Prima Pars
Lecture 115: Real Relations in God and Divine Simplicity

Transcript
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And when I speak of the relation of father to son, they're one and the same God, numerically. They're not one and the same person, because the persons will be distinguished by relations. And there's a fatherhood and a sonhood are not the same relation. But as far as what God is, as far as the substance of God, they are the same substance, and not just in kind, but numerically. But, you know, the Mohammedans think we're, what? Yeah, that we think of three gods or something, right? And we're kind of confused, you know. We say one has one God, and the other time we say that his father, son, and Holy Spirit. So we think there's one God, and we think there's three gods, right? No, we think there's only one God, right? It's interesting, you know, in Tom's way in the Summa here, the questions on the substance of God are arranged, because the last question is on unity of God. See, have your mind before you go to Trinity. It's one God, right? And however, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinguished, it's not a distinction that's going to be, give rise to many gods, to more than one God. So in that respect, the relation of the Father to the Son is like the relation of Socrates to Socrates, right? But in another way, it's unlike that relation, because the Socrates and the subject and the Socrates and the predicate are not really related. But the Father and the Son are really, what? Related, you know. That's probably why the imagination is the big cause of deception, because the imagination, the lights and the likenesses of things, and doesn't take into account their differences. So the figure of speech that the poet loves the most is the metaphor, right? The metaphor and then the simile and so on, based upon likeness. Okay, now, the third objection is taken from another relation of reason. Let's look at the reply to this. To the third, it should be said that since the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creatures. Nor is it from his nature that he has a, what? Relation towards creatures, huh? For he does not produce creatures from the necessity of his nature, but through his understanding and through his, what? Will. And therefore, in God, there is not a real relation to creatures. But in creatures, there is a real relation to what? To God. Because creatures are contained under the divine order. And it is in their very nature that they depend upon God. But it's not in the very nature of God that he has creatures. It depends upon the free act of his will. But the processions, the divine proceedings, there in God, are in the same nature, right? Therefore, non est similis ratio. And I like that. So notice, you're seeing the word beginning there, right? So what is a beginning that's not a real relation? So maybe this beginning is not a real relation either. But Thomas is seeing the difference between the two, huh? It's interesting that this kind of relation of reason is one that Aristotle talks about in the fifth book of wisdom. And if I see you, right, huh? Does my seeing you have some relation to you? It's a seeing of you, right? And my seeing depends upon you being there, right? To see you, right? And so on, huh? But is your being seen by me? Is that a real relation to you? This is the kind of thing Aristotle talks about where one thing is said to be related to another because something else is related to it. But it's not really related to it, huh? But I can't speak of my seeing you without saying that you are seen by me. Or my knowing, you know? Let's say I know what the moon is, right? It's not green cheese, I guess. If I know what the moon is, I'm related in some way to the moon, right? But is the moon related to me by what it's being known by me? Well, Thomas says that the relation of God to creatures is like the relation of the known to the knower. But the relation of creatures to God is like the relation of the knower to the knower, to go back to Aristotle's example. That's a very strange thing, right? If you compare that with the relation that will come up in the third one there, relation of genus to species or species to genus, there it's a relation of reason on both sides. But in this one I just talked about, one thing is really related to another, but not vice versa. And Aristotle will speak, you know, sometimes as the known is the measure of the knower, right? Or is knowing. Like in the categories, he talks about that, huh? You are a city. Is that true or false? Yeah. Now, are you, is it true that you are sitting because of that statement? Or is that statement true because you're sitting? Yeah. So you're sitting or not sitting is the measure of the truth or falsity of my statement that you are, what? Sitting, right? So the measure, does the measure depend upon the measured? But the measured depends upon the, what? Measure, yeah. Whereas the godlike Plato says in his last work, the laws, huh? He says, Protagoras says, man is the measure of all things. That's not true. He says, God is the measure of all things, huh? Okay. God is the measure of the creatures, huh? So the creature is really related to God as the measured