Prima Pars
Lecture 135: Image as a Personal Name in God

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In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas and John Doctor, help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Just a word here about the words, huh? In English, we have the word think, and thinking, of course, and then the word thought. So when my reason thinks about something, right? Especially when I think it out, there proceeds from my mind a what? Thought, huh? The thought is not the same thing as the thinking, huh? It's like the inna of the thinking, huh? Now to some extent, you have something like that to imagine, right? And then you have the image, right? So when I imagine a gold mountain, there proceeds from my imagination an image of a gold mountain, huh? And so these two are similar. St. Thomas explains how the Arab philosophers, right, sometimes call this here, imagining through the intellect, right? Now, of course, in English, to imagine is something other than to a thing. But they're very similar, and they're sometimes used interchangeably. So, I think that's so. I imagine that's so. I'll say, right? And we've talked before here, I think, about how Aristotle in the third book, huh, about the soul, distinguishes between thinking and imagining, huh? Okay? And there's many ways he distinguishes between those two. And one way that we mentioned was that you can, what? Imagine something without having any reason to do so. Like, I can imagine that gold mountain, right? But I can't think that something is so without having some reason for thinking something is so. But there are more subtle differences between thinking and imagining and so on. Now, could we say that God thinks? And what does God think of? Well, he thinks chiefly and first only of himself. That sounds selfish. He thinks chiefly and first only of himself. But in thinking of himself, he, in a way, thinks about everything, huh? Because he is the cause of everything else. And everything else, insofar as it is, is in some way like him who is being itself. Well, now, in Latin, in Thomas' Latin there, do you have these two? Where they're etymologically, you know, related to think and the thought, just like to imagine an image, or etymologically related? So what does Thomas call that thought? Verbum, yeah. Could have a verb for me to have to use, to verbalize. But they don't actually use to verbalize, they have more to say, right? Teacher, right? And perhaps it's something like that in Greek, too, you know? The word for Greek, the Greek word here is logos, and it's related to the word to legate, not to speak, huh? More than to the word to what? To think, huh? Now, I think you mentioned before how, um, Augustine's definition of to believe, right? And in Latin would be, uh, cogitare, cum, uh, sensiom, something like that. And I think the way to translate cogitare here is what? Yeah. Yeah. So it's to think, well, ascenti, right? Or with ascent. And sometimes they turn around and say, ascentiare, huh? Cum cogitazione, to consent. But again, the word cogitare, if you take that as kind of a synonym for it to think, cogitatum is more of that which is thought of, it's not a thought, right? Cogitatio, that's more of the activity of it, you know? You've got to be a little careful because sometimes, uh, in English, especially the word thinking, we, what, contrast thinking with, what, knowing. Do you know that so-and-so's been in the election? No, but I, I think he is, right? Okay. And in that case, you wouldn't speak of God as thinking, right? Because thinking would imply something, what? Yeah, yeah. But, um, again, going back, though, to what we've talked here about equivocal words, huh? So, you could divide thinking into, uh, thinking in the sense I just spoke of, which is contrasted with knowing, right? But knowing could still be said to be thinking in the broad sense, right? Like, I know that two is half of four. Do I think that two is half of four? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, in some sense, you could say that God thinks, right? But Thomas will say, you know, you shouldn't use the word cogitari for God, right? Because that implies kind of emotion towards understanding, huh? And in English, especially the word thinking tends to imply, right? Um, I'm thinking about this, but you understand it? Well, no, but I'm thinking about it. So, thinking is kind of emotion towards understanding, right? Well, it's kind of interesting, perhaps, after we think about it more, but in English, that we have this connection between to think and thought in Latin and in, uh, maybe Greek. The word for thought is, what, verbum or logos, huh? And they don't have a verb form corresponding to them, so it's a superiority of English in one respect, eh? Now, when Thomas contrasts the proceeding of the Holy Spirit with the proceeding of the Son, if the Son proceeds as the word or thought of the Father, right, of himself, then the Son proceeds as a, what, likeness, huh? This might be an English translation of Imago, as a likeness of the Father, right? But a likeness that is so close that it is, in fact, God, right? And, he was now speaking English here for a bit. He said that, uh, God thinks of himself, and therefore he has a thought of himself, and that thought exists in his, what, thinking, right? But his thinking is his being. There's no difference between God's being and his doing, huh? So if the thinking of God is the being of God, then