Prima Pars
Lecture 118: Boethius's Definition of Person and the Problem of Singulars

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We should buy those relations. Let's come back now to these attempts. Now, you notice that Thomas has five replies here, right? Because the first four objections, right, were saying that there's more than these, what, four relations, right? And then the said contra was saying there's less. That's the quintum, right? So you have to reply to both sides. And you see this sometimes in disputed questions, or you have arguments on one side and then the other side, right? And if the whole truth is on one side, you'll answer all the objections on the other side. But if the truth is somewhere in between, you'll be answering both sets of objections. Okay, now the first objection was saying, what about the relation of the one understanding to the understood and the one willing to the, what, willed, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that in those in which the understanding and the understood, right, the willing and the willed differ, right? There can be a real relation, right, of knowledge to the thing known and the one willing to the thing, what, willed, huh? So if I love my wife, I have a real relation to my wife because I love my wife, okay? And if I know what a dog is or a cat is, right, I have a real relation to the dog and the cat because I'm not a dog or a cat. But in God, the understanding and the understood are entirely the same thing, okay? Why? Because by understanding himself, he understands all the things. So that goes back to what we learned in the treatise on the understanding of God. And for the same reason, the will and the willed, right? Because God wills all things by willing his own goodness. And of course, as we talked about, relations of reason, huh? There has to be a real distinction between the two things that have a real relation. So God is understanding and the understood are entirely the same thing in God, huh? So there can't be a real relation there. Hence, in God, relations of this sort are not real. They're relations of reason. Just as did the relation of the same to the same. Socrates is Socrates, right? Socrates is the same as Socrates. Is that a real relation? No, because Socrates is not really too. But nevertheless, the relation to the thought is real, right? Because the word is understood, the thought is understood as going forward through the action of the what? The understandable action. Not however, as what? The thing understood, right? Okay. Unless even us, we make a distinction there between the thing understood and the thought, right? Or between a unicorn and an image of you. So the image is really going forward from the imagination, right? And the thought is really going forward from the reason, right? So God, in understanding himself, there proceeds from God a thought of God, right? That's what he's saying. This is the thought. Whence, when we understand, say, a stone, that which the understanding conceives from the thing understood is called the, what, word or the thought. So notice what he's saying then. He's saying that in God, his understanding and what he understands are altogether the same, right? But the thought proceeding is not the same as that from which it proceeds, right? And therefore, you have real relations of the thought to the one from which it proceeds, the speaker, you might say, and the relation to the speaker to the world that proceeds from it. So, Clark? It's similar to the reply given in the first relation of the speaker. Yeah. In the fourth, proceeding that from which it proceeds, real relations of reason only, but reality. Since the thing understood and the reason are thought compared really to that which it proceeds. Again, it's going back to the fact that these are relations of reason, right? You have to admire Aristotle for seeing this distinction, right? Between a real relation and relation of reason, right? And the category of relation so-called, right, is about real relations, right? But these relations of reason of many kinds and some of them, we've been up to our studies in logic, right? Relation of genus to species and species to genus. But other relations come up in the other sciences. Aristotle's classic example there is a case where there's a real relation of this to that, but not of that to this. So when I see you, there's a real relation, right? I'm really changed by seeing you, right? But if you don't know I'm seeing you, so you look at, you know, it's funny how you're in church and you look at somebody and so they kind of look around like they kind of know you're looking at them, you know? I don't know how they know it, you know? But if you're not aware of that somebody's looking at you, right, and you're not really affected at all, right, by this activity of seeing you, right? And, of course, I can see something like a stone or a chair, right? It's entirely material, but this activity of seeing it is a kind of immaterial activity. And that immaterial activity or immaterial being is only in my eyes, not out there in that chair or the stone, right? So Aristotle said, the relation of the knower to the known is real in creatures, right? But the relation of the known to the knower is a reason only. And that's the kind of relation of reason you have between God and creatures, right? The creature is really related to God, really dependent upon God, but God in no way depended or changed by having created a creature. He's an independent guy. He's really independent of us. It's kind of amazing, right? It's kind of amazing that he could love us as much as he does. And it's gratuitous love, you