Prima Pars
Lecture 116: Relations in God: Real Distinction and Divine Simplicity

Transcript
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Okay, so we're in the middle, last third almost, of the body of the article, right? Whatever therefore in created things has accidental being, the being in a subject rather than by itself, as it is transferred to God as substantial being. For nothing is in God as an accident is subject. But whatever is in God is his what? Essence, his nature, his substance. And I say you can do the same thing with the word what? Have, right? Whatever God has is God. Whatever God has in himself is God. Okay. Thus therefore, in that part by which relation in created things has accidental being in the subject, a relation really existing in God as the being of the divine essence or the divine substance. Existing the same entirely with him, right? But in this, that it is said to be towards something, right? It does not signify some habitudo, some having itself towards the essence, right? But more towards its what? Opposite. Okay. And thus it is manifest that a relation really existing in God is the same as that essence, right? Secundum realm, right? Okay. And it does not differ except according to the, what, definition or the way of understanding it. In so far as in the relation is implied a respect to its what? Opposite, right? Which is not implied in the name essence, right? It is clear therefore that in God, the being of relation is not other and the being of its essence, right? But they are one in the, what, same thing, right? Okay. Is it clear to everybody now? No, it is hard to understand how you can have distinct persons. Well, he is saying if you compare the relation to the divine substance, it is the same thing, right? But if you compare the father to the son, they are what? Yeah. Okay. And that is one kind of opposite, as Aristotle said, the relative son. So, that is a very subtle thing, right? But you have to see that. Now, let us go back to the first objection. As Augustine says in the fifth book of the Trinity, not everything that is said to be, what, in God is said according to substance, right? For something is said towards something, as the father to the son. And these are not said according to the substance, right? Okay. Now, as Thomas said, to the first therefore it should be said, that those words of Augustine, right, do not pertain to saying this, right? That the fatherhood or some other relation which is in God, according to its, what, being, its existence, is not the same as the divine essence. But that it is not predicated, right, according to the way of substance, as existing in that of which it is said, but as having itself, what, towards another, right? In account of this there are said to be only two predicaments, huh, in God, huh? Because the other predicaments imply a, what, relation to that of which they are said, both according to their being, right, as well as according to the notion of their genus, huh? So the size of something, right, is not only in that of which it is the size, but the very meaning of size is to be the measure of that thing, huh? And quality is the disposition of substance, right? As well as being in substance, huh? But nothing that is in God, right, can have, what, a relation to that which it is, or which it is said, except the relation of, what, identity of being the same thing, right? An account of the, what, highest or most complete, right, simplicity of God, right? So he's saying whatever is in God, right, must be altogether the same thing as God himself, right? Because of the, what, God being completely simple, right? Like, Teresa of Avila says, right? God is altogether simple, right? And the closer you come to God, the simpler you become, okay? But since there really is relations in God, right, which are the same, right, as the substance of God, but because they're really relations, then compared to each other, they are really distinct from each other. But compared to the divine substance, they're entirely the same. And I say, how can this, how can something be one thing and yet be three things, right? Well, it's because thing doesn't mean one thing. Okay? Now, notice, Thomas goes back to relations, right, huh? And my being, let's say, a father, right, huh, is something that exists in me, right, and it's really distinct from me, right? And by my fatherhood, I am something towards my children, right? Now, when you speak of relations in God, though, right, relation can't be something in God that's really distinct from God. But it really is, in God, something towards another. And therefore, it is really distinct from that which it is towards, right, but not really distinct from that in which it is. Do you see the idea? Because if it is really distinct from that in which it is, then God would not be altogether simple. But if it was not really distinct from that towards which it is, it wouldn't be a relation. It wouldn't be really a relation in God, then you're pitting and smoking for a while. Yeah. Yeah, but it's kind of a good expression, though. You've got to think about this, right, huh? You should look at that, right? In bed, you're a lot, because I can't fall asleep, by the way, and I've got to think about these things, you know? You don't sleep. Yeah, yeah. I was thinking about this last night. But in a sense, that's the most quiet time of the night, frankly. I'm laying in bed there, and things are more as quiet as you're down, you know? And so you think, gee, it was, yeah. Now I see who it is, huh? So you see, there's really a relation in God, right? But what is really in God is