the being of the thought of God is the being of God himself, and therefore the thought must be God himself, huh? But his, a thought, in that sense, proceeds as a likeness of what you're thinking of. And likewise, you go back to nature, right? The other name, where he's called Son, right? The Son proceeds as a, what, likeness of the Father, right? Okay? So in a sense, this imaginee is kind of, uh, almost a draw conclusion, right? If he's the Son of God, in that strict sense, right, then he's the imago of God, right? And if he's the thought of God, which God has of himself, then he's also the likeness of God, the image of God, right? That's why this comes last, right? But the Holy Spirit doesn't proceed as a likeness, right? He proceeds by way of, what, love, right? And again, he's like God, but not because he precedes as love, but because he precedes as divine love. And the loving of God is like his thinking or understanding, his being, and therefore he is God. So, let's look now at the first article here, on the Imaginary. To the first, then, okay, then we're not to seek or ask about the image, the likeness. And about this, two things are asked. First, whether likeness is said in God personally, as opposed to essentially, right? And secondly, whether it's proper or private to the, what, son. Now, to the first, one precedes thus. It seems that imago is not said personally in God. For Augustine says, in the book on faith to Peter, one is the, what, image. One is the divinity of the Holy Trinity, and the image to which man is, what, made. Therefore, the image is said essentially and not personally. In some way, we are, what? But because we're in a perfect image of him, we're said to be made to the image, right? Sometimes in scriptures. Well, that Thomas answers his own objection. On the trip there, I was reading D.D. Potencia. The question is just D.D. Potencia. And there's, you know, ten questions there with a number of articles under each question. And there's a question on the proceedings, right? And there's a question on the relations, and a question on the persons, right? So the last three questions are really kind of the same material. But do we have, you know, sometimes you have as many as 25 objections. So Thomas has cut this down for a beginner, right? I was sitting in the airport there waiting for the last flight, because it was a bumpy flight. We went from El Paso, Elbuquerque, Elbuquerque, to Elbuquerque. I was sitting there with my little computer there and going through the 25 objections. I never got to the body article that flight took out. But that's too much for a beginner's sake. Moreover, Hillary says in the book on the synods, and those I guess on the councils, right? That the image is to the thing to which it is imagined a, what, species or form that in no way differs, huh? But species or form in God is said essentially. See, at the end of the epistle of St. Paul, when he's in the form of God, right? How'd you solve that objection? This one? Yeah. I'm looking at it. So what strikes me is that the likeness, though, is said to be a likeness of something, right? By form is said more, what? Absolutely, right? Of course, what's said personally is got the idea of relation in it. Moreover, image is said from, what? Imitando, right? Aristóteles says in the book on the Poetic Art, that man is the most imitative of the, what? Animals. And we naturally delight in imitations. And at first we are, what? We learn by imitation. Imitation is a good word, huh? So in the definition of tragedy and so on, the first word is imitation, right? It's imitation of a course of action that is serious, etc., etc. In which is implied, he says, a before and after, right? Just like, you know, my statue of me is a, what? A likeness of me, right? Something posterior to me. The statue of George Washington is a likeness of George Washington. But in the divine persons, there is nothing, what? Let's go back to the Athanasian Creed, where it's an explicit, it doesn't say the Athanasian Creed, but it's an Athanasian Creed. There's no before and after. Therefore, image is not, cannot be a personal name in, what? God. You need a before and after there. But against all this is what Augustine says. This is in the Deuteronomy Tante, Book 7. What is more absurd than to say that image is, what, said to itself, huh? Well, I'd say is the opposite of what? To another, right? It's one of those, I'd say is a little bit like, what, one of those misleading, affirmative ways of saying something, what, negative, right? So to say, I'd say is to say, not to another, right? Or to be said absolutely in this other way of speaking. So it's much more absurd than to say that it's absolute rather than towards another. Therefore, image is said in divine things relatively, and thus it is a personal name, right? Incidentally, when I was reading, I think it was in the Potentia, and now we've got to determine the thing, as Augustine has done it, right? It's very explicit, you know, about referring to Augustine as his master. Okay, Thomas says, I answer, it should be said that of the notion that image is, what, likeness, huh? You see, in English, how do you translate imago? Yeah, yeah. But the native English were to be more likeness, huh? So, you know, when you're trying to translate the Book of the Poetic Arts, say, you say, the genus in tragedy or comedy is that, say, what? Well, in the translations, they'll have imitation, right? It's an imitation of, but the