Prima Pars
Lecture 144: Essential Names, Supposition, and Divine Generation

Transcript
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Okay, Article 4 here, with your essential names, concrete essential names, can stand for a person. To the fourth one proceeds thus, it seems that essential concrete names are not able to stand for a person, thus that this would be true, for example, God, but it gets you, generates God, right? Right. Because, as the sophists say, the sophists are the guys who, what, started grabbing, right? So they don't call them sophists, so that they're lesser people. Because, as the sophists say, a singular term signifies the same thing that it stands for, right? But this name, God, seems to be a singular term, since it cannot be said plural, right? The plural. Therefore, since it signifies the essence, the nature of God, it seems that it stands for the nature, and not for, what? A person, huh? Moreover, a term laid down in a subject is not restricted through a term placed in the predicate by reason of its signification, but only by reason of the time signified with, huh? Just as when I say, and notice he's saying that, right? That if you say something of the subject, right, in the sentence, that's not going to change the meaning of that, right? It just signifies something of time, like the verb does. As when I say God creates, this name God stands for the essence. Therefore, when it is said that God generates, this term God cannot, what? By reason of the predicate, the notional predicate, the relative predicate, which is what the verb, to engender, right, is something that pertains to a person. It cannot stand for a, what? Person, right? It's like you're changing the meaning of it, right? Moreover, if this is true, that God, what, generates, because the Father generates, right? For a life reason, this would be true that God does not generate, because the Son does not generate. Therefore, God is generating and not generating. So it seems to have the same God, right? And therefore, you have two gods, huh? What's affirmed of one is denied, the other can have the same God. Moreover, if God engenders God, either, what, the same God himself, right, or another God, right? But not the God himself, because as Augustine says, no thing generates itself. Nor another God, because then there would be, what? Yeah, because there's not except one God. There's only one God. Therefore, this is false, that God generates God, right? God from God, light from light, true God from true God. Moreover, if God engenders God, either the God who is God the Father, or the God who is not God the Father. If the God who is God the Father, therefore God the Father is generated, right? If the God who is not God the Father, therefore the God who is not God the Father, which is false. Therefore, you cannot say that God generates God, right? If you mind, you know, I was studying, you know, the formal soldierism there, you know, in Princeton College, you know, getting the formal soldierism down. I said, I want to get a room all by myself. It's quiet. I'm trying to understand this. It gets a little bit complicated, right? Against all this is that in the symbol, meaning the creed, right? You said God from God, light from light, true God from true God. So you say God from God, what does God stand for? You know, you say God from God. Well, the God that is from God is the Son. And, yeah. So, I mean, if there's creed in saying it. To the first answer, it should be said that some say that this name, God, and like names, properly, according to their very nature, stand for the, what? Essence, right? The divine nature. But from the joining to them of something that's, what, notional, something relative, something in persons, they are drawn to, what, standing for a person, right? And this opinion would seem to proceed from a consideration of divine simplicity, which requires that in God, the same is the one having and what is had, right? And thus, the one having deity, which is signified by this name, God, is the same thing as what? God, huh? Well, Tom's going to come in here with a distinction, right? I told you, this Dominican I knew, you know, his teacher said, you know, never affirm, seldom deny, always distinguish. Kind of exaggeration, but there's a little truth to this, right? But Thomas says, in what is proper to various kinds of speech, right, one ought to not only note the thing signified, right, but also the way of signifying it. And therefore, because this name, God, signifies the divine nature as in the one having it, right, just as this name, man, signifies, what, human nature in the, what, underlying subject. Others say better, that this name, God, from its way of signifying, right, has that it can properly stand for a person, just as this name, what, man, right? So sometimes this name, God, stands for the nature, as when it is said, God creates, huh? Why? Because this predicate, which is creates, right, belongs to the subject by reason of the form signified, which is the divine nature, huh? But sometimes it stands for the person, either one alone, as when it is said, God, what, generates, or two, meaning the Father and the Son, when it is said, God agrees, right? Or three, when it is said to the, what, king of the ages, the immortal, invisible, the only God, huh? So, am I a man, from a man, to the generated and generated, are the same? A man generated a man, it's not the same thing, obviously, as