Prima Pars
Lecture 119: Substance, Nature, and the Meanings of Person

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in my geometry and so on, okay? What exists in another subject but is what? Not a set of another would be an individual one, huh? My knowledge, right? What geometry would say. What does not exist in others in the subject but is said of another would be a universal substance, right? So man is not the kind of thing that exists in others in the subject or dog, like man said here or dog. And then, but it's said of another, right? Because man is said of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle and dog is said of Phaedo and so on. And then this man, right? Plato, right? Socrates or Phaedo or champion of the great horse of Kinaka, right? Dead number, okay? So he gets universal substance, singular, mean universal accident, singular accident, universal substance, singular, okay? And these are called prime substances and those are called second substances, the species of genius. But if you just leave out this crisscrossing, right? And just say a thing that exists not in another, right? In the subject. That's kind of the idea of substance in general, right? And you can divide it into these two, right? So you have three different meanings of substance, right? This is a common thing. When you have a division into four, often you, to follow the rule of two or three, you crisscross two divisions of two, right? Just like when you can divide, it divides quadrilateral, right? But in the elements that he begins, he divides it into five, right? So you have the square, the oblong, the rhombus, the rhomboid, and the trypensia, right? But as you get into geometry, you realize that the first four, square, oblong, rhombus, rhomboid, are all what? Parallelograms. And so they should be divided, the parallelogram, against the trypensia. That's a division into two, right? But then how do you get four kinds of parallelograms? A parallelogram is a quadrilateral whose opposite sides and angles are equal, right? But the distinction of the four is that either all four angles are, what? Right-angled or not right-angled, and all sides are, what? Or not equal, right? And then you crisscross those, and you get the four things, right? As a square has both its sides all equal and the four angles, right-angles. The, quite, the oblong has the four sides, what, not equal, but it has them right-angled. The rhombus has the four sides equal, but not the angles equal. And the rhombus, you made the one, which has neither the four sides equal, nor the four sides, the four angles, right-angles. Which is crisscrossing two things, right? Right-angled or not-right-angled, equal or not-angles, right? The sides and, you know, yeah. That's what Aristotle does here in that particular thing, in the Bible, it's all right. You run later on into a very solid division of Thomas there, you know, where he talks about how the substance of God and the persons, which are relations, are the same thing. And so sometimes you signify the substance in the form of relation. Sometimes you signify substance in the manner of substance. Sometimes you signify relation as relation, sometimes as a substance. So you get four, right? So he has signifies a substance or signifies relation. Signifies in the manner of substance, signifies in the manner of relation. That's a very subtle distinction. Is second substance and first substance related to the common notion of substance as species to a genus? No. No. But I mean, there's something like that, right? So what is the relationship of the common notion of substance and first and second substance? Well, it's something that's involved in both of them, right? A thing that exists not in another is a subject. And then that can be signified in general, like when you say man or dog, or in particular, so you say Socrates or champion or something. Okay. I met champion one time. Very, very, very. Very. Ginnati went around the whole thing with champion going sideways, you know, facing you like that and just like that. Beautiful horse. Yeah, he didn't give us a horse. Enthusiastic about that. Let's say, apart from those three meanings of substance, right? There's a fourth meaning of substance where it means what a thing is. And you'll find in Aristotle and Plato before him, they'll speak of like a definition or speech signifying what a thing is, is a logos te sucias, which is all translated in Latin as literally ratio substantiae, right? So, but that's another meaning of substance, right? And you could have a logos te sucias in a category other than substance. You say, what is, what is, what is geometry? Well, it's a science. You can define what it is. So, but notice, most, as De Kahnik used to say there, you know, every respectable word in philosophy is equivocal by reason, and this example here, that substance is equivocal by reason, and people are often deceived by such, what, words, right? sometimes it's saying that the atheist use of substance is the third thing and it qualifies as the third thing. Yeah, that you're defining for substance, like constricting it, you know? Just like, if I say here, this column here is substance, right? The thing that exists not in