Prima Pars
Lecture 129: Exclusive Diction and Natural Reason's Limits Regarding the Trinity

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In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and bloom in our images, and allows us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. May it be for us. And help us to understand all the truth. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So we've got one more tixio exclusiva to go with here in the 31 Article 4, right? This is whether an exclusive diction, right, like only or alone or something, can be joined to a personal name, right? A personal term. So he says, to the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that an exclusive diction can be joined to a personal term, even if the predicate is something quite common to the three persons. This famous text here. For the Lord says, speaking to the Father, that they might know you, the only true, what? God. Therefore, the Father alone is the true God. Well, Thomas, I have a long reply to it, as you can see there in the Ad Primo. Moreover, it is said in Matthew chapter 11, verse 27, that no one knows the Son except the Father, right? Of course, it goes on and says no one knows the, what? Father except the Son, right? Which seems to signify the same thing as if the Father alone knows the Son, right? Can you say no one knows except so-and-so? He seems to be saying he's the only one who does. Okay? It seems equivalent to that. But to know the Son is common to all three. Therefore, the same as before, right? Okay. Moreover, an exclusive diction does not exclude that which is of the understanding of the term to which it is joined. Whence it does not exclude the part, eh? Nor does it exclude the, what? Universal. It does not follow, Socrates alone is white, therefore his hand is not white, eh? Or that man is not white, eh? Because Socrates is a man. But one person is in the understanding of the other. As the Father is in the understanding of the Son. That's true in general about Galatians, eh? That's why you see you can't argue, you know, that this is an argument. A is double of B, therefore B is half of A. Because really they're known at the same time, eh? You can't argue that Paul Berkwist is my son because I am his father. Even though they kind of seem to agree. Yeah. Yeah. They're known together. Therefore, not when it is said that the Father alone is God, the Son excluded, right? Or the, what? Holy Spirit, eh? And thus it seems that this speaking is true, eh? Moreover, by the church it is sung, and this is in the, what? Glory, right? You alone are most high. Jesus Christ, I would say it in church there on Sunday. Or the day sometimes. But against this, this locution, this speech, the Father alone is God, eh? has two things in expounding what it means, in laying out what it means. To it that the Father is God, right? And no one other than the Father is God, eh? But the second is false, eh? Because the Son is other from the Father, audience there in the masculine, and who is God, right? Therefore, this statement is false, that the Father alone is what? God. And that's about like things, eh? To me, it seems a little different in saying, the Father alone is God, and the Father is the only God. The first one is more, seems to be false, and the second one, right? Because what God is the Father? Who is the only God? Still, I've got to be kind of careful about that saying, eh? The Father is the only God. It's like, I'm only a man, I say sometimes, right? That's more acceptable than saying, I alone am a man, which I would say is false, right? Because no one else is a man, right? That's why I'm only a man, right? So, I answer it should be said, Thomas says, that when we say, the Father alone is God, right? This statement can have a multiple understanding, right? Or a multiple meaning. For if the word solus lays down solitude, right, about the Father, then it is false, according as it is taken, what? Categori matice, right? We had a distinction before, right? Notice the difference between saying, the Father is alone, and the Father alone is God, and the Father alone is wise, or what do you want to say, right? Because in one case, it's, what, the technical word there is, category matice, right? But you're saying something about the Father, right? That he's not with anybody else. You say the Father is alone, right? But when you say the Father alone is something or other, then you're talking about how the predicate belongs to that subject, right? So, alone is not really a predicate being said of the Father, like when you say the Father is alone, but it's saying, in what way that predicate belongs to him, right? Something about the way it belongs to him. Just like Thomas says, every or no, you know, you say every man is good, or no man is good. You're not saying something, you're talking about how good is said or not said of man, huh? But according as it is taken in the other way, sin kate kore matice, huh? I think we try to translate that into English, right, huh? It's a thankless task, as I told my brother Richard, he was translating the commentary in the Apostolic Litics. Translator's task is... Then again, it can be understood in many ways, huh? Because if it excludes from the form of the subject, thus it is true. That is the sense that the Father, what? Alone is God. God, that is the one with whom no one else is the Father, is God. That's kind of a clumsy thing, he says, right? And this way, Augustine