Prima Pars
Lecture 134: Word as the Son's Personal Name and Relation to Creatures

Transcript
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Whether word is the son's own name, right? To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that word is not the son's own name. For the son is a subsisting person in God. But word or thought does not signify a thing subsisting, as is clear in us, right? So my thought is not a what? Substance, it's not a hypostasis, it's not a person, right? Why, the son of God is a person, so how can the word be his name, right? Therefore, word cannot be the son's own name. Moreover, the word, by a certain carrying forth, proceeds from the one speaking. If, therefore, the son is properly a word, he does not proceed from the father except by way of what? But, see, pro-latio means what? Being carried forward, right? How do you translate that in English text? Pirates. What? Pirates. Pirates. Okay, but pro-latio, latio's got the word for what? Carrying, I think, and pro means forward, right? Brought forth, carried forward, right? Which is the heresy of Valentine, right? Okay. As is clear from Augustine in his book about heresy, well, we've got to watch ourselves there, right? Be very careful when you use the words. Moreover, every proper name of some person signifies something, what? Some property of it, huh? If, therefore, the word is the proper name of the son, it signifies some property of him. And, thus, there are more properties in God than those numbered above, right? And the five notions there, huh? Such an interesting objection. Moreover, whoever understands and understanding conceives a thought or word. But the son understands, therefore, of the son, there's another word. And, thus, it is not. Private to the son to be the word, huh? Moreover, it is said in Hebrews 1.3 about the son, carrying all by the, what? Word of his power, huh? From which Basil, it takes that the Holy Spirit, is the word of the son. It is not, therefore, private to the son to be the, what? Word, huh? Now, against all this nonsense is what Augustine says in the sixth book about the Trinity. That the word alone is taken for the son, right? Of course, you could go to the Gospel of St. John, right, huh? Because there is clear that the word of God is, what? The son of God, right? Look at the whole chapter there, right? So, as far as your authority is concerned, you could be clear in the Gospel of St. John, right? But, I'll go to the reason for this. The answer should be said, that word properly said in God, as opposed to metaphorically, is taken, what? Personally, yeah. And is the, what? Its own name, the proper name of the son, right? Of the person who is the son. For it signifies a certain, what? Emanation of the understanding. But the person who proceeds in God by the intellect, emanation of the intellect, is called the, what? Son. And this procession is called, what? Generation. And we're talking about the similarity there, the word concept, right, huh? Okay. Whence it remains that the son alone is properly called the word in God. Okay. So, Thomas talks about there being only three persons in God, right? He talks about they have to be distinguished by a proceeding that remains within the, what? God himself, right? Therefore, with an activity that remains within. There's only two kinds of activity that remains within God, right? And one is the act of the understanding, and the other is the act of the will, right? The loving, basically. And so, the one proceeds by way of God understanding himself, right? And that says where the son is God understood. And the other one proceeds by way of God loving himself, huh? So, if the word proceeds by way of understanding in the son, that same way, the same person, huh? Now, the first objection says, huh? It's a good place to begin, because you've got to start the fundamental objections, right? And get more subtle things. A thought in us is not a person, but... So, when St. John says, in the beginning was the logos, what does logos mean there? How would you translate that? Like, you translate a word, right? But it's a word in the sense of thought, right? So, it could also be translated in that context by saying, in the beginning was the thought. But our thoughts are not persons, how can God's thought be a person? Well, Thomas gives you something you have to understand from the fetus of the unity of God, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that in us, to be and to understand are not the same thing. And I've discovered that in my life. I can be without understanding something, right? And I have to struggle to understand things. And so, for me to be is not... By any means to understand. Whence that which has in us, understandable being, right? That's to say, being and understanding. Understanding. Does not pertain to our, what? Our nature, because it's not my being. But the to be of God is the same thing as his to understand. For God to be and to understand are the same thing. That's something. That's an interesting position to be in, so you say, right? For me to be is to understand. It's something. Whence the word or thought of God is not some what? Accident. In him, right? Or some effect of him, right? Because an effect would have a different existence than the cause, right? Okay? But it pertains to his very nature. And therefore, it's necessary that it be something subsisting, because