another is in the subject. And then, that may be said of others or not said of others, right? It's like dividing substance into universal or second substance and first substance and so on. These are substances most of all, right? You get to the book of wisdom or Aristotle, these are substances. Those aren't. You think, no, unless you're thinking of this, right? You think that there's a world of forms out there where these things, it's our mind, you know, understanding the others in a general way. Now, the third objection is saying, is an individual more the name of an intention than the name of a thing, right? Well, this brings out the weakness of our mind. To the third, then, it should be said that because the substantial differences of things are not known to us, right? Or also because they are not, what? Named, huh? It is often necessary to use accidental differences in place of the, what? Substantial ones, right? For example, this is an example of an ancient science, it's funner to say that fire is a simple body, hot and dry, right? Or water is a simple body, cold and what? Wet, right? Well, hot and dry are in the category of quality, right? And wet and cold are in the category of quality, huh? Third species, sensible qualities. Why fire, fire or water was like a substance, right? But the substantial difference between fire and water is either unknown to us or at least unnamed, right? And so in place of that, we use, what? Some contrasting accidents, yeah. And likewise, Thomas says, the names of intentions can be taken to defining things, according as they're taken for some names of things which have not been laid down. And thus, this name individual is placed in the definition of person to designating the modus assisting which belongs to a particular substance. I was thinking of the opinion of the mercy of God, right? And how is that named? Do you know? And, you know, you have to understand the justice and the mercy of God. Well, justice is the name of a virtue that's in the human will, right? And this can be carried over to God because God has a will too, right? Mercy names originally what? An emotion, a feeling, right? And just like anger does, right? Now, when you carry the word anger over to God, this is a metaphor for the divine what? Justice, right? So, when we speak of God's justice, we're speaking properly and not figuratively. When we speak of God's anger, like in the 94th Psalm, other places, in Isaiah, we're speaking what? Metaphorically or figuratively, right? There's no anger in God. But there's a likeness between what the angry man does, who punishes you, right? What you've done. And God, who by justice, punishes us, right? Now, is there a word that is to the emotion of mercy, right? Like justice is to anger. Or is there no name? I don't think there's any name. But, so we use the name of a, what, emotion or feeling to talk about the divine will to relieve our misery and so on, right? Because you don't have a name, right? I don't think, though, when we talk about the mercy of God, we're speaking figuratively. As we are, we speak of the anger of God, right? Because there is, apart from the word anger, a name to properly name what's in God that's justice. Virtue justice. Distributed justice. But there is no name for the other. What's the problem with rising, you know, that we talked about the Holy Spirit, right? You'll find out that when you get to talk about the name Holy Spirit, well, gee whiz, God the Father is a spirit too. And he's holy, right? You see? And so, unless you stretch the name in a bit, you're kind of using a name for what has no name, right? And it's because of the kind of unique way in which the Holy Spirit proceeds. Being the same substance as the Father and the Son. It's so unlike the preacher, right? We just don't have a name for it. And, but we have a name for something that proceeds a bit like the Son does. In fact, I just have a son. I got a grandson and a grandson too. And so this reveals our ignorance. Sometimes we lack a name, right? Do you think it's that since the incarnation, now we can speak of the mercy of God? Because Christ had a merciful heart and he's still in heaven. I guess he's not, is it sorrowful in the heart? Well, no, but I mean like saying that mystery of the sacred heart. And the way it's been explained by those who study it a lot is that you begin with the physical heart of Christ, right? And his emotional warmth towards us, right? And then you go from that to the love which is in God's will. That's something different than his emotional attachment to us. And you go from the love which is in Christ's human will to love which is in his divine will, right? So there's a kind of an ascension there, right? It's interesting, you know, like if you take the standard professions of faith, the one of Peter in Matthew chapter 16. You know, who do men say I am and all these false answers and wrong answers. And then, so what do you say? Who do you say I am? Peter says, thou art the Christ, the Son, the living God. What's really a complete profession of faith that Peter's making? And then Christ says, blessed are you because flesh and blood didn't reveal this to you, but my Father's in heaven. And then he talks about