expounds it in the sixth book of the Trinity. That the Father alone, we say, not because he is separated from the Son and the Holy Spirit, but saying this would signify that, what? They, together with him, are not the Father, right? But this, since he says, doesn't come from the custom way of speaking, right? Unless one understands something implied, that the one who alone is called the Father is God. That's really stretching the thing, huh? But according to its proper sense, huh, it excludes from consortium in the predicate, huh? From union in the predicate. And thus, this proposition is false if it excludes another, masculine, right? It is true, however, if it excludes something, what? Yeah. Because the Son is allius from the Father, right? I don't know how they translate that in English text, but you... That's all the person. Yeah, but it's allius in the masculine and blatant. Not, however, what? Alliud, right? Likewise, the Holy Spirit. But because this diction, solus alone, respects or regards properly the subject, it has been said, it is more for excluding allium than alliud, right? Whence one ought not to extend such a speech, right? But it ought to be expounded in a pious way, right? If it is found anywhere in authentic, what? Scripture, yeah. So, you may recall, you know, the use of the word fate there, right? Where Augustine says, what do you mean by fate, right? And there's a meaning of fate, which is what the stars control, our destinies and so on, and our wills and so on, and this is false, huh? but some people use the word fate for some aspect of the divine providence which is beyond things and then Augustine says well if you mean that louder, hold your opinion but change your yeah, yeah but I think weight is used in that second you know, orthodox sense, right so it's not that he's mistaken but we have not to extend that way of what, speaking just like we don't say there are three substances of God well I mean by substance you know individual substance or rational nature there's three of them in there yeah, but you know for another reason we tend to think too much of substance as being what a thing is and you'd be saying there's three natures there are three essences, right three gods instead of one God now, that first text there from John there they might know you, the only, what true God, right, he seems to be addressing the Father okay this might be misunderstanding as he says to the first therefore it should be said that when we say you, the only true God this is not to be understood about the person of the Father but about the whole Trinity as Augustine expounds it and the reference in my text here is to the Trinitate Augustine's work, the sixth book, right where he talks about that particular text or he says and there's another turn to an explanation he gives if it is understood about the person of the Father, right it does not exclude the other persons on account of the, what unity of the essence insofar as, what solus excludes only, what aliona as has been said now the second text there which is a little more puzzling here no one knows the Son except the Father well, scripture itself is saying that yeah, yeah, yeah and similarly it should be said to the second for when something essential is said of the Father the Son of the Holy Spirit is not excluded on account of the unity of the, what essence, huh nevertheless it should be known that in the foresaid authority this wording nemo no one is not the same as no man, right which it seems to signify for one cannot, what take away the or accept the purse of the Father but is taken according to the use of speaking distributively for any, what rational nature that's a little bit like the text, you know where they say the Holy Spirit is not God because a number of places Paul will say, you know may God the Father be with you and the Son and then he's out the Holy Spirit and Thomas says well he wants to insinuate right that the Holy Spirit is a bond of the Father and the Son so when the Father and the Son are mentioned then the Holy Spirit is implied right well well when you say that the Father alone knows the Son you're supposed to stop and think hey doesn't the Son know himself right is the Oracle Delphi is the Oracle yeah the Oracle Delphi you know know thyself is addressed to the Son and to the Father too because the Son knows him but you too understand right that since this is something that pertains to the nature of God right to know himself then if such a thing is said of the Father it's to be understood of the what others on account of the unity of the what nature yeah now there are examples of that sort of thing you know we say in the name of the Father and of the Son and the Holy Spirit well it seems you know to be incorrect because there's three names there right so why do you say in the name of the Father and those are the three names you give the Father Son and the Holy Spirit it seems to be you know like the one name so no no you're supposed to think of what the name of God right and the one nature of God right so those are kind of difficult ways of speaking right and they're used by scripture even in scripture sometimes when they say all they only mean some or many yeah what each kind yeah so when when it says all of Jerusalem went out to John the Baptist later scripture it says the Pharisees didn't know because they didn't get baptized they presented well they said all yeah but here it said they didn't know which is there are some difficult