Prima Pars
Lecture 143: Predication and Trinitarian Theology: Substantial vs. Adjective Names

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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise to you. And help us to understand all that you are written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So what has today got in common with the treatise on the Trinity? It's got in common with the treatise on the Trinity. Right? Yeah, who's Steve Kissing? I've heard that. He's in it. Oh, 17, 17 questions. Yay! I want to recall that because I want to recall where we are here a bit, huh? As you know, the 17 questions were divided by Thomas in its premium into three parts, right? And he says, according to the order of teaching, or the order of learning, the divine persons are distinguished by relations of origin, huh? By the relations based upon the preceding of one person from another. What Augustine calls the ordo naturae, the order, that is to say, the origin of one from another. So the Father generates the Son, and the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit, right? So you had one question on the proceedings, the going forward in God, right? And then you had one question on the relations that are based on those ways of going forward. And then 15 questions on the, what, persons, right? Okay? Now those 15 questions were divided into two. And 10 of the questions were dealing with the persons absolutely speaking, right? And five of them, the ones we're in right now, the comparative consideration of the persons. Now the comparative consideration of the persons in these last five questions was divided into two, right? And in one, the first part, which is going to involve three questions, you're considering or comparing the persons to something other than the persons, which may turn out to be not so altogether different from that, but something at least in thought somewhat different from the persons. And then you have two questions comparing the persons to each other. One of them dealing with the quality or the likeness of the persons, and the other dealing with the omissions on this one person, sending another person, whatever that means, we'll find out. Okay? But now, in these first three questions that we're on, we're on the first of the first three, to what does Thomas compare the persons on? Well, if you recall what we said here, right? That the persons are distinguished by relations of origin or proceeding, right? And when he begins that whole consideration by showing that there is a going forward in God, right, then you have the three things you're going to compare them to. God himself, right? How do the persons compare to God? And then how do they compare to those relations we talked about? And then how do they compare to something pertaining, in a way, to the proceedings? How do they compare it to the notional acts, right? The generation and the breathing and so on. So you can see it's a very complete, what, thing. And very appropriate for a beginner, because you look at it from every, what, angle, right? I was reminded there of the first book in philosophy. When I was at the vault there, we had Albert the Great paraphrase the first book in philosophy, in the order of learning, which is the Isogogia of Porphyria. And Porphyria says, in the beginning of the Isogogia, we're going to talk about genus, difference, species, property, and accident. And so he goes through and considers each one of those five. And then he gets through with that. He does what you might call a comparative thing. And he makes exactly, what, ten comparisons. Whereby he compares every one of the five to every one of the other four, as to in what way they're alike and what way they're different. So he compares genus to the other four, and that's four comparisons. And then he takes the next one, like, say, difference, or species, and, of course, it's already been compared to genus, so he compares it to the remaining three. And then he takes the next one and compares it to the remaining two. And then the next one to the last one. So you end up with four, three, two, and one, ten comparisons. But it's very good for a beginner, right? And Porphy says he's writing for a beginner. And so you learn what each one of these is, but then you compare it to everything else that it should be compared to. And you see in what way it's like or different from everything else that you have in the treatise. You can see how thorough Thomas is here, right? You can say that the persons are distinguished by relations of origin or proceeding of one from another. And these proceedings are in God, right? So you compare the persons to God. You compare the persons to the relations. You compare the persons to the proceedings or to the processional acts. You might say the acts of generations and so on. So he's comparing, in a sense, completely. He's very complete the way he is. Nobody else would be this complete. But he might get a little bit of porphyry, a lesser scale there, you know. Thank God, Aristotle didn't do the categories, right? Compare the ten to the other nine. It would have been exhausted, given mine. So we're up to now the, what, third article, right? And of course, the fundamental article was the one that showed that the persons compared to God or compared to the divine nature, where you have a God, are exactly the same thing, right? In reality. That there's no distinction in things, in the things, between God the Father or the Father and God, right? Or between the Son and God. Or between the Holy Spirit and God, right? Even though there's some difference in our thought, right? Okay? That there's only a real distinction, a distinction in things, between the Father and the Son and between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, right? And then he spoke in the second article of how you can speak of these three persons being of one nature. Now, in the next article, in the article three, we're going to get into the idea of predication, which is the Latin for being set of, right? And it seems to me you can say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God. You can't say that they are three gods, huh? And it's kind of unusual, that