God, right? So there can't be any real distinction between God and what is said to be in God, right? But since there's really a relation in God, then it really has what a relation has, which is to be, what? Towards another, right? Just like, you know, take a little different example here, but, you know, is there knowledge in God, right? Is there really knowledge in God? Yeah. But what is in God can't be really distinct from God, right? So the knowledge that is in God is really God, right? But since there's really knowledge in God, then God really does know. See? Okay? But that he really knows is not something distinct from what he is, right? It's a little different thing, right? But, um... If God didn't really know by his knowledge, there wouldn't really be knowledge in God. But since God's altogether simple, the knowledge that is really in God must be God. But in the case now of these relations, they're really in God like we saw in the first article. And therefore they can't be really distinct from God. But because they're really relations, then they must be distinct from that towards which they are. So in the beginning was the Word, St. John says, right? The Word was towards God, right? And the Word was God. So the Word is in no way really distinct from God, because the Word was God. But since the Word was towards God, God there is standing for the Father. And the Word was really distinct from that which is the Word, the Son for the Father. Okay, so... Okay, will you finish the first objection here? I guess, yeah. Okay. The second objection is also taken from Augustine, right? And Augustine says that everything which is said relatively is also something apart from what? As man from master and man from sir. To the second, it should be said that just as in created things, right? In that which is said relatively, there is not only to be found a respect to another, but also something what? Absolute. Now, when Thomas uses the word absolute, I don't think in the contemporary use of the word absolute, right? But absolute is the distinguished from towards another, right? Okay. Absolute is not towards another, but sometimes they say, I'd say to itself, right? Okay. Something in itself or by itself, right? So also is it true in God, right? Okay. But nevertheless, in another way, right? In the way they say it in Latin, it's a tamen alitere alitere, right? So he's saying both in the creature and in God, right, then you don't have a relation or something relative without also having something absolute, right? But now this is found in a different way in the creature and God. For that which is found in the creature apart from that which is contained under the meaning of the relative name is another thing, right? It's an aliyarez, another thing. So what's found in me apart from my being a father is that I'm a man. And my being a man is really a different thing from my being a father. God, my being a father is something added to my being a man, right? And that's why not every man is a father, right? Okay. But in God, right, what there is besides as being a father or a son or Holy Spirit is not another, what, thing, right, huh? Okay. But in God, it is not another thing, right? But one and the same thing, right? But one and the same thing which is not perfectly expressed, right, by the name of relation, right? Just like when we say, you know, that God knows and God, what, loves, right, huh? Well, God and his knowledge are the same thing, but the name God doesn't perfectly express the divine knowledge, the divine love. The same thing is true here. But one and the same thing which is not perfectly expressed by the name of relation, as it were, comprehended under the meaning of such a, what, name, right? And Thomas then goes back like I was doing just now. For it has been said above that when we tweeted about the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine substance than is able to be signified by some name. Quence it does not follow that in God, apart from the relation, there is some other thing, say, kunnarem, really different, but only considering what? The definition of the name, right? So neither the name of the divine substance or the name of this divine relation, right, expresses either one of them fully what God is or what is in God, right, huh? But in the case of the creature, the relation and what has the relation is what? Really a different, what, thing, right? So an Aristotle distinguished theme. Oh, it's not on the board anymore. Aristotle distinguished substance, quantity, quality, relation. Relation might be based upon quantity, like double and half or taller and shorter and so on, right? And, you know, he's like so-and-so, right? It might be based upon quality, right? But the quality that he's based upon is something other, another thing, right, than the, what, relation of likeness, huh? And my size is something, another thing for my being taller or shorter than you. But in God, the relation and the substance are, what, the same thing, right, huh? And they differ only in our, what, having two thoughts, neither of which expresses perfectly what is in God or what is God, right? Subtlement, huh? But that goes back to the general thing about no names, huh? No name said of God expresses perfectly what God is, huh? Thomas, you know, quotes that passage there from the prophet there, you know. In that day, there'll be one name. And that's what? When you see God as he is, right? Then you can have a name for what you see. And we'll talk about this when they get there for you, I hope. And we'll have a name, right? One name for God, right? Because we'll see God as he is, huh? But