Prima Pars
Lecture 127: Trinity and Distinction of Divine Persons

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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Father, and Light, Amen. Cardian angels, take from the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, help us to understand all that you're written. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Incidentally, just to go back to that distinction I was pointing out last time there, to another example, when we say Deus lumen atzi omea, right? And in the beginning of John's Gospel, you know, he says, and this was a light, lightens every man, right? Comes into this world, and so on. This is said of the Word, right? Now, in which of the two ways is that being said of the Word? So you see, the Word was made flesh, right? And that the Word is a light, the light that every man comes into this world. Are those being said of the Word in the same way? Because is it only God, the Son, who enlightens every man that comes into this world? You have in the Creed, you know, God from God, light from light, right? True God and true God. So the Father is light as, well, just as much as the Son, right? So it's the light that illuminates, then the Father illuminates as much as the Son. But it's appropriated to the Son because the Son proceeds by way of God's understanding Himself, right? Just as the Teacher tries to illuminate you by His words, or illuminate you by the Word. But that's an appropriation that Thomas will talk about later on when he gets into the comparative consideration and why it's justified. But when you say the Word was made flesh, well, that's not an appropriation. It's only the Word that was made flesh. The Father did not become man, and the Holy Spirit did not become man. So you have those two different ways of, what, speaking, right? When we say Deus Illuminatio Meo, you know, God Almighty met, it's something that the whole Trinity does, huh? Which gives us to the question here in the first article. But there is a Trinity in the divine things, huh? So let's look at the objections again here. To the first, one proceeds thus. It seems that there is not a Trinity in God, huh? Now, this is an argument by, what, either-or argument, huh? And sometimes an either-or argument will, what, proceed by eliminating all the possibilities, huh? So it says, every name in God either signifies the substance of God or a relation. But this name, Trinity, does not signify the substance of God, because then it would be said of each person. So just as the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, so the Father would be Trinity, and the Son would be Trinity, well, that's obviously not correct. Nor does it signify relation, because Trinity doesn't say something towards another, does it? Therefore, the name of the Trinity should not be used in divine things. It doesn't have any meaning. Second objection. Moreover, this name, Trinity, seems to be a collective name, huh? Since it signifies a multitude, huh? But such a name is not suitable in divine things, for the unity implied by a collective name is the least unity, huh? For God is most of all one, as we saw before. In God, however, there is the maxima, the greatest, huh? The most unity. Therefore, this name, Trinity, is not suitable in divine things. So, Thomas is an element of truth in saying it's a collective name, but he'll point out some other things. Now, the third objection is a little more strange here. Everything that is three is, what? Threefold, yeah. But in God, there's no duplicity, or in fact, there's no duplicity in him, since triplicity is a species of inequality, right? Therefore, neither is there a trinity, huh? Okay, so we'll find out later on, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are all equal. There's no inequality there in God, huh? So, could you say the Father and the Son are double, see? That would imply, right, some inequality, right? Because the double is more than the, what's the double? Moreover, whatever is in God, huh, is in the unity of the divine essence or nature, because God is his own essence or nature. If, therefore, the trinity was in God, it would be in the unity of the divine essence. And thus, in God, there would be three essential unities, which is heretical. Okay? Now, this last objection is kind of strange in a way, too. Moreover, in all things which are said about God, the concrete is said of the abstract. For the deity, or the divine nature, is God, right? And the fatherhood is the Father, huh? So, in God, there's no distinction between the haver and the had, right? Except in our way of speaking, but not in God, huh? So, if we say God has wisdom, or God has justice, we don't mean that God and what he has are something distinct, right? But God is his own wisdom, right? He is his own, what? Justice. And so, we can't avoid those two ways of speaking. That was the question about, in the one sense, no name fits God, right? Because one name signifies what justice seems to signify that by which something is just, right? And so, if God was just justice, he wouldn't be just, huh? But if he's just, then he has justice, then he's composed, right? So, we