ways of speaking you know or the thing I noticed myself a lot is you know when it says and his mercy is upon those who fear him right why doesn't he his mercy is upon those who hope in him because hope corresponds to mercy I say well they have this balance of hope and fear and Thomas says hope without fear is going to become presumptuous fear without hope would despair so you need a balance of hope and fear so in some of the songs they're both hope and fear are brought together in the same song but in other places I just mentioned hope which is more directly related to mercy right other times I mention fear and say you have to stop and think why does it say fear instead of hope because you've got to balance obviously the hope is implied there right but you've got to balance the hope with the fear of the Lord right and so you recognize right away in the discrepancy or apparent discrepancy they're saying fear instead of hope you think you know that should be hope you know but then you understand that hope is there but you might leave out the fact you've got to have fear of the Lord right and like I mentioned I was in the Catholic bookstore one time and saw a little book there I think it was St. Anselm you know the meditation to gain the fear of the Lord exactly what we need in the church nowadays but you need that balance of hope and fear just like Socrates in the pharaoh there right shows his friends there they've got to have this balance of hope and fear and philosophy different hope and fear than we're talking about when we cried to God but you have to have hope of finding the truth but if that's not balance of the fear of making a mistake then you're going to what easily make a mistake right but if you have the fear of making a mistake and not the hope of knowing the truth you'll kind of give up you know it's too difficult to know the truth so there are some things that scripture says that make you just stop and think right why does he say that the father alone knows the son right that's kind of strange when I'm speaking we say why does the father know the son because he's God you have to stop and think right well the son is God too therefore the son knows himself too oh okay you see but if it is a difficult way of saying you can see how people can get kind of puzzled by it the third argument was saying well the alone doesn't exclude what universal or a part but Thomas in rejecting this as a common way of speaking says the third should be said that the exclusive diction alone does not exclude those things which are of the understanding of the term which they are joined if they do not differ what in the individual as the part and the what universal so Socrates is white Socrates alone is white the only white man let's say it doesn't mean to say that his hand is not white or that man is not white at least this man is white but the son differs right as an individual substance or person from the father and therefore it's not a what similar reason right so if you say the father alone is wise then you seem to exclude the son right but if you say Socrates alone is white you don't exclude his hand from being white because the hand is a part of Socrates right but the son differs from the father as a what person right so now the last text there to the fourth it should be said that we do not say in the glory that the son alone is most high but he alone is most high with the holy spirit in the glory of god the father right they take the whole phrase there and the objection in a sense is taking it by itself well That's right, the first part of the phrase. I'm glad I put that out. Okay. Instead of taking this in song, you say, Scripture says there is no God. Yeah. Now, if you recall, before we begin the 30-second question here, we have 10 questions here that are about what? The persons, right? Absolutely. Then there will be five questions about the comparison consideration, comparative consideration of persons, right? And then there were, of these 10 questions, there's four questions about the persons in general, and we're about to begin the fourth of those four questions. And then there will be six questions about the persons in particular, right? And following the rule of two or three or more, or both, we had, what, one question about what does person mean in general, and in particular in God, right? And then we had two questions on the, what? Multiplicity, the plurality of the persons, right? And one was more basic, and then the other one was things following upon that. And now we have really the third part, which is about the knowledge of the divine persons. And again, here is a division into four, right? So I've got to force it into my thing, huh? And about this, consequently, we're not to inquire about the knowledge of the divine persons. And about this, four things are sought. First, whether by natural reason the divine persons are able to be known, right? Secondly, whether there are some notions, huh, thoughts, that should be attributed to the divine persons. Let's see if there are. And then about the number of these notions, and these are ways of identifying or distinguishing the persons, huh, in our knowledge. And there's going to be five of them, huh? And then whether it is licit or lawful to think diversely about these notions, huh? Now, would you divide those four into two twos, or one and three? Yeah. Because obviously the first one would be divided against the last three, right? The last three are all