although God can be said of the Father, the Father is God, the Son is God, as we've shown already, right? The Holy Spirit is God. That was shown primarily in the first article, the fundamental article. Someone might jump because of the way something is said of many in creatures. Well, then there must be three gods. I guess the Muslims, the Mohammedans, they think that we're, what? Yeah, we're polyphists, you know, you see? As if, you know, God is said of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, like man is said of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. So that Socrates and Aristotle are not one man, but they're three men, right? Well, this is not the way God is said of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But you can say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God. And it seems to me you could say also the reverse, that God is three persons. You see, both of those are orthodox. But let's get it from the Master here, right? That's why it's into Verklus and we can get it from the Master. To the third one goes forward thus. It seems that the essential names, like this fundamental name, God, are not said singularly. of the three persons, but plural, to be three gods, right? The first argument here. For just as man signifies what has humanity or human nature, so God signifies as one having what? The divine nature, the deity. But the three persons are three things having what? The divine nature. Therefore, the three persons are three gods. So you're speaking like Mohammed in here, right? Moreover, in Genesis chapter 1, verse 1, where it is said, In the beginning, God created heaven and earth. The Hebrew, Hebraic truth, the language there, which is written, I guess, has Elohim, which can be interpreted as what? Gods, or judges, right? In the plural. And this is said on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore, these three persons are, what? Midi-gods and not one god. And this is something about the Hebrew language, right? Moreover, this name, thing, since it is said absolutely, seems to pertain to, what? The substance of a thing. What it is. But this name, thing, is said plurially of the three persons. For Augustine says in the book on the teaching or doctrine of Christ, that the things which were not to, were ought to be enjoyed are three. The things that should be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the other essential names can be said thoroughly of the three persons. I guess the Pope, what is the doctrinal thesis on Augustine? I think they said that yesterday. On the theology of Augustine. You heard that? A couple of different ones. The first one. I've got him in trouble to write another one. It would be interesting to see it, you know, what he did on it. We have, you wrote a later paper, it's for some other degree or certification. That's when he wrote on St. Bonavent. You know, I think that was the one, because, you see, he started his first thesis, then when someone got on his case about it, they thought it was heterodox. And they really slammed him. So, he had to rewrite a new one. I think that was the Bonaventure one. Well, I understood that was for a separate type of degree or certification or something. It was a separate thing. But I don't know the history of it. Because he said that. We have that one. That experience for them and how he said he was never going to treat anyone like he was treated. That's a kind of background to how he organized things in the CDF later in dealing with people. So, then Augustine is kind of the greatest doctor in the church there on the Trinity, huh? So, if he says there are three things, then there are three things, right? Moreover, just as this name God signifies one having the divine nature, so also this name person signifies something subsisting in an understanding nature, right? But we say three persons. Therefore, for the same reason, we have to say three gods. But then Thomas says, but against all this nonsense is what is said in Deuteronomy 6, verse 4. Here, Israel, the Lord your God is one God. It's kind of striking there when he talked about the substance of God, and Thomas had that divided into five parts, right? But the last thing he shows is that God is one. So, the last thing you remember from the consideration of the substance of God is that there's one God. So, however you understand the Trinity, you can't go against there being one God. It's like he arranged it in that order, huh? According to Subacanitia, it's the last thing he talks about is the infinity, right? But in the Subacanitia and Thiles, it goes from the infinity to the understanding of God, right? It falls immediately upon that. And the Trinity is way back in the last book, right? Because of the order of that Theta Sun. And of course, as you know from your study of Anaxagoras, that's the first thing he said about the mind, it's infinite. So, it's kind of interesting, the order there, if there's an order there. So, Thomas has got to teach us how to speak about these things here. I answer it should be said that of essential names, some signify the essence, what? In a substantial way, like a noun, I suppose, right? Others as what? Yeah. Now, those which signify the nature in a substantial way, are said of the three persons only in a, what? Singular way. Like the name God, right? So, God is sort of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, not as three gods, but only as one God. But the names which signify in an adjective way, right? They can be said of the three persons in, what? The world. So, I've got that distinction. So, can you see there are three divines? Three simple ones? Yeah. So, you have to know grammar, right? That's one of the liberal arts. Grammar, rhetoric, logic. Now, what's the reason for this distinction? That's the fundamental distinction Thomas makes at the beginning of this body. The reason for this is because these substantial names, what we might call, what nouns, I suppose, signify something in the way of a substance. Why, the adjective name signifies something by way of a, what? Accident, huh? And you find this in speculative grammar, right? These terms, the way Thomas speaks here. And by way of accent, meaning