. And in the fourth article, that this is a different kind of going forward. It's not a generation. It's not producing a son. It's more like a breathing. And then there's any other going forward besides those two. And in the third or rather fifth article, the last article, no one. Because this going forward has to be by means of a, what? Activity that remains within the doer. And there's just two of those. God understanding himself and God, what, loving himself, right? And since God's act of understanding and his act of loving is the same as his being, God as understood in himself is God. And God as loved in himself is God, huh? Now we're ready to consider the relations, huh? So we're off to question 28 now. Then we're not to consider about the divine relations. And about this, four things are asked, huh? First, whether in God there are some, what, real relations, huh? Now, Aristotle and Avicenna, right, have taught us that there are relations that are not real, that are of reason, and Thomas has brought together the teaching of Aristotle and Avicenna, right, and distinguished many forms of these relations are not real. So this chair is on my right. That's not a real relation. In the chair, right? So, if these relations in God were not real, then the distinction of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be, what, a real distinction, a distinction of things, but would be a, what, just a distinction of reason, right? You'd be back in the heresy of what, famous heretic? Yeah, Samilius, yeah. Who said that, well, these are just three names for the same person. He's called the Father because he's in God, right? He's called, you know, the second person because he became man and because the Holy Spirit, because he sanctifies us, right? As if these were not three, what? Yeah, really distinct, three things, huh? And notice the word real comes from the word for thing, right? And sometimes I like to ask people, you know, are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are they one thing or three things? And what would you answer to that question? In a way, it will depend on what you mean by saying. Yeah. Because if you mean, you know, relation, right, then there are three things, right? If you mean the substance, what God is, then there are one thing. So there are both, what, one thing and three things, you know, that's called contradiction because the word thing has more than one meaning, huh? As Aristotle was the first to really point out. And that takes you all the way back to the categories, huh? So the first article is going to be, whether in God there are some real relations, huh? Now the second article, assuming that they are real, which we'll be showing in the first one, whether those relations are the very divine, what, essence or substance or nature, or they're something attached, as we're, intrinsically, right? Of course, the answer will be that they are the very divine, what, essence or nature, huh? So if you compare these relations or these persons to divine substance, there's no real distinction. Between the Father and God, there's no real distinction. There's a distinction in thought, but not a real distinction. Between the Fatherhood and the divine nature, they're one and the same thing. In the same way, the Son and the Son. But if you compare them to each other, they're really distinct. It's interesting, huh? Then the third article, whether there could be in God, what, many, huh, relations really distinct from each other, huh? So you can see he's already answered in the first article that they're really distinct, huh? And then finally, about the number of these, what, relations, huh? Of course, it turned out to be, what, four relations, right? So you can see, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what But why is there only three persons? Because the persons are going to be constituted by these relations, right? Well, we'll find that out again. But you should be looking ahead and saying, gee, yeah, that was a little question, you know. Without them up, we'll get to think about persons. To the first, therefore, one proceeds thus. It seems that in God there are not real relations. For Boethius says in the book about the Trinity that when someone, what, turns, right, the predicaments into divine predication, all are changed into substance. Zerastoff, for example, distinguishes between substance and quality, right? And quality is something other than substance. And so my knowledge of geometry is something other than what I am, namely a man, right? But in God, it's not an accident, but is the very substance of God, right? But inadequate, altogether, it's not able to be said. This is kind of strange. Text there, Boethius, huh? I was in a bookstore the other day, and they had an edition of Alfred the Great, the King of England, his translation of Boethius' work. And on one side, they had the saxo, or that, yes, they can't read it, and then, you know, the English translation. It was kind of interesting, huh? He's quite a man. I admired him a lot. But whatever is really in God is able to be said of him, right? Therefore, relation is not really in God, huh? So Boethius is a great authority, huh? Of course, the objection, of course, is misunderstanding the text. Moreover, Boethius says in the same book that similar or like is relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son and of both the Holy Spirit as of that which is the same to that which is the same, huh? This is one example of a relation of reason, right? When I say that Socrates is Socrates, right? That's true. And I'm saying Socrates is