know? It's... He didn't create me just because I was better than others and I couldn't create it, you know? You've got to really be thankful that I chose me to be, right? That's gratuitous, right? Like in the army, you know, we say, well, when the army is retreated, what do you do? You leave some guys behind to slowly end his advance, right? And very likely you got hurt, right? Killed. Well, I've got to choose somebody. It's not because you deserve to die, you know? I've got to choose somebody to stand back, right? That's not a choice I can make, right? But I mean, God's choosing us, you know, it's not because we were better to be than others it could have been, right? Could your mother and father have married someone else? I mean, if Rosin had said yes, well, we would have been after her rather than Juliet, right? It wasn't their heavy children, but I mean, you know, it could happen, right? That's pride, right? Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Thank you. So, see, if we think, or if I think, you know, God chose me to be because he first saw the wonderful person I'd be or something, that's a kind of... I can miss it. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. The university does not have to be competing on me, you know? Yeah, that's pride, see, that's one species of the four that the great Gregory distinguishes, huh? It's interesting that the Greek philosophers had some understanding of this pride, right? And the great Empedocles, right, says that men see a part of the truth and they boast of having seen the whole. That's that first kind of pride, right? Aristotle speaks of the rhetorician who thinks he's politically wise, you know, he's kind of boasting, right? But interestingly, Aristotle talks about his predecessors and sometimes, you know, where he's going to introduce his own thinking in a subject. And he'll show that there's really defects of what his predecessors have thought, right? So it's not just that he wants to make a name for himself, right? And if he finds that they have the same thought that he has, he's not going to be upset by this. Well, in a sense, you can see Aristotle is opposed to that kind of pride where you say, I alone would see this, right? When you go through Aristotle's works, he's kind of following the advice of the great Heraclitus, you know, to find what is common, right? And he tries to find a thought that his predecessors or most of them have seen to some extent already, right? And he tries to, you know, prove or perfect that thought. But he doesn't want it to be private to him. And he's not upset that they saw it in some way, too, you know? That's what they call Martin, that kind of pride, the Lazio there, you know? You see it's unique, you know? There's more humility in the great philosophers, it seems to me, than in the modern philosophers. Anyway, Mark, you know, how Euclid, you know, the great, you know, bringing together many things from people before him, but he added things himself, you know? But he kind of respects those who came before him, and they come to him to see. And you can see, you know, he keeps what they did, and then he brings on to what he had discovered himself. It's really kind of a marvelous thing. Okay, and the second injection was saying, well, these relations of reason, reasonable or intelligible relations, according to Edison and Aristotle, too, you're talking about the infinite, they're multiplied forever, right? Now, to the second, it should be said, that in us, understandable relations are multiplied in infinitum, right? Because by another act, man understands what? Stone, right? And by another act, he understands himself to understand stone. And by another one, he understands this. Okay? So, it's one act in me, by which I understand what a triangle is, and then it's another act, by which I understand that I understand what a triangle is. It's yet another act, which I understand that I understand what a triangle is. And thus, forever are multiplied the acts of understanding, and consequently, the what relations understood. But this in God doesn't have any place, right? Because by one act only, he understands everything. You can see how the treatise on the Trinity depends upon the treatise on the operations of God, right? That's why God is only one thought, huh? Very one-track mind. But he expresses, by this one thought, everything we express by our many thoughts, and much more. And something more, right? You've heard my little poem, and I always read, God the Father said it all in one word. I wonder when that word became a man, he spoke in words so few and said so much, you know, as a privilege, and the soul went. But God said it all in one thought, huh? So you see something, you know, like this in human beings, that the greater a mind is, huh? The more it says in fewer, what, words, right? You see Aristotle or Thomas Marcus. They say much more in a few words than, I think, I see in the whole book, you know? I asked, I was wondering about the angels. The angels see things simplistically. Yeah, the higher the angel, the more he understands, but the fewer thoughts he has. Okay. They still have more than one thought, obviously. Okay. In the natural knowledge, they know primarily their own substance, right? But then, you know, the whole reality, they need more or less thoughts to pay my eye up there, right? But Thomas would talk about that, you know, being something like that in human beings, you know, that a lesser mind requires more examples, you know, and so on, right? I like the example in grade school there, you know, in math class, you know, you'd have a principal being explained, and there'd be some things