Prima Pars
Lecture 139: Love and Gift as Personal Names of the Holy Spirit

Transcript
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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas and John Donahue. And help us to understand what you've written. Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. So we're getting to the second name here of the Holy Spirit, which is love. This is question 37, article 1. Then one asks about the name of love. And about this two things are asked. One, whether this is the proper name of the Holy Spirit. And secondly, whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit. I think that's often misunderstood what that second thing means. In what sense it is true that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit. Let's look at the first article. To the first one goes forward thus. It seems that love is not the Holy Spirit's own name. For Augustine says in the 15th book about the Trinity, I know not why that just as wisdom is said, what? The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And the three of them, and all of them together, not three, but one wisdom. Not also one would say that charity or love is said to be the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And all together are one, what? As if this is something, what? Essential, right? And if we're pertaining to the one divine nature, the one common to the three, huh? Rather than being a name that's private to the Holy Spirit. But no name that is said of each person and about all of them in general is a name that is proper to one person or private to one person. Therefore, this name love is not the Holy Spirit's private or own name, huh? Of course, you know, it's hard to name the Holy Spirit, so we'll see what happens. Moreover, the Holy Spirit is a subsisting person. But love does not signify as a subsisting person. But as an action going forth from the one loving to the one, what? Loved. Or into the one loved. Therefore, love is not the name of the Holy Spirit, who is obviously a person, right? It's a subsisting person. Moreover, love is the connection of those loving. Because according to Dionysius, it is a power that unifies or unites, huh? When Thomas takes up love there in the Prima Secundae, that's the first effect of love, to unite, huh? But a connection or connection is a middle between those whom it, what? Unites. Not something proceeding from them. Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit goes forward from the Father and the Son, as we saw in the previous question, it seems that it is not the love or the connection of the Father and the Son. Moreover, of any one loving, there is some love. But the Holy Spirit is loving. Therefore, he has some love. There is some love with him. If, therefore, the Holy Spirit is love, he will be the love of love, and spirit from his spirit. Which is unfitting, huh? It doesn't fit with the rest of these things, huh? So are you all convinced now that he should not be called love? But against this is what Gregory, I assume Gregory the Great, says in his homily in Pentecost, that the Holy Spirit is love, huh? Ipse Spiritus Sanctus est Amor, huh? I don't know, what's he going to do with this, I wonder. But Thomas begins with a distinction, huh? I answer it should be said that the name of love in God can be taken in two ways, huh? Both essentially and as a person, huh? Personally. And according as it is taken personally, it is the Holy Spirit's own name, huh? Proper name. Just as word is the private name of the Son, right? Well, Thomas will often say that verbum is never taken really essentially in God, huh? But love is taken both essentially and personally. To the evidence of this, it should be known, huh, that in, it's a funny way of speaking, in divinis, huh, in divine things, huh, divine matter, shall we say, right? This has been shown above. There are two processions, two going forwards, huh? One by way of the understanding, which is the going forward of the word, thought, huh? So just like when I imagine something that goes forward in me, an image, right, of what I imagine. So likewise, when I think of something that goes forward from me, a thought of what I'm thinking about. And so there's something like this in God, huh? The going forward of the word, the thought, the mental word. And another going forward by way of the will, which is the going forward of love, huh? Now, because the first is more known to us, huh, to signifying the things, bigger things that pertain to it, or which can be considered in it, we have found more, what, their own names, huh? Not, however, in the going forward of the will, right? I'm always going back to the example of Aristotle there in the Nicomachean Ethics, right? Or even in philosophy, we find that some things don't have a name. And Aristotle is teaching in Nicomachean Ethics that moral virtue is a habit between two extremes, one of which is an excess, one of which is a defect, huh? And so he talks about courage. He'll talk about foolhardiness, which is an excess. And then he'll talk about cowardice, which is falling short, huh? And then he gets to temperance, right? And you have the excess of names, like