Prima Pars
Lecture 133: The Word as Personal Name in God

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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen. And help us to understand what's your routine. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So let's look at the premium now, at the beginning of question 34, where he begins to talk about some of the names of the second person. Then we're not to consider about the person of the Son. Now, there are attributed three names to the Son. To wit, filius, or Son, verbum, word, the sense of thought, and imago. But the ratio, or the definition of Son, is considered from the definition of the Father. Whence remains to consider about the other two names, that he is the Word, and that he is the image. Now, about the Word, three things are asked. First, whether word is said essentially in God, in divine things, meaning referring to the divine essence or substance, right? Or whether it's said referring to the person, the personality there. Secondly, whether it is the Son's own name. And third, this is, I took you as strange at first. Whether in the name of the Word is implied some regard to what? Creatures, huh? So let's look now at the first article. To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that Word is not a personal name in God. For personal names are said properly as opposed to what? Figuratively, right? In God, huh? As Father and Son. But Word is said metaphorically in God as Origen says, huh? In his comments on the Gospel of St. John. Therefore, the Word is not, what? Personal. In divine things, huh? At times, he's rather rough, you'll see what he implies to what Primo, right? About poor Origen, huh? Although he continues to quote Origen, you know, in the golden chain and other things. And I thought Benedict XVI was kind of kind about Origen, too, when he spoke about him there in those weekly audiences. Moreover, according to Augustine in the book on the Trinity, word is what? Knowledge with love. And according to Anselm, to speak for the highest spirit is nothing other than to look upon something. Cogitando. Thomas has to correct that, you know. It's a choice of the word, Cogitando, right? That means discursive knowledge or thinking about something. But Anselm is using that kind in a broad sense. But knowledge and thinking and insight are said in God essentially. So knowledge, right? Is that said essentially or is it said? Of course, you have to think back about the knowledge of God, right? Okay. In the unity of God. Moreover, it's of the definition of word or thought that it is said. But according to Anselm, just as the Father is understanding or understands, and the Son also is understanding, and the Holy Spirit is also understanding. Therefore, just as the Father is saying something, so the Son is saying something, and the Holy Spirit is saying. And likewise, each of them is said. So they both say and are said. Therefore, the name of word is said essentially in divine things. And it's common to all three, and not personally. And finally, the fourth objection. No divine person is made. But the word of God is something made. For it says in Psalm 48, fire and what, snow and ice and so on, and winds and so on, which make his, what? Word. Therefore, the word is not the personal name in divine things. But against this is what Augustine says in the seventh book about the Trinity. That just as Son refers to Father, so word to that of which it is the word. So I used to call God the Father the speaker of the house. Okay? Like my little poem. God the Father said it all in one word. So he's the speaker. But Son is a personal name, because it is said relatively, therefore also word. So, let's see what Thomas says in his reply to this. The answer should be said, that the name of word in divine things, if it is taken, what? Properly. is a personal name. And in no way essential. And Thomas is even more emphatic about that here than he is in the sentences. Sentences a little more. Let's determine. To the knowledge of this, it should be known that word is said properly enough in three ways. Now, of course, you don't see this in English word. Word, do you? But as we said before, it's interesting that in the Gospel of St. John, the word logos there, the beginning was the logos, and the logos was towards God, and the logos was God. They translate logos there, word in English, right? You know, someone might say, it would be more more clear to say it's thought instead of word. right, huh? See? Now, in English, does the word word mean thought? No, no. See, but in Greek, if you looked up at the word logos in Greek, the word logos in Greek would mean word first, and then it can mean later on the thought that the word signifies. So it's a word equivocal by reason. There's a certain connection there, right? But in translating it by word, right, you can see the English word has not been moved to that second meaning. And I remind you, when I was a freshman in college there, I had an English professor in English class I had to take. And he had his own book, which was one of the books we obviously used in the course. And, of course, I had started to look at the logic, you know, and we talked about words and thoughts and how words signify thoughts and so on. But he had the sentence in his book there, words spoken are written in our