Prima Pars
Lecture 122: Person in Divine Things: Signification and Subsistence

Transcript
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I ask you, which way is more convincing, you know? Sometimes they not only have, they have some ignorance, errors, what they do is they set up, it used to be this way, and the reason was because, and they give the wrong reasons. And then they knock it down. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Barclay there, he's one of the works there, he says, you know, some people have attributed, you know, the difficulty the mind has to things or to the weakness of our mind, but I think, you know, we have to insist upon principles we should not have insisted upon, right? This is kind of an unintelligible position, because why do we insist upon principles we should not have insisted upon if there wasn't some, you know, weakness of our mind or something, right? But he's touching upon the two causes of difficulty that Aristotle gives in the second book of wisdom, but not recalling that Aristotle said that, not recalling that Aristotle did say that, and not giving any answer to that, we just, you know, said, some people thought this, but I say it's this, and then, blah. But against this is what Wethius says in the book about the Trinity, that every name pertaining to persons, right, and I think he's speaking in the context of the Trinity, right, signifies relation, but no name more pertaining to persons than this name, what, person. Therefore, this name, person, signifies relation. So Wethius saves the day, huh? Now we've got to be able to defend what the great Wethius says, huh? A lot of times I maintain, you know, Wethius is the greatest mind there in the church between Augustine and Thomas, you know, but he simply stands out in many ways. I mean, he had influence, he was influenced himself by Augustine, and then he influenced Thomas, you know. Who's the greater mind that got Senator Thomas? He's having visions of the judgment seat. One side is St. Thomas, the other side is St. Thomas. Well, you know, it's like, you know, the contrast, I was making fun about Fred and I were on Murray. I maintain that Shakespeare was better than Homer, right? Now saying, I'll not be so presumptuous as to decide who is greater, right? And Warren was saying, well, I didn't mean that Shakespeare's natural poetic gifts were greater than that of Homer, right? But he had the advantage of what the philosophers and the poets in between, right? I said, so that the extent works of Shakespeare's are even greater than those of Homer. I think you can see that, right? You see, Thomas has the advantage of Aristotle as well as Boethius and many other people. And he speaks, you know, in some ways with a precision of speech, right? That is better than Augustine's, right? Okay. But he also has the advantage of Augustine himself, right? So, it might be, you know, following my friend Warren there, better say that that Thomas' works, you can learn more from him, right? than from Augustine, right? In less time, huh? That's not to say that the natural gift of mind of Thomas was greater than that of what? Augustine, right? In some of these bargames of Thomas, of course, there's an account, you know, of Augustine appearing to Thomas, right? And talking, but one thing I remember him saying, you know, was that you're more pure than I am, because he had lived a little more distilled life and Thomas had been chased from the beginning, you know? But, I think that's the safest answer to give, right? That's great. Yeah. I think it was John the 22nd who canonized Thomas and said you could learn more from, you know, a year of studying of Thomas than a lifetime of the church fathers. I think that's definitely true, you know? And there's all kinds of texts of Augustine that you could just understand, right? It's not, you know, even in the philosophical works, you know, where he's talking about the soul and so on. He'll quote a text of Augustine that seems to be opposed to the truth and then he'll explain the way they'll kind of save the text of Augustine. And I think in both cases, he is saving the text of Augustine what Augustine meant, right? Others have misunderstood, don't they? But again, the fact that Thomas will spell things out in a way Augustine doesn't. I think Augustine, you know, appeals to people more because of his style, right? But Thomas' style is kind of bold in a sense, right? There's no, I mean, after Augustine was a teacher of rhetoric and he's into style and so on and all this alliteration you have in Augustine. And you go back to Latin, you know, I mean, the soul is more where it's what, amat than animat. The things will rhyme in Latin don't rhyme in the translation and Thomas doesn't try to do that, right? If you look at Thomas' you know, tense like, you know, the liturgy, you know, for the Eucharist and so on and the other rotating words, those are perfect words, right? And they're very, they're very good as a prayer to use. And after Vatican II they're going to be singled out in the end creating the indulgences the most important prayers they thought in the tradition of the church, right? In terms of the Eucharist Thomas dominates that, and in a way he's out of guessing doesn't, right? So, I mean, and they're beautiful things, you know, as I said, the rhythmist says Thomas, right? I mean, he's not trying to write this in rhythm in a way that's very clear. And Thomas, you know, talks there, there's a text there, was it in the, coming here in the Psalms that we've got, it distinguishes three styles, right, you know? And the style sitting here is a very plain style, right? And we see Thomas is Latin, so if we have an icon image, you know? And by read Augustine