Prima Pars
Lecture 126: The Commonality of 'Person' in the Trinity

Transcript
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Article 4 here. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that this name person is not able to be common to the three persons. And that's how we're tied up here with language, huh? For nothing is common to the three persons except the essence, the nature of God. But this name person does not signify the essence in rectal. It signifies these what? Relations, right? So what's common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit? What's common is the divine substance, huh? Divine wisdom, everything that is the same thing is the divine substance, right? Well, person doesn't signify the divine what? Substance, otherwise you couldn't say three persons, could you? Or there are many persons, right? So you just can't say it's one person of these three. Moreover, common is opposed to the what? Incommunicable. But of the notion of person is that it be, what? Incomputable. Incomputable. As is clear from the definition of Richard as St. Victor. Well, it's incommutable. Therefore, this name person is not common to the three, huh? Because that's still about the problem, you know. Are you an individual? Yeah. And I'm an individual, so it's said of all of us, but individual is something that's not communicable, right? And yet, we all share with the individual, right, huh? You're an unique person? Yeah, in some ways you're unique. But I'm unique, too. Just like everybody else. Yeah. You can see how we get tied up with the language, huh? That's why I say the distinction between, you know, sometimes, like Boethius says, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood, right? And this is one way to distinguish between the senses and reason, between the singular and universal. But who is it that sees the distinction between singular and universal? Do the senses know that distinction? No. Only reason. So reason in some way knows the singular, right? But it knows the singular is kind of a universal way. It's kind of a strange thing, you know, huh? But that's the way it is. Moreover, if it is common to the three, right, to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, either this community is secundum rem, right, or by reason, right? But it can't be secundum rem, because then the three persons would be one person. Nor, again, by reason only, because thus the person would be universal. But in divine things, there is neither universal and what? In particular. Neither genus and species, huh? Because universal is said of many that differ in their meaning. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is the same being, right? Because they're all the same God, and he is I am who I am, right? So, there aren't many other. Okay? But again, this is what Augustine says in the seventh book of the Trinity. When it's asked, what three? We say three persons, right? Because it's common to them that which is a person, right? I answer it should be said that this way of speaking, the very way of speaking, shows that this name person is common to the three, right? So, God the Father is a person. God the Son is a person, right? God the Holy Spirit is a person. Since we say three persons, right? Just as when we say three men, we show that man is common to the three, right? But it's manifest that it is not a community of what? A thing. As the one essence of the one nature is common to the three. Because that's what would follow, that one is the person of the three, just as the essence is one. But now, this is a little more hard to understand than you might think. Of what sort, however, is this community? Or this commonness? Those investigating it have spoken in diverse ways. For some say that it is a community of negation. On account of this, that in the definition of person is laid down, what? Incommunicable, the definition of rich and victim. Some say that it is a community of an intention, a mental thing, in that in the definition of person is laid down, individuum, individual substance. Just as if one were to say that to be a species is common to what? Horse and cattle. But both of these understandings are excluded through this fact that the name person is not the name of a negation, nor is it a name of an intention. That's something in the mind, right? But it's a name of a thing. It's a nomen rade. So don't let them tell you that a person is not a thing. First things. And therefore it should be said that also in human things, right, this name person is common, right, by a community of reason, but not of genus or what? Species. But as the individuum vaguma, that means like some man, right? Now some man, I'm some man, are you some man too? Okay. For the names of genera or species as man or animal are imposed to signifying the very common natures, right? So to say that I'm a man, to say I'm an animal that has reason, right? To say I'm an animal, or that a dog and a cat are an animal, to say I'm a living body that has senses. They are not imposed to