thoughts. And so this snotty little fellow here, he says, I said, strictly speaking, he says, that's false. So, never go out, never go out to this guy, you know. But in some sense, he was, what, you know, extending the word, right? You see? So a lot of times, you know, in English, the word is not, is not moved to the later meanings. We were kind of forced to move it for the fact that we translated that by what? Word, right? Well, we don't translate spirit by what? Breath, we usually say spirit or sometimes ghost, but ghost is kind of archaic there, but it has a reference to breath. So he says, to the evidence of all this, it should be known that the word, word, that verbum, or logos, is said properly by us in three ways. And in a fourth way, improperly or what? Figuratively, right? Now, it's more manifest and more commonly in us that that is called a word that is put forth by the voice. So it's a vocal sound, right? Of course, we name things as we, what? Know them, right? Since our knowledge starts with our senses, we tend to name the vocal sound, which is sensible, word first, right? And then we carry it over and apply it to other things as he goes on to say here. Which, proceeds from something inside, as regards two things which are found in the outside word. To which, to wit, the vocal sound itself, and the meaning or signification of the vocal sound. For the vocal sound signifies a concept or a thought of the what? Understanding, right? According to the philosopher, that's Aristotle, of course, by Antoinette Messiah, in the first book of the what? Perihermeneus. And also, the vocal sound proceeds from a what? Imagination, right? As is said in the book, Dianna. Now, as a professor, I'm very much aware of this. And you're thinking about, are you going to explain something in class and so on? And you imagine the words you're going to be what? Using, right? So that imagining the word before you say it is not the thought, right? But you could call that the word, too, right? So the vocal sound is called a word. And then inside, the imagination of the sound, the imagined word, so to speak. And then the thought that is signified by that what? Vocal sound and so on. For a vocal sound that does not signify cannot be called a what? Word, right? So you may recall the definition there of a word or at least a name as a vocal sound, signifying by human agreement. No part of it signifies by itself and so on. So from this, therefore, the exterior vocal sound is called a word because it signifies a inside thought of the mind. Thus, therefore, first and chiefly, the interior thought of the mind is called a word, right? Not in our imposition of the word, but in the things themselves. Secondarily, the vocal sound that signifies that inside or interior thought concept. And third, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a what? Word, right? And these three ways of the word are laid down by Danistines, probably using the word logos, right? Instead of the Latin word. In the first book, chapter 13, that's the orthodox faith and so on. Saying that the word is called what? The natural motion of the understanding according to which it is moved and understands and thinks, right? As we are light and splendor. As we guard the first, right? The thought itself. Again, the word is what is not pronounced, but is what? Pronounced in the heart, right? This is the imagination of what? As we guard the third, right? The word here is a little different from Thomas' order. And again, the word is an angel. That is a what? Messenger of the understanding. As we guard the second, right? The vocal sound. So you have those three senses of word, right? It is said figuratively in the fourth way, word. That which is what? Signified by the word or is more what? Accomplished by it, right? As we are accustomed to say, this is the word which I have spoken to you. Or that the king has commanded, right? Having shown or showing some deed that is signified by the word, either of the ones simply announcing it or commanding it, right? Now, word is said properly in God in which one of those senses, but not in a metaphorical sense. But among the three properly in the sense of what? Thought, right? So they say in the beginning was the word. The word was towards God. You could translate it, though we don't. They say in the beginning was the thought. In the Greek, it's what? It's got the article. So it's being said by Antoinette Messiah. This is the thought, right? We talked about how among all thoughts, this is the thought that stands out, right? The only thought that is, what? Subsistent, right? It's a substance, right? And it's a thought about God. In fact, a thought that is God. Okay? It's quite a thought. Quince Augustine says in the 15th book about the Trinity, whoever can understand the word, right? Not only before it sounds, right? But also before what? The images of the sounds are involved in our thinking, right? So it's this third thing, right? The thought itself is now able to see in some way a likeness of that divine word, of that word, about whom it is said in the Gospel of St. John, in the beginning was the word, right? So it's not the vocal sound. In St. Ben there was a vocal sound, and the vocal sound was towards God, and the vocal sound was God, right? But not even the imagined word, right? But there was a thought, huh? Now, the