it more difficult to read Augustine, it's a more flowing thing, you know? We didn't guess it more if we didn't Cicero or somebody, right? He had to become a master of Latin and we didn't put it down. So I think the safe answer is to say that Thomas had the advantage of Augustine, right, as a teacher, but also verse Dabaway. And, you know, if you look at the, I think it's a thing to cut this sometimes, but go back to New of the Thirteenths and Sacred Scripture, and I'm not used to be an edition there, I have it at home there, where they print New of the Thirteenths and Sacred and the one on Jerome, I think, and then Pius XII, you know? And New of the Thirteenth is the one to begin with because he gives you the whole tradition of the Church and what the Church fathers contributed to understanding the Scripture, then what the Scholastics did, right? And then what the Moderns did, right? When you get into, say, you know, the Divino Fante Spiritu there by Pius XII, he's dealing more with the problems of modern scholarship and what is good in there and what is bad in there and that sort of thing, you know? You're not getting the whole tradition of the Church explaining the Scripture, right? If you go back and read what he says there about the Scholastics, right, and what they brought, the Church fathers didn't have, and he says, Thomas, you know, most of all among them, right, you know, the division of the text and showing the connection of one part of the text of the next and so on, none of that is explicit in the Church Fathers, right? And so there's something that the Scholastics contributed, that no one before or after has contributed, and Thomas most of all, right? And I pick up, you know, picking up some of the Church Fathers, you read them on this thing, it's kind of a homily, right? But they're off the text because of the fact they're getting a homily in the Church, right? And they're applying to various things and so on, and it flows along very much, but it doesn't stick to the text, right? And the way Thomas would do it when he was coming on the Psalms or the Gospels and so on. So we'll go back to the 13th and see what's unique to each period. That's the difference in reading St. Thomas on Scripture and reading Chrysostom. St. Thomas, it's a lot of attention to cover a small section because there's so much in it, whereas you could read pages of Chrysostom because he's preaching. And he's wearing all his examples and he gives all his practical exhortations and everything. Yeah, yeah. I think I mentioned, you know, not this trip, I'll get some of the previous trips I took along Augustine's Trinitati, right? I've read it before, but I've read through it again, you know. But there's an awful lot in there about the Incarnation and other things that don't pertain to the Trinity, right? Like Thomas, you know, things. These are kept separate, you know, but it's a little more like when you go back to, say, most people like Plato's dialogues more than Aristotle's criticism, but in a batonic dialogue you'll go from one thing to another and it's kind of, what, easier on the imagination and not the mind, right? And, but, you have to balance what is said in this dialogue with something said in another dialogue about the same matter. And it's not like everything he's got to say about the soul is in the dialogue, even in Phaedo, say, and by Aristotle it's all made out of Phaedo over there. So, it might be appropriate to begin with Phaedo, but he don't end there. Yeah, okay, sure. So we're up to the body of the article, of Article 4, right? Answer, it should be said. And notice how much longer is the body of this article than the previous article, huh? Answer, it should be said, that about the signification or meaning of this name, person, and divine things, there is engendered a difficulty, right? And that it is said, plurality, right? In the plural, about the three, right? So we can say that there are three persons in God, right? Apart from the, what, nature of the essential names, you can't say that there are three gods there. Nor, also, is it said ad aliquid, it's not said ad aliquid, just as the names which signify relation. You have a problem, right, huh? Because if the name is said absolutely and not as relation, then are there three things that differ absolutely in God? Then you're going to be in real trouble, right? But if you say it signifies relation, it doesn't. You've got a problem, right? Whence, to some it seems, huh, that this name, person, simply, from the, what, power of the vocabulary itself, the word itself, signifies the essence in divine things, just as this name, God, right? And this name, what, wise, huh? But an account of the objections of the heretics, or the attacks of the heretics, it was accommodated, right, okay, from the ordering of the, what, council, and in my text of the footnote there, council of Nicaea, as Thomas says, expression in the potentia, right? That it is able to stand for, what, relativism. As if the word is kind of stretched right and applied to something, huh? And especially in the plural, or with a name that, what, divides, right? As when we say three persons, right? Then it can't signify three absolute things. Or other is a person of the father, another of the son, right? That's partitivo, right? But in the singular, it can be taken both for something absolute and for something relative, right? It's a very complicated explanation. But this is not seen, Thomas says, to be a sufficient, what, reason, right? Because if this name, person, from the strength of its own meaning, does not have, except that it signifies only the essence in God, right? From this, that it is said that there are three persons, there would not be, what, quieted