in this life, we only know God from creatures. And what is one and simple in God is multiplied in what? Creatures, right? So you have many thoughts imperfectly expressing what is in God, huh? Based upon the fact that what is one and simple in God is divided in creatures. Like my simple example there that I usually give you the circle, right? Where the center of the circle is the beginning of all these, what, lines, right? But the end of these lines, which is in creatures, are all different, what, perfections, huh? So I have a certain perfection in understanding things, right? I also have a certain perfection in loving wisdom and loving my wife, I guess. Loving my neighbor and so on. But these are different perfections in me. Perfection I have in understanding is not the perfection I have in loving and vice versa, right? And, but in God, right? It's one thing that corresponds to understanding and loving, huh? But why do I have these two words about God and I say both that God understands and God loves? Well, it's because I'm starting from myself or other creatures in whom understanding and loving are two different things. But they both, in an imperfect way, reflect the one simple perfection of God. The one simple infinite perfection of God, huh? And so just as the perfection... of the creatures imperfectly, right, represent the perfection of God, right? So the thoughts we have starting from the perfection of creatures imperfectly reflect the perfection of God, right? And this is a special example of it, right? When I speak of God and the substance of God and the simplicity of God, I don't bring out everything involved in the substance of God, right? I don't bring out these, what, relations that the substance of God is, right? And vice versa, these names that I have of these relations, such as a technical creatures, they don't perfectly express the substance of God, right? So some things, you know, are said of God, you might say, per modem substantiae, right? The way of what he is, right? Other than the very way of what he is towards what? That's expressed, in a sense, in St. John's Word. He said, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was towards God, right? And the Word was God, right? What's the difference between the second and the third phrase, right? You say the Word was towards God, you're saying what the Word is towards me, the Father, right? When you're saying the Word was God, you're saying what the Word is. So one is signifying in the manner of substance, meaning what it is. The other is signifying in the manner of what? Relation towards something, right, huh? Okay? And you have those two different thoughts, because in creatures, what I am, and my being towards another, right, are really different things, huh? But in God, they're not, huh? But they correspond to what is in God, and perfectly, what? Understood, right? You understand, in a multiplied way, what is one in God, huh? Okay, now, the third objection, huh? Warmery says, let's look at the objection again. The being of the relative is to have itself to another, right? It's said in the predicaments. If, therefore, relation is the very divine essence, it follows that the being of the divine essence is to have itself to another. And this seems to be repugnant to the perfection of the divine being, which is most of all absolute, right? And subsisting by itself, right? For the third, it should be said that if in the divine perfection nothing more were contained than what the relative name signifies, right, he would follow that his being was, what? Imperfect, right? As having itself, what? To another. Just as if, and he makes a comparison now to something more known to us, if we're not contained there more than what is signified the name of wisdom, right, he would not be something, what? Subsisting. But because the perfection of the divine essence is greater than what is able to be comprehended by the meaning of some name, it does not follow if a relative name or any other name set of God does not signify something perfect that the divine essence has imperfect being. Why? Because the divine essence comprehends in itself the perfection of all agenda, as it is said above. And this is what Aristotle says in the fifth book of Wisdom, right? He takes up the word perfect, right? He gives three meanings of the word perfect as said of the, what, creature, right? And he makes a distinction between what is perfect simply, or universally perfect, and what is perfect in its kind. And this perfect simply there, what is lacking in nothing, as Severo has said before, Thomas, Aristotle's talking about the perfection of God, right? It's interesting, Aristotle should give the sense of which God is perfect, right? Notice what he's saying in this text here. The divine essence comprehends in itself the perfections of all agenda, right? Why the perfection of creature is always of, what, one kind, huh? Like, you might have, what, perfect health, right? That's one kind of thing, right? But perfection of health is not the perfection of understanding, it's not the perfection of loving, it's not the perfection of even strength, right, huh? My friend Jim there, you know, he was next golden glove boxer, right? But he had some health problems, right? And so he said to me, you know, Dwayne, he says, he says, I'm strong, he says, but not healthy. Now, I was more healthy than Jim, but not as strong as Jim, right? And so, that's where our perfections are, right? All the different perfections that we have, huh? But each is one kind, huh? Like, God is, what, university perfect, huh? He has perfection of all, of all agenda, huh? So