whatever is in the nature of God subsists. And therefore, Damascene says that the word of God is, what? Substantiale. Substantial. Any being in a, what? Hypostasis. That's the person, individual substance, right? But the other words, the other thoughts, to wit, ours, are powers of the, what? Virtues of the, what? Soul, right? Accidents, right? So my thoughts are in me, but they're not me. Even my thought of myself is not me, is it? Even reason's definition of reason, right? Is not reason. It's a definition of what reason is, but it's not reason itself, right? So my reason conceives that it is a, what? Ability for a large discourse looking before and after. It is what formed a thought of by itself, a definition, in fact, of itself, right? It is what formed a thought of by itself, a definition, in fact, of itself, right? It is what formed a thought of by itself, a definition, in fact, of itself, right? But is that definition of reason, reason itself? And the being of reason is not the understanding of what reason is, any more than the being of reason is the understanding of what a triangle is. So my thoughts are not me, right? Not even my reason, let alone me. So that's my single objection, but Thomas, you know, starts with that. We're very human, Thomas, isn't it? That's right, when I was giving the little discourse there on Antony Messiah, right? That St. John there is speaking by Antony Messiah. He says, in the beginning was the word, in the beginning was the thought. Just like we call Aristotle the philosopher. So if you say Aristotle is a philosopher, are you speaking by Antony Messiah there? No. If you say he is the philosopher, then you seem to be what? But saying among all men, he is the philosopher, right? Look here, as Aristotle calls Homer, the poet, right? Or as Thomas calls St. Paul, the apostle, right? But one reason why it is the thought is it's the only thought that is a, what, substance or that is a person. It's only part of why it's the thought, right? But that by itself is impressive, isn't it? I've got thoughts, but none of them is a person. I have a son who's a person. I have a son who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person who's a person. Yeah, yeah. As Hillary refers to the sixth book of the Trinity, an account of the, what, various mode, right? The other mode of bringing forth, which they laid down, is as clear to Augustine the book of what heresies. We have to go into that to see what exactly the problem was there, right? But maybe they, what, were understanding the way he went forward as being, what, yeah, yeah, worried too much about the objection there. Now, what about property, huh? This wasn't one of the five notions before, right? So on. Now, Thomas says, to the third it should be said that in the name of the word or thought, the same property is implied, which is in the name, what? Son. Now, we saw a little bit of that with the word concept, right? Yes, dear. Yes, dear. Whence Augustine says, in the same way he's said to be, what? The word as son, right? For the nativity of the son, which is a, what, personal property of him, is signified by diverse names, which are attributed to the son, to expressing in diverse ways his perfections. If we can't find a name that brings out all the perfection of the son in his birth, right? For that he might be shown to be of the same nature as the father, he is called, what? Son. That he might be shown to be co-eternal, he's said to be splendid, because that seems to be simultaneous with the flame or with the light. That he might be shown to be altogether similar, he's called the image, huh? That he might be shown to be generated in an immaterial way, he's called the, what? Word, yeah. Give me the objection to saying that God is generated, because generation means something material, right? In our first use of the word, right? So he's not generated in that way, right? There cannot be found one name by which all these things are, what, designated, huh? So saying that he's the son, does that bring out that he's the immaterial way of this, like the word thought does? Interesting how St. John begins the gospel by talking about him as the, what, word shows he wants to bring out there. Now, what about the fourth objection here? The son understands, doesn't he have a thought? To the fourth it should be said. In that way belongs to the son to be understanding, in which it belongs to him to be, what? God, because God understands. Since to understand is said essentially in God, right? To understand and to be are the same thing in God, and to be and what he is are the same thing, right? But the son is, what, God-generated, not God-generating. When C is understanding, not as producing a word or thought, right? But he's understanding as the thought proceeding. Insofar as in God, the thought proceeding really does not differ from the divine, what, understanding. But by relation alone is it distinguished from the, what, principle? Remember that word for the Holy Spirit, right? I mean, for the Father, right? He's the principle of the word, right? That's what we understand, yeah. It was in the Father. Now, the fifth objection. When it is said of the Son, carrying all things by the, what, word of his power. Power. Thomas understands this, what, to be said figuratively, right? For the effect of the, what, word, right? Whence the gloss, huh? There it says that word is taken