can't avoid that way of speaking, and we have to negate the imperfection of our names, huh? And say, okay, we can say God has wisdom, but that doesn't mean that the haver and the haver are two things, huh? But whatever God has, he is. Strange person, huh? Or strange one. But the Trinity cannot be said to be threefold, right? Or three. Because there should be nine things in God. Which is erroneous, huh? It's kind of strange. I have a little sense of humor there in Thomas. I just take that objection. So, I don't know whether Thomas is pulling my leg or not, you know. Like, when he talks about, you know, St. John the Baptist says, talking about Christ, he must increase and must decrease, right? And Thomas says, well, Christ will be stretched out on the cross, increased, and you'll have his head cut off. I said, no. You have such a humor, is that, you know? I don't know how his audience reacted to that sort of point, huh? And his humor is a little too soft. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But against this is what Athanasius says. That one ought to venerate unity in Trinity, right? The one nature in the Trinity. And the Trinity, the three persons in the unity. So now you know what to venerate, huh? Thomas is a short reply to this, huh? The answer, it should be said, that the name of the Trinity in divine things signifies a determined number of persons, huh? So just as one lays down that there's a plurality, huh? There are many persons in God, right? So also we're not to use the name of, what? Trinity. Because what plurality signifies in an indeterminate or indistinct way, right? This name Trinity signifies, what? Distinctly or indeterminate way, huh? So that's clear enough, huh? Surprised he has an article on this, but a little bit of, you know, even the little things he's careful about, right? Now, what does this name signify, right? Substance or relation? It seems to signify neither one, so does it have any meaning? Thomas has a little discourse about this. To the first, therefore, it should be said that this name Trinity, according to the etymology, right, the origin of the vocabulary, seems to signify the one essence of three persons, according as Trinity is, as it were, what? The unity of three things, huh? Trium unitas, huh? That's kind of a, maybe, Isidorean etymology, I don't know. But according to the proper meaning, I suppose, of the vocabulary, it signifies more the number of persons, right? Of one essence. So it's not signifying... It doesn't signify as much the unity of them, but the number of persons, right? And account of this, we are not able to say that the Father is Trinity, because he is not, what, three persons. It does not over-signify the very relations of the persons, but more the number of persons related to each other. And hence it is that secundum nomen, it is not, what, referring to another, right? We have a little different distinction, but related to this one way, before he said, what does the word person signify in God, right? Because the word person, grammatically, is not towards another, is it? Like father or son, it is towards another. But a person signifies in God, nevertheless, what? Emulation, right? But not permutable. Not by way of emulation, right? But here he's saying the Trinity signifies a number of persons, and therefore the way it's signifying the persons, but not as such, right? And because it signifies a number, it's not signifying, what, as a relation. Now the second objection was saying, hey, we can't have any collective names in God, because that detracts the unity of God. To the second it should be said that a collective name implies two things. To wit, a plurality of, and how do you translate that? Suppositorium, huh? Of subsisting things, right? Okay? And a certain unity, to wit, of some order, right? For a population or people is a multitude of men comprehended under some order, right? Now as regards to the first of these two things, this name Trinity belongs with collective names, huh? It has a likeness to that, it has something common with it, right? Because there is a, what, a multitude there, right? But as regards to the second, it differs. Because in the divine Trinity, there is not only a unity of order, as the best one will say, and Thomas will say they're wrong, there's the order of one from another, right? The order of origin, right? But also with this, there is also the unity of what? Essence, yeah. So Thomas is always seeing a difference in these names, right? Just like when you say the word God, the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, is that universal? Not strictly speaking. But it has a certain likeness to the universal, right? But it differs from it, huh? It's not like man said of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle where they have three men. It's looking like it, right? But God is not common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in the way that man is common to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Because then they'd have, they'd be one God only in what? Reason. And not in reality, right? Just like Socrates and Plato and Aristotle are one thing man in reason, right? But not in