Prima Pars
Lecture 142: Relations in God and Subsisting Forms

Transcript
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So, let's look at now the reply to the first objection here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that in creatures there cannot be a distinction of individual substances through what? Relations, huh? Because relations in creatures are what? Accidents, right? It can't be the substance of these things. But it's necessary that it be through essential principles, huh? Principles that belong in the genus of what? Substance, huh? Because relations are not subsisting in creatures. So, my being a father or a teacher or a husband or a son, right? These are not what? Yeah, yeah. How does that be? Many substances, okay? But in God, the relations are what? Subsisting. Just as the wisdom is subsisting, right? Why in me, if I have any wisdom, it's an accident of me. Very accidental. And therefore, according as they have opposition to each other, right? They are able to distinguish what? Yeah. I think it's kind of marvelous, huh? That when Thomas sees relation as one kind of opposition, right? He's going back to this pagan, who knew nothing of the Christian faith, Aristotle, right? Who in the categories, and in the fifth book of wisdom, distinguishes relations as one of the four kinds of, what? Opposites. And you can see the divine providence in that, huh? Because some might say, oh, he just invents this kind of opposition to get around this problem of his faith, right? You know, the thing that the church fathers said that, you know, God brings good out of the bad, right? And one good thing he brought out of the fact that all the Jews were not converted, right? And that many of the Jews, as you see in the Acts of the Apostles, and St. Paul and so on, are violently opposed to the Christians, right? But these Jews were, what? Witnesses to the antiquity of the books, the prophetic books in the Old Testament, from which the Christians drew arguments for the prophecies about Christ and so on. Why somebody might say, you know, if all the Jews have been converted, we just invented those books, so you created those books, right? The same way, you know, people, you know, come and say, you know, you're opposed to abortion because you're a Christian or something, you're a Catholic, or that's what your boss hands down. And then when the Athenian stranger in the laws of Plato, you know, proposes a law against homosexuality, you know, because it's against nature, right? You say, well, here's a guy who was not influenced, as far as I know, by the Pope. But he sees this, right, you see? And so it's interesting, you know, to have people who are non-believers or even pagans, right? And they see things, right? That they try to claim, you know, that you're saying, and they get away with a lot of this, you know, you know, pretending that you're saying it just because of religion and not because of your natural reason. And so this is a good example, right? That Aristotle understood very well the kind of opposition that relatives have, right? And Thomas learned that from his master, Aristotle. But then it helps him to understand the, what, Trinity. I think I mentioned before how, if you look at the Greek of St. Paul's text, right, it doesn't say with, beginning was the word, the word was with God, but it says the word was toward God, right? It's exactly the word Aristotle uses in the categories when he talks about relation. He doesn't use the abstract word relation, but he uses the term pros, towards, T, towards something. And in the Greek, even the Latin ones, he'll translate it as ad, adequate, right, towards something, right? And that's right in the Gospel of St. John. And if you know Aristotle, you've got the Greek of St. John, you say, hey, there is a distinction between the word and what the word is toward, right? And that's a distinction of relativism. So, but then you might have been smoking for a while. I don't know where that began. When Washington Irving went to Holland's and everybody was smoking a pipe. Even the servants of a pipe got on the field. It's like the Irish. The Irish smoke as much as the Dutch, I don't know. Well, they, I don't know. In the, I was there a long time ago, that's about out in the field with the pipes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Out in the shoe coat, sweater vest, tie, white shirt, working on a thing. Well, Irving is kind of satirical. Here's to New York, you know, is kind of making fun of the Dutch a bit, you know. And they're always, it's around, they're debating, you know, smoking their pipe and so on. It's all they do is smoke one out, but no decisions are reached. So he says, in creatures, then, he says, there cannot be a distinction of individual substances by relations. But it's necessary that it be through essential principles. Because relations are not subsisting in what? Creatures. In God-over, relations are subsistent. And therefore, according as they have opposition to each other, they're able to, what? Distinguished. Supposita, right? But they are not distinguished, what? By the essence, right? Because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other, according as they are really the same with the, what? Essence. Adonis towards each other. The second objection seemed pretty, not a logician like me, you know. Who knows the second figure of the syllogism? The second figure of the syllogism, the predicate is the, what? But the middle term is the predicate in both premises, right? And you can only draw negative conclusions in the second figure. And so, basically it's by one statement affirming something of one thing, and the other one negating it of the other, right? Okay. And we use that kind of syllogism, that second figure syllogism, all the way through the negative treatment of the divine, what? Essence, right? Okay. The composed of something before it, God is nothing before him. Therefore, God is not composed, right? They're always affirming something of one and not the other. Notice that