Prima Pars
Lecture 145: Meaning and Supposition: The Distinction in Theological Language

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Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, orden and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. And help us to understand what you have written. Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, Amen. Let's come back a little bit upon this distinction we met in the last article. The distinction between the meaning of a word or words and what they stand for. At first sight, that might seem to be exactly the same thing, right? The word stands for whatever they mean, right? Okay. But let's imitate Augustine here. Kind of approach the distinction from a little dialectic. Only look sometimes, you know, maybe in the future at the reasons of the incarnation. Thomas Aquinas following, I think, St. Augustine. And a couple of the reasons, he starts with a kind of dialectic. Augustine says, for example, God should be followed, but he can't be seen. Man can be seen, but he's not a perfect model to follow. Don't get a problem there, right? Well, God solves it by becoming man. And so you have both something to be seen and something perfect to be followed. Or, you know, man sins, so man should make reparation, but he can't do it. God could, but he didn't commit the sin. How did he get out of this dilemma? Well, God became man, right? So you see how appropriate this was. Well, go back to this distinction here and see how you approach it in this way. Okay, would you admit, if you didn't know I was going to get you into a little math, would you admit that no son is the one of whom he is a son? You're not your own son, are you? No. Okay, so no son is the one of whom he is a son. Okay? Okay? Now, I am the son of a man. True or false? True. Okay? So if I'm the son of a man, I'm obviously not a man, right? Because no one is the one of whom he is a son. I'm the son of a man, therefore I'm not a man. Now, obviously I am a man. Mm-hmm. But you've got a problem here, right? You admit that no son is the one of whom he is a son. You admit that I am the son of a man, and yet you admit that I am a man. You can't have your cake and eat it, right? Mm-hmm. You see? Now, one attempt to unravel this, which I would regard as a false solution, but one attempt to unravel this would be to say, Well, when I said that I'm the son of a man, a man means my father. Okay? Well, of course, everyone in this room is a son of a man, right? And so when I say you're the son of a man, a man means your father. And you, another man, right? Okay? But now, do the words, a man, really have all these meanings? You're talking in one sense in the real singular, the other case in the plural. Yeah, yeah. Like you say, every one of us in this room is a son of a man, right? Okay? But I'm the son of my father, and you're the son of your father, and so on, right? So, do the words, a man, when I say that I'm the son of a man, do the words, a man, mean we know Victor Berkowitz, who is my father? And when you say you're the son of a man, it has another meaning, and there's as many meanings of the two words, a man, as there are, what? Fathers in the world, huh? Is that true? Or is it that because a man can be said of your father, my father, and the next man's father, and a man means something that has human nature, and your father, my father, and the next father has human nature, therefore, a man can stand for your father in one context and my father in another context, right? Isn't that a better solution, right? Okay? Now, this distinction is a beginning of many things, huh? And a beginning in philosophy or theology is always a seed, huh? And a seed is something small in size, but great in its power. And because it's small in size, it's hard to see. So it's kind of hard to see a distinction between the meaning of a word and what it stands for. They seem to be almost the same thing. And when you say a man is an animal, let's say, or a man is an animal that has reason, you wouldn't maybe see the importance of this distinction, right? But when you say that no son is the one of whom he is a son, and yet we all would say without hesitation that I am the son of a man, we see the necessity of this distinction between the meaning of a word and what it might stand for, right? There's a connection between the two, right? If my father didn't have human nature and your father didn't have human nature, we couldn't say that a man is standing in the one sentence for my father and another sentence for your father and so on. But it's not exactly the same thing, right? The meaning of a word and what it is standing for, right? So when I say a man is an animal that has reason, a man is not standing for my father, your father, is it? Although it can be said that your father and my father, right? But it's not standing for either one of them. It's standing for man as he is what? It's what his nature is, right? Thinking of what man is by nature, huh? Okay? Not what man can stand for, right? Okay? Now, there's a little passage here from a pope here from Providentissimus Deus, the Deo of the Great. This is the encyclical on scripture, right? And in paragraph 97, he's talking about the late scholastics, including Thomas Aquinas, and their contributions to the study of sacred scripture. And I just read you this little paragraph 96. With the age of the scholastics, he says, came fresh and welcome progress in the study of the Bible. That the scholastics were solicitous about the genuineness of the Latin version is evident from the Correctoria Biblica, or a list of emendations which they have left. But they expended their labors and industry chiefly