is to the measure, right? But the measure is only said by reason, right? To be the measure of the measure. You can't think about that a lot. That's a difficult thing, huh? But it's interesting that the distinction of the relations of reason, huh? As far as I know, in Thomas, the ones that he distinguishes in the De Potentia and so on, in other places he says, well, two of these kinds are explicitly talked about by Aristotle and he'll give those and then Avicenna points out a couple, too. So there Thomas follows Avicenna, right? Avicenna says some wonderful things, you know? You know, he's always quoted by Thomas, you know, but God alone is liberal. God alone gets nothing out of his giving, huh? It's pure generosity, right? I mean, it's just, you know, it's incredible. But in this regard of there being relations of reason, Avicenna adds, you know, it's just two kinds that Aristotle doesn't talk about, right? And Thomas brings it together and so on. But they say at least three of these four kinds come up here in these here. Okay, now the fourth objection was saying, hey, this going forward of the word and so on is in reason, right? But the relations of reason are, relations are reason and not new relations. To the fourth it should be said that the relations which follow upon Only the operation of the understanding in things understood are relations of reason only. Because reason introduces them between two things understood, right? But the relations which follow upon the operation of the understanding, which are between the word or thought proceeding intellectually, and that which it perceives, are not relations of reason only, right? But of the thing. Because the understanding and reason is itself a thing, right? And is compared really to that which proceeds from it in an understandable way, right? Just as a bodily thing to that which proceeds from it in a bodily way, right? So when there proceeds from my reason, the definition of reason, then there's a real relation there between those two. But when I talk about animals, a genus, a dog, cat, horse, an elephant, right? And I'm talking about the relation of this universal to those universals, right? Well, nothing outside the mind is universal. To be universal is something that happens to things only in my mind. I mean, I used to see them, I used to read this out in class, I'd say, you know, reading the list, John, Mary, man, woman. I never had a man sitting in my class. It was always John or Tom or some other individual men, right? I never had a woman sitting there, you know? I never got a class that's, you know, John, Mary, man, woman. Boy, you're, nothing universal there, right? I never had a universal in my class. Talking about universals, right? That's in the mind, right? For the things you're universal. Now, maybe some, you know, remote foundation of these things outside the mind, right? That's the problem there that you have with the other philosophers, right? Because they thought that the way you know had to be the way what things are, right? And therefore, the Platonists thought that there would be the universals out there, right? Outside the mind, right? The world forms, man himself and dog himself and cat himself, right? And then other men, the skeptics, you know, said, well, there aren't universals out there. Therefore, our knowledge is false, right? And Aristotle says, there's nothing false in the mind considering what's common to you two guys, right? Unless they say that what's common to you exists outside my mind, apart from you guys. Then I'm making a mistake, huh? So this fourth objection there is just saying, well, these are relations of reason, right? And not seeing what you mean exactly by relation of reason that is not a real relation. Well, it's these relations that are based upon universal altyom. And what happens to things in the mind, like becoming a subject or a predicate of a statement, huh? Becoming a middle term, a major term, right, huh? But these are things that happen to you only in reason, right? But when I imagine something, right, and there proceeds from my imagination an image of this thing that I'm imagining, right? Then that's one thing proceeding from another thing, right? And when I think about something and there proceeds from my mind a thought of this thing, then there's a relation between me and the thought. So the second, third, and fourth objections are reasoning from three different kinds of relations of reason, right? And mixing them up, right, with the real relation of the Father to the Son in the face of our Son and the other real relations in God, huh? Now the second article. Thank you. To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that the relation in God is not the same thing as, what, his essence, his nature, his substance. Now he's going to take Augustine, right? As Boethius in the first and, what, second objections in the first article, and now in the first and second objections here, he's a text from Augustine, right? For Augustine says in the fifth book about the Trinity, and as I mentioned before, that's the one where he talks about relations, he gets into that. That not everything that is said in God is said secundum substantia, right? For something is said