concept of the thought, they sometimes call it the verbum cordis, right? That concept of the heart has in its very notion that it proceeds from another, to wit, from the, what? Knowledge of the one conceiving, right? Now, sometimes we compare the imagination and, what? Reason, right? Or the understanding. Because there's a similarity between the two, right? When I imagine something, there proceeds from my imagination, from my imagining, an image of what I imagine. It seems to be said, my head played the painter, right? And so when I think about something, there proceeds from my thinking, a, what? Thought, right? Now, is the image the same thing as the imagining? No. And the thinking is not the same thing as the, what? Thought, right? But the thought is proceeding from the one thinking, right? Just as the image is proceeding from the one imagining. And when Thomas talks about the acts of the reason, right? He talks about the first act of reason, huh? Simple understanding or simple grasping. He says some, like the Arabs, call this imaginatio per intellectum, huh? And imagining through the intellect, right? And of course, you'll see the likeness here also with the fact that the song will be called the imago, right? Okay? It's the same word we have for image, huh? Now, in the third book on the soul, Aristotle was careful to distinguish between imagining and thinking, huh? And between the thought and the, what? Image, right? But it's not easy to separate those two, huh? And you go to the English empiricism, and they will use the word in English, idea, sometimes having in mind an image and sometimes having in mind a thought, but using idea in a kind of what? In distinct ways, sometimes to cover one, sometimes the other, right? Okay? So I used to say to the students, you know, if your girlfriend says, don't get ideas, huh? Idea probably means images, right? And, because you're probably not doing too much thinking at this time. But if a philosopher has ideas, they should be thoughts, and not just images, although there are some philosophers who just, you know, more in their imagination than they're thinking, huh? That's right, I used to say, they remember my examples, but not the thing I was trying to simplify. But the image is something you can maybe, you know, imagine, right? To get a hold of it, but the thought is something that is more obscure. So when Aristotle distinguished, which is imagining and thinking. He doesn't begin with what is most difficult to see. What's the difference between imagining a triangle and understanding what a triangle is? It's kind of hard to see that, yeah? And I think I mentioned before how John Locke, he's trying to imagine the general idea of triangle. And is that general idea of triangle isosceles or scalene or equilaterals or right-angled or, you know? And he doesn't know what to say. He ends up by saying it's all and none of these. Well, what is the general idea of triangle, right? If you try to imagine triangle in general, can you do so? No. Because any triangle you imagine will be either isosceles or equilaterals or scalene. And so he's kind of trying to take these two images, you know, work them together, mishmash, and then he's talking about how difficult these general ideas are. And then Barclay comes along and says, well, it doesn't make any sense to say it's all and none, therefore we have no general ideas. So they have a hard time, you know, they're confusing the understanding, the thought of what triangle is in general with an image of triangle. So Aristotle doesn't begin there. Eventually he will point out that the images always sing to them. You're imagining this triangle, right? But the reason is understanding what a triangle is, and that's something universal. It doesn't start off there because that's too hard to see. He starts off by saying that I'm free to imagine something without having any reason for imagining it. But I can't think that something is so without having some kind of reason. So I can imagine myself, you know, winning the lottery today and being a millionaire, right? But can I really think I won when I haven't even bought a ticket? I have no reason to think I won. In fact, there's a reason to think I could not have won because I didn't buy a ticket. You see? But I can imagine it, right? So I was imagining and thinking the same thing. I can imagine a terrorist out there with a ski mask on and a machine gun and about here to wipe us out, you know? But can I think that there's a terrorist out there right now? I don't have any reason to think there's a terrorist out there, right? But I can imagine him out there, right? And then Aristotle points out that if I imagine it, I may not fear any particular emotion. So I'm not acting crazy like I'm a millionaire now or, you know, running in and trying to hide from a terrorist, right? But if I thought there was a terrorist, I'll take you out that door or some other door because my legs would carry me, right? So it's only graduates you see the difference in these two, right? Nevertheless, you can imagine something or think about it in its absence. And that's why we produce a thought or an image, right? When we imagine something in its absence as opposed to sensing it, right? Where I have the object in front of me. So when you speak of what is St. John saying there? In the beginning