down the calumny of the heretics, but would, occasion would be given for an even greater, but, yeah, calumny, and therefore others say that this name, person, in divine things, signifies together the essence and the relation, right? Of which some say that it signifies the essence directly and the relation obliquely, because person is said, and this is not one of these kind of false technologies, per se una, right? If you're running together, these three words have made persona out of it, right? Because unity pertains to, what, the essence, huh? But what is said per se or by itself implies relational obliquely, right? Why? Because the father is understood to be by himself, because he is, what, distinct by relation from the son, huh? Some, however, say the reverse. It signifies directly the relation and the essence obliquely, because in the definition of person, nature is placed in the oblique, huh? So it's said to be an individual substance of a rational nature, right? So directly it signifies, yeah, but indirectly the nature, right? And these accede more closely to the truth, right? Now, Tom's got to unravel all this, right? To the evidence, therefore, of this question, it should be considered that something is of the meaning of the less common, the less universal, that nevertheless is not of the meaning of the more general. For example, rational is included in the meaning of man, right? But nevertheless is not of the meaning of what? Is that clear enough? That distinction is pointing out? Okay? So something's in the meaning of what? Odd number that's not in the meaning of what? Number, right? Okay? Something's in the meaning of dog that's not in the meaning of what? Animal. Okay? So something's in the meaning of person, or excuse me, the meaning of person as found in God, maybe that's not in the meaning of person in general, right? Okay? You see that distinction? Hmm? Okay. Whence it is one thing to ask about the meaning of animal, right? Another to ask about the meaning of the animal that is man. Okay? Likewise, it is one thing to ask about the meaning of this name person in common, which he did in Articles 1 and 2, right? And another about the meaning of divine person, right? Something will be found in the meaning of a divine person that's not found in the meaning of person. That's why I divide the first two articles against the last two, right? That divides two or three, right? To understand. For person in general, you'd say it in English, right? You don't say person in common. Person in general signifies an individual substance of a rational nature, as has been said, right? It doesn't go wrong with you saying Victor, is it? Yeah. Okay. An individual, however, is that which is in itself undivided or undistinguished, right? But is distinct from what? Other things, right? So a person, therefore, in whatever nature, right? Signifies that which is distinct from others in that nature, right? Just as in human nature, it signifies these fleshes and these bones and this soul, right? Which are the principles that individuate man, right? Which, however, are not of the meaning of person, in general, right? But they are nevertheless of the meaning of a human person, right? And that's why St. Peter is not in heaven. Because in St. Peter's name of the person, and his flesh and bones aren't there, St. Peter's not in heaven, right? I mentioned how in Deuteronomy that is, his interview with Pius XII, right? Because of the definition of the assumption, right? He made that point, right? That if Mary's body not consumed in heaven, Mary would not be in heaven. And that's supposed to impress the adult Pius XII. So notice, in the meaning of person in general, is that it's distinct from other things in that nature, right? But of the nature, or the definition, rather, of the meaning of human person, is what distinguishes one human person from another, right? That's something added to it, right? So, likewise, in the meaning of divine person is what distinguishes one divine person from another, right? And that's not in the meaning of person in general, right? But in general, it's just the idea that it distinguishes one from the other in that nature, right? The distinction, however, in divine things is not except by relations of origin, right? That's why he talked about origin to begin with, or procession, and about the relations that are tied to this origin, right? But now, Thomas Kondala make a very interesting point here. But relation in divine things is not, as it is in us, right, as an accident in bearing in a subject, okay? Like, my being a father is something that exists in me towards someone else, right? But my being a father is not me, okay? But in God, God and relation are the same thing, right? But it is the divine essence or nature of substance itself. Now, whence it is subsisting, as I say, existing by itself, right, just as the divine essence subsists, right? So it's not like the relations in, what, creatures, which are accidents, right, existing in their substance, right? But there can't be any multiplicity in God, right? So the relations in God are God himself, okay? As you'll find out later on, in no way do they differ from God, but they essentially differ from each other. Okay? So just, therefore, as the deity, meaning the divine nature, is God, right, huh? So the divine, what, fatherhood is God the Father, who is a divine person, huh? Now, what does person signify divine? This is, like, here, bold in my text, in my reality text, in my reality text. Divine person, therefore, signifies a relation as what? Subsisting, right, huh? Okay? Now, that's why this second position he said before is more closer to the truth, right? Because it signifies directly relation, and this