word imitation has been degraded, the word, in English, because of our commercial customs, I suppose, right? So, what an imitation is, is a cheap or inferior likeness, huh? Of course, Aristotle says that the poet can represent men as they are, or he can represent them as they are thought to be, or he can represent them as they should be, and so the imitation might be, what, actually an improvement, right? So, if you translate the definition of these things by saying it's a, what, imitation, maybe that's not the best word to use in English, at least today, right? So, usually I translate it as a, what, likeness, huh? Now, Thomas is using the word similitudal, right? But image is going to be more exact word and meaning than likeness, as he's going to go on to explain, right? And not just any likeness, he says, right? Suffices for the notion of image, huh? Okay? So, you've got to be careful when you use the word likeness as a translation of image, but that's the word that we have in English to translate it by, right? But a likeness, which is, what, in the form of the thing, or at least in some sign of the, what, species? And then Thomas uses the standard example he uses to bring this out, right? So, if you have a piece of paper that has the skin color of a man, you don't call that a likeness of man, do you? But if it has, say, the shape of a man, then that's, at least, a, what, sign of the species, right? Or if it has the shape of a dog, then it's a likeness or image of a dog. Well, he says, the size of the species and body of things most of all seems to be their, what, figure or shape. For we see that of diverse animals and species, there are diverse figures. For we see that of diverse animals and species, there are diverse animals and species, there are diverse animals and species, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are diverse animals, there are Not, however, diverse what? Colors, right? So a cat or a dog might have the same color or something, but you distinguish them really by their what? Shape, form, yeah. So you talk about the senses, huh? There's one text there where President Petitreus is talking about the road from senses into reason, and he singles out what? What do the five senses? Well, in one text they do that, yeah. Because there's the senses of learning from another or from yourself or by yourself. But in this other text he uses touch and sight, right? Now, sometimes we point out a certain excellence in sight over the other senses due to its clarity and the sense of touch because of its certitude. But together, what such touch and sight have is that they're the only senses that know the shape of something. So I can know the shape of this glass with my eyes and also I can feel the shape of it, right? And the shape or figure is so important in what? Identifying, right? How do I know this is a chair and not a bit? Was it by its color? No, it's by its shape, right? But only my touch and my sight know the shape of things. So it's interesting that he singles out those two senses. Sometimes they'll talk about the particular likeness of these or excellence of these individual senses, right? So the doubting Thomas, he wants to put his hand to the sight of our Lord, right? And then he'll believe, right? He'll trust his touch more than his sight. This is the touch tone asserted to it now, the sense of touch. But then the sight has the other excellence of being more sharp or clear in other senses. But together, they both know what shape or form. So this is a common example of Thomas using, I see him using many different texts when he talks about this. For a sign of the species and body of things most of all seems to be their figure, their shape. For we see that of diverse animals and species there are diverse figures, but not diverse colors, right? Whence, if one depicts the color of a thing on the wall, it is not said to be a, what, image or likeness of it, unless one depicts the, what, figure, the shape. But neither does the, what, likeness of the species suffice or the figure, but there's required for the notion of image the idea of origin, right? Because as Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions, one egg is not a, what, image of another. Because it is not expressed from that. So you buy a dozen of eggs, you look in and see they're not broken, that's what he would do. And is one an image of the other? One likeness of the other? Which you might say about somebody's son, that he's an image of his father or his mother or something, huh? And I think that's somewhat implied in the English word likeness, right? To say that this is a likeness of that implies that somehow it's, what, not just like it, but it was, that's original and this is, what, from it, yeah. Yeah. Is it applied to the English word likeness? Just like in the word imitation, right? It's implied likeness, maybe likeness in something that's specific to the thing, right? But also derived in some way from that, right? Okay? So the original baby's ice cream order is, and then he has another cheaper, less expensive imitation, right? Which may not be quite as good as the original. But that's the original, right? Yes. So if you buy parts, it isn't the original equipment, and it's, but this one's just like it. Yeah. And then they'll put the word just, and they're just like it. Yeah. I know some of these products, you know. A lot of times original is the best one, you know, and they make all these varieties, so it tastes as