you say, is Homer perfect, period? Is he lacking in nothing? He might have been ugly man, he might have been blind, and some of a sudden he was blind, right? You know, there's a, he represents the poet there in the Odyssey, right? Demodocus sticks down with him, he sings of the fall of Troy, and so on. And some say this is a self-portrait. But Demodocus is represented as being blind, right? Maybe this is the origin of the legend that Homer himself was blind, right? But I think, you know, what Homer is saying is that the poet is, what, working out of his imagination. And therefore, like the lover works out of his imagination, it's said to be blind, right? Love is blind, we say, right? Not strictly speaking, right? But because the lover is, you know, imagining things that no one else sees in the beloved, right? Things that maybe aren't there, you know? Now, as Homer is not the eyewitness of the, what, Trojan War, right? That took place centuries ago, right? He's imagining things, right? It may not be, right? Just like in the Battle of Eisencourt, you know, you read Shakespeare at the end of the fifth, you don't understand why the English won, right? You read Churchill, you'll find out, but you won't find out from Shakespeare, right? You know? And so, is Homer perfect? Now, I could say Homer is the perfect poet. Mozart is the perfect musician. But you wouldn't say the perfect without saying, in what kind of perfection he had, right? What genus, huh? Aristotle was maybe the perfect philosopher, huh? But he wasn't Mozart. He wasn't Homer, right? He didn't have the perfection that Mozart has. But perfection of the creature is always limited to one kind, right? You and I are one kind of thing, you know? But strictly speaking, is God one kind of thing? Thomas will quote, you know, God says to Moses, I will show you every good. But Thomas says, that is, myself. But he has every good in a simple way, right? So, the word father, or son, let's say, doesn't say everything that, what? God is, right? It brings out something about what is in God, right? Just like the word understanding and loving will bring out something that is in God, right? But either one, I'd put it, right? Because God's understanding and God's loving are not the two different things. Sometimes, you know, we say about men and women, you know, that maybe man has a little excellence over woman in understanding, huh? So, the greatest minds in philosophy or in science or in theology, you know, are usually men, right? But then when you take loving, you see a woman has a perfection of loving maybe that a man doesn't. And Aristotle, in the Ethics, he's talking about friendship, and he says friendship consists in both loving and being loved, right? And then he says, well, does it consist more in loving or being loved? Or both, because there's mutual love, right? And he says it consists more in loving than in being loved, right? Then he takes the example from the woman who gives up her baby because she doesn't have enough milk to feed the baby, right? So she gives up to the other woman to feed, right? Why'd she do this? Yeah. But that baby is going to be attracted to the mother that feeds her, so she seeks more to love than to be loved. You see that in the Vietnam War, you know, when the science put a little child on the boat, you know, to escape, you know? And that child's going to go to America or some other place and be raised by someone else and therefore love that person, right? But they see this as the only way to save the child, right? So they seek more to love than what? Be loved, huh? I was reading the, you know, that great general, Sherman, during this, you know, the Souther story, too much. But Sherman came from a family of, what, loving children, right? But his father died when he was very young, right? And so that's how he got adapted by Ewing, you know? By the principle of loving children, right? Without the husband and so on. So he gave one to that person who was a pretty good man. So Sherman eventually married, you know, his daughter, which is a very strong Catholic, you know? Kind of drove Sherman crazy. But one of his sons became a priest, you know? A Jesuit priest, you know? In fact, he said, with funeral masses, we shouldn't have been fighting. So, but Thomas remarks upon the fact that Aristotle takes the example from a woman, right? He would have some perfection in love, you know? And so you see a lot of, you know, like in St. Francis, the sales and so on, the tree of some love, he'll take a lot of examples from women saints, right? Not that Thomas Aquinas or Augustine didn't love, they loved very much, I think, you know? It didn't stand out in the same way it does in the women saints. So, but I think it's kind of a sign that the perfection of understanding and loving may be a little bit, you know, divided between the male and the female, right? So the perfection of creatures is kind of what? Divided, yeah. Divided, yeah. See? So one more perfect in this way, another more perfect in that way, huh? And I always take an example there, you know, but a time when he had a kind of serious case there when I was teaching in college. And, you know, somebody writing letters to somebody, you know, and so on. And they finally, you know, brought the FBI in, which has a handwriting analysis and so on. And they're pretty thorough about this, right? So when the case came down, finally, you know, the father and mother of the boy was there, you know, and the uncle who was a DA and so on, and so on. But when the FBI evidence went in, the father admitted, you know, his son was guilty, you know? Mother went and accepted. So you kind of see the reason and love there, you know, huh? That sort of thing, you know. You know, there's an old saying, only mother could love him, right? And a woman has a student perfection love, right? You know? But I think that's what you have, creatures, that perfection is divine, you know? He's encouraged when he's sick to be cared for in such a way that he doesn't regret the answer. Where do I want to be? If I can't drive 125 miles to get home, being there, just get there. So maybe we should stop there, huh? Sure. Halfway through the question 28 here, huh? So maybe we should stop there, huh? So maybe we should stop there. So maybe we should stop there. So maybe we should stop there. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. And help us to understand all that you've written. And say, no, be great. Pray for us. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So we're up to the third article in question 28. And as you know, the, what, treatise on the Trinity is divided into three parts. And the first part was showing that there are proceedings, or going forwards in God, right? But going forwards that remain within the doer. Mainly God's understanding himself and loving himself. And then the question we're in right now is relations that are based upon these going forwards. And then the persons who are distinguished by these relations will be in the question, starting with 29, 15 questions. Now last time we saw a couple of things in the first two articles, huh? And the first article was showing that there are relations in God that are real. There are also relations in God that are not real. And that's a very subtle distinction between real relations and relations of reason. And, of course, it's very important to see that these relations that are the basis of Trinity are, in fact, real relations. Otherwise, the persons would not be really, like, distinct. But in the second article, we learn that these relations, compared to the divine substance, are one and the same thing. And there's no real distinction between God the Father, or the fatherhood, relation, and the divine substance. And there's no real distinction between God the Son, and sonhood, and the divine what? Of course, St. John says this, right? In the beginning was the Word, right? And the Word was toward God. That's a real relation, towards the Father. And the Word was God, right? Same thing. St. Thomas, in a sense, is going back to how St. John taught us. Now, the third article is going to talk about the relations now, not in comparison to the substance of God, but in comparison to each other. And there, they are really distinct, because they're real relations, and it's a nature of relation, like any kind of opposite, to distinguish between it and its what? Opposite, huh? So let's look at the third article here. You can kind of see how the second and third articles will kind of go together, right, then? Because one is saying, hey, these relations are real, and now, what about distinction, right? Are these relations really something distinct from the divine substance? No. Because if they were, then there would be composition in God. And we've learned before, back in the third question, that God is altogether simple, right? There's no accidents in God, nothing added to it. But how about, now the other side of this thing, how about in comparison to each other? Then they are really distinct. Otherwise, you'd be in the heresy of the Sibelius, right? Where we're just looking at one and the same person calling the Father and Son because of different things. But, of course, Thomas always takes the opposite side of what he thinks. To third, one proceeds thus. It seems that the relations which are in God are really not distinguished one from another. The first objection. For whatever things are the same to one and the same are the same to each other, right? But every relation in God existing is the same, really, secundarama, with the divine essence, the divine substance. Therefore, the relations are not distinguished, really, or secundarama, from each other. That's an interesting objection, right? If the fatherhood is the same thing as the divine substance, and the sonhood is the same thing as the divine substance, then how can we be distinct one from the other? Moreover, fatherhood, paternitas, and sonhood, according to the meaning of the name, are distinguished from the divine essence. There's a distinction of reason there, right? In the same way that goodness and the power of God, or the truth of God, or the understanding of God, and so on. But on account of a distinction of reason of this sort, there is not a real distinction between the divine goodness and the divine ability or power. Therefore, neither between the fatherhood and the sonhood, right? And notice there is something like the distinction between what? The father, the goodness of God, let's say, and the power of God. I'll take this example here, right? Because these are not really distinct from the divine substance, though. They are the divine substance. And the fatherhood and the sonhood are like that, in that they are not really distinct from the divine substance. So, if the goodness of God and the power of God differ only in definition and not in reality, then why not the same thing for the fatherhood and the sonhood, right? Moreover, in divine things, there is not a real distinction except according to origin or according to proceeding, you could say, right? But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore, the relations are not distinguished, really, from each other. You might say more of the son proceeds