to work it out, right? And extra practice for those who need it. Even the book had a sense, you know, you know, you practice those things you learned, and then extra practice for those who need it, right? Well, not everybody need it, right? Some guys do the first things, and they don't understand better than people who did the extra practice, right? And Thomas says, you know, a great mind used a few words to understand something better than somebody else. You have to explain it at great length. And he still doesn't understand it as well as the other guy. You multiply your examples, you know, and that's why we say brevity is the soul of wit, huh? Thomas is always quoting there, St. Paul there, he made a verbum abbreviatum, huh? But he says a lot of them are just a few words, huh? You've heard me expound that even in Shakespeare, right? You see that, huh? Shakespeare says more than a few words, and other people say it in an old novel or something. Words, words, as Herman says. They complain about the polonius there, right? Now, the third objection, huh? Taking it from the ideas, right, huh? Now, Thomas says to the third, it shouldn't be said, that the relations, the respect, right? The ideal ones that are in the ideas are as understood by God, right, huh? Whence from their plurality does not foul that there are many relations in God, but that God knows many, what, relations. Insofar as he knows his nature, his substance, as being imitable by the dog in this way, he said he had the idea of the dog, right? Insofar as he knows it as being imitable by the cat in this way, he has another idea, right? There's not really many relations in God there, but many relations understood by God. Now, the fourth objection, he's not going to answer too fully here, because this will come up in the treatise on the, what, persons, right? Okay, but that's a good thing to, you know, to look forward to seeing resolved. Because it gets down to the comparison of persons, you know, talk about their qualities, right? Okay, to the fourth, it should be said that equality and likeness in God are not, what, real relations, but of reason. Only, as we'll be clear later on, now without trying to get into that too much yet, this equality of the father and the son, right, is not to be considered, as Augustine teaches us, by their relations, but by the fact that they are, what, each of them, one and the same God, right? And so you can see the father is the same God as the son, and the son is the same God, numerically, right, one, huh, okay, and the Holy Spirit is the same God as the father and the son, that's why they're equal, right, okay, but is that a real relation of a thing to itself? No, it's a real relation to it. They're really equal, but the equality is not a real relation, because it's based not upon the distinction of them by relations, right, but upon each one of them being the divine substance. And so the divine substance is, what, one thing, yeah, there can't be a real relation of a thing to itself. I just got to say, but Thomas will understand better than I'm doing now. So Thomas needs that, huh? You know, he's, he brings it down to question, what, 42 there, I think, is the texture. That's the part at the end that we're considering comparing the persons, right, of equal? Of course, Athanasius says the two things are equal, right? Yeah, so it's in the essence, right? And therefore there can be a, what? You don't consider, you know, the equality of the father and the son by the relation, though, that the fatherhood is equal to the sonhood, you see, because equality is going to be in something absolute, right? And that's the divine substance of our nature. That's co-equal in the essence, you see. Now, the fifth objection is answered, I think, something we saw before, right? To the fifth, it should be said that the via, the road, huh, is, what, the same from one term to the other, and they confer so, but nevertheless, the, what, relations are diverse, the respect is different. So it's the same thing to go to Athens to Thebes and to go from Thebes to Athens, go out to California and come back. Same thing to go from Athens to California and from California back? I don't think so. Whence from this one cannot conclude that the same is the relation of the father to the son and reverse. But one could conclude this about something absolute if there are a middle between the two, right? So we speak, as they say, talking about the, you've got to watch the image a little bit there. Is there a relation between two and four, right? You might say, well, it's the same relation. Something absolute, right? Between two and four. How two and four are to each other is a relation between the two of them, right? But two is to four half. It's four to two half. It's double, right? So the father is to the son a father, not a son. To the father to the son. And the son is to the father a son, not a father, yeah. And the father and the son are agreed to the, agreed is to the Holy Spirit. And the Holy Spirit is not a breather, but agreed. I'll just take a little more time. So, the treatise in the 20s. It's divided into how many parts there, Patrick? Three. Three, okay. And now we're going to begin the third part, right? And notice, when you say it's divided into three parts, sometimes people want to say, well, I want to make these parts kind of equal in size. Is that necessary? And there's going to be, what, 15 questions, right, in the third part, or there's just one question in each of the first two parts, right? When Thomas divides a work of Aristotle, the first division of a work of Aristotle is almost always into, what, two. And what is that? Yeah. Drawing out