gluttony and lust and so on, but the defect doesn't seem to have any name. And Aristotle says, this is because it's so rare, right? And so we have to, if you want to give it a name, we have to invent a name, right? And so he invents a name and says, you know, lacking in sensation, huh? Okay? So if you don't take any delight in candy or something, you know, it's because you don't have any sense of, sense of seeds, huh? So this is a problem with the, what? Holy Spirit, right? We saw that in talking about the name, is there a name of the going forward of the Holy Spirit? No. But there is a name for the going forward of the, of the son, right? Generation and so on. Whence we use certain, what? Certain locutions, huh? To signifying the person, what? Going forward, right? And relations which are taken according to this going forward, we name by the names of procession and of, what? Breathing, right? Which nevertheless are more names of origin than of the relation, according to what is proper to the vocabulary there. But nevertheless, in a like way, one is able to consider both processions. For just as from this, that someone understands something, there goes forward a certain conception, understandable conception, the thing understood in the one understanding, which is called the, what? Word, or the logos in Greek, right? But we have the word thought. So also from this, that someone loves some things, there goes forward a certain impression, if I can speak so, of the thing loved in the affection of the one loving, according as the loved is said to be in the one loving. Amen. Amen. It's interesting that we use that word impression today even in talking about romantic love, right? So you say to somebody, you made a big impression on her. Or she made a big impression on you, right? So somehow he or she who's loved has made an impression upon your heart, impressed into your heart, so to speak. And according to this, he says, the loved is said to be in the one loving, just as the understood is in the one, what, understanding. And thus it is that when someone understands himself, right, and loves himself, there is in him not only the identity of the thing, the thing is itself, right, but also as he understood in the one understanding and the loved in the one, what, loving, right? So when my reason understands what reason is and forms a definition or thought of reason, then not only is reason reason, but there's a reason, a what, thought of what reason is. And then there's going to be something loved there, right? And you realize what a wonderful thing reason is. But on the side of the understanding, there are words found to signifying the respect or relation to the one understanding, to the thing understood, as in this word that I use, and it's the Latin word there, intelligere, right? And there are other words found to signifying the going forward of the intellectual concept, namely to say and word, right? So notice he's saying there's a difference between saying I understand something and I say something, right? Because when I say I understand something, then it notifies or names or signifies the relation of the one understanding to the thing understood, right? But when I say I said something, then there's a relation to the word that goes forward from the speaker, the one who's saying something, huh? And then he says, whence in divine things, to understand is said only, what? Essentially. Because it does not imply a relation to the thought or word going forward, huh? But word, or verbum, is said personally. Because it signifies that which goes forward, huh? And to say, dichre, right? It said, notionality, right? It refers to the, what? Relations of persons, yeah. Because it implies the relation of the beginning of the word, right? Meaning that from which the word proceeds to the word itself, right? So sometimes, and I don't know how reverend I am when I say this, but I call God the Father the speaker of the house. That's a foreign subject of our politics, right? He's the speaker of the house of God, right? But now, on the side of love, you don't have the same multiplicity of words, right? On the side of the will, beside the word to love, right? At Amare. I know this isn't lacking, you've got two words there, right? But he's talking about the same thing with these two words. But sometimes Amare is used more for the sense love, right? I love to be used for the love of the will too. And deligere, and especially the word dilexio, right? Which comes from the word for choice, for chosen love, right? The love of the will. But here he's using them kind of synonyms on the other. On the side of the will, apart from to love, which implies the, what? Relation of the one loving to the one, to the thing loved, there are not some words laid down which imply the relation of the, what? Impression or affection of the thing loved, which comes about in the one loving from the fact that it loves, but signifying its relation to its, what? Beginning, right? Or the verse. And therefore, on account of the, what? The poverty, you might say, the words, huh? These relations we signify by the words of love. And it's two words again in Latin, huh? You've probably seen