from the father, right? Not something from fatherhood. But against all this nonsense is what Waiti says in the book about the Trinity, that substance in divine things contains the, what, unity of God, but the relation multiplies the, what, the Trinity. It's time to say that theology is about two things, the divinity of the Trinity and the humanity of Christ. So the relation multiplies the Trinity, right? If, therefore, the relations are not distinguished from each other, really, there would not be a real trinity, but a trinity of reason only, which is the error of what? The word error comes from what? The error. And that's kind of a sign that, what, error is a result of a disordered movement of reason, because wandering signifies that. You have the same word in Greek, forget the word planet, the wandering stars. When Shakespeare talks about this in Comedy of Harris, we wander in illusions here, right? Now, Thomas sees as the beginning of this thing. I answer it should be said, from this fact, that something is attributed to something, right? It is necessary that there be attributed to it all things which pertain to its definition, to what it is. Just as to whoever is attributed to man, right? It is necessary that one attribute to him to be rational and to be an animal and so on, right? But is of the definition of relation the respect of one to another, right? But then he had that word ad ultra, right? He mentioned how when Aristotle talks about relation, he doesn't use the abstract word, like relation, but he uses the preposition, right? And the conine, so you say, prosti, right? Which they translate in the text and logic as ad aliquid, right? I mentioned before that this is the word that St. John uses in the beginning of the Gospel, right? The beginning was the word, and the Greek says the word was towards vada, prosti. It doesn't say, you know, with, which you can't translate it by, but Tom Sears has got this more precise way of speaking about it here. So it's of the notion, you might say, of relation, the respect of one thing to another, right? Which implies some kind of a, what, distinction there between what you're towards. According to which something is opposed to another, what, relatively, huh? Now when Aristotle takes up opposition, right, in the categories, he distinguishes four kinds of opposition. Contradiction, lack and having, contraries and relativism. So if you have a real opposition there, you have a real, what, distinction. Since, therefore, we showed in the first article, since in God, really, there is a relation, as has been said in the first article, it is necessary that, really, there be there opposition. And relative opposition, like any kind of opposition, in its notion, includes distinction. Whence is necessary that there be in God a real, what, distinction, huh? Not according to an absolute thing. Now when Thomas, you know, in Latin, he uses the word absolute, huh? It is a squishy-washy media that people have, you know, absolutely so. So what? Is that the absolute truth? But absolute is always distinguished from, what, relative, right? Okay. So I'm absolutely a man, huh? I'm absolutely white, huh? I guess so. I'm a person, right? And, but I'm absolutely a father or a teacher? No. Because I'm a father towards someone, right? I'm a teacher towards someone, right? So relation is a different kind of thing than, what, substance or something absolute, huh? Whence, he says, is necessary that in God there is a real distinction. Not according to an absolute thing, which is the essence, because there's only one substance, one nature there. In which there is the, what, the highest, the greatest, unity and, what, simplicity. Most of the time I put those two together, right? To obey the rule of two or three, right? But according to a, what, relative thing, right? So I mentioned before, I like to ask people sometimes, you know, are God the Father and God the Son and God the Holy Spirit one thing or three things? What's the answer to that? Yeah. If you mean rem absoluta, rem absoluta, then there's only one thing, right? One God, but not three gods, there's one God. But are there three relations? Are there three relations there? Yeah, there's three things in relative thing, right? Okay. So you couldn't remember all the two of them in relative thing. It's important to our style of history, so. I often wonder if Thomas would ever, you know, pray for him, you know, whether he's unbaptized, uncircumcised dog. He's lost, I don't know. Now, the first objection is a very hard one to answer, right? And, of course, Thomas goes back to Aristotle and answers this, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that according to the philosopher, huh, in the third book of natural, here, the third book of the so-called physics, huh, and this is the Lectio 5, huh? And, incidentally, that's one of the two places where Thomas shows you how to distinguish the ten figures of predication, the ten categories, as they're called. It's in this fifth reading here. Because Aristotle is comparing motion with acting upon and what? Undergoing, right? And it seems to be the same, but, you know, I think if I were going, I'm not the same, are they? To the first, therefore, it should be said that according to the philosopher in the third book of the physics, or the third book of natural hearing, that argument holds when things are the same to one and the same, that things which are the same to one and the same are the same to each other in those things which are the same in reality and in, what, definition. And it takes two synonyms there for the Pope there in Latin, huh, the tunica