the Octopus, huh? Which I compared to, what's the first division of Romeo and Juliet? Yeah, yeah. Of course, the prologue is very short compared to the play, right? So it doesn't have to be more or less equal size, right? You divide them. But it makes sense. Thomas Key is kind of the reason why he divides us into these three parts, right? Because the persons are distinguished by relations based upon going forwards, right? According to the order of teaching and learning, we talk about the going forwards, and then the relations based on them, and then the persons. And now we're about to talk about the persons, huh? But having foresaid or seen before those things which, what, seem to be, what, should be foreknown about the proceedings, huh, the origins and relations, it seems necessary to, what, aggrady de personis, right? Now, aggrady means, what, yeah, kind of approach it, right? And I've seen times use the word aggrady sometimes in what Aristotle used in the translation, when something's difficult, right? Like, we're going to talk about time, you know? And you know how the famous, Gustin's famous words about time, he says, I know what time is, he says, if nobody asks me what it is. If someone asks me what time is, I don't know what it is. Well, it's the typical thing in the Di-Dow, right? But Thomas will comment on, Aristotle says this because of the difficulty, but he's going to do, right? We're going to, I'm going to attempt to talk about time now, and he's saying something like that, right? Okay? And Thomas is talking about the difficulties, aggrady de personis, right? I think he has that sense. Now, he's going to divide the consideration of persons into two or three parts. He says he's going to divide it into a, what? Two parts, right? And first, according to an absolute consideration of them, right? And then, of a, what? Yeah. And actually, it's a ratio of ten to five, right? Two to one, right? So there's going to be ten questions on the absolute consideration of persons, and then five on the comparative consideration of them. That's a distinction into two, right? Now, he says, it's necessary, absolutely about the persons, to consider them first in general, right? And then, about them in what? And this is going to be divided into four questions. The next four questions are going to be about persons in general, right? And then, there'll be six about what? The persons in particular, right? Now, of course, we couldn't understand the distinction of six at all. So that's divided into what? One, two, three, yeah. See, he has one on the father in particular, right? And then, when he comes to the son, he says the son has three names. He's called the son, he's called the word, he's called Imago, image of God, right? Well, what you mean by son, in a sense, can be understood from what we said about father. So we're going to have just two articles on the son. One about the son as a word, or thought, and the other as image, right? And then the Holy Spirit, that's going to have Holy Spirit, and gift of God, right? And amor, the love of God, right? Okay? So, it's divided into three parts, right? The six articles, huh? And he must do something like that with the four questions, right? But those six questions, obviously, divide into three, according to the three persons, right? And one into one, he says one, one is two, and one is three, right? Now, to the common consideration of persons, four things seem to pertain, right? Okay? Some things break down, finally, they can't. Don't be too pedantic, you know, like purpose, you know? Yeah. Yeah. So first, he says, the signification of this name, personat, the meaning of this name, personat. What does person mean, right? And secondly, the number of persons, right? How many persons are there, anyway? Four persons, because it's four relations, or less than four? And then, third, those things which follow upon the number of persons, right? Or are opposed to it as diversity and likeness and things of this sort, right? And fourth, those things which pertain to the, what? Knowledge of persons, huh? So if you wanted to divide those four into either two or three, how would you do it? You could do two, and you would divide what against the other three? Person. And that definition of person. Okay, or you could divide the fourth, which is referring to the knowledge of persons, right? Okay. In other words, we could say, in all knowledge, you can distinguish between what is known and your knowledge, right? And how it's known, right? You might say, yeah. Okay. Or you might want to divide it into three, right? And put the second and the third together, right? Because, first, he considers the meaning of the word person, right? Secondly, the number of persons and what follows upon it, right? Could be subdivided to those two. And then, the, what? Knowledge of persons, right? Okay. That's another way of doing it, huh? Because, obviously, the third is much more closely related to the second than the first and the fourth, right? Not to be too pedantic about it, but if you count and it's two and three, you can't pretend it, right? Now, I had another reason to the fourth. About the first, four things are asked, right? And first, about the definition of person, right? And that's the fundamental question article. And that's the definition of person given by the great, what? Wethius, right? And secondly, about the comparison of person to, what? The essence or nature or substance of God to the subsistence of God, right? All these strange words. And the hypostasum, right? Now, the word hypostasis should be naming an individual substance in Greek, right? But they were accustomed to use that word in