reality, not one man. But the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God. So you've got to be careful. Now the third one was talking about inequality, right? The third should be said that the Trinity, the word Trinity, signifies or is said absolutely, right? Now, when Thomas uses the word absolute, a lot of times he uses it in contrast with what? Relative, yeah. So he's saying that Trinity is said absolutely. It signifies like the number of persons, right? Well, a number is said absolutely, right? If you go back to the distinction, some of you were around when you were talking about the categories, right? And when Aristotle, or rather Thomas, was distinguishing quantity and quality in relation, right? He used the word absolute for quantity and quality. By relation is towards another, right? It's the same way of speaking here. So he's saying Trinity is said absolutely. It signifies the number of persons. But triplicity, right, signifies a ratio. Thomas uses the word proportion for ratio. I'm criticizing for doing that, you know. I follow Euclid. It signifies a ratio of inequality, right? For it is a species of unequal proportion, right? Just as it's clear through Boethius in his book on Repetit. Right, yeah? So don't, don't, not Repetit, right? Boethius has got a book on Repetit as well as Yuclid, right? There's some other people in there too. And therefore there is not in God triplicity, but there is a, what? Trinity, right? Yeah? So the Father and the Son, we'd say, are what? Two persons, right? But you wouldn't want to say the Father and the Son are, what? Double or the Father. Double would be said, what? Relatively towards another, right? Like the Father and the Son are two persons, it's said, what? Absolutely not towards another, right? Is four, is four double or half? Yeah, you've got to say, towards what, right? It's double towards two and half towards eight. But four is something, what? Absolute, right? Daughter has how many grandchildren? I don't know if I can track on this now. Well, your daughter has eight. My son has got six. Yeah. So eight and six, I said absolutely, right? And fourteen said absolutely. But if I say, you know, that my daughter has more than my son, right? Or four to three. Yeah, your son has two. Yeah. Something like three-fourths. Yeah. And these are these different proportions. Well, then you'd be talking about the ratio, right? The one to the other, right? And so she ends up with sixteen and he ends up with twelve. It's totally the same ratio, but not the same absolute number, okay? So you've got that down, that distinction between absolute and towards another. I don't say you might not use the word absolute in some other sense, but that's the very common one, huh? Very common one. Now the, what, fourth objection I'm up to? Whatever is in God is in the unity of the divine essence, because God is his own essence. If therefore the Trinity was in God, there would be, it would be in the unity of the divine essence. And then there'd be three essential unities, huh? To the fourth, it should be said, Thomas says, that in the divine Trinity is understood both, what, number and the persons numbered, huh? But when, when therefore we say, Trinity in unity, we do not place number in unity of the essence, as if it were three, yeah. But the persons numbered, we place in unity of the nature. Just as the persons or the individual substances of some nature are said to be in that nature. I'm seeing Thomas in the text there in the Summa Contra Gentiles. But he refers back to Boethius in the book on the two natures, and gives kind of a little different definition of person. The definition of person in the Summa here is what? But here he quotes Boethius in the same, res subsistence, an intellectual in natura, or something like that. A thing subsisting in a, what, rational or intellectual nature, right? Here I simply express it, just as the supposita, right? The individual substances of some nature are said to be in that, what, nature, right? But equinversal, we say unity in Trinity, as that nature is said to be in its, what? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So that way of speaking is very common. So that way of speaking is very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's very common, it's in Thomas, but in the Church Fathers too, that you subsist in a sort of nature, right? But then that nature is said to be what? In you, right? In other words. Now when they say, you know, in the Creed there, not the Creed, but in the sign they say, in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, Amen. What does the word name mean? Because what does that signify there? Right. That's kind of the way we begin our prayers and other things. The essence. What? The essence. Yeah, yeah. Because the name there is singular, right? In no meaning of Latin, no meaning of the Holy Spirit. You know, you raise objections there. Why do you say in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit? Why don't you say in the names of... Because there's three names there, right? Well, in a sense, without being that explicit, it's hinting at the fact that there is what? Yeah. One thing. One