what inheres in some subject, right? But a substance, just as it has being or existence by itself, so through itself or by itself, it has, what? Unity or multiplicity. Whence the singularity or the plurality of a substantial name is to be noted by the form signified through the name. But accidents, huh? Just as they have being in a subject, so from the subject they receive their unity and what? Multitude, right? So, you take the shape of this chair, right? And what? This shape is in this wood and that shape in the chair next to it is in that wood. So, there's a multiplicity of them, right? Because of that in which they are, right? Even though the shape might be the same, huh? Not exactly in those two chairs, but you can take chairs that are closer. So, who knows the Pythagorean theorem there? Well, I'll give you the benefit of the doubt. Say, a number of us have the knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem. Well, then, is there one knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem in this room? If several of us know it, no. But it's multiplied because the knowledge is in my head and the knowledge is in your head, right? And this is the way the adjective is like an accident, right? And it's multiplied according to that which it is, right? So, he says, accidents, just as they have being in a subject, so from that subject they receive either unity or what? Multiplicity, right? And therefore, in adjectives, one notes singularity or plurality according to the individual what? Subjects, or suppositati is the Latin word there. Subjects, or suppositati is the Latin word there. Subjects, or suppositati is the Latin word there. Subjects, or suppositati is the Latin word there. Subjects, or suppositati is the Latin word there. Now, he's going to point out the difference between creatures and God. In creatures, there is not found one form in many, what, individual subjects, except that of the unity of order, right? As the form of an ordered multitude, like the order of the army, right? Whence names signifying such a form, if they are substantial, are said of the many and the singular, not over at the adjectives. For we say that many men are, what, a college or an army, right? Or a people, right? But we say that many men are collegial, right? Okay? But in divine things, in God, the divine essence, the divine nature is signified by way of a form, which is simple and most, what? One. That's why Thomas kind of puts those two together, simple and one. And if you want to divide those five attributes and substances of God into three instead of five, he puts simple and one together. When he talks about the infinity of God, he always talks about his perfection being unlimited, so it kind of goes with perfection. Whence names signifying the divine essence substantially are said singularly and not in a plural way of the three, what, persons. And this is the reason wherefore Socrates and Plato and Cicero, I left Aristotle out there, huh? We call them three men, right? But the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, we do not call three gods, but what? One God. Why? Because in the three individual subjects of human nature, there are three human natures, huh? But in the three persons, there is only what? One divine nature, one substance, huh? But those things which signify the essence or the nature, by way of adjective, right, are said in the plural of the three on account of the, what, plurality of the individual, what, subjects of these things. For we say there are three existing, or three wise, right? Three eternals, three uncreated, three immense ones. Immense means, what, immeasurable, infinite. If they are taken, what, adjutantly, right? But if they are taken substantially, then we'd say there's one uncreated thing, one immense thing, one eternal thing, and that's why he's got it in the, what, the neutral there, right? As Athanasius says, that's a reference to the Athanasian creed, right? So can we say there are three wise men? Three wise ones? When the angel says, holy, holy, holy, right? Some days, because that's a reference to the Trinity, right? So is holy there like an adjective? Yeah. So you guys say there's three holies there, right? But you wouldn't say, God, God, God, unless there's this. You're free to Trinity, right? You might say, God, you know, if he dies, you know, speaking of God, but you wouldn't say, praise Trinity that way, huh? Now, the first objection, huh? Says, just as man signifies having the human nature, so God signifies having the divine nature. But the three persons are three having the divine nature, right? Therefore, the three persons are three gods, huh? What Thomas says, puts out the distinction, he replies the distinction he has in the body of the article. To the first, therefore, it should be said that although God does signify, right, having deitatem, huh, having the divine nature, there is nevertheless another way of signifying, grammatically, right? For God signifies substantive, eh, substantially. God is a, what? We'd say is a noun, right? But having the divine nature, having deity, is said, adjutantly. Whence, although there are three having the divine nature, it does not follow that there are three, what? Uh-huh. So, see how it's very important, that distinction, right? You ever been mixed up? Yes. Yeah. And mixed up is almost a synonym for being mistaken, right? But mixed up brings out that you don't, what, possess some distinction, you don't see some distinction, right? So, in that first objection, which is drawing a false conclusion, saying that because there are three having the divine nature, right, and to be gods, to have the divine nature, the same thing, right? Therefore, there are three gods. But that proceeds from, what? Ignorance. A carry mistake does. But more precisely, from ignorance of a, what? Distinction. And the importance of that distinction, right? The distinction between what is said substantially, as he said, right? And we might say, in the matter of a noun, and what is said in the matter of an accident, adjectively, right? And having the divine nature is like, what? An adjective, right? Why God is a noun, right? And so it makes a great deal of