towards something, ad aliquidum. Augustine's got the right words there, right? As the Father ad filium, right? Atter ad filium. But these are not said according to what substance, right? Therefore, the relation is not the divine essence, right? There's a subtle distinction there that's being overlooked in that objection. I often come back to that fact that we see that a person is mistaken, and they say, so I messed up, right? Didn't see some distinction, so we're looking at some. Moreover, Augustine says in the seventh book about the Trinity, that everything which is said relatively is also something apart from that, what? Relation. As man who is a lord or master and a man who is a, what? Servant, right? Something apart from my biggest servant. Name me a man. If, therefore, there are some relations in God, it's necessary that there be in God something besides these relations. But this other cannot be anything other than, what, the divine substance or essence. Therefore, the essence or substance or nature is something other from the, what, relations. So, you've got a more subtle thing here, because when you speak of, is there a distinction between the divine substance and fatherhood? Well, there's certainly a distinction of reason between the two, huh? It wasn't a real distinction, right? Okay. That's a very subtle thing, right? Moreover, the being of the relative is to have itself to another. As it's said in the Predicamentis, that's Ernst Dahl's book on the, what, categories, right? Predicamentis is the Latin word for the categories, so. So, in Boeth or Albert the Great, you have the Predicabilibus, which is about genus, species, difference, property, accident, the isogogae of porphyry. And then the Predicamentis, which is about substance, quality, quality, relation, and so on. So, if, therefore, relation be the divine essence itself, right, it would follow that the being of the divine essence is to have itself to another, which is repugnant to the perfection of the divine being, which is most of all absolute and subsisting by itself. Therefore, the relation is not the very divine essence. So, that's really tough, tough love here, you know, as a teacher, you know. But against all this nonsense is that everything which is not the divine, what, essence or substance is a creature. But the relation really belongs to God. If, therefore, it's not the same thing as the divine essence, it will be a, what, creature. And, therefore, there ought not to be, what, shown towards it, the adoration of Latviae. Now, that's the Latin word for, it turns out the Greek word, right, for the adoration that is owed to God alone, right? It's a very precise word. And against this, it is said in the preface there, huh? This is... My text says in the preface is the Fiservis in the Trinitate. That ut in personis proprietas, and in majesty equality should be adored, right? So we shouldn't be adoring these relations, these subsisting relations, if they're not really there. Now Thomas says, I answer it should be said that about this Gilbert Poritanus is said to have heard, but afterwards he called back his error in the Council of... Oh, it could be. It could be Reims, yeah. That's it, Reims, okay. I think Reims. For he said that the relations in divine things are assisting, or outside, extrinsic, attached to it, you know? Okay? I think God's like a bulletin board, he just taxes things up. Now, to the evidence of these things, it should be considered that in each of the nine genera of accident, these are the ones that Aristotle distinguished, huh? So Aristotle distinguished the ten categories, let's just recall that for you. It was going to be called the substance, which is already quantity, quality, relation, these are the main ones. And substance, he said, what a thing is, right? Quantity is how much of it, or how many of it is, its size, quality is how it is, the disposition of it, and relation, what it is towards another, right? Okay? And these all signify something in it, right? Either absolutely, or towards another, right? And then the last six, which is not as important, is where something is said of you, but reasoned as something outside of you. And there's one of these last six that is a particular one, right? Like I said, to be clothed, right? Or shod, or something, right? Or helmeted, or something, you know? And that's something man himself alone has. But then, where you are, when you are, your position, right? And if you're acting upon something, or you're being acted upon, right? Okay? Now Thomas is talking about these three and the last six. He's saying, the nine genera of accident. So he says, to the evidence of this, it should be considered that in each of the nine genera of accident, there are two things to be considered. One of which is, that belongs to each of them according as it is an accident. And this is commonly, right, in all of them, to exist in a, what? Subject. Aristotle makes this distinction. a little bit earlier before he distinguishes a ten, right? He distinguishes between something that exists only in others in the subject and something that, what? By itself, yeah. Like a substance, right? So the distinction between something like a dog and the health of the dog, right? Or the dog