for, what, command, huh? Insofar as it is an effect of the power of the word, that things are, what, preserved in being, huh? Just as it is from the effect of the power of the word, that things are produced in being, huh? That basal understands verbum for the Holy Spirit, right? Improperly and figuratively is said, right? As word is said of someone, everything that is, what, manifestive, manifested in some way. And thus, for that reason, the Holy Spirit is called the word of the Son, because he, what, manifests the Son, right? But it's kind of a, what, improper and figurative use of the word, right, huh? You've got to watch these guys, huh? Let's take a little break here before we do the third article here. Let's take a little break here. Let's take a little break here. Let's take a little break here. Let's take a little break here. Let's take a little break here. Let's take a little break here. Let's take a little break here. Okay, the third article here. To the third one proceeds thus. It seems that in the name of the word or thought is not implied a respect or relation to creatures. Thomas is going to take that as a side, right? For every name connoting an effect in the creature is said essentially in God. But the word is not said essentially, but personally it has been said. Therefore the word does not imply respect to the creature. I think I've seen this article here because would you think of the word or the name son as implying a reference to the creature? No, the son seems to be a reference to the father, right? But the word, you're saying by the word everything you understand. And God, although he chiefly understands himself, nevertheless in understanding himself, he understands everything else, right? So in some way he says not only himself, but even creatures in his word, right? So then the question arises, well then is this word in some way, what? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Again, the word imago is said towards, what? The father, right? He's the image of the father, likeness of the father. In reference to the creatures, God is an exemplar, not an imago. Now what's the difference between an imago, or likeness, and an exemplar? Because they both have the idea of likeness, right? But the image is towards something that is the beginning, right? But the exemplar is what it is itself, is the beginning of. So I wouldn't think of the image as being the image of the creature, right? The image of the father. You could say he's the exemplar. I mean, that's not the name of the son. But the word, right, comes in. So it's kind of interesting, yeah. Moreover, those things that imply a relation to creatures are said of God in time, right? As Lord and what? Creator, right? So God is not said to be the creator until he's created, okay? But word is said of God from eternity. Therefore, it does not imply a, what, relation to the creature. Moreover, the word implies a relation to that from which it proceeds. If, therefore, it implies a relation to the creature, it would follow that it proceeds from the creature. Moreover, those ideas we talked about back in the treatise on the knowledge of God, right, are many according to diverse relations to creatures, huh? If, therefore, word implies a relation to the creature, it would follow that in God there's not only one word, but what? Many. Now, probably these can all be solved in some way by saying, well, the word is what? A word of God, right? Chiefly, right? And, but because God understands himself, understands everything else, then it has a kind of secondary way that's relation to the creatures, right? But it's chiefly of God, and therefore it proceeds only from him. Moreover, if the word implies a relation to the creature, this is not except insofar as the creatures are known by God, right? But God not only knows beings, but also what? None beings, right? Therefore, in the word, there'd be implied a relation, in a sense, to none beings, which would seem to be, what? False, huh? Now, against this is what Augustine says in the book on the edific questions. You know, it must be one of the edific questions. That in the name of word or thought is signified not only in relation to the Father, but also to those things which are, what? Yeah. By his operative power, right? Okay. Now, Thomas answers. I answer it should be said that in the word or thought is implied a, what? Relation to the creature. Why? Because God, in knowing himself, knows what? Yeah. That's what I say in my little poem there. God the Father said it all in one word. Not only himself, but teaches. For the word or thought conceived in the mind is representative, represents, everything that is understood in act. It's actually understood. Whence in us there are diverse thoughts, right? According as diverse things are understood. But because God, by one act, both himself and all other things, understands. The unique word, his unique word, is expressive not only of the Father, but also of the, what? Preachers. And just as the knowledge of God is a knowledge of God only, is only knowing God, it's not a knowledge of how to make God, right? But of creatures it is both knowing and what? Making. So the word of God, of that which is in God the Father, is expressive only, right? But of creatures it is both expressive and it operates there, right? And in account of this it is said in Psalm 32, he said, and they were, what? Made. This is in