was the word, right? What's word now in the sense now not of the vocal sound, not of the imagination of such a sound, right? But it's word or logos, a variable, in the sense of what? The thought, right? Now, because God has a thought in thinking about himself, right? As we're going back to the treatise on the knowledge of God, God's understanding is an understanding chiefly of himself. And in understanding himself, he understands what? Everything else, right? And therefore, in a way, his thought is a thought chiefly of himself, but to some extent a thought of everything. That's why I say in my little poem, that God the Father said it all in one word. Talk about the last word, right? He said it all. Of course, when Thomas talks about the descent from God through the angels down to us, right? The lower you go, the more thoughts you have, but the less you understand your thoughts. But God understands everything, expresses everything he understands, in one, what? Thought. So, he's quoted Augustine there, right? And he says, that thought of the heart in Cheptus Cordes has in its very definition that it proceeds from another, right? And of course, this idea of proceeding from another is what gives rise to the Trinity. Namely, it proceeds from the knowledge of the one what conceiving. Whence word or thought, according as it is said properly in God, signifies something proceeding from another. And this pertains to the notion of what? Personal names in God. In that divine persons are distinguished according to their what? Origin, right? That's why in the whole treatise here, there were three parts, right? First part on origin or procession. The second part on the relations of origin or procession, of being from another, or having another from you. And then the persons, right? Because the persons are distinguished by relations of origin. So just like when I imagine something, there proceeds from the one imagining an image, right? So when God understands himself or thinks of himself, right? There proceeds from God a what? Thought, right? And so this is something that is tied up with the proceeding in God and therefore the persons and therefore is a personal name rather than a name of something essential. Whence is necessary that the name of word or thought according as is taken properly in God is not taken essentially but personally only, right? Now the first objection was taken from origin. The first there, for it should be said that the areas of whom origin is found to be the what? Yes, the fountain. That's a strong thing. You know how strong the Arian heresy was in those early days, huh? That famous thing there from St. Jerome the church woke up and groaned to find itself Arian. They'd taken over so many of the bishops and so on. That the Arians whom origins found to be the fountain laid down that the son is other from the father in a diversity of what? Substance, right? So for the Arians or for Arius the what? The son is not God, right? He's maybe the highest of creatures but he's still a creature, right? Whence they attempted when the son of God is called the word, right? To construe this as not being said what? Properly, right? Lest under the notion of word or thought proceeding they would be what? Forced to confess that the son of God is not outside the substance of the father. So when I just like when I imagine something that proceeds from me an image but that image remains within my imagination, right? So likewise when I think of something that proceeds a thought of that thing but the thought remains within the what? Thinker. So what remains within God is God, right? Well they've got to take it to be said but metaphorically then, right? So you can watch out for this origin character, huh? Lest under the notion of a thought proceeding they would be forced, huh? To confess the son of God to not be outside the substance of the father, right? Or of a different substance from the father, right? For the interior word thus proceeds from the one saying it that it remains what? In him, right? Okay. But it's necessary if ... Word of God is said metaphorically, that there also be laid down a word of God said what? Properly. For something cannot be said metaphorically to be the word, except by reason of its what? Manifesting the interior one night. Because either it manifests as a word does, or it is manifested by the word. If ever it is manifested by the word, it is necessary that one lay down a word by which it is manifested. If ever it is called a word because it manifests in an exterior way, those things which manifest something outside are not called words, except insofar as they signify an interior concept of the mind, which someone manifests through exterior signs. Thus, although word sometimes is called metaphorically in God, nevertheless it is necessary to lay down a word properly said, and not figuratively, which is said, what, personally, right? Most of the word propriae, you know, is here opposed to what? Figuratively, right? Not least propriae is opposed to what? Communitaire, something like that, right? Then it's more the sense of what? Private or something. Okay, now what about this text of Augustine and Anselm, where they seem to use word to refer now to the knowledge itself, right? Well, Thomas says, he replied to this, To the second it should be said, that nothing of those things