about, what? The notions, yeah. But the first one is a different one, huh? You see that? Okay, but Thomas is not being pedantic like I am. But you can see what he's doing, right? Okay. Okay. So to the first one proceeds thus. Thus, it seems that the trinity of divine persons is able to be known by natural reason, right? I was kind of thinking about Thomas, you know. It's Thomas named after the Doubting Thomas, right? Because he always begins with doubting himself, right? Doubting what the church teaches. And then, like, Thomas, he comes around. So he's got that, huh? The philosophers, huh? Did not come to a knowledge of God except by natural reason. But there are found by the philosophers many things said about the trinity of persons. For Aristotle says, in the book De Celuid Mundo, which is actually the book about the, what? The universe, huh? And it's the book in natural philosophy that comes right after the books of natural hearing, the so-called physics, huh? But the Greek word, you know, which is translated there by Celuid Mundo, the Greek word can mean the heavens or it can mean the universe. And actually, he does talk about the heavens there, but he's talking about the whole universe in that book. So it should be translated about the universe. But the Latin word, Celuid Mundo, tends to mean just the heavens, and so they stick on Edmundo. So, that happened. He says, through this number, to wit, number three, right? We use that, huh? To magnify the one God, right? Who's eminent in his properties of those things which have been made, huh? So, Aristotle said we use the number three in praising God, right? Well, let's just have some idea of the Trinity, right? And I mentioned before how in the first book of natural hearing there, Aristotle argues that three is enough, right? Three is all there is, right? And how often that comes up, right? Two is not enough, you need a third thing, huh? And the first place where Aristotle talks about this is in change, right, huh? Where everybody sees the changes between opposites. So you have to have two things involved to change the opposites. And then Aristotle goes on to show in the next reading, the 11th reading, that you need a third thing besides the two contraries. Otherwise, change would involve a, what? Contradiction, right? And so, what's his name? Heraclitus was saying, you know, that the hard and the soft, and the young and the old, and the hot and the cold are the same because one becomes the other. Well, unless you have a third thing there besides the heat and the coldness, you'd have heat itself becoming cold. It's not a big contradiction. This is kind of the first place there in natural philosophy where three is enough, right? Okay. But, you know, the famous one in geometry or in mathematics or quantity is that there's only three, what? Dimensions, right? And the dimensions are done by taking what? How many straight lines can you draw that are, what? At right angles to each other. Well, I can draw two lines here that are right angles to each other, right? And then I could have a third one coming in perpendicular, right? But is it possible to draw a fourth line that would be at right angles to all those three? So three seems to be all there is, right? Okay. And so, in that context, Aristotle makes this point, right? But he gives a sign drawn from language, huh? That for the most part, in language, we don't say all until we get to number three. So if you and I are going to the movies, we'd say we're both going to the movies, right? But if all of us are going, the three of us, that's the first time we say all. And Aristotle just takes that as a sign that it's very common, not always so, but that three, very often, is all there is, right? Now, if you go through the different sciences, you will see the sun, okay? One example in theology, without talking about the Trinity, is in the Second Vatican Council, right, where it says that the sacred scripture, tradition, and the magistery of the church, no one can stand without the others, right? You need these three, huh? Okay. That's a very interesting example of three, huh? And so this shows up again and again. In music for forms, it seems you better have at least, what, three movements, right? So you have a lot of concertos in just three movements, very commonly, usually concertos in just three movements, right? Mozart's trios are in three movements, huh? In the Baroque period, you know, the trio became a very famous, what, musical form, huh? And it can do so with anything with a trio of instruments. You can have more, but a trio is enough to really do all these wonderful things, huh? So three is enough, or three is all. It's very common, huh? When Aristotle wrote the rhetoric, huh? You know, the rhetoricians before Aristotle were saying, this is the way you move the crowds in the oceans, and so on, right? And so on. And maybe there's a little hint there, you have to give a bit of an argument, too, you know? But Aristotle said, hey, no, there's three means of persuasion, huh? The image of the speaker, and then the way he moves the emotions of the audience. And then he said the arguments, or parent arguments, or at least a point, of course. You see? But three is all you need, right? And so you find this again and again, huh? So there seems to be a certain perfection in three, beginning, middle, and end, and so on, right? Does that mean that Aristotle knew about the Trinity, huh? Price-weaving number, maybe? It makes me a little