this book of C.S. Lewis's, The Four Loves. He's talking about four different words in Greek and how the Greeks have more words maybe to name these things, huh? So you have eros, which names a very sensual love, and then you have philia, which names, what? The kind of love you have in friendship, maybe. And storge, the love you have for your children or something of that sort. And then agape, which, you know, we translate as charity, right? But we don't have, like, that variety in, what? English, right? Now, in Latin, at least they had amor, which in a way corresponds to eros, and that's why when you say amorous, you kind of think of that. And then adelexio, right? But in English, we don't have those two, right? And so, so I just mentioned the text here, the Greek, the Latin text, you have these two words of amorous etelexio, they're in the genitive there. And this would be as if we didn't have the word word, huh? And we named, what? The word, intelligentium conceptum, Conceived understanding, right? Or the generated wisdom, right? Sapientia genitas, if you didn't have a word, or a word, huh? Okay? So we use, notice what Thomas is doing now, he's explaining the difference there, that in the case of the going forward, per modem intellectus, and understanding, you have a different name for what is relational, and for what is essential, but in the case of love, you don't have this word, especially for what is relational. And so you borrow the essential word, right? So you gotta know what you're doing, right? When you say this, huh? So insofar as we use these words to expressing the relation of the thing which goes forward by way of love, to its beginning, and the averse, thus that by love we understand love proceeding, right? And by to love, to breathe a love proceeding, right? In this way, love is the name of a person. And to love is a what? Notional word, just as to what? To speak, or to what? Generate, right? This idea of that the thing loved is in the lover. Yeah, we often speak of how the difference that love to lover is going out, or even the word is going to something in. What's the little distinction there that the word's love? Yeah, in some way, the loved is in the lover, but not in the same way as it's in the knower, right? It's in the knower as a likeness of the thing now, right? Right. And that's why the son is called the imago dei, right? The likeness of God, really. In English, we're talking to the likeness. But the beloved is in the heart, not by way of a likeness, but by way of a kind of, what, inclination towards the thing in itself. So it's a different way in there, and that's why you don't speak of that as generation, or the Holy Spirit as being the son, right? It doesn't proceed as the likeness of the father, right? Or the son. But as a kind of an inclination towards them. So it's hard, you know, it's hard to understand that, huh? But it's less known to us, huh? But if you love somebody, then that person, in some ways, in your heart, right? Impelling you towards that person. Okay? Which doesn't follow in the case of the understanding, right? Do you have a likeness of it, huh? And maybe a likeness is something you don't even love, right? It doesn't impel you necessarily towards it, right? But, it's expressing what you understand about that thing. Now, the first text was taken from Augustine, and Thomas simply solves it by saying that Augustine is speaking about love according as it is taken, what? Essentially, right? Tying to what God is. Tying to what God is. Tying to what God is. Tying to what God is. Tying to what God is. When St. John says, as it was in the epistles, right, that God is love, right? What's he talking about there? He's taking love there. It seems like he's taking ascension, right? He's not thinking of the Holy Spirit so much in particular, right? He's saying God is love, right? Because when you go back to the treatise on the operations of God, you find out that God's understanding and his being are the same thing. And God's loving and his being are the same thing. And that way you're taking understanding of loving, obviously, is something essential. And that's the way Augustine is taking in that particular text, right? But I'm sure Augustine in some other text would refer to the Holy Spirit as love. And the second objection is saying, well, doesn't the word love signify more an action than a person, right? To the second, it should be said that to understand and to will and to love, although they are signified by way of actions going out to their objects, nevertheless, they don't really go out to their objects outside the one loving. They are nevertheless actions remaining in the, what, doers, right? So grammatically, right, you know, to say I kick you and I love you, grammatically they seem to be the same thing, right? And the kicking ends up in you and outside me, and my loving ends up in you, but really love remains within me, right? Well, my kicking really goes out to you. But grammar reflects that first kind of activity that's more known to us, huh? It's interesting, you know, with the eyes, especially they say, you know, my eyes fell upon something, look, there was something that I fell