talking about the persons, right? That became kind of synonymous with person, right? Okay. Subsistentium signifies more of what? Something that exists by itself, right? Essence, of course, means the nature of substance of the thing, right? So he's going to compare it to those and partly do they mean the same thing or do they mean different things or what do they mean, right? Okay. And the third article is whether the name of person belongs in divine things. Okay. So, you might distinguish the first two articles against the last two articles, right? Because the first two articles could be a preliminary to talking about what a human person is, right? Does the name of person belong in human beings? I have to tell you a title of Shouk theory. We had a kind of a modern-thinking nun in the parish there, but her name was Jane Prissom. And this one guy kind of says, oh, he says, I didn't know you were a person. It was so funny, I could help her laugh. So, with the name of person belongs in numaris, right? From reply to woman. And what does it mean there? She's a person. So, you see how you can actually divide these four into what? The first two, right? Which are kind of general, and then the last two which are in particular in regard to what? Yeah. And as I say, you could take those first two and then, you know, you want to go talk about human persons, right? Like, John Paul II is talking about human persons all the time, right? What does it mean, you know, and so on? Beings, persons? Are there persons among human beings? And if the answer is yes, what does it mean? You say, you know, I'm a person, right? I want to be treated like a thing, I want to be treated like a person. You hear this being said all the time in the purses, right? What does it mean to be a person, right? Okay, you see that? So, again, you can see to understand this first question you have to divide into, I think, two, right? Say it clear. Maybe I should stop now at this point when I'm still ahead, huh? In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order to illumine our images, and rouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, an angelic doctor. Amen. And help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Henry Hyde died, by the way. Oh, did he? Yeah, he was like 83, 84, I think he was. Was he still on campus? No, he's just retired. Last year or so, you know. We Christ got in Pache. Let's look at the premium here to the 29th question, which is also premium to the questions here, the 15 questions on the divine persons. So, having sent before, he says, those things which seem to be known, or necessary to be known beforehand, about the processions and the relations, right, is necessary in the Greek Latin word is agredi ante personis, huh? Well, I remember in, I think it was a commentary on the fourth book of natural hearing, where Aristotle's going to take up time, and time is a very hard thing to understand, huh? You know, they always quote Augustine there in the Confessions, if no one asks me what time is, I know what time is, and if someone asks me what time is, I don't know. And so Aristotle says he's going to agree to you, right, he's going to approach time, right, and insinuating the difficulty, right? And so I'm kind of reminded of that explanation of the word that he uses here, right? We're going to kind of approach the question of the persons, yeah. Now, as I say, this is taken up in 15 questions, and Thomas divides this into two parts, huh? And first, according to an absolute consideration, huh? An absolute in Thomas usually is, what, distinguished from relative, right, or comparative. And that's going to be the first 10 questions, and then according to a comparative consideration, huh? We'll find out when these persons are equal and other things like that, huh? Now, one is sent by another one, and so on, okay? So 10 and 5 questions, then. As necessary, huh, to consider absolutely about the persons, first in general, that would be the first four questions, and then about the, what, singular persons, huh? And there would be one question about the Father, two about the Son, and three about the Holy Spirit. But they're definitely based upon the names of these persons, huh? So you have one on the Father, and then when he gets to the Son, he says, we won't talk about him as Son, because that's clear from the other guy being the Father, right? But then he talks about him as the Word, if that's one question, and then about him as the Imago Dei, the image of God. And then he has three on the Holy Spirit, as being called, what, the gift of God, huh? The Holy Spirit and the love of God. So he has three. Now, but the first four questions will be about persons in general. To the common consideration of persons, four things seem to pertain. Of course, this order of the common before the particular is the same order that Aristotle talked about in the beginning of the, what, natural hearing. And Paul VI, one time, when he was addressed, he says, this is the common rule of all teachings. So, it's generally true. First, he says, about the, what, meaning or signification of this name, person, huh? Okay? That's what question 29 is going to be about, huh? Secondly, and that will be in 30, the number of persons, huh? In case you don't know or in suspense, it's going to be three. Three, then those things which follow upon the number of persons or are opposed to it as diversity and likeness and things of this sort. And then fourth, those things which pertain to the knowledge of persons, how we know the persons, huh? Now, about the first, he says, four things are sought. First, about the definition of person. And secondly, about the