on interpretation and explanation. To them we owe the accurate and clear distinction, such as had not been given before, of the various senses of the sacred words. The assignment of the value of each sense in theology. The division of books into parts. Thomas always dividing, subdividing by two or three. And the summaries of the various parts. Now this last sentence is the one I want to make applicable to this distinction. The valuable work of the scholastics in holy scripture is seen in their theological treatises and in their scripture commentaries. Notice he mentions both of them, right? Now obviously the scripture commentaries is what he's, you know, emphasized here. But he also says, in their theological treatises, of which the summa is one, right? And the last sentence is, and in this respect, the greatest name among them all is St. Thomas Aquinas. So. Does this distinction here in theology, is it useful and necessary for understanding sacred scripture? Well, when I left last night, I got to the last class, I think it was, I got thinking about this famous passage from our Lord in the third chapter of John. For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son, that those who believe in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. So look at those words, for God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son. Well, son is not the one of whom he is the son, right? So the son of God is obviously not what? Yeah. But you see the importance of this distinction, right? You say, well, when you say God so loved the world, God is standing for what? Yeah. Now, does that mean that God the Father, for that matter, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit, that these are three meanings of the word God? No. Not three meanings, I think. No. And yet, you've got to understand this text correctly. To say that God there is standing for the God the Father. Now, okay, or take another text, as Paul VI said, talking about Matthew chapter 16. As you know, he says, the whole church is built upon the faith of Peter. So the profession of the faith of Peter at Cesar of Philippi, which is given completely in Matthew, not in Mark and Luke, is pretty important that the whole church is built upon this profession of faith. But what is the perfection of faith of Peter when Christ asks, who am I? And you get all the false answers and so on. And then Christ says, what do you say? And Christ, and Peter says, thou art the, what, Christ, the Son of the living God. Well, the Son is not the one of whom he is, the Son. In the middle of the Dalai again. So if he's the Son of the living God, he's obviously not the living God. This is radical, to say the least. And you say, well, how can he be the Son of the living God and still be the living God? Well, obviously, the living God there is standing for what? The Father, right? So this is an extremely important distinction in theology. But it helps to illuminate these, what, texts, huh? And even in the beginning of the Gospel of John, you say, and the Word was towards God, right? In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was actually like, because, towards God, right? Well, you're not towards yourself, you're towards another, right? So if the Word is towards God, then the Word is what? It's not God, right? Well, that's a serious mistake, to say the least. And so, what's the solution to this, right? Objection, right? Say, well, God there is standing for the, what? The Father, right? Does that mean that the Word God has a different meaning there than elsewhere in Scripture? No. Okay, one last thing, a little further removed, but important. We say the rule of prayer is the rule of faith, right? And we're very accustomed to the Hail Mary. And we say in the second part there, Holy Mary, Mother of God, right? I don't know if you've had this experience talking, maybe to a Protestant even, huh? Where they kind of find a little unease with the expression, Mother of God. You run into that in talking sometimes to them? Because Mother of God might seem to imply that she is somehow the mother of the divine nature. She gave rise to the divine nature, and we don't mean this at all, do we? Well, let me say, somebody would say, well, by God, do we mean Christ? Well, then why don't you say Mother of Christ? Why don't you say Mother of God? But as you know, with the stories and so on, Mother of God is very important to insist upon, right? Well, what would you say about it? Does the word God mean here? Yeah. And so God here is standing for the second person, for the Son of God, and she's the mother of this person, right? According to his human nature, right? I think that's very striking, huh? Example of how God can stand for one of the persons, right? Even when it's not, what? In his divine nature, right? But still we speak of her as being the mother of God, right? Because this person who took human nature from her, right? This person is, in fact, one of those having in common that divine nature. And therefore, you can say that she is the mother of God, right? So, the uneasiness that they have with that, right, is partly because they don't see that distinction and the application of it to that Son. Notice, even if you take, you know, further removed relations, like say, if I say, for example, that two is half of a number, would you say that? Is that true, that two is half of some number? But you're not half of yourself, right? So, if two is half of a number, then two is obviously not a number. Well, again, here you've got a different relation than Son and so on. But what is the number standing for there, right? Yeah, it's not as if it takes on the meaning of four, right? That would