upon it, and I saw, you know, did the eyes really fall upon it? You know, they're seeing you made it in you, huh? Yeah, that's right. Okay, but although they name actions remaining in the ones doing them, nevertheless, in the one doing this, there is implied a certain relation to the object, huh? Whence love, even in us, is something remaining in the one loving, right? And the word of the heart, that's the thought, remains in the one, what? Saying, okay? But nevertheless, with the relation to the thing expressed by the word of thought, or the, what? Yeah. Or the love. But in God, in whom there is no accident, an accident is something, what? It doesn't exist by itself, it exists in others in the subject. But in God, in whom there is no accident, that's one of the things we showed in the treatise on the simplicity of God, right? It has more. Because both the word itself, and the love is something, what? Subsistent. And why is that? Well, it's because the understanding and the loving of God is his very being, huh? His very substance. When therefore is said that the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father in the Son, or in something else, it has not signified something going outside of it into another, but only the relation of love to the thing what loved. Just as in the word is implied, the relation of the word to the thing expressed by the word, or by the thought, huh? That goes back to the more general thing about all these things are spoken of, huh? And then the third one is saying, well, love is something that unites these two things. So it's the Holy Spirit in between the Father and the Son. Then would he be the third person in the Apostle Trinity? To the third it should be said, that the Holy Spirit is said to be the nexus, I don't know how to translate that connection, right? Of the Father and the Son. Bond, okay. You can say that, I suppose. Insofar as he is love, right? Because since the Father loves, by one love, himself and the Son, and the reverse, there is implied in the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and the reverse, but the relation of what? The lover to the thing what? Loved, huh? And from this, that the Father and the Son mutually love each other, it is necessary that the, what? Mutual love, which is the Holy Spirit, proceed from what? Both of them, huh? But, so, but according to his origin, right? The Holy Spirit is not middle, but what? Third in the Divine Person. But according to the force in relation of a lover to the loved, right? He's a middle mix of the two, proceeding from what? Both, huh? Why did I say third in the Divine Person, the same name? Third Person. Third Person. Because there's third in the Divine. No, it says, he's the third person in the Trinity, but the grammatic word is a little different there, right? I see, okay. Yeah. So, Terzi and Trinitate Persona. Okay. These grammarians, you know, they have different words, huh? Because usually in English you put the adjective before the noun and the adverb after the verb, right? I walked fast, or I ran fast. But they call me a white man, not a man white. That Latin actually does, as I often put a little phrase stuck between the noun, kind of split up something that goes together. You see the difference there between the grammarian and the magician, right? Now, if the grammarian looks at the definition of, say, square, an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, he sees two adjectives there, right, in a conjunction, and then a noun, right? And he sees, you know, that the adjectives are put before the noun, right? Now, the magician looks at it, what does he see? A definition, right? And the first part of the definition is the genus. So, the magician sees the quadrilateral as being said of square before you say equilateral and right-angled. That's because the magician is interested in words insofar as they signify things through thoughts. And we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly, and therefore we know them in general before we know them in particular. So the genus, which is more general, comes first. It doesn't come first in the order of the words that's ever written. On Latin, you might be able to put the adjective after, right? And sometimes, like when I take the definition of reason, they're from Shakespeare, you know, you see, it's the ability for a large discourse looking before and after, then the grammatic order turns out to be what? The logical order, right? Okay. But if you, you know, if you were to define the reason as a discursive power or something like that, right, then grammatically the order would be different than the logical order, but still power would be, as far as the magician is concerned, the basic word in that complex of words, huh? I have a lot of fun contrasting those two, you know? For the grammarian green triangle and equilateral triangle are identical grammatically speaking. There's a noun being modified by an adjective. That's as far as it goes. For the magician, there's enormous difference, right? Because equilateral is a species making difference of triangle, white green is an accident, huh? And then when you get to the logic of the second act, right? From