and the dimental. Not over in those things which differ in their, what, definition, right? Whence Aristotle says there that although acting upon, acting upon, is the same as motion, and likewise undergoing, it does not nevertheless follow that acting upon and undergoing are the same. Because in acting upon is implied in respect of that from which is the motion immobile. In passion, that which is, what, from another, right? Now, take an example of what I mean there, right? Take a simple example. My kicking you, right? Is my kicking you something really different from your being kicked? Huh? Is my kicking you something other than your being kicked? Not in an absolutely. No, no, no. See? But kicking is from me to you, while being kicked is in you from me. Okay? Or take another example. If I put water on the stove, right? The stove is warming the water, right? Is the warming of the water something different from the water being warmed? Again, there's a difference in definition there, right? Because warming is from the fire to the water, right? Right? Being warmed is in the water from the fire, right? This way, Thomas gets into a discussion of those two categories, acting upon and undergoing, right? And he gets into the fifth reading there of the third book. And likewise, although fatherhood is the same, secundum realm, right? With the divine essence. And likewise, sonhood, right? Nevertheless, these two in their own, what? Definitions, right? Imply opposite, what? Respect. Because the father is the one from whom another proceeds, right? Or is that what the great says? We have a dad in Kud Sui in Kilio. We have something of himself and another. And the son is, what? From another, right? So they differ in their definition, right? So they're not altogether the same, right? Whence they are distinguished from each other, right? So when I kicked you, right? I'm acting upon you, right? You're being acted upon or undergoing, right? I kicked from the end. That's a very subtle thing, right? But it's interesting. He goes back to the very book, right? When Charles de Connick would lecture on the eight books of the physics there, you know, he would, you know, explain the text and so on. Then he'd stop and then he'd point out some difficulties some modern philosopher has or something, you know, and how, you know, if they'd read this, they would be able to escape their ignorance and so on. So it's impressive the way he goes back to Aristotle. That's a very difficult objection, right? You can think about that a lot. I've heard it. It may be, I don't know if it's the same objection, but it sounds the same. It's just expressing in mathematical terms. Yeah, yeah. It's a very obvious objection, right? It's hard it is to understand the Trinity, though. Aristotle says, is the road from Athens to Thebes the same as the road from Thebes to Athens? Well, in a way, it is the same road, isn't it? At least before they had these two-lane highways. You say, and yet it's the same thing to go from Athens to, what, Thebes and to go from Thebes to Athens? Well, it's traveling the same road, so why isn't it the same? You know? It's a hard, hard distinction, but it's a little bit of it there. And the second objection, in a way, in trying to understand, something that's hard to understand, how can the divine substance be both the fatherhood and the son? Or the divine substance be both the father and the son, right? Well, you go back to the treatise of the unity of God, you see, how can the divine substance be both will and understanding? How can the divine substance be both the father and the son, right? How can the divine substance be both the father and the son, right? How can the divine substance be both the father and the son, right? How can the divine substance be both the father and the son, right? How can the divine substance be both the father and the son, right? divine substance be both truth and goodness, or how can it be both power and will and so on, and you understand that a bit, right, how God can in a simple way contain these things, then it's not too difficult to say that he can contain fatherhood and sonhood in one thing too, okay, but then what's the difference here between the two, right, well, Thomas points out that power and goodness do not imply in their definitions some kind of opposition, and that's why you have to understand that the categories of Aristotle, or the fifth book of wisdom too, which distinguishes the four kinds of what? Opposites, right, okay, contradictories, like to be and not to be, that is the question, right, they sometimes quote those words with Hamlet, and they say, well, it's a question because you can't both be and not be, and you must either be or not be, right, and then you have lack and habit, right, now lack is like non-being, but it's non-being in a subject that's capable of having something, so strictly speaking, this glass is not blind, although it doesn't see, now you can see about everything, it either sees or doesn't see, I see and the chair doesn't see, right, but is everything either see or it's blind, strictly speaking, because blindness is the non-being of something you're able to have, it should have in a strict sense, so that's another kind of opposition, right, between lack and having, of course, there's many senses of lack that I would distinguish in, but one does not, and the third kind of opposition is contraries, and like between virtue and vice, or health and sickness, or black and white, now you see, as you go down, you have more in common there, right, because the lack and the having have a common subject, by the contraries, not only have