be kind of incorrect way of saying it, right? So, it's a very, very subtle, what, distinction, huh? But, wait, did you hear any of the Pope's addresses in this area? No, I haven't. Well, one thing that struck me is in terms of this subject matter, this course here, one of his sermons there talks, he was speaking of the triune God. I think that's an interesting word, right? What does that mean, triune God? Yeah, three in one. I even looked up the dictionary to make sure, you know, it wasn't a false etymology, right? But he wasn't elaborating on the mystery, but I mean, he used that word, huh? I think it's an interesting word to use, huh? So, yeah, three persons and one God, huh? In one nature, huh? Okay. So, a little bit of that distinction, right? Sometimes, you know, you don't see the power of a beginning until you see everything that comes from it, right? You see all these texts in Scripture, just to take those three-eighths. And elsewhere besides Scripture, right, depend upon that, what, distinction, right? And something quite different from metaphor, right? So, you're up to the fifth article here. To the fifth, one proceeds thus. It seems that essential names, signified in the abstract, can stand for the person. Thus, that this would be true, that the essence generates what? Yeah. And not only we could say God from God, or God generated God, right? But it would say that the essence generated the essence, huh? Now, first objection is from Augustine, right? Got to be careful reading this, Augustine. For Augustine says in the seventh book about the Trinity, the Father and the Son are one, what? Wisdom. Because they are one essence, huh? And each of them was, yeah, and not, in particular, you might say. Wisdom, from wisdom, right, as essence from what? It seems to me that you can say that, just like you say, God from God, light from light, true God from true God. Moreover, we being generated or corrupted, there is generated or corrupted those things which are in us. But the Son is generated, huh? Therefore, since the divine essence, the divine nature, is in the Son, it seems that also the divine essence is generated. Moreover, as we said above, to read us on the substance of God, the same is God and the, what, divine nature. That was one of the articles in Simplicity of God, huh? So if God and the divine nature are not identical, there would be something in God besides the divine nature, and then you'd be composed. Incidentally, I was reading the first book of Wisdom of Aristotle, and he's discussing the materialists, huh? Those who say that some kind of matter is the beginning of all things and is the first cause. And Aristotle's a general criticism of all the materialists. It's very interesting. He says that in material things, what is simple is imperfect, and the composed is what? More perfect, yeah. So the simple and the perfect are not the same thing in the material world. But he says the first cause must be altogether simple and altogether perfect. So there's no way they can combine these being materialists, huh? It kind of struck me, huh? Because that's always central to Thomas when he talks about the divine substance that's both simple and what? And perfect, huh? He sort of takes these two up together, right? So, here we're going back to the idea, though, that God is altogether simple, therefore there can be no distinction between the divine essence and God himself. We talked about that difficulty of speaking about God, right? Do you say God is good, or do you say he's goodness itself? Do you say God is wise, or do you say he's wisdom itself, right? Well, if he had wisdom, which signifies that by which you are wise, but he wasn't wise, what good is there in having wisdom? He didn't, you're wise by it, right? So, you have to, to bring out the divine perfection, say that he's wise. That's why we believe him, okay? But then, wise would seem to, by the form of the word there, signify what has wisdom, right? And therefore, to imply a distinction between the haver and the had, and therefore, composition. So, we say, yeah, but God is his own wisdom. And there we bring out the simplicity of God, right? But nevertheless, there is a difference in the way you're signifying here, right? When you say God is wise, and when you're saying he's, what, wisdom itself. There's a reason why you say both of those, but you realize there's a defect. And neither one of them, or even both together, we know God as he is, but use both of them to bring out something about God. Moreover, of whoever has said something, right, it is able to stand for it, right? But the divine essence is the Father, right? Therefore, the essence can stand for the person of the Father. And that's the essence that generates them. Just like in the way we were saying before, if a man can be said of my Father, then a man can stand for my Father. Moreover, the essence is a thing that is generated. Because it is the Father who is generating. So, he's saying, once you've got a slidgism there, it seems, right? If the essence is the Father, the Father is a generating thing, right? Therefore, the essence is a generating thing. If, therefore, the essence is not generating, the essence would be both a thing generating and not generating. That's impossible. God can't have a contradiction, right? Moreover, the great Augustine says in the fourth book of the Trinity, that the Father is the beginning of the whole, what? Godhood. But he is not a beginning, except by, what? Generating or by breathing, right? I see deitas there, and deitatis, that refers to the divine essence, right? Therefore, the Father generates or breathes the divine, what? Nature, huh? But against all, this