the same thing as Socrates, right? But is this Saintess of Socrates of Socrates, is that a real relation? No. Because there aren't really two things there, okay? So Boethius is saying the relation of the Father to the Son and to the Holy Spirit is like the relation of a thing to itself. And if that's so, that's a relation of reason only. That's one of the four that Aristotle and Avicenna had distinguished, right? Because every real relation requires two, what? Extremes, really, huh? Okay? Therefore, the relations which are placed in divine things are not real relations, but is an only, right? Now, as Thomas will explain, you apply to that objection, huh? Are you misunderstanding what Boethius is saying, right? Because you're exaggerating the likeness of this, right? But it's a likeness of a thing to itself insofar as there's just one God, one substance, right? Okay? God from God, light from light. Not another God, the same God, right? So as the great teacher there, Plato, said in the Sophistan, likeness is a slippery thing. So likeness is very important in knowing, but also it's very important in being deceived. And it's seeing exactly in which way these things are like each other, right? And not exaggerating the likeness between two things. Moreover, the relation of fatherhood is a relation of a beginning. But wouldn't it say that God is the beginning of creatures, there is not implied here some real relation, but of reason only. So this is an example of the kind of relation Aristotle speaks of in the fifth book of wisdom, right? He says that the knower is really related to what it knows, but is the known really related to the knower? Now he says we understand the known as relative to the knower, that's because the knower is relative to him, right? Well, God is like the, what? The measure of things, huh? And so they are really related to him, but he's not really related to them. So what's the difference between saying the father is the beginning of the son and the father and God is the beginning of the children? One case, beginning is that real relation, another case, it doesn't. Moreover, now I noticed in the second and third one there, there's two different kinds of relation of reason that I touched upon in the injection, right? Moreover, generation divine things is according to the, what, proceeding or going forward of the understandable word or thought. But the relations which follow upon the operation of the understanding are relations of reason. And this is what we study in logic, like genus and species, huh? Therefore, fatherhood and sonhood, which are set in divine things by generation, are relations of reason, only, right? So you've got three different kinds of relations of reason that I touched upon in the second and the third and the fourth injection, huh? But against all this nonsense, huh? Is that the father is not said except by fatherhood, right? And the son by sonhood. If therefore fatherhood and sonhood are not in God really, it would follow that God is not really the father or the son. But according to what? Understanding only. Which is the heresy of what? It's a billion heresy. Kind of adjective in there, right? So Thomas is going to reply to this now. I answer it should be said that some relations are in God really, right? Not the relations of God to creature. There are some other relations that are really in God. To the evidence of this, it should be considered that only in those things which are said and the Latin says ad aliquem. That's exactly the way they translate Aristotle's category. In Greek, it's pros ti, right? Okay? So in Latin, they translate that aliquem. In other words, Aristotle doesn't use the abstract word relation, right? And when we translate Aristotle's text there, we translate it as completely as Aristotle does, so it translates as toward something or toward another, right? Okay? And I'll mention that how knowing that from my study of Aristotle, I'm struck by the Greek, the Greek of our friend Saint John, the possible evangelist, right? Because he says, in the beginning was the word and the word was yeah, you see? and there, the Latin translation is not as clear as they do in logic, right? As they say, awkward, right? Instead of, folks, right? But the text, the Greek text of Saint John gives weight, right? To what Augustine and Hillary and Boethius and Thomas and so on in the church say about how it is that the persons are distinguished. They are distinguished by being distinguished. What? Towards someone, right? So here, in this texture, you've got the exact word. Notice why it's much better that way, because we use the word relation in English, maybe other languages too, and I hate this, there's another word that's used all the time now here in the sermons all the time. Relationship, right? It's an abstraction of an abstraction. But, you know, we speak of it being a relation between us, right? And it gives you kind of a false idea of what a relation is. Is there a relation between me and my father, let's say? Is there something between me and my father? Or is it more clear to say, my father is something towards me, to me, he's a father to me, and I'm to him a, what, son, right? And being a father and being a son is not the same thing. There's not some third thing, my father, me, and between us out here is a relation, right? Like, between you and me is this blot of a container or something like this, right? A relation between us, huh? You don't have to misunderstand a relation that way, but you tend to do it that way, right? There's nothing between us, huh? In between us. But no, I am something