Genesis 2, I guess, let me guess that interprets it. Because in the word or thought is implied a thought that is, that makes those things that God makes, huh? That is, he maker of those things that God makes. That's how he's trying to say the fatila. I think from a right thing, you know, in the first, one way of dividing the four books in the sense that they're Lombard, the first two books are about God being the beginning of things, right? And the last two books about God being the end, right? The procession of things from God. But in the first of the first two books, right, he deals with these processions, right? And God himself and then the procession of creatures from God, right? But as Thomas explains there, the processions in God are before the procession of creatures from God. Not only in time or in duration, because they're eternal, why the creatures are not eternal, right? But also, they're a cause, right? So in a sense, the procession of the word from God, right, is in some way a cause of the procession of creatures from God. In a sense, God, it's like God's art, and it makes these things. But I suppose it's also going to be said about the Holy Spirit, right? Proceeding by way of love, right? So it's kind of interesting the way those things are tied up in the sentences, huh? One way of dividing it, huh? You divide the first two books, you get the last two books, right? as opposed to what Thomas does say in Summa Conte Gentiles, right? Where he has one book about God himself, one book about God is the beginning of things, and one book about God is the end of things, right? Well, Thomas kind of, I mean, in the sentences, God is the beginning of things, of creatures, that is to say, is put along with the processions in God himself. Why? Because of the relation between the two, that one is a cause of the other, right? And it's kind of anticipated here when you start to talk about the word being expressive and productive of what? Creatures, right? Now, the objection says, the first objection says, every name connoting an effect in creatures is said essentially, right? But word is said personally. That seems a good objection, right? Now, Thomas says, well, let's go back to the definition of person, right? Okay? To the first, therefore, it should be said that in the name of person is also included the nature, but oblique, right? Okay. What does that mean, oblique, right? Because you don't say that a person is the rational nature, but it's an individual substance of a rational nature, right? So, you say it's directly individual substance, right? But you do put in the definition there, right? Obliquely, the rational nature, right? Just like if you define the point as the end of a line, what end would be said directly, it's directly said to be an end, it's not said to be a line. But line is in the definition of point, right? If you use it as a definition of it. Obliquely, that's the way of speaking, right? It's supposed to be directly. In the name, therefore, of a divine person, as far as what? The personal relation, right? It does not imply respect to the creature, but it does imply it in that which pertains to what? The nature, right? For nothing prevents, insofar as what? His essence or nature is included in his meaning, right? That it implies respect to creatures. Just as it is proper to the sun that it be the sun, so it is proper to him that he be God, the generated God, right? Then you have the nature there, you say God, right? Or he is the generated creator. And in this way, there is implied relation to creature in the name of what? The word, huh? It's kind of a delicate thing that Thomas is doing there, right? Because he wants to admit the force of what? The objection that says, if you're going to talk about relation to creatures, you're talking about what's essential or the divine nature, right? So unless you're bringing the divine nature in some way into the, what, definition of the person, you don't want to have any respect to that, right? But if you take the, what he says, the personal relation as such, right? There's no relation to the creature, right? But just to the, what, one from whom one proceeds, huh? Okay, now the second thing is saying here, hey, if you have a relation to creatures in some way, that's going to be something, what? In time, right? Lord and creator, right? You can't be creator without the creature. The creature is in time, right? You can't be the Lord of the things he's made without those things being, right? But word is, what, something eternal, huh? In the beginning was the word, right? The first way that you should interpret that is the eternity of the word, right? I'm not saying in the beginning was the word, huh? To the second it should be said that since relations, right, follow upon actions, right? Let's say the relations that are involved here. Because there are other relations involved that follow upon quantity, right? Some names that imply a relation of God to creature, which follow upon an action that, what? Goes into exterior matter, right? As to create and to, what? Govern, right? And such are said of God, extemporaneous in time, right? But some, a relation which follows an action that does not go into exterior matter, but remains in the knower. As to, what? Know and to will, right? Now, the grammar there, right? You can go back and say, some names imply, right? Okay. A relation which follows upon