is what Augustine says. So, I'm giving Augustine a chance to redeem himself. But against, this is what Augustine says in the first book of the Trinity, that no thing generates itself. But if the essence generate the essence, we will not generate anything but itself, since nothing is in God that is distinguished from the divine, what? Essence. Therefore, the essence does not generate, what? An essence, right? Now, Thomas begins by taking the difference here, the abbess, abbot, Joachim. I answer, it should be said, that about this erred the abbess' son, Joachim, asserting that just as it is said that God generates God, right? So it can be said that the essence engenders the essence, huh? And he said this considering that because of the divine simplicity, there is nothing other, God, then the divine, what? Essence of the same thing. So if they're the same thing, why can't you say the same about them, huh? But in this he was deceived. Again, Thomas is going to point out a little distinction, a little difference here, right? Which is important. Because for the truth of locutions, of speeches, right? It is not only necessary to consider the things signified, huh? But also, what? Yeah, the way of signifying, huh? This has been said, huh? So although, in the thing itself, God is the same as the divine nature that he does, there is nevertheless not the same way of signifying for both. For this name, Deus, God, because it signifies the divine essence as in the one having it, from the way of its signification, it naturally has that it can stand for, what? A person who has a divine nature. And thus, those things which are proper or private, huh? To the persons are able to be said of this name, God, as it is said that God is, what? God, begotten, and, or generating, huh? Okay. God gives birth. I'm going to be without, but I give others, right? You know, it says. And he's also, what? He's also born, right? But this name, essence, does not have from its way a signifying that it stands for the person. Why? Because it signifies the essence or nature as a, what? The abstract form rather than the concrete. And therefore, because those things which are private to the persons, by which they are distinguished from each other. cannot be attributed to the essence, huh? For it would signify that there was some distinction in the divine essence itself, just as there is a distinction in the, what? Yeah, standing. You see what Thomas is saying here, right? He has to take into account not only what the words signify, right, in reality, but the way they signify, right? And the name God signifies that which has the divine nature, right? And so since the three persons all have that divine nature, right, the name God can stand for them, right? But the essence, huh, signifies a divine nature and a kind of abstraction, right, from the persons, huh? And therefore, there can't be understood any distinction in regard to the nature itself, right? And the nature is always good as simple. Now, he's got a little trouble there with the dust in the rain. The first, therefore, it should be said that towards expression, the unity of the essence and of the person, the holy doctors, right, sometimes spoke more expressly, right, than the suitability or propriety of speech allows, right? Whence these ways of speaking should not be, what, extended, but explained, yeah, as that abstract names should be expounded, huh, through, what, concrete names, huh, or even through personal names, huh? As when it is said, essence of essence or wisdom of wisdom, the sense is that the Son, who is, what, the divine essence, the divine wisdom, is from the Father, who is also the divine essence and wisdom, right? Is it basically the same principle about standing for towards essence stands? Well, it involves that, but, I mean, he's saying that that the one name that signifies concretely as having the divine nature can stand for the persons even in their, what, private differences, right? Why the name, the abstract name, the name of essence or the divine nature, by the way of signifying, can't stand for the persons and, therefore, can't stand for them in their distinctions, huh? Okay, yeah, but then here, in this side of the panel, isn't he saying something a little different, though, or he's making... Well, he's saying sometimes the doctors spoke more, what, explicitly. Sure, sure. Yeah. They wanted to bring out the fact that the one who is the divine nature and is the divine wisdom, right, generated another one who is the divine nature, who is the divine, what? It's almost like they want to emphasize the unity of the nature. Yeah, with the person. With the person. With both persons, yeah. Okay. Yeah. Yeah, speaking in a certain way. Sort of speaking more rhetorical. Yeah. So, but if you speak of the sun and the divine nature, is there any difference in them? No. You see? But in these abstract names, a certain order should be noted because those which pertain to action are closer to the persons because acts are of the, what, individual substances, right, of the persons. Whence it is less improper to say nature of nature, right, because nature always has the idea of the beginning of motion and rescue at the beginning of an operation, right, or wisdom of wisdom because wisdom orders things, then to say, what, essence of essence, right? So notice how careful Thomas is there, right? He says the way Augustine's speaking there can be understood in a way that is orthodox, right, but it's not a way that we should adopt to speaking, right? But then he also sees a distinction between a name like what? nature and a name like what? Essence, yeah. And the name nature is more able to be used for the