the point of view of grammar, I am a stone is better than I am a man. The magician would say, no, I am a man is better than I am a stone. It's true, I am a man, isn't it? It's true, I am a man, isn't it? It's true, I am a man, isn't it? It's true, I am a man, isn't it? But the grand remark, I am a stone. Joan, correct, and I, as a man, wrong. He doesn't care about truth and falsity, he's a grammarian. Terrible, terrible. Superficial. You get this sometimes in the Neoplatonists, you know, and they kind of put a guy down and say, he's a grammaticus, you know, he's a grammarian. Fourth objection of saying, well, if he's loved, isn't it going to be, if he loves the Holy Spirit, wouldn't he have a love, maybe a love of love, so on? To the fourth, it should be said that just as to the Son, although he understands, nevertheless, it does not belong to him to produce a word, right? Because it belongs to him to understand as the thought going forward. So also, although the Holy Spirit loves, taking love essentially, right? Nevertheless, it does not belong to him to really love, right? Which is to take love notionally or relationally taken, because thus he loves essentially as love itself proceeding, right? Not as that from which proceeds what. That's always hard to understand, but, you know, if he wasn't that, it would be confusingly persons, multiplying the persons. I think it's tied up with, probably easy to say, relational. He's talking about the notions, you know, that pertain to our knowledge of the persons, right? That was a kind of technical term we saw before, right? Back in question 32, right? It's like fatherhood instead of fatherhood. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's what gives rise to the relation. It was back in question 32, the second, the third special articles, right? Where there are some notions by which attributed to the divine persons, and a number of notions. But these are things by which you distinguish the persons, right? Yeah. So, sometimes they say notionality, or I say personally, right? So, a lot to think about there, but the basic thing you want to see is that love can be taken in these two ways, huh? The word love, essentially, and what? Personally, right? You don't have that problem with the word son, or the word, what? Word, huh? Word is taken reading God only personally, right? But if you didn't have a word like word, right? You may have to say, well, he's the, he's a generated wisdom, he has some kind of circumlocution, right? To talk about the wisdom that is proceeding from another, and it's related to it, and so on. That's a problem we have with the Holy Spirit, huh? In these things. Now, Thomas takes up the Trinity. Here in the Summa, Canto Gentiles, and so on, you always talk about the, what, Father and the Son before the Holy Spirit, right? It's almost like it's more known to us, huh? There's probably more one reason why he talks about him before, but in terms of being known. Now, I've often heard people say it, the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, or he's our love, but what does that mean exactly? We'll see some of the distinctions here if we can grasp them, huh? Ahem. To the second one proceeds thus, it seems that the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Spirit. For Augustine says in the seventh book of the Trinity, for Augustine in the seventh book of the Trinity, proves that the Father is not wise by this generated wisdom, but the Son is what? Generated wisdom, huh? So the Holy Spirit is love proceeding. Therefore the Father and the Son do not love each other, by the love going forward, which is the, what? Holy Spirit. So is the Father wise by the wisdom that is the Son? See, sometimes we appropriate, as we'll talk about appropriation in the last questions, we appropriate power to the Father for a number of reasons, and then wisdom to the Son, right? And then mercy or love or goodness to the Holy Spirit, right? Does that mean that the Father is wise by the Son? Or the Father and the Son are good by the Holy Spirit? Because wisdom and goodness, speaking properly, not by appropriation, are essential names, right? So, this seems to be a good objection, right? The Father is not wise by the Son, by wisdom proceeding, or wisdom generated, right? He had to generate the Son before he's wise. And the Holy Spirit is like that, but in terms of love. He's love proceeding, right? So does the Father love by the Holy Spirit? That same thing as saying he's wise by the Son? You can argue from, I like this here, right? He's not wise by the Son, by wisdom proceeding. He's not loving by love proceeding. But thank you, pipe and smoke. Moreover, when it is said that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, this word to love is either taken essentially, or what? Notionally. But it cannot be true according as it is taken essentially. Because for a like reason, one could say that the Father understands by the, what? Son. Nor also, as it is taken notionally. Because for a like reason, one could say that the Father and the Son breathe by the, what? Holy Spirit. Or that the Father generates by the Son. Therefore, in no way is this true that the