subsisting idea, no people, right? Okay? And this is to signify relation per modem substanti, right? Which is in hypostasis, subsisting in the divine nature. Even though what subsists in the divine nature is not other than the divine nature. Now, I was mentioning before, there's another text of Thomas, I think, in his sentences, where he says that because the relations in God are the divine substance, right, you have these four ways of speaking, because it's a little complicated. You can signify the divine substance by way of a relation, or you can signify the relation by way of a substance, or you can signify substance by way of a substance, or relation by way of a what? Relation. Relation, yeah, okay? Now, if you speak of father, you're signifying relation as a relation, right? If you say God, you're signifying a substance as a substance, right? But now, if you say a person, you're signifying a relation as a what? As a substance, right? A modem substanti, right? Now, later on, you run into things like the power to generate, right? Well, they're absolutely relative, right? But signifying something absolute by way of what? Relation, yeah. So you have those four things, right? But that's a little more, doesn't, Thomas doesn't give all the way here, but, you know? You can't realize that you have something strange here, right? You have these relations, but they are the divine substance, right? So sometimes you signify the substance insofar as it has something relative about it, right? And therefore, you signify the substance, per modem, you'd say in Latin, right? By way of relation, right? And sometimes you signify what is really relation, per modem substanti, the way of substance. Those are two odd ways to signify it, right? And then you can signify something absolute, absolutely, right? And something relative, relative, right? Do you see? So a name like father and son are signifying a relation as a relation, in that relation. Person, since it's signifying something that distinguishes in the divine nature, right? It must signify what? A relation, right? But it signifies the relation, the way relations are in God, right? Where they are something substantial and not an accident like in man. So it signifies a relation by way of what? A substance, right? Do you see a little bit of that? It's a very subtle thing. That's going to solve the difficulties, right, about this name. And according to this, it is true that this name person signifies relation in recto, which I mean, kind of directly relation, right? And the essence in what? Not, however, a relation insofar as it is relation, right? But insofar as it signifies per modem hypostasis and therefore is a what? Substance, right? Okay. Likewise, it signifies the essence directly and relation in obliquo insofar as the essence is the same thing as a hypostasis, right? For hypostasis, which is an individual substance, right? Is signified in divine things as distinguished by a what? Relation. And thus relation signified in the matter relation falls in the what? Definition of person in oblique, right? And according to this, it can be said that this meaning of the name person was not perceived before the calumny of the heretics, right? This is the point that Augustine makes, right? Heresy is necessary, he says, for theology to develop, right? Because the heretics deny something of the faith and so the church fathers are forced to depend on that and to make certain distinctions and to see things that they would not have seen without this, right? The same thing happens in philosophy, you know, where a mistake forces one to defend, you know, the truth and you sometimes see something as a result of the mistake, right? That you wouldn't have seen otherwise, right? As Aristotle says in the second book of wisdom, right? They were indebted to others not only for the bits of truth that we got from them, right? But also even for their mistakes, which in arguing against, we developed our mind, right? And that's very true about, you look at the works of Augustine there, and so many of them are contra so-and-so, against so-and-so, right? And so Augustine, there's something, you know, as Vatican II says, something ad hoc about that, right? You're defending this article of faith, which is being denied by this heretic, and you're getting to a deeper understanding of this article of faith. And it's not until you get to maybe the scholastics that you start to bring this together as a whole, right? That's the nature of the human mind, to see a part of the truth before you see the whole truth, right? So Augustine, you know, as the church say, you know, on grace, the mind of Augustine is the mind of the church, right? But why did he develop the doctrine of the grace, right? It's because of the heretics, right? And Thomas says, and looking at Augustine's works on the grace, he speaks more carefully in the later works than the earlier works, because he sees more of their mistakes, right? And he's trying to apply to them. And so this is a very interesting example here, right? It's a very key word here. A person, obviously, you talk about God, right? And, you know, we're baptized, this one was baptized in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, right? He's a marvelous priest, that Father, if you tell him. He gives very good sermons, you know? He never preached here, because he was only, I think it was the first time we saw him since he was a dame, and he was a dame for six years. When was he a priest? Brother Vito, he was here last time, a few months ago, in San Francisco. Were you here? No, maybe you weren't there. Maybe it was last spring. I think it was last spring if you weren't there. He used to come here as a seminary, and he was here all