persons, right? Because persons are what acts, huh? In the famous book of John Paul, the act in person, right, huh? Okay? The idea that acts are persons, right? So a word that has some relation to activity, like the word wisdom, you know, we're always saying it belongs to the wise, wisdom to order things, wisdom more dissolving sweetly from one end to the other, and the word nature, which is always beginning of some kind of operation, motion, could more, right? And he doesn't say we should adopt those ways of speaking either, but he says minus impropria, less improper, is this, right? Okay? So he's excluding really two categories, right? But one even more so than the other, right? And that's the one that's in the objection, right, in essence. So Thomas, correct me, that's not over there in this language, huh? The second objection says that when we are generated or corrupted, what is in us is generated or corrupted, right? To the second, it should be said that in creatures, the generated does not receive the same nature in number which the one generating has. So my human nature is not the human nature of my father. Numerically, it's the same in kind, right? But that's his nature. Absolutely. But it's not, what? The same numerically. I, humanity, is not his humanity, right? But numerically means number, though. You know, he's one, you're one. Yeah. Well, that's an expression that we look back to say. Let's say one in numbers, use the expression one in number, right? Then they mean it's what? Individually the same, right? Okay? Kind of a funny expression but it goes back to Daristava, right? So you speak of things as being one in genus, one in species, one in number, right? Okay? So the man and the dog are one in genus and two men are one in species and I'm one in number, it's said, right? Okay? Really, there's no number there in me. Okay? So it's not the same individual in the generated, the one generated and creatures but another one in number which begins in him to be through generations newly and would cease to be through what? Corruption, right? And therefore, in some sense, it is said to be generated and corrupted namely, what? Procedence, right? But the God generated takes the same nature in number which the one generating has. So the Father doesn't give the Son a nature like the one he has but it's not the division of the same. No, it gives him the same nature and division that he has and therefore the divine nature of the Son is not generated it's the same nature because it's not something what? New, right? So my Father generated me there's a new human nature the one that's in me not in him you see? So my Father didn't give me the human nature the same individual human nature that was in him and I have, right? If he had then the human nature would not have been what? He had nothing new about it it's the same one save old save old That's an important distinction he makes there, right? I'm not having to disagree yet the same in kind but not the same individually My nose is not my Father's nose I don't breathe for the same nose that my Father did But the son, you know, understands through the same understanding that the father does. Laws are the same love that the father loves. But my love is not my father's love, right? Even if you have the same thing. So the objection is trying to say, he's trying to reason mistakenly from what takes place in us when a father generates a son, right? And human nature has a new existence now, right? It's a human nature that begins to be that wasn't before when I'm generated. My human nature. My individual human nature, right? But when the God the Son is generated, right, there's not a new divine nature there in the Son, resembling the father, but a new one. No, it's the same nature. Right, say there's nothing new? Yeah, there's a relation there, yeah. Yeah, that's why we said before that the persons are what? The relations are modem substanti, right? Subsisting relations, right? In other words, the relation is subsisting in the divine nature is the person, right? And by reason of the relation, there's a real distinction. Because the Son is not the one of whom he is a son. If the Son is the son of the Father, he's not the son of the what? Yeah, yeah. And Aristotle talks about relations and the categories, you know, he says, we don't always give the proper correlative. So it would be common if we used to speak about a man and his slave, right? Okay. The slave of a man, but is the man of a slave? No. And the proper correlative of slave would be, what? Master, right? So the master is relative to the slave, slave to the master. Sometimes in the wedding ceremony, they say, we now declare you a man and wife. I don't know, wife's, like you said, ah, two wives. But, strictly speaking, the correlative of wife is what? Husband, yeah. So if one is a wife, one is the wife of a husband. And a husband is the husband of a wife, right? But you can't say, you know, if you're a man, you're the man of a wife, right? You see? Or if you're a man, you're the man of a slave, right? So sometimes you don't give the proper, what? Relative. But if you give the proper relative, that's it, right? So, I mean, is the God, the Son, the Son of the divine nature? If that was a proper relative, then he would not be the divine nature. Yeah. But he's the Son of the Father, so therefore he is not the, what? Father, right? And the Father is the Father of the Son, so he's not the Son. Again, when you go back to the standing, standing in, so to speak. You're not giving the, what? Proper relative, right? So you say that I'm the Son of a man, right? A man is not giving the proper relative of me, huh? You have to say I'm the Son