and the size of the dog. Or the dog and the shape of the dog, right? The shape of the dog or the health of the dog is something that exists in another, right? But the dog is not something that exists in another, it's in the subject, right? It might be in some place, but not in another subject. For the being of an accident is to be in another, right? In essay. Another thing that can be considered in each of these is the proper definition of each of these, what? Genes, right? And in other genera, formulation, as for example, quantity and quality, also the, what? Proper definition of the genus is taken by comparison to its subject, as quantity is said to be the measure of substance, right? The size of substance and so on. Quality, the disposition of substance, right? But the proper definition of relation is not taken by comparison to that in which it is, but by comparison to something, what? Outside, right? Okay. If, therefore, we consider, even in created things, relations, according to this that they are relations, thus they are found to be, what? Assisting, right? Not, what? Intrinsically effects, right? Because the meaning of relation is toward another, right? As it were, signifying a certain respect, Yeah. In a way, touching the thing related, insofar as it's, what? Towards another, right? You kind of see when Aristotle talks about large and small, what the other thing that this is, he says. Well, is that something absolute, large or small? What might be a large party in my house would be a small number at the Super Bowl or something, right? You see? So large and small doesn't seem to say anything about how many people I had or how many people were at the game, right? But something towards another, right? But as an accident, in general, it's something, you know, something. If we consider a harbor relation according as an accident, thus it is something existing in a subject, right? And having accidental being in that subject, right? But Gilbert Poritonis, huh? Considered relation only in the first, what? Way. Now, whatever in created things has accidental being, right? As it is transferred to God, has, what? Substantial being. This goes back to what part did we see this first of all in the treatise on God? What question did we learn that there's no accidents in God? Yeah, simplicity of God, right? That was one of the articles in there, right? And this goes back to the fact that God is a pure act. So if there was an accident in God, something existed in God that was not God, right? Like my health exists in my body, it was not my body, right? God would be to that as ability is to act, it wouldn't be pure act. So nothing that is in, there's nothing in God as an accident in a subject, right? But whatever is in God is his, what, essence, his substance, his nature, right? Now we've talked about that before. We talked a little bit about the words in and the word to have. How are those things, you know, those two words in and have? Well, in Aristotle, it's up the word to have in the fifth book of wisdom, right? He says that there's as many meanings of the word have as there are of the word in. And, of course, in the fourth book of natural hearing, the physics, he distinguishes the eight meanings of in, right? So, corresponding, each meaning of in, there's a corresponding meaning of at. Now, just think of yourself a bit now. Do you have some knowledge? And can we also say that there's knowledge in you? Yeah. So, knowledge is said to be in you, or maybe you could say knowledge is in your mind, right? And your mind is not in the knowledge, but your mind has that knowledge, right? Do you have any health? If there's health in your body, your body has health, right? Does your body have a shape? Yeah. But the shape is what? In your body, right? So, they kind of correspond, right? But now, in God, when we say that something is in God, is there a real distinction between the haver and what is in it? Or if we say that God has something, there's any distinction between the haver and the hem. It's only In reason, right, we distinguish between the two, and that's because we, what, start from creatures where the haver and the had are distinct, right, and what is in something and that in which it is are not the yours. Same, yeah. So whatever God has is God, and vice versa, whatever is in God is God, okay? In a sense, it goes back to, you know, the first thing we learn, the distinction of matter and form, these things have changed, right? And the matter is said to have a form, and the form is said to be in the matter, right? And that's what our mind knows about as a proper object, right? So we turn to God and say, what's in God? What does he have? But eventually we realize whatever God has is God, and there's no real distinction, right? And that there's this variety of haver and had, a distinction between what is in something and that which it is in is, what, something in creatures, right? Okay? And so we borrow those words to talk about God, but then we have to realize that what is in God is God, and what God has is God, right? So if there are three persons in God, or there are some relations that are really in God, are they really distinct from God? Just as if there's some knowledge in God, right, or