importance, son. And Aristotle says, well, men are not good at seeing distinctions, especially things that are close together, right? If you study dialectic there, Aristotle's book on dialectic. The third tool of dialectic is a tool of difference, son. And Aristotle says, now, the mind is exercised in seeing the difference between things, right? But the closer things are, the more it's exercised in seeing their difference. And when he talks about the fourth tool of likeness, in a way, it's the reverse, son. So the likeness of genus, or the likeness of species, seeing that doesn't exercise the mind, it's seeing a likeness of ratios, son, which is more, what? No, further away, right? Okay? So, well, in the case of difference, it's reversed, right? To see the difference between things that are very close together exercises the mind more than seeing the difference between things that are far apart, right? To see the difference between a dog, say, in a chair is an exercise of the mind very much, but to see the difference between a dog and a cat more so, right? And then to see the difference between different kinds of cats, right? I was in the supermarket, not supermarket, in the shopping mall with my wife there, and, you know, they go on and on, going through things, so. I went into a little pet shop there, right? You know, there's little dogs in there for sale, right? And they're labeled the kind of dog there, right? So I was, you know, learning the differences between the dogs again, right? So my mind is being exercised in seeing the difference between dogs more so than seeing the difference between a dog and the cage, let's say. You know, there are differences to great, right? But in likeness, it's reverse, right? To see a likeness between things that are far apart exercises the mind more, right? Than seeing a likeness between things that are close together. We have a kind of a sliding scale of ability to distinguish between objects, meaning, kind of hard to explain, but if you are, say, in a state of nature and you don't have any sort of education or anything like that... The distinction that you'd be able to make would be maybe much more crude than if you were, say, highly educated in scholasticism or something like that. But it could be dependent on. I mean, if your likelihood depends on making those distinctions, you'd get it in a hurry where somebody more educated how it would be. Yeah, if you just concentrate on one narrow thing, you might see differences that people wouldn't see, you know. Apparently I've been told that this is not, I grew up with this understanding that there's like something like 20 different names for snow among the Eskimos, and then somebody later has said, that's not true. So I don't know actually what's right there, but it seems reasonable that they would, there could be many more names than what we have. We sort of want to make a few distinctions like it's crusty or whatever, but whereas with them, it would seem like there would be more distinctions. So maybe, I mean, it was probably kind of an inane comment, but so Thomas Quintus, he's sort of helping us through the things that we wouldn't necessarily even notice. Yeah. I see, you know, if you take the distinction between, let's say, wine and beer, that's easier to see, right, than the distinction between various wines, huh? I told you, you know, that Ron McCarthy there, the former president of Thomas Quintus, he had the fact that you were for dinner, right? And it's kind of a joke, he served a different wine in a different bottle, right? And everybody was deceived, thinking they're drinking what the label is, right? Except for Brother Mark. He says, this is not bad. But I'm sure I would have been deceived, right, you see? And the, some people would make a purpose of this, you know, to kind of, you know, reveal imposters and so on, right, you know? They keep an expensive, you know, bottle and the thing, and they fill in the cheap wine, and they come away by what a great wine this is, and everybody's abused by this. And, well, as Socrates says, we, you know, that's what we tend to do, claim to know, we don't know. Maybe your brother knew Ron and MacArthur very well, too. So the mind is more exercised in trying to find the difference between different wines and wine and beer, right? So, but I think what's interesting is that we have this word for, we have two words, actually mixed up in the steak, you know? And mixed up very clearly kind of brings out the connection between a mistake and distinction, right? But you're mixed up, you don't really see a distinction. You mix up two things. But mistake is somewhat the same thing, you know? Plato describes mistake as, well, reaching the box of one thing and you get the wrong thing. And it's kind of because you don't distinguish between the two, huh? Now, the second one here is one we can't deal with too much here. Unless we know Hebrew better, but it's an important thing that Thomas points out here. And occasionally it comes up even sometimes when Thomas is coming in the text of Aristotle and it doesn't come out exactly right in Latin, right? And Thomas sometimes says, perhaps this is more according to the Greek idiom, right? He says, to the second then it should be said that diverse tongues, huh? Diverse languages. I guess language comes from lingua, right? Diverse tongues have a diverse way of speaking, right? Whence, just as an account of the plurality of individual subjects, the Greeks say three hypostases. So, also in Hebrew, there is said plurally, Elohim, right? We are, we do not say plurally, neither God nor substances, lest the plurality be referred to the substance, the very nature of the thing. You go tough for the Hebrew language, no? Now, the third objection is based upon the word thing, and no less the man in Augustine speaks the three things. Well, how's this? Well, Thomas says, to the third it should be said that this name, thing, is among the transcendentals, huh? Now, let's stop on that, because maybe you're not too familiar with that. What do they call the transcendentals, huh? Transcend what? Yeah, yeah. And more precisely, they are something that is said of all ten, right? Names that are said of all