Thomas answers here now. To the second, it should be said, that insofar as the essence and the person in God differ in their, what? Understanding, huh? It follows that something can be said of one that is denied of the other. That's insofar as they're not the same in, what? Thought, huh? And consequently, that supposing one, the other is not, what? Yeah. Now, another place where I see Thomas take up the same rejection, you know, he goes back to the third book of natural hearing of Aristotle. And Aristotle's talking about acting upon and undergoing, how they're really the same thing. And so, take a simple example, it's my kicking you, and you're being kicked. Are they two things, different things? No. No. They're not the same because they're in the subject. Same subject. But the thing is in the subject. But there's a whole different definition, right? Yeah. It's called kicking insofar as it's from me to you. But the same thing that's going on, insofar as it's in you, from me, is called being kicked. And so, you're not kicking, and I'm not being kicked. So we can affirm on one what you would deny on the other, right? He has the same reality by kicking you. He has the same reality by kicking you. He has the same reality by kicking you. He has the same reality by kicking you. He has the same reality by kicking you. And you're being kicked, huh? Okay? Or as Heraclitus said, the way up and the way down is the same. So does the same go up and go down? It's something like that, right? But Aristotle could see that two things could be, I mean, something could be one thing, and yet be two in what definition, and therefore something could be affirmed of one that would be denied of the, what, other. Yeah. So those are, you can see all those objections, though, that can really paralyze people, right? Thomas speaks of, you know, giving the objections and not the answers, leaving the cistern open, right? Just so you can fall down there. Which is what they said that Voltaire did, right? He'd just go through it, as soon as we get these objections, then, you know, embarrass Father Son's only came, or embarrass some Catholic, and he showed up. Okay, now the third objection is a different type of objection, right? That's going back to the way we say, what, after Bar Waze is speaking appropriate to creatures and we talk about God, right? Well, then we eventually negate these, the way of saying. To third, it should be said that we impose or place upon divine things, names, according to the way of creatures, right? And because the nature of creatures is individuated by matter, which is subject to the nature of the species, hence it is that the individuals are called subjects, or supposita, right? Or hypostasis. Now, I don't try to tell you anything, you should say, what, they're called the underlying, or the standing under, right? And account of this, the divine persons are also called hypostasis, or supposita, standing under, right? Not that there, is there some supposition or subjections that couldn't do them around. So I know some philosophy when you're talking about the creature and so on. Aristotle's talking about the word in there in the fourth book of natural hearing. And he distinguishes about eight senses of in, right? And strictly speaking, nothing is in itself, right? So there's always a distinction between what is in something and that of which it is. So if the water is in the glass, there's some distinction between the glass and the water. The genus is in the species, there's some distinction. And so when we say that the divine nature is in God, right? You might say, well, then there's some distinction between God and the divine nature, right? And you say, well, we can't avoid these concrete and abstract names because of our natural way of knowing. So Aristotle says in the third book on the soul that our reason's own object is the what it is that's something you can sense or imagine. And so our language reflects what you can sense or imagine. That's why even our statements involve a noun and a what? Verb. And a verb signifies with time, right? So I'm going to talk about something that isn't in time like God, you see? But, you know, when Thomas makes that first consideration, really he has names a lot there after he takes up the unity, I mean the simplicity and perfection of God, right? And so do we say that God is wise or that God is wisdom? Well, by reason of simplicity, we say God is wisdom itself. But then that seems to not be saying that he's wise. And that attracts him to his perfection. So we say he's wise, right? So we say he's wise to bring out something of his perfection, right? He's just, he's merciful, right? He's just, he's merciful, right? But we say he's justice itself. So we fear it. He's just as itself. But he's mercy itself, right? He's wisdom itself, right? Then you bring out the, what? Simplicity of God, right? But the form and creatures would be really distinct, right? And so we have the preposition in, we say, wisdom is in God, right? But there's not a real distinction between wisdom and what it's in, right? Therefore, you have these two statements that we were mentioning earlier, that whatever God has is God, and whatever is in God is God. We'll use the word has and in because our way of knowing God, right? The creatures. But with him, it's just reverse. He knows that composed to himself was completely simple. A little break here? Amen. Amen. second article here. It seems that it should not be said that the three persons are of one what? Essence or one nature. For Hillary says in the book on the synods that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are in substance three, through consonantium, through what? Harmony, right? He says it's a Latin word for harmony, huh? One, but the substance of God is his essence, huh? Therefore the three persons are not of one essence, huh? There are three substances. The word substance can mean what? As Aristotle, Thomas is always quoting Aristotle there, the two main beings as substances, what a thing is, and then the