nature. Yeah. In the one nature, right? Of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It goes back to what Aristotle says. The name signifies what a thing is, right? So the name, first of all, signifies a nature, right? So that's the way it's being taken there, right? It's so much better than simply saying Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Yeah. You're professing the unity of the three, right? Okay? A little bit like that thing that in the etymology of the word there, right? Trium unitas, right? The unity, the one nature of the three persons. One nature individually, right? In number, not just one nature in kind like the one nature of Socrates played on Aristotle. No, it's the one nature individually or person. You know? So I mean, a lot of times you say this for a long time. You say, gee, what's that mean? Why do I say in the name of? I think people usually stop and think about that, right? Why is name there singular and not plural, right? Referring to some name other than the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, because those are three names, right? So what's that other name? Well, it's maybe God, right? You see? Yeah. It's already implied when you say a name, though, right? Spelling that out. Okay, the fifth one is talking about, well, why can't you say twinitas is twina, right? I could say that the wise is wisdom, right? And God. When you said twinitas twina, by reason of the number implied, it's signifying a multiplication of the same number in itself. But when I say twina by itself, it implies a distinction in the, what? Individual substances of that which is said. And therefore, one cannot say that the Trinity is, what? Twina, because I need to put this nine things in. Because it would follow the Trinity with three, that there were, what? Three individual substances of the Trinity, right? Opportunity. Just as when they said that God is three, it follows that there are three, what? Yeah, yeah. Supposita is a little bit like hypostasis in what? Greek, etymologically, you know? And therefore, it signifies, you say, hypostasis, if you wanted to write that, try to, you know? I suppose it doesn't seem to translate in English very well. Hypostasis is in English, but it comes from the Greek, right? Okay. What? Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. One of the ones, brother. Very helpful. Okay, so there's a Trinity then in God, I guess, huh? If you still have some doubts, you can, according to my text here, look in sentences, distinction 24, question 2, article 2, right? But the questions in the sentences come up as, comes up in the text of your Lombard, right? So it doesn't have the same order that the summa has, huh? Okay, we're up to the second article now, huh? Whether the sun is alios, huh? Now, if you know a little bit of Latin, alios is what? Masculine, yeah. And so it's different when you say alios and if you say Hollywood, right, huh? Okay. So you've got to be kind of careful, right, huh? And so you have to kind of follow this in the Latin a bit, huh? So, to the second one proceeds thus, it seems that the sun is not other from the father, right? But in English you can't capture that without the case. For other is a relative of diversity of substance, right? If therefore the sun is other than the father, it seems that he is diverse, huh? Of a different nature from the father. Which is against Augustine in the seventh book of the Trinity, where he says that when we say three persons, we do not, what, wish to be understood, what, a diversity, right? Whoever are other from each other in some way differ from one another, right? If therefore the sun is other than the father, it follows that he is different from the father. Which is against Ambrose in the first book on faith, where he says, the father and the son are one in godhood and deity, nor is there there a difference of substance. Nor any what? Diversity, right? And there you have the word, what, substantia there, right, huh? Which in Latin signifies usually the nature, right? Moreover, from another, you get the word alieno, right? But the sun is not alien from the father. For Hillary, now Hillary is a great authority in the Trinity, in the seventh book of the Trinity, that in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, huh, in nature, nothing alien, nothing, what, separable. Therefore the sun is not other from the, what, father, right? The fourth one gets down to this Aleus and Aleud, right? Moreover, Aleus and Aleud signify the same thing. Aleud, but they differ only by the, what, consignification of the genus, huh? So Aleud is what, masculine, feminine, or what? Neuter. Neuter, yeah. I guess, Edward the Great, he has an explanation of the word neuter, and it comes from neuterus, huh? Not the neuterus. Anything on the neuterus would be male or female. But this is neuterus, therefore, that's how he explains the word neuter, right? That's a concrete guy, these guys, Albert and Thomas. Now, against all this nonsense is what Augustine says in the book on faith to, what, Peter, huh? One is the essence of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in which is not Ollywood, right? There you got