ten. And even more precisely, you can say they are the most universal names, right? Okay? And let's just recall them a bit, some of those names. We'll go through them all here, but you have the word being, and the word thing, or something, which we combine a couple of them. Then you have the word one, the way they suddenly speak of it. And then, strange as it may seem, the word true, and the word what? Good, right? Okay? Now, these names are most universal, they're said of all, right? And it's kind of obvious to stop and take these first names, which is easier to see. Can there be something that isn't a being? See, being means what is, huh? So whatever can be said to be in any way whatsoever, can be said in some way to be a being. So can there be anything that isn't a being? Now, being is completely universal, right? Now, how about thing or something, huh? Can there be something of which something cannot be said? Can there be something that isn't something? No. So all there is besides being is what is not, and all there is besides something is nothing. Okay? And to some extent, we know everything, right? Because we know the difference between something and nothing, don't you know that? You have the famous statement of the early Greeks, you can't get something from nothing, right? Something is not nothing, right? And so we know something that is said of everything. That's extremely indistinct knowledge, huh? This is something. Okay? But everything is something. So in some way, we know everything. And that's how we understand the word everything. My students would say, I'm going to go home and tell my dad, I know everything. That's right. They can tell it to parents. But you'd say, you know everything, in some way, in some perfect way, right? Because you know what is said of everything, right? Well, then the fourth book of wisdom, huh? Aristotle shows that there's a one, not the one that's a bigger number now, but there's a one that is as universal as being and thing, huh? And one means, what? Undivided being, huh? Okay? So every being is either, what? Simple or composed, right? And if it's composed, it can't be without being put together, and that's to be one. And if the composed is one, in fortiori, the simple is one, right? So every being is in some way, what? One, right? And then, later on, some of it in book two, but more so in the ninth book, you find out that true and good are convertible, too. But I'm not going to actually say that right now, right? So Thomas is saying that the word thing or the word something is among the transcendentals, the most, what? Universal, right? But because they're said of everything, that's why they're very, what? Equivocal. So it was Aristotle's discovery that these words are equivocal by reason and not by chance. So if you look at the beginning, the first question of the great Hattie, right, Thomas will talk about this, starting with what the great Avicenna has said about these things, right? So he's calling it, this is among the transcendentals. So thing or something is said both of substance and quantity and quality and even what? Relation, right? So to be a man is to be something, right? To be five foot ten is something. right? To be a geometer or something, right? To be a father or a teacher or something, right? But not exactly in the same sense, right? Whence according as the name thing pertains to relation, it can be said in a plural way in God, right? There are three relations, right? Or four relations, actually. And three persons, right? Remember how Thomas points out, then, that there are four relations there, but only three persons, right? There's some distinction between relation and person, right? So you have to compare the two, right? Okay? And we'll be doing that in another question, right? Whence according as it pertains to relation, it is said plurally in God, right? So the father is not the son, and the son is not the father. And fatherhood is not sonhood. And then they're not so well named in the Holy Spirit, but it's the same principle, right? The breather and the breath, right? Not the same. But according as thing pertains to the substance of the thing, what it is, right? It is said singular. So I often ask you, and I say, well, Dustin, let's take us to him because he's the master. Whence Augustine says there that the same Trinity is the highest and the greatest thing. So he says both that is one highest thing. That's going to be singular, right? And then there are three things here. The father, the son, and the Holy Spirit. So sometimes I ask this question, are the father, the son, and the Holy Spirit one thing or three things? And what is the answer? Yeah. Yeah. See? Because you have to realize that thing is said of substance and relation, but with a somewhat different what? Meaning, right? So if by thing you mean the substance of God, the nature of God, what God is? God. Then they're one thing. They're one God, right? But if by thing you mean, what? Galatians, therefore the persons, right? Then they are, what? Three, not four. It's only where the relation is, what? Opposed, right? You have a real distinction. So if the father is a generator, and a breather, that doesn't make him two. There's no opposition between being a generator and a breather. But between being a generator and a generator, there's a real opposition. Between being a breather and being the breath, there's a real opposition to an issue. But those things will be cleared up when you get to the next question. So Thomas quotes Augustine, right? A little draining is a dangerous thing. They say, Augustine will say in one place that these are three things, the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. In another place, you'll see the one highest, greatest thing, right? I just looked at it. Actually, that's the same sentence. The beginning, the end, the same sentence. Yeah. Yeah. Oh, yeah. So that's a beautiful example there, right? It goes back to the categories in the sense of Aristotle, right? And understanding that being or thing there is said of all ten of them, but not the same way exactly. It's a primary substance, as he points out in the fourth book of wisdom. Okay. Now, the fourth objection is