the time. I think it was our dame, and we have some again. One time, we got a little sermon of the other great, you know? It's actually very, very good, the other great, you know? So, according to this, it can be said that this meaning of this name, person, was not received before the common heretics. So, you see a little bit of what those first people were saying, right? It's not as if the name has been accommodated, but something in the meaning of the name was not understood until the heretics were answered. Whence there was not in use this name, person, except as one of the, what? Whence there was not in the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name of the name They're absolutes, right? But afterwards was accommodated, this named person, this was the word, accommodatum, this named person to standing for something relative from the, what? So the ability of its meaning. That it stands relative not only from use, right? As the first opinion said, now he's correcting a little bit, but also from its very, what? Meaning, right? Now, let's go back to the text and look at it again before we look at the reply. For Augustine says in the seventh book about the Trinity that when we say the person of the Father, we do not say something other than the substance of the Father, right? For person has said, I'd say, meaning absolutely right, not I'd feel you. You see, Father has said, I'd feel you, right? But the person of the Father, that's said. Now, Thomas is very subtle here. To the first, therefore, it should be said. That this name, person, is said, I'd say, right? None at all term. Because it signifies a relation, not per modem relationis, but per modem, what? Substantium. Which is an hypothesis. In other words, maybe you said it more simply. You said it signifies relation as something subsisting, right? And to subsist is, what? Characteristic of the substance, right? So it signifies relation as something substantial, right? Okay? And according to this, Augustine says that it signifies essence, right? Insofar as in God, the very essence of God is the same with the, what? Hypostasis, right? So as we'll learn later on when he makes this comparative study, right? There's no real distinction between God and the Father. There's no real distinction between God and the Son. There's no real distinction between God and the Holy Spirit. They're identical. There's a distinction in meaning, but there's no distinction in reality. But there's a real distinction in reality between the Father and the Son, right? Because the Father is toward the Son and the Son is towards the Father. And the real distinction of the Holy Spirit from both of them because he's towards them, huh? They're breath. And according to this, Augustine says it signifies essence. Insofar as in God, the essence is the same with the Hypostasis. Because in God, does not differ what is and that by which it is. And the second objection is taken from strange use of the word quid there, right? Because normally, especially in philosophy, quid, we're thinking of what a thing is. It's nature, right? To second, it should be said that quid sometimes asks about the nature which the definition signifies as when it is asked what is man, right? And we respond a mortal rationality, right? It goes back to the definition of porphyr, right? Sometimes, though, it asks for the supposito, right? As when we ask quid not to demar, right? I mean, it's a little more clopio in Latin, right? And we answer fish, right? And thus, when we ask quid tres, we ask the persons, right? Now, it's a bit part of the Latin way of speaking, but in English, you know, when I say, what is a man or what is a dog or what is a cat or what is a triangle and ask for the nature of the thing, substance of the thing, right? Is that the only way we use the word what in English? When you hear a strange sound, what was that? See? That's a little more like this other use of the word quid there in Latin, right? Sure. Okay? You've heard that. Now, third objection was taken from the philosopher, right? And there, Aristotle says that what is signified and meant by a name is its definition. And then it quotes the definition of person there. Therefore, this name person signifies substance. And Thomas says, to the third, it should be said that in the understanding of an individual substance, that is something, what? Distinct or not communicable. It is understood in divine things, what? Relation, right? So you're talking about in the meaning of person in general is that it's something that's distinct, right? And not multipliable in that nature, right? Something communicable, right? But of a divine person, what is it that makes one person distinct from another? Well, it's the relation that distinguishes one person from another, right? Therefore, the meaning of a divine person is added, right? What it is that actually distinguishes one divine person from another and that's something that is a relation, fatherhood or sonhood, right? And therefore, in that sense, the name divine person as a distinction from a person signifies a relation, right? It signifies it per modem substancia, right? It's something subsisting by itself, right? Unlike relations and creatures which signify accidents, right? So you keep the specific meaning of relation that is toward another but you drop the idea of being an accident that you have in the categories. Aristotle has relation there, you know, it's one of the categories of accident, right? And you don't drop the genus, right? It's a common aspect but you keep the specific toward another, right? God the Father is toward the Son, right? It's the way Thomas is spelling out, you know, what Augustine really means. It should be. But Augustine himself