good as original. Sometimes you can't find the original one. You've got so many, you know, barbecue chips. Finally had to go to Dave's Barbecue down there and help toss it with the kids out and so on. And, you know, they bring in, like, a six-pack with six different barbecue sauces so you can try them all, you know. How hot you want them or how you want them. Of course, it really tastes good the first one you eat with the barbecue sauce, but after that you can't taste it. You can't taste it. You can't taste it. Your tongue is turned out. Okay, so Augustine says, and notice how good his example is there, right? One egg is not the... They do look very much alike, huh? Eggs do. But to this, that something be truly an image, right, is required that it, what, proceeds from another, right? You've got the idea of proceeding from another, right? Like to it in species, or at least in a sign of the species, like the shape of the animal is a sign of that species or kind of animal. So once you understand what an image is, right, then you see that what? It's going to pertain personally, right? Because those things which imply a precession or origin in divine things are what? Personal, right? Is that conventional? Whence this name, image, is a what? Personal name, huh? I'm really struck here by this word, proceeding name. Just go back to that for a moment there. You know, in the 10th question of the De Potencia, right, Thomas takes up, I think, the first article, with the word proceeding, procession, should be used in God, right? They can speak of proceeding in God, right? And again, going back to the language here a bit, how should you translate that word, right? Proceeding, right? Well, sometimes you translate it to be transliterate from the Latin into English. And it kind of strikes me, you know, in my work in graduate school, Monsignor Dion was speaking of the three ways of proceeding, right? Distinction of the three ways of proceeding. And it's starting in a text of Thomas where he speaks of the modus proce din, right? And it's a particular text there in the second book of wisdom where Aristotle's talking about the modus proce d'ende in each science is somewhat different, huh? And it has to fit the matter, the subject of that science. And Aristotle says, we shouldn't try to do two things at the same time. So we shouldn't try at the same time to acquire a science and to, what, learn the modus proce d'ende. Well, then, which should be learned first? Now, how is modus proce d'ende translated into English, right? Well, you could do it very much as transliterate the way modus proceeding. But generally, we tend to substitute for the word modus, the word way, right? Which, etnologically, is not exactly the same. Modus is related to the measure, right? And the Greek has the word tropos. What we said is translate this, halfway, way of what? Proceeding. Well, then, that text here, Thomas says, yeah, but he says there's the mode of proceeding that is proper or private to this science, right? But then there's the common way of proceeding, which is studied in, what, logic, right? Okay? So in logic, we study the common way of going forward and reasoned out now. In the beginning of geometry, we learn the private way of proceeding in geometry. And Thomas says, well, just as Aristotle says, you have to know the way of proceeding in geometry before you can acquire geometry. So you've got to acquire logic, which is about the common way. Which is about the common way. of proceeding before all the other sciences so logic comes first in the order of what of learning and then much indian came into class and he says okay and he was thinking of what then the natural way of going forward right now if you wanted to translate or proceeding more into a native english word what would be the translation going forward i think is the way to translate uh the way of going forward the way of going forward it's kind of stretching how this word therefore is very much in my mind in this context of dianne and see dianne's distinction of the three ways of going forward right the three ways of proceeding but in the text from the 10th question of the on the holiday de potencia thomas talks about this word some more right and he makes a very interesting point and maybe a little more precise point and that is the more general principle that he gives in the beginning of the fifth book of wisdom that we name things as we know them right and since our knowledge begins with our senses right then we name what can be sensed always first right and then we carry names over what can be sensed to things that are less able to be sensed and then eventually things that cannot be sensed right you can see this through all of our words but in this particular texture in the 10th question he points out something more precise there about what we sense right and he talks about the continuous and how all these words that carried over start from the continuous or something of the continuous right okay and so this word going forward it goes back to the continuous the first meaning of coming and going is what locomotion which is the most continuous of the kinds of change it's more continuous and growth and obviously more continuous than becoming hot or something like that huh and so we carry this word over right but in the use of this word here in moncy dion's distinction there and in thomas's distinction you're already moved the word to something that is what not bodily at all right not