God has some knowledge, is there any real distinction between God and the knowledge that he is said to have, or the knowledge that is said to be, you know, interesting? I'd like to ask you some time, what do you think about thinking about God, right? I mean, does thinking about God make you a saint? But why do we think about God, anyway? Okay, that's part of it, yeah. You know, there's two definitions of theology, right? One which is quoted by Thomas in the beginning of the book, right? Where, take it from Augustine, right? The science of which faith is, what, engendered, nourished, strengthened, and defended, right? Okay, and then another one that's sometimes attributed to St. Anselm, that it's faith or belief seeking understanding, right? Although you might say that really goes back to Augustine, too, because Augustine says, I'm just a sort of man who'd want to understand what I believe, okay? But notice, if you look at those two definitions, you can't define theology without, what, faith, right? Okay, okay? So one says, theology is, fides, querenz, intellect, belief, seeking, understanding, right? That's the one that's, in those words, I guess, in St. Anselm, but really goes back to Augustine, too, right? And then the other one is the one that's at the very beginning of your book here, when Thomas asks where the theology is a science, right? And it's Article 2, right? And in the said contra of Article 2, and it's taken again from this great work of Augustine, the 14th book of the Trinity, right? Okay? And to this science is attributed to that by which faith, the most saving faith, right? Is engendered, right? Nourished, defended, and strengthened, right? Do you see that? Okay? Now, let's just put down that again. Now, Dustin says, you know, another place that heresy is necessary for theology to develop, right? Now, a heretic, what? He denies an article of the faith, and some church father, right, has to defend that article of the faith, right? And in defending that article of the faith, he came to, what, understand it better, right? But kind of the first impetus, you might say, is to defend this article of the faith that's being denied by Sibelius or some other heretic, man. Now, if you look at these two definitions here, they're kind of different, aren't they? Because the second definition says, is belief for the sake of theology, or is theology for the sake of belief, what would you say if you were asked that question? Yeah, yeah. And in the second definition here, you can see that theology is for the sake of belief, right? In other words, if you have theology, this would help you to, what, your missionary, right? To bring someone else to the faith, right? And your own faith and that of yours, you know, flock and so on, you can nourish that, right? You can defend it, right? And your faith would become stronger, right? But this definition brings out that theology is for the sake of belief, right? Now, if you look at the first one here, what does it seem like? Yeah, it seems like you're, what, you're seeking to go beyond faith to understand this, right? Well, I've got to be careful about that, because you're not going to understand it very well, right? But this shows the harmony there of belief with, what, reason, right? Because reason naturally wants to understand your beliefs, huh? So even if I believe Euclid, let's say, the Pythagorean Theorem, you know, everybody's heard about the Pythagorean Theorem. But I'd actually want to understand what I believe, right? And of course, in the case of the Pythagorean Theorem, I can completely understand that and the reasons for it, right? Here I can never completely understand what I believe. I'll completely understand what I believe, only when I, what, see God face to face, huh? And I have to be a Christian. So this here is kind of a consolation before I get to be a Christian, right? But my seeking to understand that shows, as I say, the harmony of reason with, what, faith, huh? That you naturally want to understand as far as you can, right? And Thomas often quotes a beautiful passage from Hillary, huh? And of course, I think it's taken from Hillary's work, On the Twinties. It's probably in here, later on here. The one where Hillary says, you know, that I know I should never arrive fully understanding it, but I make some progress, you know? And the one who sets out to go to something that's kind of infinite, right? He knows he's not going to arrive, but you get a little bit of consolation, a little bit of understanding, right? Okay? So, it's sort of natural. want to understand what you believe, right? Insofar as the definition there of faith that's given in St. Paul is the substance of things hoped for, right? It's kind of like the beginning of things hoped for. And until you get what you hope for, eternal life, to see God as he is, this is kind of a consolation in between, right? A little bit of nevertheless, the relation there between theology and faith is a little different in these two, right? So, would you say the beatific vision, seeing God as he is, the famous text is in what? St. John's Epistle, right? Just seeing him as he is. Is the beatific vision for the sake of faith? No. Faith is for ultimately the beatific