of my Father, right? Okay. Okay. So, it's not exactly the same way, this generation of divine things, as inhuman things, huh? The Son there would chip off the old block. It's not the same. Individual substance there. A third objection is taken from what we learned. God and the divine essence are the same thing, right? What's the same thing? Why can't you say the same about them? To the third, it should be said, and this is what was in the body of the article, that although God and the divine essence are the same in things, secundum rem, nevertheless, by reason of a different way of signifying, it's necessary to speak diversely about what? Both of them, right? Now, the fourth objection is somewhat similar. Of whom something is predicated, is able to, what, stand for that, right? Actually, you know, the kind of objection stating, you'd think that patra is being said, the sensi divina, but in implied reconnaissance, understanding of the universe, right? To the fourth, it should be said that the divine essence is said of the Father by way of what? Identity, on account of the divine, what, simplicity. But does not however follow that it can stand for the Father, on account of this diverse way of what? Signifying. And the argument proceeds in those things which one is said of the other, as universal of the, what? Particular. So my Father is a man, and your Father is a man, so a man can stand for my Father, in some context, right? Or for your Father, in some other context. Now, the fifth objection here. It starts with a kind of like a syllogism, right? The essence is the Father, and the Father is a thing generating, therefore the essence is a thing generating. If you look at this, you're going to end up saying it is, and it's not so, right? And Thomas says, to the fifth, then, it should be said that this is the difference between substantial names and what? Adjectives, huh? Adjectable names. No solid name there is, or noun is what? Broader than, we use it sometimes, huh? You don't call an adjective a noun, right? Incidentally, in Greek, I think, and Latin, I don't know if they have a different word for name and for noun. And you come to that question in the Pericherminaeus of Aristotle, where he's talking about the statement is composed of a noun and a verb, right? Well, in Greek, both a noun and a verb can be called a name, right? But they don't have a separate name for a name, but they don't have a separate name for a name and for a noun. So I've explained that before, but we can get the part right out of here. Take the Latin, which is the same as the Greek, you have nomen and verbum, huh? And then in Greek, you have, like, onoma, and then you have onoma and rhema, okay? Noun and verb, right? So you have the same word for a name and what? Noun. It's like in Latin for name and noun, right? Now, in English, we could translate this as though as name, and this down here as noun, so we have a separate name, right? And this is the least equivocal, but yet you'd say the word nomen here has two different meanings. And why does this name keep the common name and the other one get a new name? Yeah. So Aristotle will first define the name and he'll say, well, it's a vocal sound. It signifies the human agreement. No part of it signifies a thing by itself. If it signifies with time, it's a verb, a rhema, without, it's a what? Moment. So a verb adds something positive to the idea of name in general, right? That is, but it signifies with time, okay? So it gets the new, what? Name. And that's a common way that happens, right? That when the same thing is set of two things, more or less with the same meaning, right? But then one of them adds something that stands out to that common meaning, it gets a new name, right? So animals sort of... So animals sort of... So animals sort of... So animals sort of... So animals sort of... So animals sort of... So animals sort of... So animals sort of... The beast and man, but sometimes you keep the name animal for the beast, and distinguish animal against man. So if I call you an animal in biology class, I'm perhaps not insulting you, but if your girlfriend, as I always see the students, calls you an animal, she probably is insulting you for putting you in your place or something. You see the idea? I notice that English has a tendency, you know, to use name for a noun, too, isn't it? From practice, call a man or a dog a noun, a name, then walks or runs, right? But Aristotle's definition of name in general would cover walks and runs, too, right? You see, there's other difference we have here with man and woman, right? In Greek, the Latin, you might have, say, Omo, and then you can divide it into vir, and femina, right? The same thing in Greek, you have a different word for the male and the female human being, right? But in English, we divide man into man and what? Woman. And so one keeps the common name for a different reason. But this is like what you have with, what? Onamonrena in Greek, right? So one language will have a word, but the other language doesn't. It's just the way the language develops. I don't know why exactly, but it's a very common thing, right? Now, one difference between these two kind of names, the nomina substantiva and the adjectiva, is that the substantive names bring along their own what? Well, subject, you might say, but the adjective ones, not, but they place the thing they signify about the, what? Substantive name. Whence the sophists who begin grammar, and you're too, point back to the Greeks, huh? So you're the lower mindset of the sophists, right? That they sort of developed grammar, why the Greeks, the philosophers developed logic, right? And the sophists also develop