action that is not, what? Not a transitive action, as you say in English, huh? Such as to know and to will. And such are not said of God from time, right? You know? So when did God choose me to be? Yeah, yeah. What's that text there, you know? I've loved you with an eternal love. Yeah, yeah. See? So, to choose is an action that remains within the, what? One choosing, right? You see? And so God did not choose me in time. After my mother and father met, then he chose me to be. No, he chose to be eternally, right? But did he eternally create my soul? No. After my mother and father prepared the body, he said, well, give me a soul for this body here. So he created my soul, poured it into that body, right? So I'm stuck with this body. That's what the blessed column of Armin had prepared for me. And such are not said of God in time, right? And this sort of relation to the creature is implied in the name of, what? Thought, right? Because to understand as such, right? Or to know is an activity that remains in the one understanding, the one, what? Knowing, right? Nor is it true that the names implying a relation to God, the creature, that all of them are said, what? In time, huh? But only those names which imply a relation, falling upon an action that goes out to exterior effects, huh? It's transitive, right? Those are said in time, huh? I think it's in English in time, but from time. Okay? So I'll bet. You have to see the distinction between an action that remains within the one doing, right? And one that has an exterior, what? Effect, right? Okay. Now, you know, in English, we can use the word doing to name both acts, right? But the action that has an exterior effect we call making. And the other one we call what? Yeah. Okay? Now, the reason why this keeps the common name, and this gets a new name, is because here there's nothing apart from doing. The understanding, or loving, or choosing. But here, there's something apart from the doing, namely this product, okay? So, understanding a theorem of Euclid, right? Apart from the understanding of the theorem of Euclid, what is there? Nothing. This is what I say. You're doing nothing. I'm doing something. I'm understanding what a triangle is, right? See? But in making a chair, right? Then apart from the making, there is a what? A chair, right? Okay? So, this is something in addition to the doing. And therefore, it gets a new name, right? But not something that makes it better than this, right? Because there are style of art that is doing, as opposed to making now, doing in that sense, is the perfection of the doer. Right? Okay? It's a perfection, or a perfecting, of the doer. But making is a perfecting of the, what? Doing. Of the made. Okay? Now, Aristotle talks about this in the Ninth Book of Wisdom. And he makes kind of that. there to ethics, where ethics is about the end of man, and does the end of man consist in this kind of activity, or this kind of activity? That'd be the first, right? Because that's the perfection of the doer, and here's the perfection of the thing made, right? Now, that's why in a sense we criticize Marx, right? Because Marx is seeing man's ultimate perfection in his making, and now in a sense Marx tries to overcome that, even though I may not be thinking, it's so explicit of the objection, but he says that man in transforming the world around him also transforms himself, right? And there is some truth to that, right? So I heard a carpenter saying, you know, he likes this job because he's learning something, right? You see? But still this is the fallacy of the accidental, because it's accidental that the maker is perfected by his making, just as I often said about teaching, right? It's accidental that the teacher is perfected by what? Teaching. Even though it might happen all the time that the teacher understands the matter better after he makes this effort of trying to explain to others, right? And we'll teach him, we'll say that, right? Unless you're teaching something that's extremely elementary, right? You know, we're just kind of, you know, repeating yourself ad nauseum, but if you have something profound like this, you're always seeing it a little bit better each time, right? But still it's accidental to teaching that that you don't understand what you're teaching. You see? And insofar, in your degree, you know, it's not, you're not a teacher insofar, you don't understand what you're talking about. Right? You see? So, it's still by happening that the teacher is perfected by his teaching, in the same way that the maker is perfected by his making, right? The cook, you know? If he knows how to make the meal, he doesn't learn how to make the meal by making it. Is that true? You know, that's what I talk about in politics now, you know, who's ready, you know, on day one is Hillary's saying, you know, she's going to be ready on day one. But probably nobody's ready on day one, do you think? She's ready on day one, even if they don't elect her. So, there's a real distinction between these two acts here, right? And so, it's God's understanding creatures, right? Or loving them, right? Which is, two kinds of acts is that, see? So, it's really this first kind of act, right? And so, it's the second kind of act that's implied when you say that God's, what, made universe, right? Or he made my soul, he created my soul, he created the universe, right? And that is the sense of God, in relation that