the neuter, right? The Father, Aleud, the Son, Aleud, the Holy Spirit, right? How do they translate that in English, by the way? The lesson says there is one essence of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another and the Holy Ghost another. Yes, they don't know how to do it, exactly. Although personally, right, as persons, aleus pater, right? Aleus filius, aleus spiritus sanctus, right? So if you just used of, you don't know what the heck he's talking about. Now, there's a beautiful quote that Thomas uses a lot, huh? I answer it should be said that from words put forth in a disordered way, huh? Heresy is impure, right? As Jerome says, right? And therefore, when we speak about the Trinity, one ought to proceed with caution and, what, modesty, right? But as Shakespeare says, all my reports go with the modest truth. No more nor click but so. So you've got to, the truth is something modest, huh? As Augustine says, because as Augustine says, and this is a beautiful quote I use a lot in the beginning of the Trinity. Nor anywhere, right, does one make a mistake with more danger. Nowhere is it more dangerous to make a mistake, when you're talking about the Trinity, right? Nor with more labor, more difficult, as you know, something is, what? Sought. Nor is anything found that is more, what? Fruitful, right? That's actually beautiful. That's a beautiful text. I mean, you can't improve upon Augustine's way of saying things sometimes. And Aristotle says, we should try to say some things better than our predecessors, and other things as well as they said it. As he said, you can't improve upon that, right? You know? Like Kierkegaard says, you know, no one's going to write a better opera than Mozart's Don Giovanni, right? He wants to, you know, Mozart's got to write Don Giovanni over again, but that's it. But you see something like the way, you know, or the way Shakespeare will say something, you know? Now cracks a noble heart. Good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing thee to thy rest. You can't improve upon that, huh? So I think Aristotle's words are interesting, right? We should try to say some things better than our predecessors said them, you know, because they said them. Maybe they said false things, maybe they didn't say it so well. And some things as well as they said them. It's marvelous. So both of these quotes here, the quote here from Jerome, I think it's marvelous, and the one here from Augustine. So now you're in the treatise on the Trinity, so listen to what Augustine says, right? There's no places more dangerous to make a mistake than when you're talking about the Trinity. You can see what happened in the areas, and those people got involved, and Sibelius and the rest of these guys. Nor is anything sought with more labor than here, the Trinity. But, and this is the thing, nor is something found, there's more food for it. That's really marvelous. I used to have, you know, I'd say on my birthday, you know, I'd, a few days on my birthday, start reading the Trinity, reading the Trinity, right, and I'd give you my birthday present to myself. Now, it is necessary in those things which we say about the Trinity to avoid two, what? Opposite errors, right? Temperately proceeding between the two, right? I noticed in the quote I was giving from Shakespeare there about modesty, right? All my reports go with the modest truth, nor more, nor clipped, but so. It's in between two, what? Extremes. Yeah. I usually explain that in terms of saying, what? There's two ways of departing from the truth. One is to say that what is, is not. And the other is to say that what is not, is. And when you say that what is not, is, you're adding to the truth, right? And when you're saying what is, is not, you're subtracting, right? So Shakespeare says, all my reports go with the modest truth, nor more, nor clipped, but so, right? Or as Falstaff said, if they say more or less than the truth, they are villains and the sons of darkness, huh? Well, he's the biggest liar himself, right? But Shakespeare will say very beautiful things by a man who doesn't exemplify, you know? Doesn't practice what he preaches, huh? Where it is a soul of wit is very true, but it's said by an old fool who speaks too much. To wit, now in time of the Trinity, the heir of Arius, right? With the Trinity of persons. ...has a trinity of what? Substances, right? So the Father is one substance, and the Son has another substance, less than the Father. And the Holy Spirit has even yet another substance, right? So is he saying that what is, is not, or what is not is? What is not is, yeah. He's got two substances that aren't there. What is not, or what are not, he's saying are, right? And the heir of Sebelius, right, who laid down with the unity of the essence, the unity of the persons, huh? So Sebelius said that the Father became man, right? And when he became man, he got the name Son. And then he maybe sanctified us and got the name Holy Spirit, right? Let's be the same guy going by three names, huh? And so is Sebelius saying that what is, is not, or what is not is? Yeah. Now, it's interesting, huh, then the other main mystery of the faith, the