individual. In one sense, there are three substances, in another sense, they're not, right? Three angels would be three, what it is, as well as the persons. Moreover, one ought not to affirm something in God that is not expressed by the authority of sacred scripture, huh? So the 13th said that the sacred scripture or the study of sacred scripture is the soul of theology, as it's clear through Dionysius in the first chapter of the divine names. But never in scripture, sacred scripture, is it expressed that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one, what? Essence. Therefore, this should not be asserted. Moreover, the divine nature is the same thing as the essence. Therefore, it would be sufficient to say that three persons are of one nature. Moreover, it is not customary to say that the person is of the essence, but more that the essence is of the, what? Socrates is of his nature, or his nature is the nature of Socrates. Therefore, neither suitably can it be said that the three persons are of one essence. Moreover, Augustine says that we do not say that three persons are from one essence, from one nature, right? Lest we understand in God that the person and the essence are other, right? Of course, we can say that, what? The table is from wood, but there's some distinction between the wood and the table then, right? We can say my son is from me, but there's some distinction. So if we say that the three persons are from one essence, neither of those senses, you're going to be in deep trouble. But just as prepositions are, what? Transitive to something other than themselves, right? So the, what? Bleak ways of speaking. Genitive. As if you're, I've got a real distinction there between the three persons and the essence, right? Yeah. Just the genitive or any other cases as well? Perhaps other cases, yeah. So it's just a way of referring to the... Yeah, what comes, you know, um... I see, you know, but... Okay. Therefore, for a like reason, why not, not to say that three persons are of one essence. That implies this kind of distinction between them, right? Moreover, what is able to be an occasion of error ought not to be said in God, huh? But when one says that the three persons are of one essence or substance, there's given an occasion of error. Because as Hillary says in the book on the Sinaits, the one substance of the Father and the Son is predicated, what? Either as one that has two, what? Yeah? Subsisting, it signifies something subsisting. Or one, what? Divided substance that makes two big substances. Or a third, a prior substance, which is, what? Usurped and assumed by two. Okay? A little bit like the incarnation, right? When you assume that nature isn't exactly the same as you. Therefore, we're not saying that three persons are of, what? One substance, huh? But against all this is what Augustine says in the second book against Maximino. So many of these books of Augustine are a contra. A very, a very, that's the way theology developed, right? Kind of an ad hoc character, right? This man denies this article of faith, so against him we defend this article of faith. And that would be for the medievals like Thomas to, or, you know, bring the whole together, like the Second Vatican Council, which is one of the reasons for studying Thomas. But against this is what Augustine says in the second book against Maximinos, that this name homo usian, which means, what? Of the same substance, huh? Usian is what? Usia is substance in Greek, right? Homo, same substance. Which in the Nicene Council was made firm against the Aryans, huh? It signifies the same thing as the three persons to be of one, what? That's what we see in the creed, you know, the word essay there instead of substance, but what was it? What does the creed say? One being, one being. Yeah, but the actual word is substance, right? Yeah. So, are you convinced? It's dangerous when I'm speaking. I answer, it should be said, that has been said above, our understanding names divine things, not in the way of them, because he's not able to know them thus, huh? In other words, we name God not as he is, but as we know him. And because the nature of some species is made individual through man, and thus the nature has itself as a form, the individual as a what? Yeah. It's not the line before. On account of this, also in divine things, as far as the, what? Way is signifying, the essence is signified as the form of the three, what? Persons. I don't know if he's going to refer to the epistle there, it reminds me of the epistle though, right? The Philippians, is it? When he was in the form of God, huh? He did not consider it, you know, to be equal to God, right? And then he took on his form of a servant, okay? So, you speak of the nature there as being the form, right? Okay. Now we say in created things that any form is of that of which it is the form, just as health or the beauty of some man, right? You speak of the health of the man, that's a form, accidental form of the man, right? But, the reverse, a thing having a form, we do not say to be of the form, except with the addition of some, what? Adjective, huh? Which designates that form. As when we say, this woman is of what? No, form is form. She's of an exquisite form. I'm thinking, like, being egregious, you know. So, we're going to say, we wouldn't say a woman of beauty so much as a woman of exceptional beauty. It would be an adjective in there, right? Or this. So, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going to say, we're going Man is of what? Of perfect what? Virtue, right? That's very interesting that we do speak the way he says. I'm not sure I fully understand why we do speak the way, but we'd bring in the adjective there, right? You'd see he's a man of much knowledge, right? Not that he's a man of knowledge. And likewise, because in God, a person is being multiplied, but the essence of the nature is not multiplied, right? We say that there is one essence of the three, what? Persons. And the three persons are of what? Yeah, one essence. So that these are to