will speak about, you know, there's a whole book there talking about the relations distinguishing the persons, right? So, it's not true to say that divine person signifies something absolute, period, right? Because something absolute doesn't distinguish, right? It's something relative, right? Then there's this odd thing that you can signify something relative per modem substancia. You know, when Aristotle was talking in the categories, he's distinguishing the categories. When he first distinguishes them, he does so using, for the accidents, the concrete names, right? And later on, he gets into that category and he may use the abstract name, right? But if you take health, let's say, and healthy, take an example there, which signifies an accident here? In both cases, health and healthy signify an accident. But which signifies an accident more per modem accidentis, you might say? The word health or the word healthy? Yeah. But the word health seems to kind of signify, yeah, yeah. So now, this distinction is something out of the blue here, right? And Aristotle says, you know, when you talk about health, you know, does health really exist? You know? See? And that, you know, it doesn't seem to exist in the way that they help you do, right? And sometimes I find people, you know, will, you know, I want to call it, you know, he's kind of hung up on this idea, you know, but, you know, there's no such thing as science, right? You know how we, in articles, and, you know, science is this or science is that? Well, there's no science, you know, science. With a capital S. Yeah, yeah, there's only scientists, right? And they don't all agree, right? And, now you kind of exaggerate this, you know, because I think that you can say some things like this, but, in a sense, you're kind of making science kind of something that's subsisting by itself, right? Science. Yeah, yeah. Science has proof. Yeah, yeah. The science is a person that can do something, not prove something, right? You see the point? I mean, the kind of distinction there is not altogether useful only here, but it comes up other places, right? And so when Aristotle distinguishes the categories, he'll say what it is, how much, how, right? use that in the kind of Greek way of speaking, and that's important because they distinguish the accidents by how they are for its substance, right? Because quantity is a measure of substance, or quality is a disposition of substance, and so on. Now, the fourth objection, right? Person in men and angels doesn't signify relation, but something absolute. If therefore God signifies relation, it would be said equivocally of God and men and angels, right? Thomas makes a very good point in logic, in the beginning of the reply to the fourth objection. To the fourth it should be said that a diverse definition of the less common does not make equivocation the more common. Now, you know, I know from experience as a teacher there, sometimes even students will get mixed up in something like this, right? When you say the word animal, of dog and cat, do you mean the same thing? But sometimes you have a student who will say, no, when you say that a dog is an animal and a cat is an animal, you don't mean the same thing. You see? As if because the meaning of dog is not the same as the meaning of cat, therefore the meaning of animal, you say, a dog is an animal and a cat is an animal, it's not the same. But it is the same, right? You see what I mean? You see? But you have to point it out to the students, not to you students, but to the other college, right? Thomas is making that point, right? A diverse definition of the less common does not make equivocation in the more common. Although there is its own definition of what? The horse has its own definition and ass has its own definition, right? Nevertheless, they have the same meaning, right? Univocantare, in the name of animal. Because the common definition of animal belongs to both, right? But that is a fundamental distinction and I know some people, you know, if I say an odd number is a number and a prime number, an even number is a number, it's never been the same thing. Is it? It doesn't mean the same thing. As if the fact that odd number and even number don't mean the same thing, therefore a number instead of them doesn't mean the same thing. Whence it does not follow. Although in the meaning of a divine person, right? Is contained relation, right? And this is not contained in the meaning of an angelic person or a human person. It doesn't follow that the name person is said what? Yeah, yeah. Although neither also what? Univocantare, right? Because nothing is univocantare said of God and preachers as has been said above, right? Of course, there's an exception to that, right? Because when God became man, then man is significantly of God and man, right? That's a part of the... Well, again, yeah, yeah. But notice there's another thing to take into account. But when I talk about name equivocal by reason, right? Sometimes a name said univocally of two things is kept by one of them, right? As its own name, right? And a new name is given to the other, right? So, you know, I'd say to students, how many fingers do I have? And they'd say five fingers, right? And then you'd say, how many fingers do I have? Well, four fingers and a, what? Thumb. So one of the fingers gets its own name and the other ones, for most people, I mean, they keep the common name finger, right? Because there's something about this one finger that makes you able to hold a glass or a can of beer, as I say. And so there's something unique about it. It stands out like a sore thumb, right? It's like a sore finger with a sore thumb, right? So, when fingers kept for these four as their own name, and