stop and kind of wonder, right? What's this business here, huh? I was seeing something there, was it about the Incas, I guess, who didn't invent the wheel or didn't have the wheel? They knew about the circle. But they saw the circle as representing, what, perfection, right? Thomas talks about this in Aristotle, about the circle being perfect, right? Because you can't add anything to the circle. It's a straight line you can always add to it. So there's something kind of complete about it. But the circle symbolizes what? Yeah, that's why wedding rings are a circle, right? It kind of represented the hesitation of this. Well, they say the Incas didn't want to use a circle for a wheel because it would be degrading to the circle to me. I don't know if that's true or not, but it's interesting, you know. So they see a certain perfection in the number three. Augustine says also in the seventh book of the Confessions, right? There I read in the books of the Platonists, right? He was kind of a Platonist. Not in these very words, but the same altogether. In many and multiple reasons. In the beginning, he saw there was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word, right? So Gustin is saying now, he's seen things like that in Plato. And things of this sort, which there follow, in which words the distinction of the divine persons is treated. You know, whoever is said in the gloss on Romans 1 and Exodus, that the magi of the Pharaoh failed in the third sign, right? That is in the knowledge of the third person, of the Holy Spirit. And thus, at least they knew two of them, huh? That's a little bit like Plato, too. I mean, that's the final Plato. And Trium Majestus says that the monas, genuine, the monad, and what? Comes back upon itself with heat and warmth and love. You've got the Trinity, right? To which it seems that the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit are intimated, right? Therefore, a knowledge of the divine persons can be had by natural reason. So you're all convinced now? These are some of the famous texts, right? Moreover, the great Richard of St. Victor, right? In his book about the Trinity, he says, I believe without doubt that for every explanation of the truth, not only probable things, but even necessary arguments are not, what? Backing them. Whence, to proving the Trinity of persons, some induce a reason from the infinity to the divine goodness, right? Which communicates itself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons. Some horror through the fact that, what? Through this statement, that there cannot be a joyful possession of any good without some, what? Consortium without some companions, right? And St. Augustine proceeds to manifesting the Trinity of persons from the procession of the word and love in our mind, which way we ourselves above have, what? Followed, huh? Therefore, by natural reason, one can know the Trinity of persons, huh? I was reading that in Thomas today, there was talking about how, talking about the image of the Trinity in our soul there. So, when my reason thinks about what itself is, and it forms a thought of itself, right? There proceeds from my reason a thought about what reason is. Like Shakespeare's definition of reason, huh? When I understand that definition of reason, the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after, then there proceeds from my reason, and there isn't my reason, a thought about what reason is. And when I realize what reason is, then I love reason very much. So, there proceeds from my knowledge of what reason is, a great love of reason, huh? Like Augustine says, intellectum volde ama. Love very much leads the understanding of reason, huh? And that's like the Trinity, isn't it? Okay? Yeah? Okay. So, the first objection is taking things from these pagan philosophers like Aristotle, right, huh? And so on. And the second objection is taken, though, from Richard St. Victor, and even Augustine is stuck in there a bit, although Augustine is not claiming that he's knowing it by an actual reason, right? And the third objection is something quite different, huh? It's saying, it seems superfluous for man to treat of those things which are not able to be known by human reason. But it should not be said that the tradition, the divine tradition about the knowledge of the Trinity is superfluous, right? And therefore, the Trinity of Persons is able to be known by human reason, right? In other words, God wouldn't talk about it, or reason wouldn't talk about it, if it couldn't know it, huh? That's a little different argument, right? But against this is what the great, what, Hillary says, huh? Hillary seems to be after Augustine, quite after Augustine, but quoted very often by Thomas in the Treatise on the Trinity. Hillary of Poitier, I guess it is, huh? But against this is what Hillary says in the second book that he has about the Trinity, that man should not think that by his intelligence, right, he can follow the, what, the sacrament of the generation, the secret, huh? The secret sign, the secret of the generation of the word. And Ambrose, one of the great, Ambrose, one of the great four doctors, is it, of the Western Church, is impossible to know what? The secret of the generation, right? The mind, what, fails, the voice becomes silent, huh? But by the origin of generation and procession is distinguished the Trinity and divine persons, huh? The Trinity is what? These persons are distinguished by the relations of origin, right? So