towards you, as a teacher may be, and you are towards me as a student or something like that, right? Okay? Or four is to two, a double, and two is to four, a half. But two is to six, three, a third, right? And so on. Now, relations are one of the most difficult things in the world to understand. It takes a long, long time to understand all the subtleties of relations. Now, to the evidence of this, he says, it should be considered that only in those things which are said ad-aliquid, towards something, is there found some things by reason only and not by reality, huh? According to the thing. Which is not so in the other highest genera. Because the other genera, as quantity and quality, signify, right? According to their proper definition, something adhering in something, right? So, quantity is the measure of substance, right? Now, notice, in Aristotle, he distinguishes the categories in the two places where he does most typically. Sometimes he uses the word substance, from sea in Greek. Other times he just says, chiesti, what it is, right? And then, instead of quantity, he uses the concrete, how much. And, in quality, how, how it is. But now, even the man in the street used the right words. He will recognize this, right? Now, if I say to you, using the Latin words, is the substance of a thing and its quantity the same thing? He wouldn't be too sure what to say, right? But now, let me state it more correctly. Is what a thing is and its size the same thing? What a dog is and the size of a dog the same thing? And you and I can have the same what it is, right? And not have the same size. Like, say, John the Cross. He has what a man is. He is what a man is. But he doesn't have the same size as the taller brother, right? Okay? So, in a sense, quantity is the size of a thing, right? How much of it there is. And quality is how it is, right? Healthier, sick, wise, or foolish, and so on. But those things which are said towards something, they signify by their proper definition only a respect towards some other thing. which respect is sometimes in the, what, very nature of things. As when some things, by their very nature, are ordered to each other and have an inclination towards each other, huh? And these relations are necessarily real. Let me take the example from the ancient science. Just as in the heavy body, there is an inclination ordered to the place which is the middle of the universe. Whence the respect is in the heavy body, once there's a certain respect, huh? In the heavy body with respect to the, what, middle place of the universe. And similar about other things of this sort. Sometimes, though, the respect signified through those things which are said towards something is only in the, what, grasping of reason, conferring one to another. And then it is relation of reason only. Just as when it compares the, what, notion of man to animal as species to, what, genus, huh? And those are the kinds of relations of reason that I study in logic, huh? Am I a subject or a predicate? In reality, am I a subject or a predicate? It's only in reason that I'm a subject or a predicate, right? And when I say Berkwist is Berkwist, I'm both a subject and a predicate. Okay? No, so when I say that the dog is a quadruped, right? And the dog is an animal. Am I saying two different things of the dog? Yeah. Yeah. Or if I say that three is a number and three is an odd number, right? Yeah, yeah. Maybe you can tell a relation of those two, right? But is that relation in things? Universal is only in reason. So Boethius, when he's commenting on Porphyry, the first book of logic, he says, the thing is singular when sensed, but universal when understood. So these relations among universals are relations that don't belong to things by themselves, but in what? Reason, huh? Now, it's kind of strange, huh? But another kind of relation of reason is today is before tomorrow. And the reason why they say that's a relation of reason is that tomorrow doesn't exist. Okay? So the relation of what exists to what does not exist, or in Fort Siro, you know, tomorrow is before the day after that. Relation between two things, you know, what exists, is that new relation? It's kind of strange, huh? The time there where we first think of before and after relations, huh? It's not real relations. But when something goes forward from a beginning of the same nature, it's necessary that both, to wit, the one going forward, and that from which it goes forward, are found in the same, what? Order. And thus it's necessary that they have, what? Real respects or relations to each other. But since, therefore, these going forwards in God we spoke about in the previous question are in, what? An identity of nature. This hasn't been shown. Let's go back to the fact that, what? God's understanding of self, God's understanding, is God's being. That's something we learned back in the treatise on, what? The understanding of God, right? And God's loving is God, right? So St. John can say God is love, right? Okay? You can't say I am love, or I am understanding, right? No. I'm a man who understands a few things, who loves some things, right, and so on, but I'm not understanding. And for me to be is not to understand, is it? For me to be is not to love. But for God to be and for God to understand are the same thing. And for God to be and to love are the same thing. So God is understood, you could say has being in God's understanding, but that's the same as his being. So it is God. And God is loved, you know, as being in God's love, but God's loving is his being. Therefore it has the same being that God has, therefore