what? Signify the intentions of these common natures, right? Which is signified by these names, genus or species, huh? You're talking there more about the, what? The relation of reason there, right? That animals to dog, cat and horse, like quadrilaterals to square, oblong and oblong, right, huh? Okay. It's a name said with one meaning of many things. Other in kind signifying what they are, right? But the individuum vagum, right? I call it vagum because some man, we're talking about, right? Okay. Well, some man came into the shop and, you know, it's a little bit vague, right? But I'm thinking now of a, what? Individual man, yeah. But the individual vagum is some man. It's not like Socrates came into the shop or something, right? It signifies the common nature with a determined way of existing which belongs to singulars. That it be subsisting by itself and distinct from, what? Others. But in the name of a singular designated, they signified something determined, right? Not vague, right? Just as in the name of Socrates, this flesh of Socrates and these bones, right? Stoodle down in the cold a lot, huh? I mean, a soldier. But this difference there is that some man, right, signifies a nature or individual from the side of his nature, right? With the way of existing that belongs to singular. But this name person is not imposed to signify the individual from the part of his nature, like some man, but to signify a thing subsisting in such a nature. It's individual substantia, right? So this is common by reason to all the divine persons, that each one of them, right, subsists in the divine nature distinct from others, huh? Okay? I go back to the definition of person. Individua substantia, right? Of a rational nature, right? Okay? In this case, the rational nature is divine nature, right? But substance means you subsist, right? by yourself, and individual, you're distinct from all the others, right? Okay. So to say that the Father is a person, you say he's subsisting, right? In the divine nature here, huh? Distinct from the Holy Spirit and from the Son, right? And thus this name person, by reason, is common to the three, what? Divine persons, huh? That signifies the relation as subsisting. Yeah, yeah, yeah. If you said the word God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, would that be common, secundum, rationum, or secundum, realm? Yeah, yeah. Okay. But does person signify something that is really common to the three? The reason, right? Right. Reason sees that each one of them is subsisting, and the divine nature distincts from the other two. Now, the first objection says, nothing is common to the three persons except the divine nature. But this name person does not signify the essence in rectal. And rectal means what? If you go back to the definition, it signifies an individual substance of a rational nature, right? So that of is indirect, it's called the oblique, right? So it signifies directly the individual substance, right? But this name person does not signify the essence in rectal, right? Therefore, it's not common to the three, right? What Thomas says in reply, to the first it should be said that that reason of that argument proceeds from the community of what? A thing. So, it's common not as one thing that is common to them, right? But it's something that's common by reason to the three. Subtle distinction, right? The second one says, well, it's of the notion of person that'd be incommunicable, right? If we can't have this name common to the three, right? And Thomas says, although person is incommunicable, right, nevertheless, the way of existing, incommunicably, right, can be common to three, right? And I was thinking, say, more known to us the way we'd say that you are an individual, right? Or you are unique. In some sense, every human being is unique, right? And they say, well, unique means what? No one else has it, right? So how can I be unique if you're unique too, right? He says, okay. Well, we say, although to be unique is to be incommunicable, right? This way of being, incommunicable, is common to all of us, right? Okay. You see that? Okay. Kind of a subtle thing, right? Or, going back to where you're more known, I'd say, when Boethi says, a thing is singular in sense, universal in understood, right? Well, you understand the distinction between singular and universal? Universal is common to many, set of many, right? The singular is, what? Not common to many, right? Okay. So how can you be a singular and we be a singular? And singular means, right? You see? Well, reason can understand singularity, right? Yeah. Yeah. But it's strange, huh? You see? So the reason that knows directly the universal can understand singularity, right? While the senses that know directly only the singular cannot understand or cannot sense universality. Maybe they can see in some of the lifeless of things, right? But they can't really see the universal as such. They can't separate out the idea, huh? It's a hard thing to get to your own. And you can see how a sophist will have a lot