if you can't know the generation, and 840, the procession, which is hard to know the generation, then you don't have any knowledge of these things. Since, therefore, man is not able to know and follow out by his intelligence, for which a reason, a necessary reason cannot be had, it follows that the Trinity of Persons is not able to be known by what? Reason, huh? Okay, for which a necessary reason cannot be had, right? I can't give you a necessary reason to Aristoteles here today, if he's here today, why there must be three Persons in God, right? And therefore I can't really know it. It might have some probable reason to say so, right? Right? So what do you think about this question? Well, Thomas is going to go back to the fact that natural reason knows God only through his, what? Effects, right? And these effects are results of the divine, what? Power, the divine substance, and that's, what? Common to the three Persons, right? That's going to be the basic reason he's going to give, I think. You know, forever, and so Persons cannot be known by reason, and so we just don't, the whole mystery of the Trinity just doesn't really want it to generally be touched by people. Yeah. I answer, it should be said that it's impossible by natural reason, right, to arrive at a knowledge, in the full sense, of the Trinity of the divine, what, Persons, huh? For he's been shown above that man, by natural reason, right, can arrive at a knowledge of God only from, what? Creatures, huh? But creatures lead us to a knowledge of God as effects lead us to a knowledge of the cause. But that only, by natural reason, can be known about God that necessarily belongs to him according as he is the beginning of all beings, huh? And this foundation we used above in considering, in our consideration of God, huh? But the creative power of God is common to the whole, what, Trinity, huh? Whence it pertains to the unity of the essence. and not to the, what? Distinction of persons. Through natural reason, therefore, we are able to know about God those things which pertain to the unity of his essence, the unity of his nature of substance, not over those things which pertain to the, what? Distinction of persons. That's the only reason that comes years that I can recall, you know? Even elsewhere, right? Come back to the same reason, right? That natural reason knows God only as a cause is known to its effect, right? But the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit are causes of the creatures by one power, right? Which is the same as their common nature, their common essence, right? So, we can only know things that pertain to the common, what? The nature of the three persons, their common power, their common essence, through, by natural reason, from the effects. Now, he says those who attempt to prove the Trinity of persons by natural reason, they, what? Take away from faith in two ways. First, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which is about unseen things, which exceed human reason, right? Whence the Apostle says, at Hebrews chapter 11, verse 1, that faith is about things that are not, what? Seen. I think that's where you have, at Hebrews 11, verse 1, the definition of faith, right? Which in Latin is, what? Substantia. The substance of things hoped for, the conviction of what is not, what? Seen. Argumentum non operentia, right? So, you're lowering the dignity of faith. It's something above our reason, right? Or what's being proposed, right? It's about things not seen, right? And so, you're, what? Taking away the excellence, right? The excelling character of faith, huh? And the Apostle, the Apostle now is St. Paul by Antoine of Messia, right? And the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians chapter 2, verse 6, we speak wisdom among the perfect, right? Not the wisdom of this world, right? Nor that of the princes of this world, huh? Which Thomas interprets to mean the philosophers, right? Wow, we're the prince of the world. But we speak the wisdom of God in mystery, right? Which is, what? Hidden, right? Now, the second reason why this is bad, right? Is in regard to the usefulness of drawing others to the faith, right? For when someone, through proving the faith, brings in reasons which are not, what? Cogent or not a force of mind. And he gives way to the faithful making fun of it, huh? Okay, to the world after, let's say. For they believe that resting upon these reasons, and I counter them, we, what? Believe, right? So if you give, like this is say, even in philosophy, you know, that a bad defense of the truth is worse than a good attack upon it, right? If someone makes a good attack upon it, we'll kind of force somebody else to defend it, right? But if you make a bad defense, you say, well, we've heard that side, you know, it's just going to end up. Well, this is a little different case, but something like that, though. And so say, well, is that what you believe? Because your reason has a definition of reason, and it's impressed with what reason is. Therefore, there must be a trinity of persons in God, huh? See? Well, these three things in me are not one substance, or three persons, right? You know? There's some likeness there, right? The church is in common. Well, how do you know that? Because the church said so. The church is fine. So, the things that are of faith, right? One should not attempt to prove, except, what? Through authorities, right? And with those who receive authorities, right? Now, Thomas