comes upon this kind of activity, in time, right? And God is not a creator before the creature, and if the creature is in time, it didn't always exist, then God is said in time to be a creator. He had to say, well, how this could be done. But in the case of these others, God could, what, love the creature, right? Before the creature is. And he could choose me to be with my parents met, that's what I was saying, right? See? But he created my soul after my parents met, huh? So, he's the creator of my soul in time, but he's not the chooser of my soul. He's the chooser of me, in time. See? But still, you said he chose me, that seems to be, in some way, saying he's, what, related to me, right? Okay? Let's say that's a real relation, a relation of reason, but there is certainly a relation of some kind to me, right? But different from his relation that he has to me, because I'm related to him, really, from the fact that he created me, right? It's kind of a relation that Aristotle says, you know, that you have when you say that the knowable is relative to the knower, right? It's a relation of reason, right? The knower is really related to knowable, but the knowable is not. He's said to be knowable by the knower because of the relation in between them. Now, the third objection here says, moreover, the word implies a, what, relation to the one from whom it proceeds. If, therefore, it implies a respect to the creature and father, he proceeds from the creature, right? Thomas says that the creatures are not known by God by knowledge taken from the creatures. If it were, then they would be like his father, right? But to his very, what? Essence, yeah. Whence it is not necessary that the word proceed from creatures, although the word is expressive of the creatures, right? So you could say, you know, that the exterior object, in a sense, is the father of my, what, sensing, right, you know? Because my knowledge in some way proceeds from the exterior thing, but God's knowledge in no way proceeds from the exterior things. But the exterior things proceed from him. But the son really does proceed from the father. Yeah. Idea. The fourth objection. The fourth objection, simulating the word to the what? Ideas, right, huh? Okay. And there are many ideas, as Guston says, right? Thomas says, to the fourth it should be said that the name of idea is applied to God, like Guston does. Chiefly, it's placed upon things to signify what? Respect to creatures. Now there aren't many ideas really in God, right, huh? But God understands what? How this creature could be like him, and how that creature could be like him, and another way, and so on, right? So these are more understood, these relations by God, right, huh? And because the way in which the dog could be like God, and the way in which the tree could be like God, and the way in which the angel could be like God, it's all different, right? Then there are said to be many, what? Ideas of God, right, huh? And therefore pluralitary, right? Plurally. They are said in God, right? Nor is it personal, right? But the name of word or thought is chiefly imposed to signify the relation to the one saying it, right? And consequently to creatures, in so far as God, in understanding himself, understands every creature, right? And account to this, in God, there's uniquely only one word, there's only one understanding, right? And it is said personally, huh? You see the difference there between the ideas, right? And why there are said to be many ideas of God, right, huh? Because he understands the way in which each creature can be like him, right? And the way in which the angels like God is different from the way in which man is like God and the soul is like God, right? And the way in which this angel and this angel and the seraphim and the lower angels are like God is different, right? And so he understands these many ways, right? And those are said therefore to be many ideas, huh? But the word is what? To the one saying, to the one saying it, yeah. There's only one saying it, right? Because he said it all in one word. Now what about non-beings, right? In the way in which the knowledge, what? Of God is of non-beings, so the word of God is of what? Non-beings, right? Because there is nothing less in the word or thought of God than in the what? Knowledge of God. So we go back to the knowledge of God. Does he know things that he never makes? Yeah. But he could make, right? Okay. So does his word then express those things too? Yeah. But it's not factiva, it's not productive of those things that he chooses not to make, right? But nevertheless, the word is of beings, right? Things that are at some time, rather, both expressive and productive of them, right? But of non-beings, it is only what? Expressive and manifest in them, right? But it's not productive of them. So, the next word would be imagini, right? Better stop now. But notice how there's a connection there between the son is the image of the father, right? And the word is kind of like this So, what's the word of? It kind of follows naturally upon those two, right? But in particular, it goes back to this, what? Text, St. Paul there. Is he quoted here? He quoted somewhere. Which one? No, here it is, Colossians. Yeah, it's quoted in the next one by the article. Colossians 1.15. Qui est imago de invisibilis, right? He's argued that it's property. Let's go. Let's go. Let's go. Let's go. Let's go.