which pertain to the understanding are said personally, as referring to a person in God, except only what? Word, huh? Now that, for only word, signifies something, what, going forth from another, right? That which the understanding and conceiving forms is the, what, word, huh? But the understanding, according as it is, what, through the understandable form and act, is considered, what, absolutely, right? So we distinguish between the, what, form by which you understand, right, and the thought that proceeds from your understanding. And this understandable form, the form by which God understands, is nothing other than divine substance. So it's on the side of the absolute, right? But it's the thought proceeding that's going to give rise to, what, a real distinction, huh? According to the relations based on that going forward. And likewise to understand, which thus has itself to the understanding and act, has to be to the being and act. For to understand does not signify an action going outside, huh, the one understanding, but remaining in the one understanding, huh? So they sometimes call it an imminent act, right? But this is true in a way about sensing, too, right? So the difference between understanding and sensing and even loving, right, these are acts that, what, as such, remain in the one understanding or sensing or loving, right? As opposed to making, right? Building and so on. Which have an exterior product, right? Okay? Now, he's kind of correcting the language of that one. When, therefore, it is said that the word is knowledge, right? Knowledge there is not taken for the act of the understanding knowing or for some, what, habit of it, huh? But for that, that the understanding concedes in what knowing, huh? Whence Augustine says that the word is wisdom, what, generated, right? Which is nothing other than the very conception of the one who is wise, huh? Nothing other than the, what, thought, right, huh? Notice that the word conceptio is so close to, what, the word phileos, right? So if the thought is called the conception, right, you can see how the phileos and the verb are the same, huh? In God, I used to say. Because for God to be and to understand the same thing, not in us, right? My concepts are not my children, strictly speaking, right? But if for me to be and for me to understand the same thing, then my thoughts would be my, what, children, right? Which, in a like way, could be called, what, knowledge generated, right? I know what Thomas is doing there, in a sense he's kind of correcting the language there, it seems to me, of Augustine, right, huh? Because notitia, by itself, would seem to indicate more the act of knowing, huh? Than the thought that proceeds, right, huh? In the same way when he's referring to the words of, what, Ansel, right? And in the same way can be understood that to speak for God is to, what, have insight in thinking, huh? Insofar as by the insight of thinking, the divine thinking, is conceived the word of God, right, huh? And then Thomas corrects, hence I believe it, as far as the word cogitatsia, right? Now, I think I was referring to the definition of the word to believe, in the sense of the theological virtue, right? When Thomas takes it up in the secundi secundi, right, he'll say that to believe the act of the first theological virtue, right? Well, the definition of the question is, is, you know, of these two, Ascentere cum cogitatsione, right? Or, cogitare cum ascensione, right? Now, how'd you translate that, right? Well, to ascent, while thinking about it, right? Or, while thinking about it, to ascent, right? And Thomas would point out that this definition of Augustine separates the act of belief from every other act of reason. You know, if you take, for example, the things you naturally understand, like the whole is more than a part. Now, to think about those things, they're obvious, you still ascent to them, right? Other things you ascent to after we've thought them out, right? So, we're still thinking about it, we're not yet ascenting. But here, we're ascenting while we're still thinking about it. Because we don't understand, huh, what we're ascenting to, right? But this respects the nature of reason itself, right? Because reason naturally wants to understand, huh? And so, reason naturally thinks about what it doesn't understand, and tries to understand so far as possible, right? So, this is related, then, to the definition of theology that St. Anselm gives, that they often quote, right? Which is, what, belief, seeking, understanding, right? They'll say, fides, weyrends, intellect, right? Something like that. Faith, seeking, understanding, huh? But the kind of root of that is in the very act of faith itself. Faith, seeking, understanding, right? Faith, seeking, understanding, right? Faith, seeking, understanding, right? Faith, seeking, understanding, right? Faith, seeking, understanding, right? Faith, seeking, right? So you're thinking about the Trinity now, in this course, plus simply there being three persons in God, right? And of course, we never really fully understand it in this life, right? And so we're always thinking about it. And Thomas had quoted Hillary earlier, you know, even though I know I should have arrived, big progress thinking about it, right? The more I think about this, the more I get a little imperfect understanding, right? And