saying, well, we speak of three persons. Why not of three, what? Gods. Well, he says, God signifies, what? The divine nature there, right? But the form signified by this name, person, is not the essence or nature of God that's signified by the word God, but the personality. Whence, since there are three personalities, that is to say, three personal properties, right? In the Father, in the Son, in the Holy Spirit, it is, they are said of the three, not singularly, but what? Plural, okay? So he's putting out the distinction there between the name person and the name, what? God. It's beautiful the way he's doing it there, right? Because you stop and think of, you know, well, the name, the word God can be said of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. The word person can be said of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. But you can say there are three persons. Well, why? Because person is said of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. Well, if God is said of the three, why aren't there three gods, right? But he's putting out the difference, right? That the person is really signifying the relation, okay? And the God is signifying the nature, right? So he said there are three gods, he'd have three divine natures. And that's not true. There can only be one divine nature, only one God. But there can be three persons if the persons are these relations, huh? That wasn't too hard, was it? I have to bring in a text from the Second Vatican Council about, you know, fouling Thomas. It's very strong, actually. You know, it's talking about the Vatican to cast light upon the mysteries of the faith as much as is possible, right? And to penetrate these mysteries, right? And see their connection. They should take Thomas as a teacher. You know, sometimes people say, and they've got to figure out what they're doing wrong, you know, they'll say, oh, St. Thomas, he's trying to pry into God, or something, you know, they'll say that. But the thing is, is that what he's really doing is he's, as we're prying into how we speak of God. That's, you know, that's what he's really... Yeah, but, no, so I was going back to the definition of to believe, huh? You know, believe in the supernatural sense now, the theological virtue of to believe. And Thomas will talk about this in the Secundi Secundi, right, huh? But he'll defend what Augustine says, right? And Augustine will define the act of believing as to assent while thinking about it, you know, or thinking about something while sending it to it. We don't do that in philosophy, right? We're thinking about it, we don't assent to it yet. And once we think it out, the thinking about is over, now we assent to it. But in the act of belief, we're assenting while thinking about it, by not really comprehending it, right? So the idea of thinking about what we believe is something that is natural to reason, right? And you see that even in human belief, you if you believe you're a teacher, but you don't really understand the thing, right? You think about what you believe, right? It's natural to do that, right? So in that sense, it's natural for reason to think about what you believe, huh? And faith doesn't, and grace in general, doesn't go against nature. That would be something God would be kind to think of himself, because he gave us this nature. But you could also say, you know, that because of the difficulty of thinking about these things, and the fact that you can easily be, what, mistaken in thinking about these things, one should not be too ready to think about these things, right? But the point was that in the development of the theology, there are people called heretics, right? Which is a Greek word meaning choosers. They choose to believe some things and not other things, right? And sometimes they give some kind of a reason for their heresy, and this reason can be drawn from philosophy, and sometimes it's drawn even from scripture, right? Or it can be drawn even from Augustinism, a church father. And this confuses people. And some church father is called upon them to defend this article of the faith against this heretic, or against these heretics, so he's got followers, right? Because every heretic wants to have followers. And so a kind of force to what? Defend this, right? So Augustine can say that heresy is necessary for the development of what? Theology, right? So the Pelagian heresy is about grace, right? Forced Augustine to think more deeply about grace, and so the church, you know, says, you know, the mind... of Augustine on grace is the mind of the Church on grace, you know, really a strong thing what the Pope said. And Thomas says, you know, Augustine spoke later better about grace than he did earlier as he's forced, you know, forced to face his heresies. And you go back to the great Church councils, you know, and the first four Church councils especially were kind of laying the foundation of faith, and they were, what, when the Pope said, you know, he venerates the first four councils as much as the four Gospels, right? You know, so you've got the tradition of the Church as well as the written word. But they were reacting to heresies of Arius and people like that who were denying the divinity of Christ and sometimes denying the divinity of the Holy Spirit at least, right? So you have to try to understand how it's possible in some way for there to be three persons and one God and yet only one God, right? And so you're kind of forced by necessity, right? And you see, you know, we have these couple of definitions kind of interesting of theology. There's one that is quoted a lot, belief seeking understanding, right? And this is attributed to St. Anselm, Fides Aquarius Intellectum. But it's really substantially, what, in Augustine, right? Augustine saying, just the sort of man who would want to understand what he believes. And so when you define theology that way, then you're thinking simply of the fact that our mind naturally wonders about what he believes but doesn't understand. It naturally does that. And just like I wondered about the Pythagorean Theorem before I understood it, right? I still do, kind of. So belief seeking understanding is sort of in between belief and the