incarnation, right, huh? And you have the reverse, huh? You have one person with, what, two natures, right? So in the case of the, you have the same two kinds of mistakes, right? But there are some who say that because you have two natures, you've got two, what, persons here, right? And so they're saying that what is not, a second person there, is. And others say, no, you've got one nature because you've got one person. And they're saying what is, is not, right? But it's just kind of reverse what is, in the case of the Trinity, huh? I'm kind of curious the way God has arranged this thing. So, but in both cases you have to proceed moderately, right? But then as Thomas will often explain, the two mistakes can't, what, explain each other, right? If there's really three persons and three natures in God, right, why would anybody think there's one person and one nature? And vice versa, if there's just one person and one nature, why should anybody think there's three persons and three natures? But if the truth is in the middle there, right, if there's one nature and three persons, you can see how a person can make the mistake of thinking there are three natures, because there are three persons. Or the mistake of thinking there's one person, because there is one nature, right? And the same with Christ becoming man, right? Because there are two natures there, you can think, well, maybe there's two persons then, right? Or because there's one person that must have coalesced and made one nature, the word, he became flesh, one nature. So it's kind of a sign that you're mistaken, that you can't explain your mistake or that guy's mistake, right? But the man who has the truth who's in the middle, he can explain the two mistakes and why they were made. That's another sign of his having the truth, huh? So we've got to be very careful about how we speak, right? From this great quote of Jerome, from words disorderly put forth, heresy is incurred, right? So to avoiding, therefore, the error of areas, we ought to avoid, in talking about God, the name of diversity, right? And the name of, what? Difference, huh? Lest we take away the unity of the essence or nature, huh? But we are able to use the name of distinction on account of the relative, what? Opposition, right? I said that before, how the word distinction is more appropriate there than the word division, right? And now you're saying the word distinction is more appropriate than the word diverse or different, right? You know, from logic there, difference there is, what, used in talking about a genus being divided into its set species, right? So, and that's one kind of whole, right? The genus, the universal whole, right? And so division there kind of implies you have whole and part. So distinction is a better word to use. So, if anywhere in sacred scripture, in authentic sacred scripture, right, we find diversity or difference of persons found, right, huh? One ought to take diversity or difference in that text for, what, distinction, huh? Lest over one take away the simplicity of the divine essence, one ought to avoid the name separation and, what, division, because that would imply that it's a whole composed of parts, right? Which is a whole and parts, huh? Lest one take away equality, one should avoid the name disparity, right, huh? Which I guess comes from the, what, unequal release, you know what I'm saying? Lest one take away the likeness, one should avoid the name alien, right? And discrepant, yeah. For Ambrose says in the book about faith, that in the Father and the Son, there's nothing discrepant to him. But one divinity. And we've already seen, according to Hilary, in the divine things, there's nothing alien, nothing, what, separable, right? So you better watch your words now, huh? The P's and Q's, right? But to avoiding the error as a bellius, we ought to avoid, what, the name singularity, right? Lest we take away the communicability of the divine, what, nature, yeah. Whence Hilary says in the seventh book of the Trinity, to predicate Father and Son, a singular God, is sacrilegious, right? It's a little hard to understand that. We ought to avoid the name unique, I guess, lest we take away the number of, what, persons. Whence Hilary, in the same book, says that from God is excluded, singular, understand the singular, or the, what, unique, huh? We can see, nevertheless, that unique sons are, because there are not many sons in God, right? We ought not to say that he's a unique God, a unique God, because the Godhood is common to the many, huh? Many persons. We should avoid also the name of confused, huh? Lest we take away the order of nature from persons, huh? Now, Thomas did wrong, we'll talk about that phrase of a custom, ordo natura, right? And that's the order, what, of one from the other, right? So the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. So, she needs to be confused, right? Because you'd be denying, right, this order of origin, huh, nature. Whence Ambrose says in the first book about faith, make way confuse a mess, what will a mess. Nor is that confused, which is one, right? As if the Father, Son, Holy Spirit are mixed up in the divine nature, right? Okay? Instead of one being