building the church in it, right? Remember Paul VI one time saying, you know, as you know, he says, the whole church is built in the faith of Peter. But notice the order there, right? Thou art the Christ, the Son, the living God. He ascends from his, what? Humanity, huh? That is anointed to his divinity, right? Okay? That's kind of the order that's appropriate in the beginning because of our, what? Being animals, huh? That have reason. That begins from the sensible, right? Okay? But now when you get to the last gospel, then he begins with the Word, right? And the beginning was the Word, and the Word was towards God, and the Word was God. And so on. And then later on you say, and the Word was made flesh. Isn't that's technically flesh there for humanity. The Word was made man, huh? So then the order just reversed, isn't it? Okay? And you can say in the order of definition, an understanding of God and of the persons of the blessed Trinity, which are in here, right? And also an understanding of what man is. It comes up a little bit later on in the final parts. Both of these, in the order of definition, are presupposed to an understanding or defining of what the incarnation is. Because incarnation is God, the Word of God, becoming man, right? So you have to understand what God is and the Word of God is, and what man is, before you can understand what it means for the Word of God to become man, right? But then the order is reversed, huh? And the Word of God can be without being a man or becoming a man, right? And before he became a man, he was not a man, but he was the Word of God, right? So in definition, it's before meaning, right? But in the profession of faith of the great Peter, right? You begin by what? There at the price of some of the living God. Now, at the end of John's Gospel, right? Now, Peter and John are very close together. You can see them at the end of the Gospel, at the end of this and in the Acts of the Apostles and so on. Well, St. John says, these are written that you might believe that Jesus is, what? The Christ, the Son of God. He's exactly the same profession, the same order, right? Now, our Lord himself follows an order when he says, I am the way, the truth, and the life. Because he's the way as man, and he's the truth, truth itself, and life itself as God, right? So he goes from the human to the what? Divine, yeah. But St. John, beginning of his Gospel, goes on the way around, right? Now, Thomas in the Summa Theologiae is following the order of St. John there, right? Because we're going to learn here about the, we learned about God, and we're learning about the persons here, right? And about the Word of God, in particular, among these. And then it's not until we get to the third part, we learn about the Incarnation and so on, you see? But you can follow both of those orders, but for different reasons. But the first one you have to do is meet the Humanity of Christ, right? And so when we instruct little children about these things, we begin with what? The Humanity of Christ, right? And the Nativity and so on, and the rest of it. And then gradually lead them on to the Divinity, huh? That Master, one of the grandchildren, one of the little two-year-old, you go, God's there. You say that, you know? Mounds of babes, you know? That some people don't believe, he says. So, he's pointing out how sometimes then we don't know the substantial differences, right? Or at least they're not named, right? And therefore we use accidents sometimes to name what is substantial. And sometimes we use an intention to, what? Name something that is of a thing. And similarly, the names of intentions can be taken to defining things as according as they're taken for some names of things which are not laid down. And in other ways, he said, we'll have to do that with the Holy Spirit, right? In his way of proceeding. And thus, this name, individual, is laid down in the definition of person to designating the way of subsisting which belongs to particular, what? Substances, huh? Now, sometimes when you take something that we know about, somewhat, man, and how do you define man? Well, he's the rational animal. right? The animal that has reason. But is reason really the substance of man? Reason is really an ability that man has, and it belongs in the second species of quality, which is an accident, right? The soul has many abilities, but we name this soul from the ability of reason, just as we name the what? Animal soul from it's a sensing soul, right? So we're using reason there for what it is in the substantial nature of man once he has its ability. By sensing, you know, it's named really the ability of the animal, right? But if you're using it to name the substantial difference of him from the plant, right? The animal differs from the plant because he senses. You're naming what is perhaps unknown, right? The substantial difference between the animal and the plant by something that follows upon the substantial difference, huh? Or there's at least a name placed upon that differently, huh? It takes someone like Thomas to understand the definition here and to defend it, huh? Now the fourth objection was saying this name nature, right? Now, in the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle considers the names that are equivocal by reason and that are used most of all in wisdom itself but also in the axioms, right? Because they're so common but to some extent everywhere. And among these words in the fifth book there is the word nature. First word is beginning, then cause and element, and then nature, huh? And he's giving a little bit of this teaching about it here, huh? According to the philosopher in the fifth book of wisdom, the name nature or phusis in Greek first is placed upon in positum, right? To signify the generation of living things which is called, what? Nativity. Now you can see that somewhat in the English word nature because you have other words like prenatal, postnatal, nativity, right? Are you a native of this city? You know, were you born here? You can see the original meaning of the word nat there, birth, huh? Okay. And then the word nature was carried over and applied to the source of the baby within the mother. And then was generalized, that idea of a source within, for not just birth but for any kind of change that has its source within the thing. And because this generation is from an intrinsic beginning, right? The name was extended to signifying the intrinsic beginning of any motion. That's actually the third sense that Aristotle extinguishes there. And thus, nature is defined in the second book of the, what? Physics. And because this beginning is either a form or a matter, right? That's what you learn in the first book of natural hearing. It's all over there. A little back a while. Now, commonly both matter and form are called, what? Nature. And finally, because through the form is completed the essence of each thing, in a very general way, the essence, the substance, what a thing is, of each thing, which its definition signifies, is called nature. Now, notice in English there, we tend to use the word nature then in that last sense, huh? Forgetting all the meanings that you got to it, huh? So in that sense, we could speak of the nature of God. The nature of a tree, the nature of tragedy, you know? The what it is of anything, right? Okay? And in that last sense, it's taken here, in the definition, the word nature, right? Okay? So the objection, you could reply to the objection that you're taking the third meaning of nature rather than the sixth or seventh meaning, shall we say, of the word nature, right? The last meaning of the word nature. Now, you know, I was saying, you know, last week, I think, was it, that it's very important to understand names equivocal by reason, right? And one of the many reasons I gave for that is that the most common mistake in thinking comes from mixing up the senses of a word, and people are not apt to mix up the senses of a word equivocal by chance. Roger and Mary said, 61 home runs with a bat. The bat is a flying rodent, huh? Therefore, Roger and Mary said, 61 home runs with a bat. We just laugh at it like a joke, right? Because the meanings have no connection at all. You're not going to mix them up at all. But words that are equivocal by reason, there's a connection among the meanings, maybe a likeness among the meanings. And then people, very common, you know, Aristotle in the book on fallacies there, there's a book on system refutations. This is the most common mistake in thinking. And when I teach the students the word before and after, right, they're equivocal by reason, huh? And I distinguish the four senses of before, principal ones and so on, and try to get them to understand it. And they say, now, later on in the course they say, you will all mix up some of these senses and be mistaken. Because after, it's been explained to the different senses, right? And later on, it's actually what they do. I told you before I had to do this. I know you'll do it, huh? Well, that's what's happening with the word nature, huh? Quent's belief is in the same book says that nature is what? What informs each thing with a specific difference, right? What completes its nature, in other words, what it is. But the specific difference is what completes the definition and is taken from the proper formative thing. There must be enough to, up to that point, I'm going to make another little subtlety about this, but that's enough to be, reply to the objection, right? You're taking nature in a different sense than it's intended to be the definition, huh? And therefore, more suitably, is it in the definition of person that's the singular of some determined genus to use the name nature than essence, which is taken from being, which is most, what? Common, right? Now, the fifth objection is a different kind of objection, right? The one about this person in heaven, right? The soul might be, but he's not. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the soul is a part of the human species, and therefore, although it is separated, huh? Because nevertheless, it retains the nature of its, Being united to the body, right? It cannot be called the individual substance, which is an hypostasis, or first substance, just as neither a hand, right? Nor any other of the parts of man, right? And thus, there does not belong to either the definition of a person, nor the name, right? Now, I guess when Charles DeConnick was one of those theologians, you know, had a conversation with Pius XII before he defined the assumption, and among his arguments was that Mary would not be in heaven if his soul would not be assumed to be in heaven. And that's kind of impressed, they say in Pius XII, you know, this argument, right? But it's based upon this, right? It might be a serious thing for Mary not to be in heaven, right? See, when you say, Peter, pray for us, you know, say, Peter, then this is, what, a figure of speech, a synecdoche, a part for the whole. Yeah. And Augustine says on that, we'll enjoy seeing God even more when our soul is rejoined to our body, because we have a more perfect thing to see God as a part of something perfect compared to the whole. That's kind of interesting about that psalm there, the 62 or 63, O God, you are my God and I seek for you my flesh pines and my soul thirst, and you be in the body as well as the soul, right? And then the riches of a bank shall my soul be filled with exultant lips, my, you know, because that's talking about the body being reunited seems to the soul, right? Thomas says explicitly that in heaven there will be, what, vocal praise of God as well as this interior stuff, There will be music properly in heaven, huh? Thomas says that there will be pleasures of the senses that are compatible with the immortal state, right? So it won't be the pleasure of drinking wine, I'm sorry. So it's going to be the other day about, you know, scripture talking about, you know, so this is a metaphor about eating at his table, right? There won't be the pleasure of eating or drinking or reproducing because that's all ordered to this, what, corruptible state, but there will be the pleasure of the eyes and the ears and the senses of the beautiful, chief delight, right? So maybe, you know, Mozart will be up there, you know, in the past, or you don't, so on. I hope it's not going to be up to us, that's all I have to do. I say something that's not too much attached to the music of Mozart, you know, or, or, or, the 16th, right? As the piano rock goes on occasion and he plays Mozart, right? And, I like to hear a concert, you know, and give him a concert, you know, probably, I don't know how good a pianist he is, but he's pretty, he's pretty good, you know, he ain't an amateur, but still, pretty good at it. But, it gets too attached to the music of Mozart, you know, but there's going to be even better music I've got up there, huh? They say, you know, no one realized how beautiful the female voice could be until Mozart wrote some of these arias for it. And he realized, oh, goodness, you know, but the arias up in heaven are going to be, the human voice would be even more beautiful up there. Please, you take a little break before we go on to the second article. I'll see you next time. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. the second article here now, where the person is the same as what? Hypostasis, subsistence, and essence. The second one proceeds thus. It seems that person is the same as hypostasis, subsistencia, and essentia. For Boethius says in the book on the two natures that the Greeks call, by the name of hypostasis, an individual substance of a rational nature. But this also, among us, is signified by the name person. Therefore, person is altogether the same thing as what? Hypostasis. Moreover, just as in divine things we say there are three prisons, so in divine things we say there are three subsistences, which would not be unless person and subsistence signified the same what? Thing. Therefore, person and subsistence signify the same thing. Moreover, Boethius says in the commentary and the predicate mentor, that's the categories of Aristotle. If you look at the, at the, at Albert the Great sayings, the paraphrases of the isagoge of porphyry and the categories of Aristotle, well, the genus, species, difference, property, and accent would be called the predicabilia, and then the substance, quantity, quality, the other ten, the predicamenta, right? So Boethius translated this and we have come to that. Now, that usia, now actually in Greek that would be O-U, right? Usia. Which is the same as what? Essence, right? And that signifies this and what meaning of the word substance in Greek, usia, is what a thing is, huh? So Plato and Aristotle will use sometimes for a definition. Logos teisusia. It's a ratio substantiae, right? I don't have an article, so. Okay. That signifies something composed from matter and form, at least in material things, right? But that which is composed from matter and form is the individual substance, which is called the hypostasis of the person. Therefore, all the forested names signify or seem to signify the same thing, right? So this second article is really to clear up the meanings of these words and to distinguish them, right? But against this is what Boethius says in the book on the two natures, that genre and species subsist only. Individuals not only subsist, but they also stand under a substata. But from subsistendo, subsisting, are said substances, subsistences, I should say, just as from standing under, substantiae of the hypostasis, huh? And incidentally, you know, this is the great problem in the thinking