God, but, you know. You, even your son, and your father. So when a man generates a man, the first man, in a sense, stands for the, what, father, right? And the second man, in a sense, stands for a son, right? You can see a man generates a man, right? It's not exactly the same, because the human nature is multiplied there, right? All right, God, when God generates God, you're going to have the human nature, the divine nature, multiplied there, it means a woman. Okay, now, in regard to the first objection there, right, Thomas points out that this name, God, God, although it comes together with singular terms. that the form signified is not what? Multiplied. It comes together nevertheless with common terms, right? In this regard, that the form signified, the divine nature which is signified in there, is found in many what? Individual subjects, right? In many persons. Whence it is not necessary that it always stand for the what? Essence which it what? Signifies, huh? What's he saying there? He's saying that the name God can stand for something that it doesn't what? Signify it. Sounds a little strange, doesn't it? But because it signifies as what? Having the divine nature. And that's true of the person, right? So we can attribute to God, or say God generates by reason of a person who has a divine nature generating, right? And we can say a God is generated, right? Or a God is born, right? Didn't they used to, on Christmas day, to have, you know, a number of masses and one would be dealing with the divine birth of him and then he'd get down to the human birth in the later mass? Isn't that the way they were set up, you know, a number of masses? But notice that's because of the difference, huh? If God signifies the divine nature, would you say the divine nature generates? But what has a divine nature can generate. One who has a divine nature can generate, right? And another who has a divine nature can be, what? Generated, huh? Because God signifies not just the divine nature, but what has a divine nature. And that can be said of the person, right? And that generating, the power of generating the Father has, has one half of the nature. Yeah. I will get into that in the other question, right? I think it's like the pretty things, okay. Now the second objection says, is not saying that the name God can stand for a person as well as for, what? The divine nature, right? So he says that objection proceeds against those who say that this name God does not have a natural supposition for a, what? Person, right? Thomas is saying by reason of the fact that it signifies what has a divine nature, right? And because each of the three persons has a divine nature, right? Then the name that signifies what has a divine nature can stand sometimes for a person. And you know that from, what? The verb or something, right? That it is here standing for this person or that person, right? So we say God is born. God is generated. Then God here is standing for, what? The Son, right? But if I say God generates or God gives birth to, then God is standing for the, what? Father, yeah. You know, the third objection. If this is true, he says, that God engenders because the Father generates, for like reason, this would be true that God does not generate because the Son does not generate. Therefore, there is a God who generates and a God not generating. And so you're affirming of one God which you're denying of the other God. So they can't be the same God, right? They've got one God, right? Okay. It sounds kind of long reply to this, right? You know how this guy got to sleep at night time. To the third it should be said, in another way, the name God has itself to standing for a, what? Prison. How does your text translate that, by the way? That's probably the best way I'm putting it, to stand for, I think, in English. Do they use the word stands for? Yeah, I think that's the way they translate it. Often puzzled about supposition, you know. But, you know, it's not like the supposition of a name is the same thing as the meaning of the name, right? So he said the name stands for something. It's not to say that's its meaning. Anyway. In another way, he says, the name God stands for a person and it's name man. Because the form, or the nature signified to the name man, that is humanitas, or human nature, right, really is divided in diverse individual subjects, right? Then by itself, it stands for, what? A person, right? Even though nothing is added that determines it to that person, right? Which is a distinct, what? Individual. But the unity, or the community of human nature, is not in things, it couldn't have well, right? But only in the mind, only according to, what? Consideration. So human nature is common only in our mind, huh? Out here in the real world, it's all, what? Individually. Your human nature and my human nature. Whence this term, man, does not stand for the common nature, except when it is required by something added, right? As when we say man is a species, huh? That's only in the mind, huh? But man is universal. That's one of the five predicables, that Porphyry talks about, huh? It's only Porphyry is very anti-Christian, anti-Catholic, right? And I guess Thomas says somewhere that Augustine says, was it pride or what kept them out of faith? I think it's an interesting thing in terms of reason in faith, right? That Porphyry's book is regarded as the beginning of philosophy. And as I mentioned, you know, Albert the Great has