from the other. Nor is that able to be multiple, which is indifferent, right, in its nature. When also to avoid the name of solitary, lest we take away the consortium of the three, what, persons. For, Hilary says in the fourth book of the Trinity, for us, neither, what, solitary nor diverse should God be confessed to be, right? But this name, all of us, taken in a masculine way, right? Masculine, son, too. Does not imply except a distinction of, what? Suppositive, huh? When, suitably, one can say that the Son is, what, other from the Father, but, see, you can't translate it in English, right, why are you? Because he's another individual substance of the divine nature, just as he is another person and another, what, hypostasis, right? Okay, now, the first objection said that alios is a relative of diversity of substance, right? And therefore, if we say the Son is alios from the Father, Father, you're going to say that he's diverse from the Father, right? So Thomas says, The first, therefore, it should be said that allios, because it is a certain particular name, holds itself on the side of the individual substance. Whence, in its reason, there suffices, or for its reason, the definition there suffices, a distinction of substance in the sense of what? Hypostasis or person. There you have that equivocation, the word substance we spoke about before. But diversity requires a distinction of substance in the sense of, as in certain nature. And therefore, we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although we can say he's another person. How's that? Maybe you should say another, huh? I suppose you could say the Son is, in English, you could say he's other than the Father, I suppose. But another, maybe that's the same. Maybe that's the same way we could use it. You've got to be careful here, though, huh? Some words disorderly put forth by burqvist heresy is in prayer, right? You had it first, and you had that, oh, yeah. And you had a whole lot of that. First trinity is better. Yeah, yeah. Well, he says you can say alia persona, doesn't he? He says that in the text here, right? Sicul est alia persona, at the end of the body of the article, right? Yeah. Alia suppositum. Didn't mean to, yeah? You don't see alia by itself. You're getting in trouble. Okay? Now, the second one is saying that whoever are other from each other, but are in some way different, right? And this is not to be used according to Ambrose. To the second, it should be said that difference implies a distinction of what? Form, right? Notice, in English, you know, we use the word form for species, right? So you have the genus divided into species by differences, right? So you have a different species or form, and then you'd have a different nature, right? So we'd say democracy is one form of what? Government. Government is a genus, and democracy is one of the species. Abraham Lincoln said it's government of the people, which is true of every government, but by the people, for the people, right? So that separates it from other governments, by the people, for the people. So you have a different form. But there's only one form in divine things. It says, Cleareth that which is said in Philippians chapter 2, verse 6. That's a famous text that we say. He was in the form of God, and it was not, you know, wrong to say he's equal to God, right? But then he took on the form of a slave, right? Became man, so on. So, humbled himself. So, form there means a sense of what? Nature, right? You see that in the chapter on nature there in the fifth book of wisdom. Aristotle talks about it. Scripture is speaking the way Aristotle is explained, right? And therefore, the name of difference, since it implies a, what, difference of form, and therefore a difference of nature, does not properly belong to divine things, as is clear through the authority brought in, which is Ambrose, right? One of the four major doctors of the Western Church, I guess. Damascene, however, this is, you've got to be careful, is it? Damascene, however, uses the name of difference in divine persons, according as the relative property, right, like fatherhood, is signified by way of a form. So, we can say the father differs from the son by fatherhood, right? And the son from the father by sonhood. So, it's like a form, and therefore you could kind of stretch the word difference, right? So, whence he says that they do not differ from each other, the hypotheses, according to substance, meaning the nature of the thing, but according to determined, what, properties. But difference, he says here, is taken for what? Yeah. So, yeah, watch these guys, right? She knows Greeks. Well, I told you how I was scandalized when I first was reading the text of the Greeks there, and St. Basil says that the father is the idea of the son. Well, in the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle takes the word archi, beginning, and then the word idea, cause, right? And every beginning, every cause is a beginning, but every beginning is a cause. The beginning is more general, right? But cause, if you speak, you shouldn't say the father is the cause of the son, because then the son would be the effect of the father. And