about these things in the beginning, that how do you translate hypostasis into what? Lactin. Well, etymologically speaking, hypostasis corresponds to what? Substantiae. But if you say there are three substances, in Latin, substantiae also means what a thing is, the nature or substance of a thing. And so if you speak of three hypostasis and you translate it into Latin as three substances, then you, into a heresy, right? There are three natures here and so on. And so it shows the difficulties until they clear these things up, right? Since, therefore, to be hypostasis or persons does not belong to genre and species, hypostasis and persons are not the same thing as what? Subsistentiary. That's a little bit going back to what we're saying over here, right? Subsistentiary seems to apply in some way to the genre and the species, huh? Because man or dog is not the kind of thing that exists in others in the subject. By geometry and health and shape and so on, the things that exist in others in the subject, right? Moreover, as Boethius says in the commentary on the predicaments, the categories, that hypostasis is said matter, usiosis, that is subsistence, form. But neither form nor matter can be called a person. Therefore, a person differs from the fore said, right? You see how confusing I can get with all these uses of the word here, right? But Thomas will clear it up. Have no fear. I answer it should be said that according to the philosopher, that's Aristotle, in the fifth book of wisdom or first philosophy, metaphysics, substance is said in two ways. In one way that is called substance, the what it is of a thing, right? Which the definition signifies. According as we say the definition signifies the substance of a thing, right? So sometimes we say the definition signifies what a thing is, right? We also say it signifies the substance of a thing. Then substance is what a thing is. Which substantiam, the Greeks call usiam, right? Which we are able to call what? Essentia. In another way that is called substance, which is the subject or suppositive that subsists in the genus of what? Substance, that's the individual, you or me. And this, taking it commonly, can be named both by a name signifying an intention, and thus it is called the suppositive one, and it's like a subject, right? Placed under. And is named by three names signifying a thing, which are a thing of nature, subsistence, and hypostasis. According to a threefold consideration of substance, thus said. Now what's all this about? I'm not going to explain it. For according as it exists by itself, right? And not in another, it is called what? Yeah. For those things are said to subsist, which are what? It's exist not in another as in a subject, right? But in themselves, right? Which is a way of saying what? Not in another. In the fourth book of Natural Hearing, Physics, when Aristotle is talking about place, he's about to define place, but he takes up the word in, and he distinguishes eight different meanings of in, right? And he doesn't order them, right? And Thomas says, well, we're going to order them in the way that Aristotle taught us in the fifth book of Wisdom. And he orders them, right? But then after he orders the eight meanings, he goes on to show that nothing is in itself. Again, he shows it inductively, and he shows it by reason, huh? But then at the end of that one, Thomas is a comment, he says, but sometimes we say, in say, meaning what? Kind of in an affirmative way, grammatically, of saying something that's negative in meaning, right? So if we say substance exists in itself, we mean really it doesn't exist in another, not in another. That way of speaking, you have to be careful about it, right? So according as it exists by itself and not in another, it is called subsistence. For those things we say subsist that exist not to another, but in themselves, right? But according as it is what? Placed under, you might say, some common nature, it is thus called a thing of what? Nature. As this man, like you over there, are a thing of a human nature. Okay? Okay? The dog's around here, there's a dog around here, isn't there, somewhere? Is a thing of a what? Doggy nature, yeah, kenai nature. But according as it, what, is placed under accidents, right? It is called a, what, hypostasis, still, substantia. So substantia means, I mean, etymologically, either one of those words in Greek or Latin means to stand under, right? So it stands under accidents, because accidents exist in that. But what these three names signify, communitera, commonly, in the whole genus of substance, right? This name, person, signifies, in particular, in the genus of rational substances. Substances that have mind or reason, right? Now, is that crystal clear? That's what he's doing there, right? He begins with a text of Aristotle from the fifth book of wisdom, right? Where two principal meanings that Aristotle gives of the word substance is what a thing is, right? And then, right, the subject, or suppositum, as he calls it, that subsists in the genus of substance, huh? The individual substance, right? And then he's got to talk about how that second thing can be named, right, huh? And by a name, that signifies an intention, and then by three