be, what? Constructed as it were, in a designation of a, what? Form, right? Now there's another place where Thomas takes up the same topic and it's kind of interesting, huh? That he goes back to the distinction of the four causes, right? There's going to be a chance to, you know, defend the days over there, right? He says you've got four kinds of causes. Matter, form, mover, agent, and then the end for the purpose, right? Now he says, in God, is anything like matter. So, nothing in God is like the matter of something else. In no way. So even like that. Is one person like the inner purpose of another person in God? No, because the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end. And therefore, if one person was an end of another person, he would be better, he wouldn't be equal. And could you speak of, even though he talks about this, would you want to speak of the divine nature as being the end or purpose of the persons? That would seem to kind of make them, the divine nature better than the persons, right? So that would give them a minute, right? What about these two causes, right? Well, Thomas is not in a strict sense. These are a cause, right? But there's something like this, when he says the Father generates the, what? Son. And creatures are really the mover, the maker of my son, in a sense, right? Well, he says, large, you know, speaking kinder. But there's something like that, right? You say the Father generates a son, right? Something like this. And here you have something like the, what? Form, you say that the three persons, right? Are what? Yeah. And Acts is an epistle of the Philippians, I think, the one when he was in the form of God, you know? There is a word form, right? Not that there is a real, what, distinction between the, what, person, right? And the nature, but the nature is, because our way of speaking, right? Drawn from creatures is like a form, right? We use that for species sometimes, too. So he says, And likewise, because in God, the person is being multiplied, the essence is not multiplied. We say that there is one essence of the three persons, and three persons of one essence, that one understands the genitive, in this case, to be, what, put together, constructed. What's the best way to translate construed? Construed? In the manner of a, what? Form. Okay? Well, notice, I'm just trying to be a little more complete here. We could speak of the son of the father, couldn't we? And this kind of is touching upon something like this, right? Okay. When we speak of, what? Three persons of one nature, then one nature there is not like the mover or maker. And that's why I guess we said you can't say from, right? Because that would imply either like matter or like the mover in this sense. But we say it should be understood kind of like saying the form, right? Okay? Even though in God, the form and what has the form are what. The same thing, right? Okay? It's like you said, God has great wisdom, right? It's like a form, right? By wisdom, God is wise. So I've been thinking about that word philosopher, right? It means a lover of wisdom. So if God is wisdom itself, then the lover of wisdom must be a lover of what? No wonder the modern philosophers stop loving wisdom, huh? Okay, now the first objection, which we're touching upon already, the one from Hillary, where he says in God there are three, what? Substances, right? Well, to the first it should be said that substance is taken there for what? Yeah. And not for the essence, right? So these are the two main meanings of substance that Aristotle gives in the fifth book of wisdom, right? It can stand for the hypostasis or for the, what? Essence, right? And of course, remember the problems that were created by the word substantia, right? Because etymologically, it's the same as hypostasis, right? But hypostasis usually in Greek, maybe it doesn't signify the nature of the thing, why substance can. And then that's why Jerome spoke of, you know, veninum, poison, you know, in this word, right? Because people were translating the three hypostasis that the Greek are talking about as three substances and understanding it, though, to me, not individual, yeah, but the nature, right? Three natures, and then they're getting into trouble, huh? These problems arise with the words, huh? The second objection is saying, well, there's nothing like this in Scripture, so what are you talking about for? The second should be said that although the three persons are of one essence is not found in sacred Scripture through those very words, in those very words, it is found nevertheless in its, what, sense or meaning. As in John 10, verse 30, I and the Father are, what, one. And later on, yeah, I'm in the Father, and the Father is in me. And this can be had to many other things. That's an objection we meant before, you know, where something's not word for word in Scripture, but the meaning is there, right, huh? And of course, you have to bring it out when the heretic is putting his words forth. Disorderly. Now, the third one is saying, why do you say essence instead of what? Nature, right? The third, it should be said, because nature designates a beginning of an act, right? So our style says that nature is a beginning. So our style says that nature is a beginning of an act, right? in clause of motion and the rest and so on. Why essence is taken from what? Essay, from being. Those things can be said to be of one nature which come together in some act. As all things, what? Ealing, yeah. But those things are said to be of one essence, only that are of one, what? Being, right? And therefore more is expressed to unity, the divine unity, to the fact that the three persons are said to be of one essence than if they were said to be of one, what? Nature. That doesn't mean you can't call them of one nature. You can call them that, right? Moreover, it's not customary that the person be of the essence, but more that the essence is of the, what? Person. Do you understand the nature of the dog? Get dogs around here, don't you? Nature of the cat? So you