comparison of person to essence or nature, to subsistence, and this Greek-derived word hypostasis, right? You've heard of the hypostatic union, right? Now, notice those first two articles are general, right? And they could be put before a consideration of, in particular, of what a human person is as well as what a divine person is, huh? But here he's going to go after those two general articles to apply it to the divine, right? And the third article, whether the name of person belongs in divine things or is suitable to divine things or competent to that, right? And if so, what does it, what, signify, right? Should you use the name person there, huh? And what does it mean when you speak of three persons, huh? Okay? So you see the difference between how the first two articles are divided against the last two, huh? We've got to follow that rule of two or three as far as possible to understand these things, huh? Now, the definition of person comes from none other than the great what? Yeah. What other famous definition that we ran into in the Summa so far came from Boethius? Yeah, yeah. The definition of eternity comes from the consolation of philosophy and the definition of person here from the work on the two natures, huh? To the first, therefore, one proceeds thus. It seems that the definition of person, which Boethius assigns in the book on the two natures, is incompetent, right? And what is that definition? That a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Now, if you look at these objections, most of them will, what, single out some part of the definition for criticism, huh? You see how appropriate this is for a beginner because you're made to think about that particular part of the definition in that objection and in the response to that objection, huh? Because every word is, what, important, huh? I used to say to students, you know, that in one way, defining is like spelling. You know, if you say before, you know, you leave one letter out, you haven't spelled the word correctly, can you? And you leave one part of the definition out, you haven't defined something, right? And there's an order in the letters when you spell, and there's an order in the parts of the definition. It's a very exact thing. The definition is more by nature than the word, right? You know, people like Shakespeare don't know how to spell their own name, right? And words down through time, you know, sometimes get variations in how they are spelled, huh? So the first objection is, nothing singular is defined, but a person signifies something singular. Therefore, a person is not suitably defined. You don't define a singular, huh? That's curious, isn't it, huh? You know, sometimes I ask students, you know, we're in natural philosophy, and we talk about mathematical physics too sometimes, and I say to them, which is more fundamental, knowledge in words and sentences, or knowledge in mathematical symbols and equations? Which is more fundamental? And one sign of this is the fact that you can say in words what a word is, but you can't write a mathematical equation that tells you what a mathematical equation is. I can write a mathematical equation that's an example of an equation, but it doesn't tell you what an equation is. And I can put a mathematical symbol on the board there, but it doesn't tell you what a symbol is. So it's a kind of knowledge that can't be used in talking about itself. And therefore, like Plato would say, a kind of knowledge that doesn't really know itself. Of course, the first thing the seventh wise man of Greece said was, you know, this is a kind of knowledge of Greece. Thou tell, know thyself, huh? That's kind of interesting, huh? Now, likewise, you talk about a metaphor, right? Well, in the book on the poetic art there, Aristotle helps us to understand what a metaphor is. Thomas, you know, in the comments on the Epistles of St. Paul, explains what figurative speech is and what a metaphor in particular is and so on. But can you define what a metaphor is, and what metaphorical speaking is, by using metaphors? You can. So I can explain, speaking properly and not figuratively, the difference between speaking properly and speaking figuratively, right? But speaking figuratively, I can't explain what it is to speak figuratively. Those are kind of interesting things to see, right? Now, if you talk about the singular and the universal, what similar point would you make about that? Yeah, yeah. What you mean, in general, by singularity, you can explain that with universal things, right? But you can't do the reverse, huh? And explain what a universal is by the singular. So I'm sure Thomas will be playing out something along these lines, huh? But it's kind of interesting. It makes you stop and think, right? Moreover, substance, notice the first objection kind of concentrates on the word individua, right? The individual, right? How can you define the individual? Second objection is concentrating on the word substantia. Moreover, he says substance, insofar as it is placed in the definition of person, is either taken for what Aristotle calls first substance, right? Or what he calls second substance, huh? First substance would be Socrates or Plato. Second substance would be the species of the genus in which they are, like man or animal. Now, if you take it to mean first substance, it's superfluous to add individual, because first substance is an individual substance. If it stands for second substance, it's falsely added, and there would be a, what, direct opposition there. For the second substances, they're said to be the genre or species with which the first substances are. Therefore, the definition is badly assigned, huh? I'm