a whole paraphrase of it, right? Cardinal Cajetan has got a commentary on it, right? Thomas uses it all the time. So they all agree that this is excellent and fundamental even though the Mohammedans would regard as the beginning of logic and so on. And so despite those who are Mohammedans or Christians or pagans or whatever they are, they all accept the, what, Porphyry of Isegogae. Marvelous. But the form signified by this name God to wit the divine nature is one in common secundum rem in things. Whence by itself it stands for the, what, common nature, right? But from an addition, something added to it, its supposition it's standing for is determined to some, what, person. whence when it is said God generates by reason of the notional act, the relative act, it stands this name God for the person of the Father. But when it is said that God does not generate, nothing is added that determines this name to the person of the Son. Whence it would be understood that generation is repugnant to what? Yeah. But if there is added something pertaining to the person of the Son, the speech would be true as if it were said that the generated God does not what? Yeah. Whence also it does not follow that God is generating and God is not generating unless there be placed something pertaining to the persons. As if we say that the Father is God generating and the Son is God not generating. And thus it does not follow that there are many gods, because the Father and the Son are one God, as He has been said. I've been smoking for a while, right? Read that in the quiet of your cell. The letter is supposed to be of advice to Thomas to the students, you know, love yourself if you want to know. But Moses, he joking, said, stay in your cell, and your cell will teach you all. Yeah. On his fourth objection, it could be very difficult here. If God generates God, either Himself God, right? Or another God, right? Not Himself God, because nothing generates itself, therefore another God. It can't be so, because there is, what, only one God. Therefore, it's false to say that God generates God, right? To the fourth, he says, it should be said that this is false, that God, that the Father generates Himself God, right? Because the pronouns say, right? Self, since his reciprocal refers to the same, what, individual subject, right? I generated myself, what he's saying, right? Nor is it contrary what Augustine says to Maximus, huh? He's actually referred to as Contra-Maximus, isn't he? That God, that God, the Father, generates another, what, self. Because the word self is either of the Abitur case, that he generates someone other than himself, right? Or it makes a simple relation, and thus it, what, identity of nature. But it is an improper or emphatic speech, whose sense is that he generates another, most like, what, himself. Likewise, this is false, that he generates another God. Because although the Son is other in the masculine case, therefore the Father, nevertheless he should not be said to be another God. Because it would be understood that this adjective, other, would place its thing around the substantial thing, which is God. And thus it would signify a distinction of the divine nature. Some, however, can see this, that he generates another, what, God. Thus that the word allios is substantive, and the word God is, what, construed with it. But this is an improper way of speaking, and should be avoided, lest there be given an occasion of, what, here. I won't try to unfold it anymore. Now the fifth one, here. If God generates God, either the God who is God the Father, or God who is not God the Father. If the God who is God the Father, therefore God the Father is generated. If the God who is not God the Father, therefore there is a God who is not God the Father, which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that God generates God, right? To the fifth, then it should be said that this is false. That God, what, generates a God who is God the Father. Because since the word Father is, what, construed with, what, the word God, it would restrict it to standing for the person the Father. So the sense would be that it generates a God who is the Father himself, right? And thus the Father would be generated, which of course is false. Whence the negative is true, it generates a God who is not, what, the Father. If, however, this construction be understood to not be, what, a positive, how do they translate that anyway? Yeah. Yeah, that's what it is in Latin, a positive, I don't know if there's a better word for it. But something should be, what, interjected, right, or placed in between. Then the reverse, the affirmative is true, the negative false. The sense is, he generated a God who is God who is the Father. But this is a, what, stretched, extorted, huh, exposition. Whence it is better that simply the affirmative being denied, right, and the negative, what, conceded. Pre-Positinus, nevertheless, says that both the negative and the affirmative is, what, false. Because this relative who, in the affirmative, can refer to the individual subject. But in the negative, it refers to the signified and to the, what, subject, yeah. Whence the sense of the affirmative is that to be God the Father belongs to, what, the person of the Son. The negative sense is that God the Father is not only removed from the person of the Son, but even from his divinity. But this seems unreasonable, Thomas says, irrational. Because, according to the