of fun with that, right? When I talk about Shakespeare's plays, you know, and you divide them into roughly four kinds and so on. But I sometimes, you know, say you don't want to press this too much, you know, because to some extent each play is unique. Well, people will see that, right? And what are you saying? It's common to all of them and not unique, right? Isn't that a kind of example, though, of that subtle thing we talked about, the central question of philosophy, that the way we know, does truth require that the way we know be the way things are? And you say, well, there's two answers to the question, yes or no, right? And Plato seems to answer yes, right? And Aristotle answers no, right? And Goetheus, in The Consolation of Philosophy, after announcing the first book that he's a member of the Academy of the School of Plato, right? He gets to the fourth, the fifth book, right? He has Lady Wisdom introduce Aristotle as her true follower. And then he follows Aristotle as opposed to Plato, right? Because he has to understand how God can know the past, the present, the future, how they're going to be present to God now in the now of eternity without there being any, what, falsity in God's knowing. So, in a sense, when I understand singularity as opposed to universality, what it is to be singular or unique, I'm understanding the singular universally. Does that make me false? Do you think you're being false? When I say Socrates is an individual man, a singular, right? And man is a universal, and I see the distinction between them, right? Or my cat, Scrapper, my first cat, Scrapper, we call him, Scrappy, is a singular, right? But cat is universal. So I understand singularity universally. So my way of knowing is not the way the thing is, but I don't attribute my way of knowing to the thing and say that, well, therefore, to be a singular man is to be something universal, right? That would be the mistake of thinking that the way I know must be the way things are. What I say about the thing has to fit them, right? That's a very solid example of it, isn't it? I didn't admire Aristotle for seeing this, right? And as great a mind is Plato, the other, you know, the chief philosopher. There's something to get from Plato, we don't get from Aristotle, but the, you know, attached Justin was to Plato and so on. But Plato was mistaken about this, huh? A lot of other people. Most people, in fact, don't think it's mistaken, huh? Now, the third objection says, there's no, what, universal and particular in God, right? So how can you have the comedy, right? It says, to the third it should be said, that although this is a community of reason, right? And not of the thing. Nevertheless, it does not follow in divine things that there be the universal and the, what, particular? Or a genus or a, what, species. Both because neither, even in human things, is the community of a person a community of genus or a species, right? The same with the community of individual, right? You see? Because a genus or a species, species in the sense of the lowest species, is a, what, name said with one meaning of many things, not other in kind, right? Or individually, signifying what it is, right? Okay? And genus, as the name said, with one meaning of many things, other in kind signifying what it is, huh? Well, does a person signify that? No, it's signifying something, what? Directly, individual, right? And unique and not common to many, right? Yes. So neither, in human affairs, is the community a person. You say, I'm a person, you're a person, right? Because of that joke, we had a kind of a, of a, of a nun who was, uh, thought it would be ordained, you know, but it's not going to happen with this John Paul. All the second and so on. But maybe eventually, you know, and so on. But her last name was Person, right? And so this old guy that worked around there, he said, Oh, I didn't know you were a person. She said, What did she say? You know, I thought, it was so funny, you know. In the context, I didn't know you were a person. And I was trying to get it off. That was her name, Person. And so... I'm not a nun, I'm a someone. Did you hear that one? That's a classic one for the feminist nuns. I'm not a nun, I'm a someone. That's all I want to say when they want to bring in her history to her story. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, although he says it is a community of reason and not of a thing, right? In that sense, he resembles a genus and species, right? Nevertheless, it does not follow that it is a universe in particular or a genus and species. Both because neither in human things is a community of person, a community of genus or species, huh? And also because the divine persons have one, what? Being, right, huh? But genus and species and every universal, right? Is said of many differing in their, what? Being, right, huh? Okay? That's a subtle thing that Episana pointed out, right? Okay, Thomas picks up on it, right? Dr. Rester, I guess, huh? Let's look at the framing here, though, to the 31st questionnaire. So, where are we now, right? Well, let's go back to the beginning, right? And Thomas says, according to the order of teaching or learning, the divine persons are distinguished by, what, relations of origin, right, or proceeding. So, we first of all have to talk about the origin or proceeding that takes place in God, right? That's what we did in the first question, right? And then we have to talk about the relations that are based upon these, what, proceedings, right? Like, one proceeding is, what, generation, right? And according to that proceeding, you have two relations, father and son, right? Then there's another proceeding which is not a generation, right? And that does rise to the distinction of the Holy Spirit and those who breathe them. And then he's going to have 15 questions, right, 17, on, what, the persons, right, who are distinguished by those relations of origin. Now, how is the 15 questions on persons divided into two or three? Yeah, kind of the absolute consideration of persons, which is the first 10 questions, and then the comparative consideration of the persons, like, are they equal, are they, you know? Things of that start, right? Okay, and there's one send the other one somewhere, and so on. And now we're in that first part, the 10 questions, the absolute one, right? Now, is that divided into two or three? He talks about the persons in general in the first four questions, and then in the last six, he's going to talk about the persons in particular, right? So in those six questions, there'll be a question on the father, and especially the name father, right? And then there'll be two questions on the son, and then three questions on the Holy Spirit, huh? Okay? But now, how are these four questions in general related, right, huh? Okay? Well, let's look back now, huh? Because the first one is about what a person is, right? And then something about the plurality of persons, right? And that's actually two questions, huh? Now, if you go back to the, this is divided into four, but it's not really violating the rule, right? It's just combining a division with a subdivision, right? So let's look back at the beginning of 29 there. Okay, having sent before those things which seem to be, what? Known beforehand, right? About the processions and the relations, right? And there was that. It remains to, what? A graded, to take up, right? And a graded, as I say, is the same word that he has in the fourth book, when Aristotle takes up time, right? Going to take up time, but kind of, you know, going to approach time, right? It's a hard thing to know, right? But it's kind of interesting, because Aristotle says the difficulty in knowing can be in us or in the thing. In the case of time, the difficulty in knowing is in the thing. Because it hardly is. But in the case of these persons, the difficulty is in us. Okay? And first he says, according to an absolute consideration, there'll be ten questions, as we said, dealing with that. And then in comparative consideration, there'll be about five questions there. And now about the absolute consideration, first in general, and that'll be the first four questions, right? Of which we've done two so far. And then about the singular persons, there'll be six questions about that. Make sense? Now, to the common consideration of persons, four things seem to pertain. Now he breaks down the rule of two or three, right? First, the meaning of this name, person, right? Which was subdivided into the meaning of person in general, and then the meaning of a divine person, right? Remember that distinction? Okay. Two articles in each. Secondly, the number of persons, right? And third, the one we're getting next time, those things which follow upon the number of persons, right? But who does not see it, the second and the third question kind of what? Are involving a subdivision, right? Okay. And then the fourth pertains to the knowledge of persons, meaning our knowledge of persons, right? Okay. So first of all, what a person is in general and in divine things, right? And then the number of persons, right? Consider it itself and the things that follow upon it. That subdivision, right? And then our knowledge of persons, right? Okay. Now, this is interesting. Again, we're going to be digging up next time. And about this thing here, let's just follow upon the unitary priority. First, about this name, Trinity. What does that mean? He's asked about the name person, right? But now, this Trinity. What does that mean? They trace the name Trinity. Secondly, whether it can be said that the son is other than the father, right? Okay. I'm just going to get a little bit into even the Latin grammar, right? Alios. You say alios, but not Hollywood. Okay. I guess it's very complicated here. Whether the exclusive diction, right? Which seems to exclude otherness, right? Can be joined to an essential name in God, right? What the heck does this mean? And whether it can be added to a personal name, right? Okay. Now, just a little bit of... I'm thinking about that a little