studying Ernst Towers' book called The Categories. I found that there are four different meanings of the word substance there. In one day, I ran across a text of Thomas where he distributes all four of them in the text. This makes you stop and think, how is the word substance being used there, right? If it's being used for first substance, then individual is superfluous. If it's being used for second substance, it's false. It does concentrate your mind upon each part of the definition. You may recall when he took up the definition of eternity, each part of the definition was called into question, huh? Moreover, the name of an intention, something that is in the mind, should not be placed in the definition of a thing. A person is a thing, believe it or not. A person is something. For it would not be a good assignment of a definition if one were to say that man is a species of animal. For man is the name of a thing, and species is the name of a what? Intention. Since therefore person is the name of a thing, it signifies a certain substance of rational nature, unsuitably, individual, which is the name of an intention, right? Is placed in its definition. So when you go down, like say, you know, from substance, you say, you've got material substance and immaterial substance, and material substance is divided into the living and non-living bodies, and living into animals and plants, and animals into man. And then man into Socrates and Plato. They're not divisible any further, right? See, this is dealing with the intentional order, right? Why do you use a name like that when you talk about a thing, which a person is? See, Tata must be getting in trouble with these priests that are talking. A person not making a thing. Okay, but intention is something in the mind, not in things. So some of you want to use the word attention. Rather than intention. And finally, an objection to the word nature, right? Nature is a beginning of motion and rest in that in which it is, per se, as such, and not by happening or by accident. As is said in the second book of physics. Well, the physics is a Greek word for nature, right? In the second book of the physics, or natural hearing, as it says in Greek, Aristotle defines what nature is, right? Natural philosophy is about things that are by nature, not things that are by art. So what's the difference between nature as a cause and art as a cause? And eventually defines that cause called nature, right? So nature is defined there as a beginning of motion and rest in that in which it is, as such, and not by happening. But person is even in what? Unchanging things. As in God, right? And in the angels, huh? Therefore one ought not to place in the definition of person nature, but more, what? Essence, huh? So, we got to all four parts of the definition there, right? Objection everyone. Fifth objection is a little bit different. Moreover, the separated soul is an individual substance of a rational nature, but it is not a, what? Person, huh? Unsuitably, therefore, is person less defined. So, you know, is St. Peter in heaven? Yeah. But that's the synecdoche, right? You're using the name of the whole there for the part. Mary's in heaven. Jesus Christ is in heaven, right? But it's a soul, Peter, that's in heaven, right? He doesn't really explain why the separated soul can't be a person. Well, you apply to the objection, you apply to the objection, you'll explain. Okay. Now, Thomas is going to explain why, in part here in the Bible article, that the name of a individual substance of a rational nature has a name, like person, right, huh? And you put it to that. Even though, as he goes on to say at the very beginning here, universal in particular are found in every genre, right? But why do, you know, my knowledge of geometry, does that have a name? Or my health? What's the name of my health? It doesn't have a name, right? I have a name that my mommy and daddy gave me, right? You see? But why do I get a name and my health doesn't have a name and my knowledge of geometry doesn't have a name? My shape doesn't have a name. My hand doesn't have a name. You see? Okay? Well, Thomas is going to explain. I answer, it should be said that although universal in particular are found in all genre, in substance, quantity, quality, relation, and so on, right? Nevertheless, in a very special way, individual is found in the genus of what? Substance, huh? For substances are individuated through, for a substance is individuated through itself. But accidents, like the quantity, my size, right? My health and so on, are individuated through the subject in which they are. So my health is individually different from your health because my health is in my body and your health is in your body, right? Okay? And if you and I know this, the body is in your body. Pythagorean Theorem, but my knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem individually is different from your knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem, because it's in me, my soul, and your knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem is in your soul. For example, this is called this quiteness, right, which is the name of an accident of quality, insofar as it is in this subject, right? When it's also suitably, right, individuals of a substance have some special name before others, for they are called, in Greek often, hypostasis, right, or, in Latin, first substances. Now, but still in a more special and perfect way are found particular and individual and rational substances, right, which have, what, the control, you might say, dominion of their own act. And they're not only led, as other things are, but they act, what, by