epitetic vision, right? And just as you know the definition of belief there in the epistle to the Hebrews, right? You know, the substance of things hoped for, the conviction of what is not seen, huh? But the substance of things hoped for, meaning the foundation in some way of things hoped for, right? That you're, in a way, believing what you hope to see eventually one day in the good equation. And this belief seeking understanding is kind of a consolation before we get to see God as he is, huh? But as I say, it corresponds a little bit to that definition of to believe in Augustine. But as I say, it shows the connection and the harmony between belief and the nature of our reason, right? Because it's natural for our reason, right? To ought to understand what it believes, even what it guesses in some cases, you know, in philosophy, before, you know, it understands it, it tries to understand it, right? But then Thomas, you know, has another definition of theology in the beginning of the book here, right? The one from Augustine. That theology is a science by which belief is engendered, not in you, but in others. Nourished, strengthened, and what? Defended, right? So you could say theology is a defense of belief, right? That's what it should be, right? And that's even more necessary, you might say, right? Than to satisfy the wonder you have about what you believe, right? But you don't want to deny that trying to satisfy so far as is possible in this life, one's wonder, because to deny that would be to deny the nature of your mind or reason, right? But the idea that theology develops there to defend the faith is seen in the history of the church, right? Where you go to Augustine, people like that, you have all these books that are said, contra, maximum, contra, contra, contra, you know? But they're against some heretic who has denied some article of the faith with some faulty reasons, right? And you have to defend the article of the faith and answer those reasons, and you're developing, you know, in your defense here, the faith, right? And, you know, something like that takes place in philosophy, you know. I say, you know, if somebody agrees with you, well, then you kind of, you know, don't think about it much more, right? But if somebody disagrees with you, right, that's good, because either you're mistaken or not, right? And if you're mistaken, it's good that you disagree with you, because you might possibly discover your mistake. But even if you're correct and he disagrees with you, right, you're forced to kind of defend what you think. And even if it is the truth, you come to understand it, what? Better in the reasons for it, right? So there's kind of two different definitions of belief, I mean, excuse me, of theology, and they bring out two different things, right? Is there any sort of common ground between, say, Christianity, Western tradition, and Islam as far as using reason and theology to have a common sort of starting point for discussion? Well, that's what the Regenberg talk, you know. That's what security is, I hope, you know. Well, is, yeah, I'm sorry. Yeah. I mean, there are, you know, great thinkers among Mohammedans, like Abyssin, right, and the Verowes and so on. They made some mistakes, but, you know, they discovered a lot of things, too. And Thomas is always critical where they made a mistake. I mean, he often quotes him with approval, right? I don't know how many times, every time he talks about the liberality of God, right, he quotes Avicenna, right? Avicenna says, God alone is liberal, truly liberal, right? He gives, you know, he gets nothing in return. And we get, you know, the merit of a good act, you know, and we're liberal and generous, right? But God gets nothing. And he alone is liberal. He's always quoting, you know, Avicenna. And, you know, if you look at the beginning of the, the Veritati is quoting Avicenna there, right? Now, I mean, there's some things Avicenna doesn't understand, and Thomas will sometimes correct Avicenna. Avicenna makes some great mistakes, and Verowes does, too, right? But, you know, there's some question, you know, are these men, um, uh, yeah, yeah, yeah. They were very that way, you see? And it might be, you know, somewhere, even on time they were, you know, criticized, right? So it's not that kind of openness, in a sense, to the reason, huh, that there is in the church, you know? I'm sorry if these are, like, way off, out of left field, in which case I'll stop asking the question. But I'm curious if, I mean, it seems like reason has developed into a very fine art, almost, and science in the West. And it's certainly part of the gifts that God has given all of us people that he's created, whether we're from the West or not. But, um, this ability to make distinctions, and stuff, uh, would you say that it has been developed to a uniquely high degree in the West, and would Thomas Aquinas be a great exemplar of it? Or do you see other traditions elsewhere with that sort of comparable? Well, I was saying, you know, these men like Avicenna, you know, they arrived at the idea, you know, that God is I and who am, right? And God is being, is his nature, right? You know, in fact, I think they attributed it especially to El Farabi, right? You know, but you find Avicenna, and I've seen it in, uh, where I was, and so on. So, I mean, they got pretty far, these guys. I mean, they weren't, you know. Now, they made some very serious mistakes, too. I mean, you know, Thomas will, you know, and he's got books against the Arabists and so on. But, uh, um, there's a, a, uh, a real buildup there, you know, huh? But the Mohammedans did contribute something, yeah, definitely. You read Albert the Great, you see this very much so, too. You read something because Western civilization is sort of considered to be a bad thing in the West these days, you know, in the professional world and the medical world. And, uh, so this seems to be a tremendous achievement as far as being able to, uh, fine-tune our ability, our gift of reason. And yet, it's, uh, something which is under attack as being a Western, sort of, the Earth-centric kind of thing. Yeah. And, uh, but I'm curious, I mean, since reason is a gift from God to all