bit there, because in English it comes up. Is the father alone God? Is the father by himself alone God? Is the father God? Yes. Yeah. Well, then isn't the father alone God? A certain way. You can see how it's kind of complicated, right? And I'm not sure, you know, that there isn't, you know, we want to have a little difficulty in going between the Latin, you know, in the ways. Would you say the father is the only God? That's right. Does the word alone and lonely mean the same thing, see? Would you say the father alone is God? Yeah. See, what would it mean to say, if I say, the father alone is God? To me, that seems to be saying that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not God, right? It's like if I said, I alone am a man. I mean, you guys aren't men, right? Good sound. Now, maybe the way you can understand, I alone, you know, I don't need you guys to be a man. I, by myself, am a man, right? Or if you were surrounded by farming, most of you were out there feeding the cows and they're all acting stupid that day and you say, I alone am a man. But there's a lot of ways of speaking, right, huh? See? If I'm all by myself in my room studying there, I alone am a man. See? But in another way, you could say, you know, if I say, I alone am a man, then nobody else is a man. Yeah, presidential. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's what I said to him. But you see, you know, if you say the father alone is God, you might seem to be a to exclude the Holy Spirit and the Son. On the other hand, you know, if you deny that the father alone is God, you might seem, well, then he's only a part of God. You've got to have the, you know, the other two there. Well, see, is there any distinction between the father and God? So isn't the father alone God? I find... I find, you know, when I think about the thing in English, you know, I see the difficulty and you have to see, I'm not sure that there isn't a problem going between English and Latin, but I can see why you can have analogous difficulties in the Latin, right? We try to sort them out, you know, but when you say the Father is the only God, right? Is that the same thing as saying the Father alone is God? Is it more admissible to say the Father is the only God there is? Admissible because it seems to be referring more to the nature. Yeah, because there's only one God, see? So, the Father is the only God there is, and the Son is the only God there is to it, and the Holy Spirit. It's kind of tricky, this alone and only stuff. You can see there's a problem, right, as to how exactly you should speak, right? Even God would say, I alone am God. Yeah, he's not using the name of the Father or the Son, you know? But then we'll go back to the Gospel of John there. He said, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was towards God, right? So, what does the word God stand for there? The Father, yeah. And the Father by himself? Because the Son is, the Word is towards, right? So, it seems like the Father by himself is God. Then Nixon says, in the Word was God. So, those last two articles are going to give us... We won't get to those next time, but I'll get to those two articles. Just the entire full end. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But, you've got to think very carefully of these things, huh? Just look at it. We've got a few minutes here before we have to... Okay, let's look at the first article a little bit. Just look at the Jetson, so we've got our appetite a bit here. To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that there is not a trinity in divine things, huh? Why? Well, here's an either-or argument, right? Every name in divine things either signifies the substance of God or a relation. But this name, trinity, does not signify the substance, because then it would be said of each of the persons, huh? Each of the persons is God, right? Nor does it signify relation, because it is not said towards something, right? It's a little bit like the problem you have with the word person, right? How does the word person signify relation in God when it doesn't, what? Yeah, a person is not towards something, right? It's something subsisting, right? And Thomas saw a kind of very subtle thing. It signifies a relation, paramodem substantiate, right, huh? Okay? And you remember we had that text from Augustine, right? Augustine said that person signifies substance, right? That seemed to contradict what Thomas was saying. It signifies a, what? Relation, right? And Thomas resolved that objection drawn from the text of Augustine by saying Augustine is talking about, what? The way it signifies, right? Not what it signifies, right? Okay? I think I mentioned there was a text there. Maybe I'll look it up someplace. There's a text here where Thomas says that because the relation and the substance of God are the same thing, right, huh? You have these four ways of speaking, right? It can sometimes signify the substance, paramodem substantiate, right? And sometimes, paramodem relationis. And the relation, paramodem