philosopher, about the same of whom, there's affirmation, there can be, what, yeah. So, then you've probably been smoking for a while. Difficult, huh? But notice, what's the basic thing that Thomas is saying in the body of the article? He's saying that the name God can stand for, what, divine nature, right? So, when you say God creates, right, God is good, right, you're saying this by reason of being, what, God, by reason of having the divine nature, right? When you say that God generates or God gives birth, then God is standing for the Father, right? And why can you stand for the Father? Because God signifies what has the divine nature. And knowingly does God have the divine nature. But you can truly say that since the Father is God, the Father also has the divine nature, right? So, God can stand for the Father. And that it's standing for the Father is clear from the, what, predicate, right? So, I mean, you get these two statements. You say God is good, or God creates or something. And you say, well, by reason of the predicate, you can see that it's standing for, what, what belongs to God, the reason of his divine nature to be good, right, huh? Or you say God engenders or gives birth, right, then God is standing for the, what, Father, right, huh? I mean, it's got kind of a subtle distinction there between the meaning of a word and what it, what, stands for, right? And so I was taking something more and more known to us and saying that, is it true or can it be true that a man generates a man? You say, well, if a man generates a man, then the generator and the generator are the same, because they're both a man. You say, well, and if you can't say this, right, because nothing generates itself. You say, well, can't you say that a man generates a man? No, no, it's not two different meanings of a man, right? So you say a man generates a man, does a man mean the same thing? Well, yeah. You see, because, yeah, you see, yeah, yeah. But does a man stand for the same man? You say a man generates a man. Then the first one stands for the Father, and the second one stands for the Son, right? 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But isn't there a true distinction there between the meaning of a word and what it stands for, right? So you say, well, what does that mean, you know? Now, if you say that man is a species, right? Or man is universal. But man is a species, the kind of universal it is. Now, one of the mystic arguments is like this. You say, man is a species, Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is a what? Species, right? So you say man is a species, and you say Socrates is a man. Does man mean the same thing? Well, it's the universal. Species is one of the five universals. And when you say Socrates is a man, though man is something universal being said of Socrates. So isn't the meaning of man the same in those two sentences? Well, I mean, when you say Socrates is a man, man is a species, right? Does man have a different meaning in those two sentences? No, not the thing. Well, if it's not a difference in meaning, is it a difference in what they call supposition, what it's standing for, right? Yeah. Is that the same as saying it's the way it's signified? No, I don't think it's the way it's signified. But when you say man is a species, it's standing for something in our mind, right? Because it's in our mind that something's universal as a species, right? But when I say that Socrates is a man, is man standing for something in our mind? No, something in the real world, right? So it doesn't seem to me that you have two meanings of the word man there, but there seems to be some kind of difference in supposition, right? Just like in my example there, you say a man generates a man, or a man teaches a man. We're focusing here. Can a man teach a man? If a man teaches a man, then wouldn't the same man be knowing and ignorant? It's like giving birth to yourself, right? You see, you have to both be and not be, right? So if a man teaches himself, he both knows and doesn't know the subject, right? So you say, well, therefore, it's impossible for a man to teach a man. But, you know, you say a man teaches a man, does a man have a different meaning in the subject and in the, you know, predicate there? Yeah. But you have a teacher and student in there, right? Not in the sense, right? We're a teacher or a student. So you say, is it false to say that sometimes, rarely, a man teaches a man, right? Is that, or is that, can that be true sometimes, that a man teaches a man? Okay. Yeah. You say a man teaches a man. Yeah. But you could say that the first a man stands for the teacher, right? Mm-hmm. And then, in the second case, it stands for the, what, student, right? Mm-hmm. You see? I mean, that's the way to speak of it, rather than say that a man has two meanings here, right? Right. And first it means teacher, and then it means, what, student. See? Well, some of you might be tempted to say that, right? Mm-hmm. But are those really two different meanings of the word man? Does man sometimes mean teacher and sometimes mean student? No. A teacher and a student are both a man in the same sense of man, aren't they? You see? Now, sometimes, you know, students will get confused, you know, even with, you know, their genus and species, and you say, well, when you say a dog is an animal, you say a cat is an animal. You say both of them, that's an animal, right? And then you ask the students, well, you