it is God. It's an amazing thing, right? As opposed to, as you were saying in the image of the Trinity in us, when my reason understands what reason is, when my reason defines itself as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, right, is reason's understanding what reason is, the being of reason. So that definition of reason is not simply speaking reason itself, is it? Although in a way it is. Okay. But because my understanding of reason is, is not the existence or being of my reason, right? Then this is not exactly like the Trinity, is it? Okay. But there's a sort of likeness there, huh? Because it's proceeding from a thing in thought of itself, huh? But the thinking is not the being of the thing in this case, huh? And the first thing my reason thought about was obviously not what reason is. Yeah, yeah, quite a bit after. Even though, as I found to point out, my first teacher was Aquinas. The kindergarten teacher was in Aquinas. Sister Aquinas. And then if you back upon it, I said, there's some deep, you know, meaning in it. Yeah, yeah. I didn't realize that. My first and last teacher. What? Your first teacher. Well, that's true. That's true. I don't know if you're a grandma. Even your kindergarten teacher came later. Okay, so he says, since, therefore, the going forwards in God are an identity of nature, if you've been manifesting a bit here for that reason, that the understanding of the loving of God is his being, right? It's necessary that relations which are taken according to these going forwards in God are real, what? Relations of him. That's something he can chew upon for a while. Well, just like the relation of me to my father and my father to me are real relations, right? If I proceed from him in this, what? In the same nature. Not the same nature numerically, but the same nature specifically. Now, how does he explain this text of Boethius here, right? A little difficult, this one. Boethius seems to be saying that towards something is not said in divine things, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that ad aliquit, towards something, is said not altogether to be said in God, right? According to, what? Proper notion of what is said to be towards something. Insofar as the proper notion of what is said towards something is not taken by comparison person to that to which the relation is existing in, but with respect to what? Another. Not, therefore, through this does Boethius wish to exclude that relation is not in God, but that is not predicated by way of what? Existing within, according to the proper notion of relation, but more in the way of what? Having itself towards another, right? It's not like an accident of God, right? In fact, these relations would be the same as the substance of God, then. Now, the second objection is taken from the likeness of the relation of the Father to the Son and of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit, and that of something to itself, right? And that likeness that it has to a relation that is not real. That's kind of interesting, right? To the second, it should be said that the relation which is implied by this name or noun or word, same, is a relation of reason only if it be taken as what? Simply the same. Because this relation cannot be what? Considered, except in a certain order which reason introduces something to itself. According to what? It's two considerations. But it is otherwise, when some things are said to be the same, not in number, right? But in the nature of the genus or species. But Boethius, therefore, assimilates the relations which are in divine things to the relation of identity or sameness, not regard all things, but only in this respect. In fact, that through these relations, the substance is not what? Diversified, just as neither through the relation of what? Identity. So when you say God from God, light from light, true God from true God, is there a different God you're talking about there? In that respect, you know, we say Socrates is Socrates. Is there a different Socrates in the subject and in the what? Predicate? No, it's numerically the same, right? And so, when we say that Socrates and Plato are the same, we mean the same in what? Not numerically, but the same in species or kind, right? And that's not the way the father and son are. They're just the same kind of thing. They are the same thing. Okay? Substantially, huh? And therefore, that's the way in which they are alike. See what a dangerous thing likeness is? How true Plato is in the sophists when he says it's a slippery thing. And I was studying the four tools of dialectic. And dialectic is reasoning from probable opinions, right? Sometimes even the contradictory conclusions. And the first tool of dialectic is the tool of selecting probable premises. And the second tool is the tool of distinguishing the meanings of the words that are in these statements. The third tool is the tool of difference. You see, the difference of things. The fourth tool is the tool of likeness. I was struck by the fact that Aristotle puts the tool of difference before the tool of likeness, right? Because likeness is a cause of deception when you don't see the difference between these things, huh? Okay? And so, he puts the tool of difference before the tool of likeness. Maybe for that reason. I mean, there's one reason. So, Braithius is assimilating, right, the relation of the father to the son to the relation of Socrates to Socrates in that, when I say Socrates to Socrates, the Socrates in the subject of that statement, the Socrates in the predicate, are numerically the same person, right? Okay?