said in the beginning, you might remember that, huh? He said, contrasting philosophy and theology, that in philosophy, the argument from authority is the weakest, right? So, if I say the Pythagorean theorem is true because Pythagoras said so, well, I suppose there's a reason, you know, to accept it. But it's the weakest one I could give, right? But in theology, it's the strongest, right? Now, when Thomas is writing the Summa Contra Gentilis, he's dealing with those who do not receive the, what? Authorities, right? And Thomas contrasts it. He says, with the heretics, we can, you know, at least argue from the Sacred Scripture, right? From the Old and the New Testament. With the Jews, you can at least argue from the, what? Old Testament. But with the Mohammedans, right? We can't do that, right? We can't do this reason, right? But Thomas is thinking, you know, like Averroes and Avicenna, right? Who did do this reason, right? But among others, it suffices to defend that what the faith says is not impossible, right? Okay. Now, if you look at Thomas, say, like in the Summa Contra Gentilis, he will show the Trinity or the Incarnation, the truth of it, from Sacred Scripture, right? Okay. But then you also have arguments drawn from reason against the possibility of being many Christians in God or against the possibility of Incarnation. And then he'll show that the arguments against it are not sufficient. Once Dionysius says in the second chapter of the Divine Names, if there's someone who, what, totally resists the Sacred Writings, I guess, right, he will be a long way from our, what, philosophy, right? If, however, he looks towards the truth of the sayings, the Sacred Sayings, then also, what, we will use the canon of them against him, right, if he denies these things. So, as Thomas did in the body article, he first gives the reason why natural reason cannot know the Trinity, right? And then why you should avoid, right, trying to show by natural reason that there's a Trinity. I mean, you should try to avoid demonstrating it, right, for two reasons, right? One, that you will lower the dignity of faith, right, which is above the things that are above our reason, and secondly, because people will think that's why you, what, believe, huh? Okay? Okay, now, the first objection was a slew of things from the philosophers. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the philosophers did not know the mystery of the Trinity of the divine persons per propria, right? Which are the fatherhood, the sonhood, and, for want of a better name, the procession, right? The name, the relation, the Holy Spirit. According to that of the apostle St. Paul, one of Corinthians 2, we speak the wisdom of God, huh? Which none of the princes of this age, right, knows. That is the philosophers, according to the gloss. Now, careful here, see. They did know certain essential attributes, though, right? Which are appropriated to the, what, persons. And we said later on, there will be an article here about appropriation, right? A question about appropriation. Just as power is appropriated to the, what, father. You will see why it is appropriated to him, right? That's in the creed, right? I believe in God, the Father Almighty, creator of heaven and earth, and so on. Is the Father alone Almighty? No. Is the Father alone the creator of the world? No. But these are appropriated to the Father, and we'll see the reason why they are when we get to that point, right? Wisdom to the Son, huh? Wisdom to the Son, huh? Okay, he proceeds by way of God knowing himself, right? But is the son alone wise? No, it's appropriation. And goodness to the what? Holy Spirit, huh? Because goodness is tied up with the will, right? So they could know about the power of God, the wisdom of God, the goodness of God. They could know attributes that we appropriate to the three persons, right? But they wouldn't know the three persons as such. What Aristotle therefore says, that to this number, right? You know, we honor the gods and so on. It should not be understood that he laid down a number three in God. But he wished that the what? He wished, he wanted to say, that the ancients use a number three in sacrifices, right? And in prayers, on account of a certain perfection of the number three, right? So we see that it's perfect. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So the number three seems to designate a certain what? Yeah, a certain completeness, huh? Since God is altogether perfect, it's appropriate to use a number three, right? Is that to understand the Trinity? No, obviously not, huh? But it's interesting, right? That we see a certain perfection there in the number what? Three. In the books of the Platonists, there was found, in the beginning was the verbum, the thought, right? Not according as thought signifies a person, yeah, gendered in divine things, but in according as, by verbum, is understood the, what? Ideal notion, or ideal ratio, the ideal species to which God, what? Makes all things, and this is appropriated to the, what? Sun, huh? Like in the, Timaeus there, right? He speaks, you know, of the Demiurgos, right? And he's got the pattern out there and he's making things according to it, right? That's a little bit like God making things according to his thought, right? But you're not seeing it as a, what? Distinction of persons in the thing there. They are said, nevertheless, to fail in the third sign, that is in the knowledge of the third person, because from