Father and the Son love each other by the, what? Holy Spirit, huh? Last night I was given the Love and Friendship course. I have these two guys that come into the house there. We've finished the treatise on love there, Thomas there in the Prima Secundae. And now we're going to start the thing on friendship, huh? And before we go to Aristotle's treatise on friendship there, especially in the 8th book in the Comachian Ethics, I give him a little, a bunch of readings on friendship, that loosen up their mind from thinking about friendship, huh? And one of the things is from Shakespeare there where he speaks of God-like amity. So, here he's praising friendship as being something God-like, right? Now, of course, St. John says that God is love and friendship is love, right? So, in that way, it's God-like, right? But friendship is also mutual love, right? And so, is it also God-like insofar as it's mutual love? Well, if the Father and the Son love each other, then there's mutual love in God, right? But there's only, if God is just one person, right, would there be mutual love in God? So, in that respect, God, friendship might be God-like insofar as it's love, right? But it wouldn't be God-like insofar as it's mutual love, because there'd be no mutual love in God. So, when Shakespeare says that friendship is God-like, right, is he thinking of it as being mutual? It's connected with this particular passage, and it's interesting that Aristotle takes up friendship, he distinguishes between friendship among equals, he takes up first, and then he talks about friendship among unequals. And the prime example of friendship among unequals is the friendship of the Father and the Son, in human things, okay? Or the friendship of Hamlet and Horatio would be a friendship of equals, or Bassanio and the Merchant of Venice, right, then? Okay? But what's interesting, if there's mutual love here of the Father and the Son and God, you have a friendship of equals, because God, the Father and God and the Son are equals, you'll see that comparative consideration of persons, but it's also a friendship of Father and Son. So, what are two different kinds of friendship in the creature, right, are one in God, right? It's kind of interesting to see that, right? But all this depends upon seeing that in some way the Father and the Son have what? Mutual love, right? And, in that regard, are they said to love each other by the Holy Spirit? Well, up to this point, it seems not, huh? Okay? moreover, by the same love the Father loves the Son and Himself and what? Us, you can't have three loves, but the Father doesn't love Himself by the Holy Spirit because no notional act, there's that word notional again, reflects back upon the beginning of the action, right? For we do not see that the Father generates Himself or that the Father breathes Himself, right? Therefore, it cannot be said that He loves Himself by the Holy Spirit according as to love is taken, what? Notionally. Also, the love by which He loves us does not seem to be the Holy Spirit because it implies a relation to the creature and thus it pertains to the, what? Essence, huh? And therefore, this is false that the Father loves the Son by the, what? Holy Spirit, huh? So, I'll call this tying yourself into a knot, tying the mind into a knot, huh? But against this is what Augustine says in the 6th book about the Trinity, that the Holy Spirit is that by which the one generated is loved by the one generating it, huh? And He loves His, what? The one generated loves the one generating it, huh? So Augustine seems to be saying that they do love each other, right? By the Holy Spirit, yeah. Now, I answer it should be said that about this question, it brings out difficulty when it is said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit because the ablative, now, that's the Latin grammar, Because the ablative is construed or constructed in the relation of some, what? Cause, huh? Now, incidentally, some grammarian told me, you know, that the Latins goofed up on their cases, right? Because they're too stupid. to figure out the grammar of their own language. And what they did was to imitate the Greek grammarians, right? So the grammar of the Latinx was learned from the Greek grammarians. The languages are not exactly the same, right? And the way he explained it, anyway, was that in Greek you have the nomative, right? Then you have the genitive, and the dative, and the accusative, right? In that order. There's no habit. But, and the distinction between the genitive, the dative, and the accusative is in the relation to the verb. But the genitive signifies that which, in a way, is before the action of the verb. So the atlet, used the atletive in Latin for, would be in Greek often from the, what, genitive, right? Okay? The dative was with the, what, action of the verb, and the accusative is imagined to be after it, right? But the Latins came in the thing, they said, we've got kind of a nomative case. We've got a genitive case, right? We've got something like the dative, right? Something like the accusative. And then, and this other thing, they couldn't fit in, so they just tacked it out again, the ablative. But the ablative is