vision, right? So, this seems to be a little bit on the way towards the beatific, right? Well, how can it be both then? How can it have this double relation to faith, right? Well, I mean, why do I, for example, think about God, right? Is it because I want to strengthen my belief or is it because I'm curious about these things. They're very interesting. They're very wonderful. Can it be both? Both, right? Yeah. Yeah. Thomas, in the commentary on weight, this is De Hebdomadibus, huh? Here, look at the little premium he has to the De Hebdomadibus. Thomas quotes scripture, one of the sapiential books. And the sapiential book says, run into your house and play with your thoughts. And Thomas says, well, why does he compare this to play, right? And of course, you have to care for it. There's a two-fold likeness here. One is that play is, what, enjoyable. And also that play is, to some extent, for its sake. But Aristotle takes up play in the Tenth Book of Wisdom and he shows us not having this play. See? So can something be for its own sake and still be for the sake of something else? And so what Aristotle is saying, you know, in the epics, that something can be for its own sake, it can be desirable for its own sake, right, and yet be for the sake of something else. And so as you take the example of a medicine, right, the medicine tastes awful. You take medicine only for the sake of something else to get healthy, right? But if the medicine was delicious, then you might enjoy the medicine apart from the fact that it's going to lead to health and you might even, you know, to some extent, you enjoy it for its own sake. Is that a kind of fiction? I remember as a little kid having some medicine for something and it came out like little red things like the cinnamon things you get in the store sometimes. and it actually tasted good with the cinnamon coating, right? I remember one time instead of swallowing it, I can't even. And all of a sudden I started to the youngest part, I went off and tasted it. I realized that was just, you know, safe and dry. But there was something for its own sake that, you know, it's like this is candy. And so, I can both, right, think about God because it's enjoyable, right? And I think about God to some extent for its own sake. And it's kind of anticipation of seeing God as he is, right? Because if we see God as he is, are we doing this for something else? Well, if we are, it's also being done for its own sake, right? And so here you see, in a sense, this understanding is, in part at least, for its own sake. It's desirable in itself. I'm often saying, I think about God because I can't think of anything better to think about. Don't think more interesting to think about, right? You know? So I try to think about God every day, see? And I think about other things so I can think better about God. I think about the nations of reason and all that sort of stuff, right? Because it helps me to think better about the Trinity and so on. Okay? But I should also think about God in order to, what, engender faith in others, right? To nourish the faith in them and in myself. To defend it, right? From these crazy attacks, To strengthen the faith, right? And that's not in kind of bitch with this, right? But it's a little different thing, right? But if you answer the other question, there it is. Thinking about God make you a saint, I'd say, no, no, make you holy. But now when you go to the prayers, right? Hope and so on, you say, hallowed be thy name. Well, even that doesn't make you holy. But you're asking God's help to be holy, right? Or like in the, I'm a Christian, you know? Santifically, right? Look at the hallowed name, right? So you're seeking to be holy, right? Okay? But you're told, you know, in the Psalms, you seek always the face of God, right? In a sense, you're trying to see him a little bit here, and you try to understand him, right? Because understanding is called seeing, in a sense, isn't it? So, you're supposed to seek always the face of God, and quite in harmony, right? To try to understand these things so far as you can, right? Right? really? Some just kind of really understand these things, right? But if you, you know, the Mohammedans take over, they may one of these days, you know? And I've got to defend now, you know, that there's only one God, despite the Father being God, and the Son being God, and the Holy Spirit being God, right? I've got to know a little about theology to defend this, I told you, I had a student from the side of the great guy that told that little story, right? And he, he, he's Mohammedan, and he said that he rejected to Shakespeare calling reason God like, right? And so I tried to explain to him in what sense we speak of the creature being like God, and I was going to the fourth ladder in Consciano, where it says you can never notice a likeness of the creature to God without a greater what? Unlikeness, you know? I don't know if that says fine or much, but I was trying to defend it a little bit, you know? We were not, you know, naive in saying that something in creatures was like God, right? Okay, so, we're in the second article here, I think. Take a break, a little break. A little break? Okay, yeah. Okay, yeah. Okay, yeah. Okay, yeah. Okay, yeah.