notice the definition of faith in the epistle of the Hebrews, right? You've read that definition, huh? But in Latin, we'll define it as a substance of things hoped for, right? The conviction of what is not seen, right? So, conviction of what is not seen, huh? You're assenting to something that you don't see yet, right? You're thinking about something you don't see yet, you don't understand it yet, huh? But you're doing that. But take the first part of the definition. It's the substance, huh? The Greek word is hypostasis there. But in what sense is the substance of things hoped for? What's hoped for is the beatific vision, right? And this is called the substance of that. Substance in the sense of what? What underlies it? In a sense of kind of a foundation, right? Kind of a foretaste, right? Substance in the sense that I'm not a possessive indivision yet, right? But that would be faith. And faith disappears, as St. Paul says, when you see God as he is. But you could say it's a foretaste of what is hoped for, right? A little appetizer, right? And this appetizer makes you want to have the, eat this, right? But that's the difference with the seer, right? When you're thinking about it, you're getting a little kind of a taste of that. But a foretaste, right? It's not really the meal that isn't here yet. Pignus. Right? Pignus, that's what St. Thomas called. That's a pledge. A pledge, yeah. Instead of the Eucharist, yeah. It's kind of interesting, you know, that Thomas uses the word convivium, right? Both in describing the Eucharist itself and in regarding the what? The division, right? Okay. And it wasn't Psalm then, was it 62? Something like that. Where it says, you know, use the word banquet in there, right? And when I try to understand that psalm, I say, well, it can be applied either to the Eucharist, right? We have a certain banquet in this life, or to the what? Yeah. The two are connected, right? But that same metaphor, really, banquet, is used for both of them, right? Thomas speaks of the ineffable banquet, huh? He calls Eucharist also banquet, huh? So, Thomas is kind of correcting the use here of cogitari, right? That the sense of cogitari is more the sense of what? Thinking about something, and just the mind going through a kind of emotion, trying to understand something, right? For the word of cogitaxio does not properly belong to the word of God, right? As Augustine says in the 15th book of the Trinity, Augustine is better than himself, isn't working. Thus, it is called the word of God that cogitaxio is not said, right? That's a Latin word, right? Lest something, what? Moveable or in movement is believed to be in God, which now takes the form, it'd be a word, right? And can be dismissed and changed about in many forms, right? For cogitaxio properly consists in the investigation of the truth, right? Which has no place in God, right? God always actually understands himself and everything else, right? So he always has actually a perfect, what? Thought of himself, right? That proceeds from him, right? Why in us, we have to think about something maybe before we, you know? So when we're studying something, we're kind of, what? Forming our thoughts, see? But God always has a thought because he always actually understands. For when the understanding has already arrived at the form of truth, it does not think about anymore, but it contemplates the truth, what? Perfectly. When Segestin improperly takes the word cogitation for contemplation, right? So Thomas treats Anselm with respect, but he sometimes corrects his language a bit, right? But in general, and I may this could be more expanded on this part here, it seems to me that to call the word knowledge is kind of not speaking so correctly, you know? You see? You might say the word is more that in which you express what you know. So we can't identify the two, right? Is imagining, and you can go back to something more known to us, is imagining the image of what you imagine? No. An image is something proceeding from your imagining when you imagine something, right? And a thought is something proceeding from your thinking or your knowledge, right? When you know something, right? And so you could, you know, see maybe that way of speaking is novel together. The best way of speaking, right? If you have this problem, huh? I was looking at some text in the sentences there, and was it Chrysostom? I think it was Chrysostom, yeah. Another one of the doctors in the Greek church knows you the word cause, you know, the father of the cause of the son, right? And Thomas has to, what, piously expound what he really means. So, I mentioned how I was kind of shocked to see Basil, right? You know, but you can see how Thomas is very much the pupil of what, Aristotle, right? Because Aristotle is very clear about beginning, cause, element, right? Beginning is more general than cause, right? Every cause is a beginning, and one sense of cause is beginning, right? But beginning is broader in meaning, right? So, there can be a beginning that is not a cause. Like, the point is the beginning of the line, not the cause of the line, right? So, there's some similarity between the first objections, but the first objection there, there's a tie-up with the, what, Arians, right? And the fact that they want to use the word metaphorically, only God, right? Because they don't