relationis, or relationis, and paramodem substantiate. It's a very subtle thing, right? So I'm sure there's going to be some very self-distinctions here, right? I don't use this stuff for a sermon, you know? It's not even for Trinity, sorry. Yeah. But, moreover, this name, Trinity, seems to be a, what, collective name, since it signifies a multitude, right? But, such a name does not belong in divine things, since the unity implied by a collective name is the least unity, right? But, in God, there is maxima unitality, right? Saw it back in the treatise, right? Therefore, this name, Trinity, does not belong in divine things. Moreover, every three is threefold. But, in God, there's no threefoldness, because threefoldness is a species of inequality. Therefore, neither is there a trinity. I guess that's enough to say it's going to make one heck of a problem when talking about the trinity, huh? Moreover, whatever is in God is in the unity of the divine essence, because God is his own what? Essence. If, therefore, there is a trinity in God, it would be in the unity of the divine essence. And, thus, in God, there would be three essential unities, which is heretical. Moreover, in all things which are said of God, the concrete is said of the abstract. For the deity, or the divine nature, is God, and the fatherhood is the father, right? But the trinity cannot be said to be three, because, thus, there would be nine things in God. Which is erroneous. Therefore, the name of the trinity is used in divine things. Now, it's interesting. You see, I would kind of laugh a little bit, you know, at the overall orthodox here, I think. But, if you look at Waytheist's great work on the trinity, right? Which Thomas has a commentary on. Waytheist is writing in a very contracted and brevity, you know, of style, so that no one will make fun of what he's going to be saying. He's in a sense, hiding what he's going to say, right, huh? You see? Now, you get an irreverent person out here, and he would be, you know, quoting these things in a way to make, what, fun of them, you know. It's like, talking about how many angels dance on that, you know, all that sort of stuff. He didn't really argue about it that way, but he would make fun of me, you know, all this, you know, complication, right, huh? Well, I'm just a humble guy who wants to know what you mean when you speak of the trinity, right? And that's the way Thomas is, right, huh? But, you can see why Waytheist wrote the way he did, right, huh? And to kind of hide the things so people would not make fun of it, right? You see? Somebody said, I think, on Christendom, he spoke about the Eucharist one way in his sermons. He wrote a letter to the Pope, something about, I don't know, some concrete thing, like particles being lost or something during liturgies, and he wrote to the Pope, speaking a different one about the Eucharist, that he wouldn't speak in his sermons. I don't remember the exact thing, but the different ways of speaking about the history. Well, later on, we'll see, you know, part of the reason why we have this appropriation, right? Of course, the objection is that when you appropriate something that pertains the substance of God to one of the persons, you know, that you give a danger of what? of misunderstanding, right? That the Father alone was all powerful, and the Holy Spirit alone was responsible for the Incarnation, right? You know, the Spirit will overshatter you, you know what it says. And Thomas says, well, no, that's a misunderstanding that you're doing when you're appropriating, right? But he's saying, the substance of God, and those things we say about it, are more known to us than the Trinity, right? And so, when you appropriate this to that or that, or this or that person, or the Trinity, is by reason of a connection between what's proper to that person, right, and that general attribute, huh? And therefore, using the more known to manifest the less known, right? In a sense, that's what we do in the Creed, huh? And in Scripture very often, and that's more appropriate in the Sermon, right, to speak that way, right? But Thomas will defend the way of speaking, that's not the way Scripture does speak, huh? It does say the Holy Spirit overshadowed her, right? But that's not the work of the Holy Spirit, it's the work of the whole Trinity, the Incarnation. Why is it appropriate to the Father that he be the Creator, huh? Yeah, right, yeah. And this, of course, goes back to Aristotle, right, that the definition of power is the beginning of change in another, right, huh? And so, the idea that he's being the beginning of the whole Trinity, right, this fits in, huh? Thomas is another way of doing it, too, huh? Because the Father down here gets kind of flabby and weak, you know, and so on, and so it's by way of the Incarnation, right? Just as wisdom's attributed to the Son, because the Son is more foolish than the Father. You've got to take a double way that these things are appropriated, but they're very sown, right? They're not appropriate.