of us, to children, uh, are there other traditions even outside of the West of Islam? Well, you see, you've got to realize that the Arabs came in contact with the Greeks, right? Right. And, uh, just like with science there, you know, Schrodinger says, uh, there's a book, he's a famous physicist, Schrodinger, right? The guy perfected the mathematics and wave mechanics and so on. But Schrodinger has a book called Nature and the Greeks and so on. He says, uh, science is the Greek way of looking. at things. Now, it's obviously not a definition of science, right? But it's a compliment that's never been paid to anybody but the Greeks, the ancient Greeks, right? And he says, and no one has ever had science, he says, who's not come in contact with the Greeks. And you can say the same thing about philosophy, right? No one's had real philosophy who has not come in contact with the Greeks. Well, the Arabs came in contact with the Greeks, you know, before the medievals, in some respects, right? Because they were exposed to the texts out there. And I guess, you know, some of the Christians actually helped them, you know, in the Middle East there. And so, they developed things, you know, medicine and things of this sort. So they, but then they went into a decay, you might say, right? And you wonder now whether there's anybody's reading Avicenna or Averroes over there. You know, see, I doubt it, you know, but I don't, you know, I've never been to the universities or whatever they have there. Yeah. But, you know, when you compare even the Greeks, say, and the Romans, like I mentioned how this grammarian is telling me how the Greeks figured out the grammar of the Greek language, and the Romans couldn't figure out the grammar of their own language, so they copied the grammar of the Greek language, which to some extent fitted the Latin language, but not perfectly. And that's why he says the cases, that we learn them in Latin, the order is mistaken, right? And it's because what they did was take the order of the Greek cases, which don't correspond exactly to the Latin cases. And the Latins have the case that the Greeks don't have, so it just got attached on the end there. And he says in Greek, you know, the noun, nominative case, as it's called, underlies the whole sentence, right? And then the other three cases, the genitive, the dative, and the accusative come in that order because of their order to the verb. So the genitive signifies something that is imagined to be before the action of the verb, okay? So I hit you with a tool, I can add the tool if I hit you, right? So that would be signified in the genitive, right? And then the dative goes along with the action of the verb. And then the accusative is imagined to be something after the thing. So I hit you, you're after the the action of the verb, right? So, but in Latin, say, the abdative does some of the functions of the, what? The genitive in Greek, but it's put last because there's nothing like the abdative in Greek. And the dative, I guess, in Latin is kind of understood as after the accusative. So I gave the book to you. That's in the dating, you know? And doc, debra, me, you know, something like that. And so that should be put after the accusative. But they put it before because the Greeks had this, you know? So the Romans were too dumb to figure out the grammar of their own language. And then he tells me that the English grammarians, even if they had the Roman grammarians. So, you know, then you see the same thing in fiction, right? You go back to the Greeks, and you see, especially the Roman comedies, their imitations of the Greek comedians, huh? And they imitate the tragedians and so on. And then, of course, Shakespeare's The Comedy of Errors is imitating the Latin comedy that imitates the Greek comedy. So I didn't realize, you know, the standard book, you know, in geometry, the one I still study, Euclid's Elements, right? It's written, what, 300 B.C., yeah, 300 B.C. in Alexandria about that time. So that was the standard textbook, right? And so Einstein says, you know, if Euclid didn't arouse your youthful enthusiasm, you were not born to be a scientist, right? And Heisenberg says, you know, we're still trying to answer the questions the Greeks asked, you know? And so, now, of course, the modern Greeks may not be at all the, you know, what the ancient Greeks were, right? But the ancient Greeks were kind of the sources of philosophy and science and grammar and geometry and grammar. It must come from the Greek word, right? Gramming. And then geometry, Greek word, right? Arithmetic, philosophy, yeah? Not by chance these are Greek words, right? It's kind of take more and try to make a Latin English or whatever, philosophia, philosophy. So, I mean, the nations are not equal in their contributions to the life of the mind, huh? One thing that we might, you know, be very proud of is our music, right, huh? The music of the Baroque period, huh? And then he came in, you know, Father Newhouse, I was talking about having dinner with, a meal with Cardinal Ratzinger, and Ratzinger says he ends up the day, you know, with a half hour, mostly Mozart, days mostly Mozart for half an hour, sometimes 37 minutes. But I don't think Greek music got the same development, you know? I suppose partly the fact that the modern world was characterized by this mathematical knowledge, and there's something mathematical about music, music, huh? I suspect Mozart would have found nuclear rather easy. So I don't know how open they are to reason over there anymore, you know? Yeah. Well, you see these elections, you know, people. Why are you supporting so-and-so? I remember a friend of my brother-in-law was working one of the gubernatorial campaigns in years ago now, and he was trapped in law of the state of Massachusetts, you know, working for this guy who was named for governor. And the thing that struck me was that people don't really know the issues, you know? And they're often supporting the candidate who's opposed to the issues. And they don't even know that, right? But you just see this ignorance all over the state, you know, I mean, as the white people... So go on to the next article here now? Yeah. Oh, okay, yeah. Okay.