want to admit that the word of God is God, right? He's a God-like thing, but, you know, just the highest of the creatures or something. He's divine. Augustine will say, God became man, so man might become God, right? Be careful. Don't you be mad. Let's look at the third objection. It's of the notion of the word or thought that it is said. But according to Augustine, not only is the Father understanding, but the Son and the Holy Spirit, right? Therefore, should they also be said to be saying something, right? To be said and so on, huh? This is a difficult objection, huh? To the third, it should be said that just as properly speaking, the word is said personally in God, huh? And not essentially, right? So also, speaking properly, strictly, right? To say. If I'm going to quote my poem again, right? I said, God the Father said it all in one word. No wonder when that word became a man. He spoke in words so few and said so much. He was the brevity and soul of wit. I'm saying God the Father said it, right? So it's something personal, right? Whence, just as word is not common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, so it is not true that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one what? What? Speaking, per se. Whence Augustine says in the seventh book of the Trinity, speaking by that, what, one co-eternal word, right? What's the nun in there for? It should be here. It should be here. Huh? Yeah. But he's trying to say that it's going to be understood, what? As unique, right? To one person, right? Yeah. But to be said, as opposed to say, right, belongs to each person, right? For that is said, not only the word is said, but the thing which is what? Understood or signified by the word, right? Okay. And I say, well, you said that. You said not only your words, but you said what the words be. Right? Watch out what you say. He said it. Thus, therefore, to one person alone, right, in God, does it belong to be said in the way in which a word is said, right? But in that way in which a thing understood in the word is said, right, it belongs to each person to be what? Said, right? For it is for the Father in understanding himself, right, and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and all the other things which are what? Contained in his knowledge, right? He concedes the word, right? He said it all. One word. So that thus, the whole trinity is said by the word, right? But in that one sense of which you can say it's said, right? Okay? I just said, I didn't say you could go. I just said the word you could go. The difference there, right? And also, every creature, right? Just as the understanding of man, by the word or thought that he concedes in understanding, right, says, in understanding stone, says the what? Stone, right? And some improperly, right, takes to speak, right, or to say, for to what? To understand, right, to understand, right, which nevertheless differ, right? For to understand implies only the relation of the one understanding to the thing, what? Understood. In which no notion of origin is implied, but only information, informing, right, in our understanding. In so far as our understanding comes to be an act through the form of the thing understood, huh? In God, however, it implies in every way identity, right? Because in God, all together is the same thing, the understanding and the, what? Understood. But to speak or to say implies chiefly a relation to the, what? Word conceived, huh? For is nothing other, to say or to speak is nothing other than to bring forth a word, huh? But by means of the word or thought implies a relation to the thing understood, which in the word brought forth is made manifest to the one, what? Understanding. Understanding. And thus, only the person who brings forth the word is speaking in God. So I say God the Father is the speaker of the house, right? No one else is speaking in that sense, huh? The sense of bringing forth the word, right? He's the only speaker. When, although each of the persons is, what? Understanding and, what? Understood. And consequently said by the, what? By the word, right? That's awful to think about there, huh? And that's that text that Thomas has from Hillary, huh? Ex verbis in ordinati prolatis. So from words disorder put forth, heresy is incurred, right? So until we can get into it, using the word dicere for interligere, huh? You say the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, each of them understands, but you say each of them speaks, and if each of them has a word, might give them one word or something, I don't know. It has some kind of radical thing in it. Now the fourth objection is taken from this text from Psalm 148, which you probably are familiar with, right? Okay. And that's where you're taking it figuratively, right? Metaphorically in particular. Insofar as what is signified or as an effect of the word is called a, what? Word, huh? Thus creatures are said to do the word of God insofar as they follow out some, what? Effect, right? To which they are ordered from the word conceived by divine wisdom, right? Just as someone is said to do the word of the king, right? He does the work to which he is instigated from the word of the, what? The king, huh? It's been accomplished, right? Where is my command? He said to the woman. Okay. Okay, should I look at the second article here now?