like the Greek genitive, insofar as it's, what, signifies what is before the action of the verb, right? So it doesn't mean it come last, right? And you can see that here, in a sense, huh? He says, cum ablativeus, right, the ablative, is construed or understood in the relation, habitudine, of some cause, right? Okay? So if I, so hit the nail by a hammer or something like that, with a hammer, right? You know? Then that's the cause in some way of doing this, right? Okay? So, now a lot of times, these prepositions, too, have the sense of what? A cause, huh? Through which, by which, so the man, okay? From which, okay. So if you see that the father loves the son by the Holy Spirit, you might say that the Holy Spirit is the, what? Beginning of their love, right? Okay? So since the ablative is understood in the relation of some cause, it's seen that the Holy Spirit is the beginning of loving for the father and the son. Which is, on nino impossibile, entirely and completely, what? Impossible, right? And that'd be like saying, you know, the Holy Spirit, I mean, excuse me, the father is wise by the son, right? The son, in a sense, makes him to be wise, right? That's altogether impossible, right? Okay? And some say, therefore, that this is false. That the father and the son love each other by the Holy Spirit. And they say that this was drawn back, retracted, right? By Augustine, in the similar retraction he made, right? When he retracted that, that the father is wise by, what? Generated wisdom, right? Now, some say that this, so some people just simply reject it, therefore, right? Because it's saying that the Holy Spirit is, in some sense, the source of their love, right? Some say that it's an improper statement, and thus they expounded that the father loves the Holy Spirit, excuse me, the father loves the son by the Holy Spirit. That is, that is, he loves the son by, what? Essential love, right? Which is appropriate to the Holy Spirit, right? In that sense, it would be by appropriation, but not properly speaking, right? That's the second opinion. Some say that this ablative, right, should be figured out in the relation of a sign. That the sense would be that the Holy Spirit is a sign that the father loves the son. Insofar as he proceeds from them is what? Love, right? That's the opinions. Now, some say that this ablative should be constructed, put together, in the relation of a formal cause. Because the Holy Spirit is the love by which, formally speaking, the father and the son love each other. That's the fourth opinion, right? Just like if I say you're healthy by health, right? It's a formal cause, right? Finally, there are those who say that it should be constructed in the relation of a formal, what? Effect. And these exceed more closely to the truth. So you can see how, I heard, besides, you know, people, you know, priests in the pulpit, you know, saying that the father and the son love each other by the Holy Spirit, or they'll say that the Holy Spirit is the love of the father and the son. I wonder what they understand by this, right? Which of these opinions? Yeah. I never pin them down. I'd be unkind to do that. Okay. What is, why is this last one approach the truth more? Whence to the evidence of this, it should be known, huh? That things are, in general, denominated from their, what? Forms, huh? As white from whiteness, right? And man from humanity, right? Whence that by which something is denominated, as far as this is concerned, seems to have the, what? Relation of a form, right? Even though it's not always, in fact, a form, right? So, if you say that I am healthy by health, right? Health is a, what? Form in me, right? And by this form of health, I am denominated healthy. Or I am a geometer by this form of the science of geometry in me, right? Okay. But now the example comes as about to give here. In a similar way, I'm said to be clothed by, what? Clothing, although my clothing is not really like my health or science of geometry, right? But it kind of is imagined, so to speak, to be like a form, right? That just as I am healthy by my health, so I'm clothed by my clothing, huh? I'm shod by my shoes, right? Okay. I'm armored by my armor, right? Aristotle talks about this denomination in the beginning of the categories, huh? First chapter, right? So it's talked about a lot of the categories. As if I say this man is clothed by his clothing or his vest, this abitiv is, as it were, construed in the relation of a formal cause, although it is not a, what? Form, right? You see the distinction he's making there, right? Likewise, it happens that something is denominated through that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent by his action, right? So I am what? Yeah? The fire is warming the air, right? By something proceeding from it, right? That's different, right? Rather than a form by which it has its activity, right? Am I a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my teaching? You might say both, right? But if you say, I'm a teacher by my knowledge, that's the form existing in me. You might say, I'm a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge? I'm a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge, or am I a teacher by my knowledge? 