this one is given a new name, then you have some equivocation, right? So sometimes animals kept for the beasts, right? As their own name. And man is given his own name, right? And therefore, we don't say that man is a what? Animal, right? And sometimes, you know, beasts find that the plant is kept for the little things and three, it gets its own name because there's something unique about that plant. Way more popular, looking down upon them, right? Shading them and so on. Once it does not follow that although in the meaning of a divine person is a contangulation, not over in the meaning of an angelic or divine person, that the name of person is said equivocally, although neither is entirely said uniquely, right? That's another little thing that I talk about when I talk about a definition, right? And when we first talk about a name being said univocally, we say, well, a name is said of many things univocally and said with the same definition in mind, right? And that's a good way of beginning. But then the question is, since the name is composed of names, right, is it not possible that a name, that one of the names in the definition might be what? Yeah. And I give an example I used to do when I teach on that thing I think when I talk about statement I give the definition of statement that it's speech signifying the true or the false, right? But now when you say statement of regular statement like man is an animal and you say instead of the if-then statement and either-or statement that's true mean the same thing, right? That's actually what I was after you might be using words in the devil. Yeah, but I don't think that's true in the case of animal, right? But there is a kind of equivocation if you limit the word animal to beast, right? Because then in a sense it's almost like you're saying animal means a living body with sensation and no reason, right? It seems like you're kind of implying that. But because man has reason he gets a new name, man, right? But because he has reason the sense life, it seems to mean the sense life of man differs from the sense life of animal. Yeah, it does, yeah, but when you give the genus animal, you're not talking about that difference between the sense life of man and the beast. Even though it is different, right? When you descend, right? Just like you talk about person, he's saying here, you see a person of you, let's say, and of God the Father, in both cases you mean something that's distinct from other things in that same nature, right? But you're not, you see a person in general there, of both of us, you're not yet talking about what it is that distinguishes you from me, what distinguishes God the Father from God the Son, right? So when we call man and animal, we're not thinking of his senses, what they have distinct from him. Yeah, yeah, Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But this other distinction was I was saying, you know, if I'm distinguishing between statement, let's say, and definition, right, and logic, and I'd say, well, they're both a speech, right? They're both vocal sound that has parts that signify by themselves, right? But the difference is that a definition is speech signifying what a thing is, and a statement is speech signifying the true or the false. So that's the way the two of them differ, right? But then when you examine this definition, I give it a statement. When you say statement of the simple statement and of the compound statement, true and false don't mean exactly the same thing, right? Therefore, right, there's still not to get univocally said in the three, right? But in comparison to definition, that seems to separate them all from it, right? So Thomas is saying something like that here, right? But he's making a more general point that we'd still say that each of them is what? An individual two, ...substance of a rational nature, right? The same way I can still say of each of the three statements, each of them is, what? Speech signifying the true or the false, right? It separates them from the definition, right? So, now we know what a person is, so we know what a divine person is a little bit, right? So what does divine person signify, yeah? Well, you could say, going back to the common definition, signifies something distinct, right, in the divine nature. But, to be more precise, what is it that makes something distinct from another in the divine nature? Well, it's a relation of origin, right? And so it signifies a relation, but it signifies a relation as something subsistent. Therefore, it signifies a relation, per modem substanti, to use the verb, a little bit like, you can say, the word help, right? It signifies an accident, but it kind of signifies it as something subsisting, right? Okay? Or, do the comparison, right? It's a little bit of that sort of thing, right? While healthy signifies an accident, more per modem accidentis, right? As an accident, then? And so Thomas says, you know, well, healthy, or Aristotle says, healthy seems to be more real than health, right? Okay? Then later on, when Aristotle takes up the category of quality, he uses the abstract word, right? And he makes it equality divided into habit disposition, and power, and sensible quality, and so on, and shape, and so on. So does health exist? Not by itself, right? Exploding in a form somewhere. Yeah, yeah. It's typical, I said strength is typically German, and everybody sees this healthy-facing health. Here's the abstract. I guess we'll have to stop here. It's for 20 years. Let's just look at the next two. The next two are put together, right? The 30 and 31. Because the 30 is talking about the number, the paralysis of persons, right? And then some things falling apart will be in the next question, right? Thank you.