say a dog is an animal, and you say a cat is an animal, does animal mean the same thing? And you usually get some student who will be tempted to say that animal doesn't mean the same thing, right? Is that true? In other words, you'd be saying that dog and cat are two meanings of the word animal. You see? You'd be like saying, you know, that square and oblong, let's say, rhombus, are two meanings of the word quadrilateral, I think. You see? Or like saying that tragedy and comedy are two meanings of the word play or drama, are they? Or like two and three are two meanings of the word number, are they? Huh? No. They're one and the same meaning, right? So when I say a man teaches a man, which happens occasionally, does a man, in the two uses in that sentence, have a different meaning? One case it means teach, and another case it means student? You know, you tend to say that, right? See? But still, there's some difference, right? Because it can't be the same man who is a teacher and taught. So when you say, but is it false to say that sometimes a man teaches a man? Sometimes God teaches a man. But I mean, you could say that, truly I think, that sometimes a man teaches a man. I mean, you've got to make some distinction then between meaning and what it stands for, right? Because a man means someone has human nature and the teacher has human nature, then a man can stand for the teacher, right? And since a student has human nature, he's a man too. So it can stand for him, right? In the same way you say a man generates a man, right? Or a man kicks a man. That's pretty hard. I thought you could kick yourself in some sense, but it's kind of hard too. So it takes a while to get thinking about this supposition, right? But there is something there, right? That has to be, what? Understood. And if we understood not the same problems exactly, but somewhat similar problems, even with things other than God, right? It's not the same thing to say that this is the meaning of a man and what it's standing for in this sentence, right? And perhaps this other example is getting there, you know, where you say Socrates is a man and man is a species, right? Does man have different meaning in those two sentences? But in one case, man is standing for what is in reality, right? In the other case, it's standing for what is in our mind. When I first started out in philosophy, you know, to ask you what a metaphor is and people would say improper supposition. I know where they got this idea, you know. And is that really what it is? I don't think it is that. In other words, what Thomas says when he says He explains metaphor, and he begins in the general there, and he says in the figure of speech, that when the man speaks figuratively, the meaning of his words is not the meaning of the speaker. So is the word standing for something they shouldn't stand for? Is that what metaphor really is? They call it improper supposition, right? So when I say you're a pig, you know, they're saying, well, pig is standing for what? Glutton or something, right? And that's not really what it stands for. It stands for it's four foot down. Does that be the way to understand what a metaphor is? So when I call you a pig, do I really mean that you're a pig? No, what I really mean is you're a glutton. So my word doesn't mean what I mean. And then Thomas says, well, that's kind of a strange thing that you're doing, right? To not say what you mean. But there's a way in which what you mean can be understood in what you say. And in the case of metaphor, it's by a certain, what, distant likeness, huh? You rat, you know? You prepare you to the different animals, right? Boethius talks about this, you know? How a man, when he departs from reason, he becomes like a, what, a beast, yeah. But different beasts going to what is, a fox, you know, a fox, you know. One, yeah. Right. Mm-hmm. Yeah. Doves and so on. Where does Thomas talk about that? Yeah, I can use some of those passages. But kind of the key passage for me was one in the commentary on the epistles of St. Paul, where St. Paul uses irony, right? And Thomas has to defend St. Paul from lying or saying something false, right? And he explains the fact that Thomas is speaking figuratively, right? And he's talking, isn't it Galatians or something like that? He's talking about what wonderful people you are, you know? And well, then Thomas gives this general notion of what figurative speech is, right? That when you speak figuratively, the meaning of your words, right, and the meaning of you are not the same, right? And then he just contrasts two of them, metaphor and irony, right? Because metaphor is based, as we said, upon a likeness, right, although distant, between what your word means and what you mean, right? The likeness, in this case, from the pig, let's say, the glutton, right? And then in the case of irony, it's the reverse. It's the opposite. So the example I always gave when I was teaching, I'd say, if I come in here on the weekend, and I find you drunk under the table, and I'd say, what a fine example of a, you know, some sort of college student, right? Well, they know I don't mean that. I mean, just the opposite of what I said, right? But a lot of times in daily life, when someone's kind of mean to us, they say, gee, you're nice. You know, you hear people say it all the time, right? And so, St. Paul is using irony, right, huh? Saying the opposite of what he means, huh? So, you've got to distinguish