speak of the nature of the dog, the nature of the cat, huh? Yeah. The nature of man, what? The spirit of the cat, nature. Yeah, yeah. And therefore it's not suitably said that the three persons are of one, what? Essence, huh? Thomas says to the fourth, then it should be said that form, absolutely taken, right? Is customary signified as of that of which it is the form, as the virtue, let's say, of Peter, right? The wisdom of Aristotle, the wisdom of Thomas. The reverse, a thing having some form, is not customary signified to be of that form, right? Except when we wish to determine or designate that form in some way. Yeah. And then there's required two genitives, huh? One of which signifies the form, and the other the, what? Determination of the form. As when it is said that Peter is of great virtue, huh? Or also there's required one genitive having the strength of two genitives. As when we say he's a man of blood, huh? Meaning he's a, what, one who's a spill of much blood, right? Because therefore the divine essence is signified as the form with respect to a person, in our way of understanding it. Suitably, the essence is said to be of the person, right? But not the, what, reverse, right? Except when something is added to the, what, particular designation of the essence. As if one were to say that the Father is a person of the divine, what? Essence, yeah. And likewise in the present one that the three persons are of what? Of one nature, right? But that's one in number, not just one in what? Kind, huh? You see, you and I are one kind. Not one in America. You see that, don't we, sometimes, you know, you and I are one mind in this matter? You and I have one mind in these, out of the Trinity, I hope. You wouldn't say you and I are of a mind, but one mind, right? Now the fifth objection was arguing from other, what, prepositions, that you shouldn't use other prepositions, like Augustine says explicitly you shouldn't say that the three persons are from one nature, right? Then Thomas gives a little bit of this thing that we were talking about earlier, right? That I was giving earlier the four causes, right? To the first, then, it should be said that this preposition, X, right? Or De in Latin, right? I don't know how exactly, X is from, right? Does not designate the relation of a formal cause, but more the relation of an efficient cause or a material cause, huh? And Aristotle defines material causes, what? That from which something comes to be, existing in it, right? Okay? So he uses the word from, actually, the definition of the material cause. The mover cause, he'll speak of whence first, right? There's the beginning of motion. But whence has almost got the sense of from which, right? And so sometimes you have texts of Thomas where he'll distinguish between different meanings of the word from, right? Something is said to be from the opposite, from the matter and from the, what, mover or maker, right? Now, which causes in all things, he says, which causes, he means the efficient and material, right? Which causes in all things are distinguished from those of which they are, what, causes? For nothing is its own matter. So is the chair its own matter, the wood. Some distinction between the wood and the, nor is something its own, what, active beginning or cause. So, mover or maker. But something is its own form, as it's clear in all immaterial things. So the great Plato spoke of the forms, the world of forms, right? And each of these things in the world of forms is what? Its own form. And therefore, for the fact that we say three persons of one essence, signifying the essence in the relation of form, one does not show that, what, the essence is something other than the person. Or if you use the word from, if you said that the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit are from one nature, like saying the table and the chair and so on are from the same wood. And there'd be some distinction then between the two, right? And therefore, from the fact that we say three persons of one essence, signifying the essence in the relation of form, we do not show that they're something other, the essence than the person, right? Which would be shown if we said that three persons were from X, that's the same, what, essence, huh? And that's coming back to this thing here. Remember how I mentioned how Bezo uses the word clause, right? See? But even this large sense of the mover, the maker, you see, the Father generates the Son, then there is a real, what, distinction, huh? Just like there is when you talk about the efficient clause in the strict sense, huh? Now, now, what about this occasion of error, right? This question come up again with appropriation, right? You know, this question here. To the sixth, it should be said, as Hillary says in the book on sin, that son, that badly is it what? Prejudicial to sacred things? If those things are not had in a holy way by some, right? This ought not to be, huh? For if someone badly understands homo usiyan, what is it to me? Understanding well. There is therefore one substance from the property of the nature generated, not from, what, proportioned from a cutting up of the divine nature, right? Or from the union of the two, or from their communion, huh? So, let me say, heck with you guys, huh? I don't know how to understand these things, huh? I don't understand that you're part of it. Yeah, yeah. But you know how the Muslims say that we're not monotheistic because we have three... See? That's how they understand the three persons, right? But then you have to read the three articles to see whether because the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, just like Socrates is a man and Plato is a man and Aristotle is a man therefore there are three men. So if the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God then three gods, right? That's obviously a mistake. But why that difference, you know? Time to go on. Better stop. You're kind of over the list. Yeah, yeah. You better stop right there. Why are you stuck right there? Think about that.