something material at all the way in which your mind goes forward right so kind of in between that first meaning of going forward right where i'm going forward now and then you apply it to my mind going forward right i mean i learned the the definitions in euclid there right right and the postulates right and the axioms and then i go forward from that to some conclusions and i go forward from those conclusions something further right okay and this is more like my walking forward right but eventually this word is carried all the way over and applied to god right and that's in scripture right because we do speak you know in the gospel of saint john as the holy spirit proceeding from the father and so on right okay but um once you go back to something continuous to start right notice in the in the text there the talking about the word form there right the first meaning of form is shape right and shape is the limit of the what or limits of the continuous right so that's the way these things are what named okay that's just kind of you know coming back to what you say here at the end of the body of the article those things which imply a what going forth right or origin in god are personal right that's the way the relations right are distinguished the persons are distinguished by the relations and the relations are based upon this one going forward from that one right once the name image is a personal name because it implies not only a likeness but a likeness in something specific right and the likeness to an original if i could say the father is the original god you gotta be careful about that because the son is the same god as the father right now okay but the son is like the father and having the very same nature individually that the father has right but he has it from the father i see a text there i think it was in there i was reading some things from on the trinity in the sentences too and uh thomas says uh the divine nature is not in the the father and the son of the holy spirit in the same way that's kind of interesting thing to say he says the divine nature is in the father not from another the divine nature is in the son from the father and the divine nature is in the holy spirit from the father and the son so in one way you could say yeah that the divine nature is not in the father the son the holy spirit in in the same way you gotta be careful about the way he's speaking but it struck me very much the way he says these things you read you know the different places it's taken up you know like in the mario edition i give you a cross for instance but uh sometimes you'll say a little different in one place than another they sound interesting now let's look at the first objection right this goes back to the fact that uh man said to be made to the image and likeness of god and so on to the first therefore it should be said that image is properly said what goes forward to the likeness of another now that whose likeness something proceeds properly is called a what exemplar improperly a what image thus however augustine uses the name of image when he says that the divinity of the holy trinity is the image to which god is what or to which man is made the text is saying that you are made to the what image of god meaning that you're made like god right but thomas says that's not really the proper way of using the word i was correcting the dust in here a little bit right but we call that the exemplar right just all talks about when he talks about the second kind of cause right it says it's a form in the exemplar right but the exemplar is an extrinsic form right that you imitate in making something right okay we see sometimes a famous painting and someone what makes a copy of that painting right so that's kind of a exemplar right so god is more the exemplar according to which we are what fashion yeah rather than the likeness because likeness implies that that we'd be the original right yeah isn't saint augustine i'm using the the words of scripture the word let us make man in our image yeah yeah so if saint augustine is using the words of scripture yeah is saint thomas saying that um the sacred writers said let us make man as our i don't know well it might be that the scripture is saying you know this is the image in the sense of of likeness right but even the word likeness you have to be kind of careful because even in english the word likeness kind of implies that but uh you're like something that originally had this right okay but maybe scripture is merely means to say that we are being made what like god right we're being made to his likeness that's to say we're being made like god right okay so maybe it's a weaker word i don't think what the hebrew word is what it is there you know yeah now would you just get the divine nature is a The likeness of our soul, that would seem to be improper, right, because when it implied it almost that our soul was original, but you say our soul is made in the likeness of God, right? It's interesting, one of the Eastern fathers, Abraham, uses that, kind of extends that comparison if we say we're the image of God, the likeness of God, and he says, so God had man in his thought, and then he made it, and then man had God in his thought, so we became like God, because now we have God, so in a way it's comparable to, but obviously it's a big difference. It's interesting, because I was thinking, you know, I was teaching a love and friendship course here at my house, these people come Wednesday