themselves, right, for actions are found in singulars. And therefore, also, among other substances, singulars of a rational nature also have a certain special, what, name. And this name is person. And therefore, in the foresaid definition of person is laid down individual substance, insofar as it signifies a singular in the genus of substance, right? And there's additive of a rational nature, insofar as it signifies a singular in rational substances, huh? That's all very clear, isn't it? Yeah. And Thomas died, when he told me what the great says, the light of the church is being extinguished. I said nice things about Bonaventure, but Thomas looked at it. Yeah, I wasn't going to make a comment. He came to see Bonaventure, and someone said, he's breaking on his life of St. Francis, right? And Thomas says, well, let us leave a saint to write the life of a saint. Okay, now the first objection was saying, you don't define a singular, right? The first, therefore, it should be said, that although this singular or that cannot be defined, huh? You can't define me. He can point to me. Yeah. He'd say he's a man, he's white, he's in his 70s, but all that could be common to other people, right? Okay? Nevertheless, that which pertains to the common, what? Notion singularity can be defined, huh? And in this way, the philosopher, and that's what Aristotle by António Messia, huh? Defines first substance, huh? In the book called Categories. And in this way, Boethius defines person, huh? That's interesting, huh? That we can say, in general, what it is to not be in general, right? To be, oh, to be the singular, right? I can't give a definition of this singular, right? But I can give a definition of what it is to be singular, individual. I can give a definition of what it is to be in general. That's interesting. Yeah, yeah. That's true. So only reason knows the relation of the universal to the singular. But you have to know the singular in some way to talk about the relation of the universal to the singular. So I can talk about how man is said of each of us individuals around this table, huh? But the senses don't know anything about that. However, the great says the first thing to be considered in logic is universal. But it's said of many, right? And some universals are said of many individuals. So reason has to know in some way what individual is. But you can't define the individual. You can't define my health. You can't define health. You can't define my health. My friend Jim says, a woman likes to be told you can't understand her. But in some sense, no individual is understandable. I mean, no material. Now, the second objection was, what does the word substance mean in definition, right? Does it mean first substance or second substance? To second it should be said that according to some, substance in the definition of person is laid down for first substance, which is an hypothesis. And then reply to that objection to that. Nevertheless, superfluency is not at individual because by the name hypostasis or first substance is excluded the, what? Idea of the universal and of the part, right, huh? For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor also do we say that the hand senses only a, what? Part, huh? But through this that is added individual is excluded from a person the notion of a sumptability. For the human nature in Christ is not a person because it is assumed by something more worthy to wit by the word of what? God, huh? But it's better, Thomas says, it's simpler, to say that substance is taken, what? Commonly insofar as it's divided through first and second, right? And through this that is added individual is drawn to standing for what? First substance, huh? So those are three different meanings of the word substance that you have in the categories of Aristotle, right? It distinguishes first substance and second substance, but then he also speaks of the category of substance, which includes both, right? And this is the way it's to be taken here, right? But Plato and Aristotle, they often use the term substance in a fourth sense, meaning what a thing is, huh? So when you say the father and son, you know, consubstantioid, talking about what it is, huh? We don't mean that they're the same person, but they're the same nature, huh? What would be the third sense of substance, huh? Substance is common to prime substance, first substance and second substance, huh? Well, second substance is already universal. Yeah. How can we... Well, you see, second substance is said of something else, right? First substance is not, huh? Okay. But what's common to them is they exist not in another as in a subject. So that gives rise to, like, another notion of substance? Yeah, you just, you leave out that other part, huh? But where Estelle does it in the one chapter of the categories is you'll say said of another and not said of another, okay? And then you'll crisscross that with another definition, right? Exist in another in the sense of, in the subject, right? And not exist in another subject, okay? So he crisscrosses two divisions, right? Incidentally, you know, I mentioned it to you last time I was looking at the theological dictionary and the origin of the word crisscross. It comes from Christ's cross. Oh, really? Yeah, see, and now we're going to get something like a, you know, crisscross, huh? We're crisscrossing two divisions, right? We get a cross, right? It goes back to crisscross. It's kind of nice little thing, huh? So what exists in another as in a subject, in a sense of another, would be universal accident, huh? I would say, um, geometry, right, huh? Geometry exists in another, like in the mind, and geometry says your geometry.