yet, you know, and that's his language, isn't it? Greek, basil. And so... I think he studied Aristotle, didn't he? Yeah, yeah. So, I'm... He came with friends in Athens, didn't he, when they studied? Yeah. So, you'd have to say, said idea is taken for archi. Cause for beginning, right? I'm sure. But these things, you know? Amen. Yeah, and there's difficult things, you know, like the text that they often quote, and no one knows the father except the son, and vice versa, right? At times, does that mean the father doesn't know himself? Yeah. You know? He has to explain this bit of speaking, you know, but you can see how it's a difficult way of speaking, right? So there's no proper way, I mean, you can't say that the father is the cause of the son? There's no proper... No, you shouldn't say that, no. Then there'd be diverse in substance, right, in essence. It won't have his existence from the other. There may have a dependence on being on it. Yeah. But it does proceed from the... The son does proceed from the father. That's what we call him, he's a principle. Yeah. No, we'll get into that when we get to the father there, because if you looked under the... The father, yeah, there will be a... Yeah, in fact, under the person of the father, where it belongs to the father to be beginning. It doesn't seem a cause, though, for reference to the other persons. That would be the first article there. So... So that's the fifth book of wisdom of Aristotle, it's kind of important, you know? St. Basil, I think he studied Aristotle at some point, because his book on the six days of creation, his sermon, he talks about the four causes, but he doesn't make reference to Aristotle if he takes quotes from Scripture to distinguish the four causes. It's kind of interesting. So, I mean, I think he was familiar with it. Yeah. But he had the same word there, wasn't he, idea, and, you know? Yeah. So, you point out at St. Thomas, what about the same with proportion and radiation? Yeah, you know, I... Yeah, even when we're not... No, it became kind of, you know, established, customary, when I was speaking to Thomas, you know, a lot of times, you know? I try to get people to say, you know, the eight books of natural hearing, but I say, you know, the physics, you know, because they don't know what I'm talking about, you know? So, you've got to force... You realize how custom knows. Shakespeare says custom is a tiger, right? It forces you sometimes to speak in a way you know is not the best way to speak, but the only way that people are going to understand you is because they're accustomed to using words in this way, accustomed to meaning things in this way. So, you've got to really... You've got a real struggle there, right? Between what's more reasonable and what's more customary. You realize that force of custom is very hard to overcome. Okay. Now, the third objection I guess we're up to now, and that's trying to say that alien, right, comes from allia, right? Alien, right? But the son is not alien from the father, right? Who's that alien? Thomas says, to the third it should be said that alien is what is extraneous and what? Unlike. But this is not implied when one says, alias, at least, ask me to do that. And therefore, we say the son is alium, from the father, but we do not say that he's what? Alien. Alien, right? That's the word that Karl Marx made very popular, alien, right? Man's alienated. Oh, yeah. In his nature, yeah. See, books by the Jesuits say, oh, what kind of alienation here in Marx, yeah? Alienation. That doesn't have enough work. Okay, now, this fourth objection is very important for the, what you're doing in Latin here. Moreover, alius and alioid signify the same, right? They differ only by the consignification of the genus, huh? If, therefore, the son is other from the father, it seems that the son is alioid from the father, right? Okay, now you get it. That's why I say it's, you know, a thankless task of translating, because there's no way to translate some of these things, really, right? To the fourth, it should be said that the neutral genus, right? That's the genus he's referring to, is informe, right? Unformed, as it were, right? But the masculine is formed and distinct and similar, what? Feminine, right? And therefore, suitably, through the neutral genus, right, is signified the common, what? Nature. But through masculine and feminine, some individual substance, right, determine it in the common nature, right? Whence also in human things, if one asks, quis es iste, you get the word quis there, right? We answer Socrates, right? Which is the name of a suppositum, right? If, however, one asks, what is this? We answer, a mortal and rational animal, right? It goes all the way back to what? Forfeit, right? And therefore, because in divine things there is a distinction by persons, but not by nature or essence, we say that the father is alius from the son, right? But not what? Yeah. In a converso, we say that they are unum, because they have one nature, but not what? Unus. So learn your Latin, John. You have less trouble with this text. Text of article two, huh? So should we take a little break here before we do the third article? Sure.