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Yeah, it's not the source of my being a teacher, right? Am I a teacher because I teach, or do I teach because I'm a teacher? I'm always saying. I mean, if you say both, it's not in the same way, right? Okay. Now you're making another distinction here, though, huh? It happens that something is denominated through that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is denominated from its action, right? So you might say that the fire is a heater, and it's being named from the fact that it's what? Heating other things, right? But then he says it can also be denominated from the end or the limit of the action, which is the effect of it, huh? For we say that fire is heating by what? It's heating. But the action here, you see. Although the heating is not heat, which is the form of the fire, right? But it's an action proceeding from the fire, right? You see the difference there, right? See? Is the fire a heater by its heat, or is it a heater by its, what, heating? The air. Well, maybe we might say both, right? But when you say the fire is a heater by its heat, you're giving the quality and the form in it, or by its performance act, right? But when you say the fire is a heater by its heating, the air, then you're denominating it from an action that's actually proceeding from it, right? Okay. Now, and we say that the tree is flowering by its what? Yeah, but they're actually proceeding from it, right? They're not the form intrinsic whereby it's able to perform its activity. Although the flowers are not the form of the tree, but a certain effect proceeding from it, huh? It's like I was saying, you know, that Michelangelo is a sculptor by the statutes he's made. You might say, is Michelangelo a sculptor if he had made no statutes? He had no statutes? Yes, sir. But this is actually something proceeding from him, and the end of his action is sculpting, huh? Well, we do denominate something that way, right? Okay. Now he's going to apply all these distinctions to the matter at hand, huh? According to this, therefore, it should be said that to love is taken in divine matters in two ways, right? Essentially, and that's perhaps what St. John is in mind. He says God is love, right? He's taking it essentially there. And what? Notionally or relatively, right? Now, according as it is taken essentially, in that way, the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Spirit, but by the essence itself, the nature, because God's essence is love. Okay? When Augustine says in the 15th Book of the Trinity, who dares to say that the Father, either himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, loves except for the Holy Spirit? Who dares to say this, right? And according to this, proceed the first, what? Opinions, he's saying, I want to truth in them, right? According as it is taken notionally, then to love is nothing other than to, what? Breathe a love, right? Just as to say or to speak is to produce a, what? Word. And to flower is to produce flowers. Thus, therefore, as the tree is said to be flowering by its flowers, right? So the Father is saying by the Word or the Son, himself and what? Preaches. And the Father and the Son are said to be loving by the Holy Spirit or by the love proceeding from them, themselves and others, right? Okay? So am I saying something by my words? What does that mean? Or am I saying something by my knowledge and ability to make words? Kierkegaard says, no doubt that women can talk. It has, he says, verba facture. Kierkegaard says, no doubt that women can talk. So am I able to talk by my knowledge and my ability to form words, right? Or do I talk by words? Yeah. It's different, yeah. And so is the Father and the Son loving each other by the Holy Spirit? Is that like my talking by my knowledge and my ability to make words? Or is it like my talking by words? Yeah, yeah. And that's what he says. In habitudine effectus formalis, right? Because you kind of construe that as a form, but this is like a formal effect, right? So I speak and I talk by words, right? So you shouldn't think of the Holy Spirit as a work being the source of the beginning of the love of the Father and the Holy Spirit. I mean the Father and the Son, rather, right? But from them, right, loving each other, there proceeds the, what? The Holy Spirit, right? So the love, in a sense, is like my speaking by words, right? I don't know if that's what they understand when they say that in church. How do you walk? Yeah. Is it walking that enables me to walk? No. If you say I walk by, I don't know, muscles and other things like that, right? Then you're talking about what? So that's from which this activity of walking, in a sense, proceeds, right? But if you say I walk by walking, that's like a... A certain location. Well, no, no, no, that's an action proceeding, but you name something, right? From that, right, then? From an action proceeding from it. You can also name it, or denominate it, as he says, right? Name it from an effect of the action or activity, right? Do you know any authors? It's a man authored by his books here. It's a man authored by his books here.