names signifying the thing. And what do those three names signify, right? Well, one is comparing it to what? Well, that's true, yeah. Or it has, what, a sort of nature of that thing, right? And it underlies, sort of what? Accidents, huh? Okay, so Socrates, insofar as he does not exist in others in a subject, he's said to subsist, right? Insofar as he's an individual of human nature, he's said to be a resonator, right? And insofar as he, what, stands under certain accidents, right? Courage, wisdom, and so on. Then he's called a, what, hypostasis or substance, right? Okay, I think I'm interested in that word substance because it's named from standing under something else. And what does it stand under? Accidents, right? Now, why is it named, in a way, from its position with reference to accidents? Well, partly because accidents are more, what? Yeah, because they're more sensible, right? Okay. Now, you know, the moderns always have problems with substance, right? And Bertrand Russell said, you know, the accidents of Mr. Smith, he said, have no more need of a substance to exist in than the earth has need of an elephant to rest upon. But then, what would you call them accidents, right? You see? Now, Descartes is a little different problem. Because Descartes identifies the substance of material things with their size, with their quantity. And so he's really confusing an accident with the substance, right? Now, you want to speak in English, huh? And speak in a way that could be understood by even the common man. You could ask a man, you know, is what a dog is, and the size of a dog the same thing? Is what a man is, and the size of a man the same thing? But if you take away your size, it's hard to see what's left. Yeah, yeah. That's how it gets to that problem, right? See? But if you ask the common man, is what a man is, and the size of a man the same thing? No. You could have what a man is, and it becomes a different size, right? See? So the size of a man is not what a man is. But furthermore, as you go through life, your size changes, huh? Especially in the first years of your life, huh? And yet, you remain, right? So I used to joke about Descartes. Descartes never grew up. It wouldn't be the same substance if you have different size there, right? But notice, Aristotle does give quantity as the first category of accident, so closely related to substance, huh? And that's why, you know, people like Descartes, it's confused with that, huh? And to some extent, the Platonists did that, and they agree on that, huh? Nevertheless, the word substance does show that accidents in some way are, what, more known to us, huh? Because they are sensible as such, why substance is not, right? So I see your color, and I see your shape, in a way I don't see you. But something else in me understands you, when I see your color and shape, and so on, huh? Einstein gets very confused about that, right? He ends up, you know, thinking that you are an hypothesis. It's nice to make fun of Einstein, say, you know. For Einstein, the existence of his wife is an hypothesis. To explain a bundle of, you know, smells and colors and sounds and so on. So the individual substance is of some nature, and therefore it's called a res naturae, it says, right? It stands under accidents, and therefore it's called a hypostasis, or substantia, right? And it exists not in another, and therefore it's called a subsistence, right? So there's a little different reason for giving each of those three names to it, right? But that could be applied to a dog, as well as a man, or even to a tree, right? Those three names, right? Because a dog doesn't exist, and another isn't a subject, so he's subsistent to the dog, right? He has, by accident, some colors and health and nasty nature and so on. And he's also, what, an individual of some nature, right? A canine nature. But the word person is naming what has those three qualities in a more particular way, just in the genus of, what, rational substances, huh? Now, something happened with the Greek word, huh, in custom, right? And so he doesn't apply to the first one here. Because the Greeks, and you find this in theology a lot, they'll speak of the hypostatic, what, union, right? Now, what does that mean? It means that the human nature and the divine nature of Christ are joined in the, what, one person in the word of God. And that's what they're called, the hypostatic union, as if hypostasis means the same thing as person, right? But Thomas says, to the first it should be said that hypostasis, among the Greeks, from the proper meaning of the name, right, it has to signify any individual, what, a substance, right? It's etnologically the same thing, a substance here, right? But exus solopwende, they're accustomed, right, to what? It has to be taken for an individual of a rational nature, for a reason of its excellence, right? So the word, etnologically speaking, and so on, would signify an individual of any kind, huh, in the genus of substance, right? But the Greeks are accustomed to use it just for, what? Yeah, for a person, right? Okay. So that's, that's, that happens sometimes in words, right? It's like the word someone, right? 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