rhetoric, which fits them, right? Because they, yeah, yeah. Once the sophists say that the substantial names stand, right, you might say, the adjectives do not stand, but they join something, huh? So the substantive personal names can be said of the essence on account of the identity of the thing, right? Nevertheless, nor is it followed that the, what, personal property determines a, what, distinct essence, but they are placed around the, what, subject implied by the, what, substantive name. But the notional and personal adjectives are not able to be said of the essence unless they be added some, what, substantive name. Whence we're not able to say that the essence is generating, huh? Although we are able to say that the essence is a res, a thing, that's a noun, right? Generating or God generating. If God and thing stand for a, what, person, huh? Not ever if they stand for the, what, essence. Whence it is not a contradiction. If it is said that the essence is a thing generating, a thing not generating. Because the first thing stands for person, the second for the essence, huh? That's just very subtle, then, the thing I was talking about, you know, when I say the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit are the one thing for three things, right? And if they're one, then they're not three, and if they're three, they're not one. Well, you can say, if thing stands for what? Substance, right? What it is, then they're one thing, the divine, one God. But if by thing it stands for relation, then they are what? Three things, right? No. Even Aristotle distinguished those meanings of thing, between what it is and relation, right? And the categories, huh? So you go back to the categories, then. Put that in your pipe and smoke it, huh? But notice, again, a very subtle distinction, but a distinction. That you're kind of forced towards, because without seeing that distinction, you end up in a contradiction, right? Just like you would with, you know, saying the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one thing, and saying they're three things, huh? If you don't distinguish between thing in the sense of what it is, and thing in the sense of relation, then you have a, what? Contradiction, right? Now, the last one is from this way of speaking, Augustine. That the Father is the beginning of the whole, what? God. To the sixth, it should be said that Deitas, insofar as it is one in many subjects, has a certain, what? Agreement with the name of a collective name, right? Not that it's that, but as in like as of that. Hence, when it is said that the Father is the beginning of the whole deity, it can be taken for the universe of the, what? The universe of sins. Insofar as in all the divine persons, he is the, what? Beginning, huh? Nor is it necessary that he be a beginning of himself, huh? Just as someone of the people is called the ruler of the whole people, not, however, of himself, right? Of course, that's like things we get into all the time when we talk about God is the first cause, huh? The first cause of all things. Well, all things but himself. You know, but we do say all things, don't we, right? It would be kind of annoying to always be adding that, you know? Well, but you have to understand it that way, right? You have to think of a logician. We say God is the beginning or the first cause of all things, and God is among all things, therefore, kind of problem, right? Or it can be said that he is the beginning of the whole Godhood, not because he generates or breathes the Godhood, but because by generating and breathing, he, what? Communicates the divine nature, huh? To the Father and the Son. And Thomas is saying in the sentences there, later on, we get to talk about the missions there, you know, between the sentences, that the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit, it's to lead us back to God, huh? And ultimately, it is back to the Father, huh? So you're going back to the principium diitakis, as a result of the mission of the Son to you and the mission of the Holy Spirit. But it's getting ahead a little bit. I'm reminded of it, and he talks about it in his beginning, huh? Greta says somewhere, huh? Happy man is a man who can join the end of his life to the beginning of it. I'm not sure exactly what that means. Not only is it true, you know, but there's some truth about it, you know? You know, like our soul came, what? Immediately from God, huh? It didn't come immediately from our parents. Our body came from God through our parents, right? But our soul came immediately from God, huh? And our end is to return to that from whom we came, right? So this will come out at some times in talking about the mission of the Father and the Son, I mean, the Son and the Holy Spirit, rather. The Father doesn't, isn't sent anywhere. But we'll see what that means, to be sent, huh? But they are sent, you know, as a result of their divine proceeding. And then they, because of the certain effect that they have upon us, they are sent to, be sent to us, right? Then to bring us back. Okay. So, yes, did I go straight? But there's a contrast right now between 5 and 4, because 4 was saying that God can stand for God the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, in a way that the abstract, the divine essence, the divine nature, the divine substance, is not appropriately, right, to stand for them. And that's because of the different way in which the two, what, signify? We have those two ways of signifying, because we can't get rid of our natural way of thinking about things, huh? which is about material things, where the nature or the form of a thing is not identical to the thing. But the thing has its nature or form.