a common subject, but you have, what, the same genus, so both virtue and vice are habits, right, and vice is not simply the lack of virtue, it's a real habit, real inclination, right, to eat too much or something, right, okay, a real thing to run away in battle, right, and so on, but then Aristotle distinguishes this fourth type of opposition, which is relatives, right, so potencia and bonitas here, power and goodness, are they contradictors, or contraries, or lack and habit, are they relatives, no, so God can be truly powerful, right, and be really good, without his power and his goodness being two really distinct things, can God be, what, God the Father, and be God the Son, without there being a real distinction between God the Father and the God the Son, because there's something relative in the very definition of Father, and something relative in the very definition of Son, and this is one kind of opposite Sons, in fact, Aristotle saw that, right, kind of opposites, right, what is it that, well, they have a common, yeah, in ordinary opposites, like, say, double and half and so on, right, they have a common genus too, right, and of course, when Thomas explains it, you know, he follows the rule of two or three, right, and sometimes when you have four, you distinguish them into two twos, but sometimes you distinguish them into one in, what, three, right, like I noticed when Thomas talks about the four species of pride, and this goes back to what Gregory the Great, right, and Gregory the Great says, well, you're proud if you think you have some excellence that you don't have, okay, think you're better than you are, right, okay, but you, even if you are, even if you do have this excellence, you can still be proud another way, okay, for example, you can think that you have this excellence, what, from yourself, right, okay, for example, am I proud when I say I don't the Pythagorean theorem? Well, if I don't really know it, I tell you, I tell you, I was sitting in a math class, a calculus class, and a professor was getting calculus, and he used the Pythagorean theorem, right, and so he's a very good mathematician, so I asked him after class, I said, now, I know she uses the Pythagorean theorem, and I said, could you teach the calculus without the Pythagorean theorem? He says, no. I said, now, how many of you students could demonstrate the Pythagorean theorem? That's a part of the theory, right? It's easy, though, he says, but I mean, the point is, somebody might claim to know that the interior angles, I mean, the squaring, the side opposite, the right angle is equal to the squares and the ones, without really knowing it, right, okay, then he'd be pretending to have an x that he doesn't have, right, but now, I, Dwayne Burkwest, when I say I can demonstrate here on the board the Pythagorean theorem, I can say whatever it's about, which I don't forget, but I really do know it, you see, so I'm not being proud when I say I know it, right, but now I can be proud when I go insane, I discovered that by myself, and actually, you could tie it to me, right, that's another kind of pride, right, okay, now, think something like grace, though, right, maybe I have some grace, right, and I know I didn't give myself this grace, right, but I deserved it, right, or I know that God created me, you know, but he saw that excellent person I'd be, you know, and he was kind of obligated, you know, I really deserve to be created, and all these other people, you know, were not created, you know, they didn't deserve to be like I did, right, or another kind of pride would be, what, I'm the Pythagorean theorem, and I'm the only guy in the world that knows it, you know, because I'm unique, you know, I have an excellence that nobody else has, and maybe I do have an excellence, I'm not the only guy that has it, that's the famous thing, you know, there's only two other people in the world who understand the general material activity, and Einstein is not one of them, so some, some, some, I don't know, but first you could say, I'm the only person, you know, who understands this thing, you know, well, Thomas, you know, he divides those three, right, those four, rather, he divides them into what, three, because I can be proud in thinking I have something, right, that I don't have, right, or in the way I have it, right, or in uniqueness of my having it, right, and then you can subdivide with one of them the way of having it, have my own, what, discovery or invention or my own power, or from my own merits, right, okay, so he divides four into three, and then one of the three divides into two, right, okay, that's one way of following the rule two or three, right, but with the opposites, Thomas will not do that, you divide it into two, so you'll put the contradictories, and then lack and having, and contraries, because one of these removes the other, right, so to be or not to be, right, one of those will make the other, right, to have sight or blindness, right, then, okay, if I have sight, I can't be blind, if I'm blind, I get on the sight, and if I have a virtue, I don't have the opposite vice, or if I have the vice, I don't have virtue, right, it's very discouraging to go through the list of Aristotle's virtues areas, like that, I don't think I had that one, no, I don't have that one either, so in these opposites, one eliminates that, right, but in the case of relatives, like, say, double and half, one requires you to add that one, right, so something can't be double without something else being, what, half, but the double can't be what is double up, and the half can't be what is double up, right, so four is,