between figurative speech and lying or making a mistake, right? So those are all different things, right? And, you know, my example in class was, you know, if Romeo calls Juliet Rosalind, which is the name of the girl he was in love with before he knew Juliet, that would be a mistake. It's always a mistake to call. But if he calls her Honey, you know, she'd be pretty dosed. She'd say, that's not my name. Then he'd be speaking figuratively, right? But he says, Rosalind. Who's that? And I suppose, you know, another thing would be lying, right? When you speak figuratively, you're not lying, right? I've told you a million times. That's hyperbole, right? Well, is your mother lying when she says that? She says, I told you a million times, you know, to pick up your room or whatever it is? She probably has. If I told you once, I told you a million times. Don't exaggerate me. The thing is, you know, we don't want to speak metaphorically in daily life and in fiction, you know, more to express our emotions, right? But there are other reasons why sacred scripture uses metaphors, huh? Not to express emotions, right? But for the reasons Thomas gives in the beginning of the book, right? Because of the great distance between these things, right? But also to somewhat hide the truth, right? But also, you know, Thomas gives as a reason that the whole of us should be subject to God, right? And so when I genuflect, my legs become subject to God, right? And when I use metaphors, or scripture uses metaphors, even my imagination becomes subject to God, right? It's more important to me that your imagination is subject to God than your feet, although that's important too, right? But the imagination is always leading us, like, astray, as Jane Austen would say, you know, it's always... We're always imagining people to be other than they are, and we rarely, you know, in politics, it's the truth, you know, in the image of the speaker, and the politician is usually the opposite of what he is, right? Yeah, yeah. Be in person now. Be in person. Exclude anyone. My politician, a friend coming back there, coming back from the Democratic Convention, that nominated Kennedy, and he said, what is Kennedy really like? Cold as ice. Wow. So everybody got... But I know in Minnesota we had two guys, Humphrey, you know, who ran national, and Friedman, and Friedman didn't really like people, you know. Humphrey's really a funny guy. Even in private life, he was really a nice guy, you know. So one image, you know, was quite false. The other image was Tui really was kind of a nice guy. It sounded like Regan was, right? Because in private life, he was a nice guy, you know. Some of these guys, not really what they pretend to be. So in Jane Austen's novels, you often have, you know, man, here's something other than he is, right? Then you have the moment of truth. Shakespeare has that in Oswald and Innsbruck, I guess it is, yeah. Where the guy's always bragging about what great soldier he is, right? And so they dress themselves up like enemy soldiers, and they capture him when he's out on patrol, and then they pretend, you know, can't demand, you know, and he reveals the thing and so on. And then after he reveals the thing, then they pull off their masks, you know, and he's completely disgraced. He says, who cannot be betrayed by the plot? Well, it's the idea, you know, that, you know, if you arrange the plot, you can find out maybe things about people, right? You know, I think I told you I saw this, I guess they made a movie out at one time, where people were going to be interviewed for a, what, position with the Secret Service, you know, for the CIA, it was. And they were all being invited to this mansion in Virginia someplace, right? And then they were going to be examined, you know, the thing. And after they arrived, of course, they were informed that the people who were going to investigate them were delayed, you know, and they were going to be staying at the mansion for a couple of weeks before the thing begins. What they don't realize is that during those two weeks, they're really being examined, right? And some guys are falling in love with the woman there, you know, and this is a bad thing for a spy, you know, because that's how secrets get out, usually, you know. And other things are testing them, you know, and that way they find out, right? There's another guy, kind of a vulgar joke, but he's kind of funny, huh? They're at a party there, and he's discussing with the woman there, would you sleep with a man for a million dollars, just one night? Well, for a million dollars, yeah, you know? And then later on, the guy comes by in the office, the woman, $20. He says, who do you think I am? And the guy says, well, we already know what you are, just dig in about the price. But, you know, there's an old saying, every man has his price, right? You see? And, you know, I hear this sometimes, too, you know, an offer you couldn't resist, you know, I mean, you know, good people go to some place and go to another place, because they got an offer you couldn't see, you know, couldn't refuse, right? So, I mean, you could arrange, you know, plot, you know, get the moment of truth about somebody, right? That's a terrible thing, right? So this guy's name is Paroles, which means in French, I guess, words, right? So who got me to betray the plot, right? He doesn't have much dignity, so he can still come back to society and make a living, you know, somehow.