night, and, you know, the two main causes of love are the good as known, and then likeness, right? Now, when we see God as he is, right, we'll love him more than we did in this life, for both of these reasons, right? Because in seeing God as he is, we'll see that he's goodness itself, and therefore the goodness of God will be known in a way it wasn't known in this life, and that will cause us to love him more than we could love him in this life. But in the text where St. John there, where it's 1, 3, 2, something like that, 1st epistle, 3rd chapter, 2nd verse, something like that, that when he appears, we shall, what? We shall be like him, he says, because we shall know him as he is. It's interesting that St. John there says we shall be like him, and he gives you this reason for that, or that we will know him as he is. But when you study, how is it you can see God and know him as he is? Well, only by having your mind joined to God as that by which you see him as he is, right? So you'll be more like God when you see him as he is for two reasons, right? Because God sees himself as he is. Well, in this life we don't see God as he is. But God sees himself as he is, through himself, as the understandable form by which he sees himself. And we're going to see him as he is, through God himself, as the understandable form by which our mind sees him. So that's the second way in which we will be, what, like him, huh? So if likeness is the second cause of love, the first being that good is known, then we're going to be more like God than we could be in this life, right, in those two ways. And therefore, being more like him in those two ways, we will love him more than we could have loved him in this life. It could have sounded similar. Then, you see, God, we shall know, we shall know as we are known. Yeah, yeah. It's a compliment. Yeah. Going in last night, I was reading a little bit of a note there in Kittredge on Hamlet, you know, as a reference to Leith, to the river that you bathe in, you know, in the Greek mythology, and then you forget about this world. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I said, well, it's not so far away from it. It's going to take place, right? I don't think we're going to remember all these silly things in this life much. Once we see God, we're going to be, let's just say, distracted. We'll be occupied. Yeah, yeah, yeah. We'll be occupied. We won't think about this life anymore, I don't think. Yeah. Or election 2008. Yeah, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no The form's out. So anyway, no, let's get off the kitchen. It may be a little problem with the grammar going back to the question there, you know. We are said to be made to the image and likeness of God, right? Are you calling Him the image or likeness that we are being modeled after, you see? And it seems kind of improper to say He's... Or you try to talk about what's the result of our assimilation here, right? We're being made like Him, right? But, you know, in my father's factory there, he used to make farm wagons. They'd come down and order from the office for a number 500 wagon. Well, there were patterns on the wall there, and they would cut the wood according to those patterns, right? But those are like kind of the exemplars, and you imitated them down here, right? But we might use the word, you know, that's a likeness for what you're going to make, right? You've got to be kind of careful about the word likeness, right? Because it more indicates, what? That you're not the original, right? Obviously, God is original in comparison to man. Now, to the second it should be said, this is the objection from Hillary, right? That the species, insofar as it's placed by Hillary, the definition of image, implies a form deduced in another, from another, right? And in this way, image is said to be the, what? Species of another, just as that, yeah. Just as that which is likened to another is said to be its, what? Form. Insofar as there's a form like to that, huh? Well, it's kind of implied, what Hillary says there. He says, ad quam, right? To which, huh? It's not just species indifference, right? But you might say, you know, that the statue is that which has the form of another, right? Was it just a form? No, you're kind of implying that it's the form of what? Of another, right? It's been derived in some way from that, huh? Now, the third objection, Thomas says simply that imitation in God, in divine persons, does not signify afterwards, being after, but only what? Likeness, huh? Now, sometimes Thomas will solve those by saying that you don't really have one before another, but you do have one from another, right? So you can say that, you know, God from God, light from light, true God from true God. Don't say God after God, light after light, you know? He's the word from, huh? And Augustine, you know, you'll meet this later on, I think. You know, Augustine will speak of the ordo natura, right? And Thomas will say, what does ordo natura mean? He means one from another, right? Not one after another, right? But when you're looking before and after, right? In God, you have to, what? Proceed negatively. When Thomas would show that there's no before and after in God, he would usually show that the four central senses of before that Aristotle gives in the categories. And no one of those senses is the father before the son, or the father and son before the Holy Spirit. Now, if it's a personal name, is it proper to the, what, son?