goodness, which is appropriate to the Holy Spirit, they, what? Deviated, right? Okay? When knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, right? As is said in Romans 1.21. Or because the Platonists lay down that there's one first being, right? Whom they also called the father of the whole, what? Yeah. Now even Homer speaks of it, right? He speaks of Zeus as the father of gods and men, right? Okay? And then consequently, he placed under it another substance, which he called the, what? Paternal intellect or mind, huh? He had that same idea in Avicenna, right? He didn't say he did the Trinity. He's a Muslim, but he has the idea that the first being, right? Produces this greater mind and so on. And which were the reasons of all things? As Macrobius recites or the dream of Scipio, right? Very famous little work. Most of you wrote some music for the dream of Scipio. But they did not lay down some, what? Third substance, right? Which would seem to correspond to the Holy Spirit. Of course, the Holy Spirit is more hidden from us even, huh? But thus we do not lay down father and son as differing in their substance, right? But this was the mistake of Origen and Arius following in this respect be, what, Platonism. So Thomas is very hard in origin sometimes, right? He gets into some trouble, you know? Now what Priba and Justus says that the monas, the one, generates the one, right? And it turns back upon itself with heat. It does not refer to the generation of the son or the procession of the Holy Spirit, but to the production of the world. For the one God produces the one world on account of the love of himself, right? So he brings the whole world back to himself, right? So, I mean, the philosophers knew that, huh? They knew that God was the beginning of all things and the end of all things, huh? Aristotle says explicitly that God is the end of the whole universe, right? But that three is not the, what, trinity, huh? There's something complete about that, right? And although there's all kinds of particular differences between the division and order of the two sumas, say, of Thomas and so on, but underlying both of them is the, what, consideration of God in himself and the consideration of God as the beginning of all things and the consideration of God as the, what, end of all things, right? This is especially noticeable in the way the summa of God as the gentile is the divider, right? But underlies this, too. What exactly is modad? Well, modad is a Greek word for one, right? And Thomas says, the, what, the one God produced the one world, right? On account of the love of himself, right? So that's why they compare it to a circle, right? In a circle, what is the beginning is also the end, right? It's in Acts and Andrew said, but they understood in a material way, right? Thus thou art and to death thou shalt return, right? But God is the beginning in the sense of the maker, not of matter, and the end in the sense not of destruction of things, but their last good, right? So there's kind of a circle there, right? So he says, the one God produced the one world and brought it back to himself, right? By love. That's well said, right? That's not the Trinity, right? But you do see these kind of likenesses there. The Trinity in some way, I don't know, three. Now what about these reasons that they say he can give? Well, to the second it should be said, and this is kind of a famous text of Thomas because it's a little understanding of experimental science too. To the second it should be said that to some thing we can bring a reason in in two ways. In one way to proving sufficiently some root. As in natural science has induced a reason sufficient to proving that the motion of the heaven is always of a universal what? Velocity, uniform velocity. Another way a reason is induced not which sufficiently proves the root but to the root already laid down it shows the effects to be what? Congruent. And he gives the example from Ptolemy, right? As in astrology or we'd say astronomy today is laid down on the ratio of what? Eccentric synepicycles, huh? And it got very complicated, right? Because you had things traveling around in a circle and then around that circle there was a circle on top of it, right? It got more complicated until someone said let's try to explain it some other way, right? From this that such a position laid down one can save the what? Sensible appearances about the celestial motions. But this is not a sufficient reason proving it because perhaps by some other position one could say the same thing, right? Now Einstein's example there is a guy looking at the face of a clock, right? And saying, well let's try to explain these motions as one way to construct a clock I guess. And so you can imagine a way that the mechanism of the clock might be that would explain these motions but is that actually the way these motions are being produced? You don't know, right? So there's one reason that kind of forces the mind, right? Another reason so well it could be this way but I don't know, see? In the first way therefore one can induce a reason to proving that God is one and things of this sort, right? Think about the unity of God. But in the second way a reason is induced to manifest in some way the Trinity, right? Because the Trinity being laid down these reasons are good with it, yeah. Not that to these reasons sufficiently is proved the, what? Trinity the Christians, right? The Trinity, right? The Trinity, right? The Trinity, right?