Prima Pars
Lecture 146: Appropriation of Essential Attributes to Divine Persons

Transcript
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And so we have these two kinds of words, and then we have to use both of them because of God being both simple and what? Perfect. The sixth article here. To the sixth one proceeds thus. It seems that the persons are not able to be said of the essential names, the concrete names. So it can be said that God is three persons, or he is the what? A trinity, huh? Wasn't I saying that? The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God, and the one God is three persons? Wasn't I saying that? He says, you can't say that. Well, this is an objection, so. Maybe he'll change his mind before he gets... Thomas has always changed his mind halfway through, right? Like stream of consciousness. I see some simple soul, you know, in a good sense, picking up the book and trying to read it, and he says, why does he always... Yeah, why does he always start by saying one thing and then end up saying just the opposite? What makes you stop, Ben? What? The thing, I think. What is it the great Heraclitus says? The opposite is useful. So it's good to have opposition in thinking, huh? Because if you're mistaken, you might discover your mistake, right? But even if you are correct, you're answering these objections or these things makes you, what, understand better the truth, right? It enables you to defend it, too. I was first teaching at St. Mary's in California. I had one very good student, you know, to come in. Every day in class, he'd have objection. And he'd reach for it like that, you know, and state his objection like that. And then as I, you know, at the greatest of these, answer his objection, I'd say like this, you know, like this, you know. You're going to be Polish, you know. It happened every day. Every day I'd go in there and say, of course, I'd have heard of his objections, you know. You're probably going to have heard of his objections and more objections than the students could be in trouble, you know. So I've heard that a million times, you know. And I said to you one time after the class, or after the course, I mean, you know, I thought I always, when I have you today, you know. You know, he's got an answer. There's a other joke about the guy who was teaching the seminary there, you know, just giving the old stuff over and over again, you know. And never answering questions or objections or anything like that. And finally somebody, you know, could not ignore it. So he had to say yes, and the guy stated his question and objection. And I look back at his notes, you know, and it doesn't say. Education, what crimes are committed in my name? So, for this is false, that man is what? Every man. Because for none of its subjects can it be verified. So I'm a man, am I every man? No. For neither is Socrates every man, nor is Plato every man. Anyone else? And likewise this, God is what? Yeah, or he trinity. It can, it's not able to be verified for any of the what? But, yeah, for the father is not a trinity, nor is the son, nor is the Holy Spirit. But the father is God. So if we can say God is a trinity, then the father must be trinity. You know? I was going to get on that. Moreover, the what? Less universal, right? The inferiors are not said of the superiors, except by a what? Accidental predication. That's when we say that an animal is what? Man, right? You can't say an animal is such as a man. Otherwise, every animal would have to be a man, right? For it happens to an animal to be man, right? But it doesn't happen to a man to be an animal. But this name, God, has itself to the three persons as something common to what? The inferiors, huh? Things come under it. As Damascene says, huh? So we think of the more universal as standing above, right? And the less universal as being below. It doesn't mean inferior to in the sense of goodness, right? Therefore, it seems that the names of persons cannot be said of this name, God, except what? Accidentally, huh? Against this is what Augustine says in his sermon on faith, huh? We believe the one God to be what? The trinity, right? Of the divine name, huh? So strange. Yeah. Thomas says, I answer. It should be said. That just as has been said, although personal names or notional adjectives, and those are things like what generate and so on, right? Generating. Are made to be said of the essence. Nevertheless, the substantive ones are able, on account of the real identity of the essence and the what? Persons. For the divine essence is not only the same really with each, with one person, but with what? All three. Whence one person and two and three are able to be said of the what? Essence. So, as if we say that the essence is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And because this name, God, has as such that it stands for the essence, therefore this is true. That the essence is three persons, just as this is true that God is what? Please read it. Okay. Back to the first objection there. Man is not every man, right? There's not three men. So, the first therefore should be said, as has been said above, that this name man, as such, stands for the person. And from something joined to it, it has that it stands for the common nature. And therefore this is false, that man is what? Every man. Every man. Because it cannot be verified for any one of those things standing under it. But this name God, per se, as such, has that it stands for the what? Divine nature, for the essence. Whence, although for none of the supposita, of the divine natures is true, God... is a twin it is nevertheless true for the what essence which not paying attention to poritanis again in trouble negated it he comes out in the fourth lotterian council i think he gets into trouble in other places and that's kind of a subtle thing he's saying there he's saying that god the name through itself or by itself has more than it stands for the divine what essence or nature and the name man does stand for the human nature why is he saying that back here to article four odd three let's look at the reply there making this distinction that to the third it should be said that in another way has this name god to standing for a person and this name what man right why because the form signified by this name man we're back in 39 here article four odd three okay um because the form signified by this name man that is humanitas or human nature is really huh things divided in the diverse what subjects right therefore as such it stands for the what person huh even if nothing is added that determines it to the person which is a distinct what subject for the unity or the community of the human nature is not in things secundum rem but only according to consideration unless you're a platonist right you think you got the human nature up there in the world of forms by itself right huh okay but it's only in our mind that you say you guys have something in common you're all two-legged animals right and then i said you have a two-legged animal right and uh it's common to all of you but it's only secundum considerationum he says my mind vaguely see what you have in common whence this term man does not stand for the common nature unless that's i just standing again right unless in account of the requirement of something added as when it is said that man is a what species right that old specific argument man is a species socrates is a man socrates is a species right they can see there that there's something what the man doesn't usually stand for we usually think of man as a species no we think of man in the way that he's said of individual men right okay but the form signified by this name god to wit the divine nature is one in common secundum rem huh not secundum considerationum right in the thing itself it's one you know you know some of the late philosophers there in the modern age there you know they get all hung up on on uh but gee whiz how can you talk about man because there is no man it's just individual men right and then what happens to our science which is about man right not about the individual men and all these problems right huh but today into this difference huh so the but the divine name the name the nature rather the form signified that it's named god let's use the word forma therefore what nature right now scripture sometimes speaks that way too and said when he was in the form of yeah took on the form of a slave right and then form refers to nature right but the form signified by this name god to wit the divine essence is one in common secundum rem in the things whence by itself huh without any addition right it stands for the what common nature but from something joined to it it's standing for is determined to some person whence when it is said god generates by reason of the relative the notional act right it stands this name god for the person of the father right but when it is said god does not generate nothing is added that determines this name to the person of the son of the son whence is given to be understood that generation is repugnant to the divine nature the divine nature is not generated right but if there is added something pertaining to the person of the son the speech would be true right as if it were said that the generated god right the engendered god does not generate whence also it does not follow that's the objection that he's applying to but we may have to go through all the rest of this that's the distinction that he's making use of in this later what article right that's why he says you can't really say that man is every man but you can say god is what three persons and son because of this we're doing it the first objection right by the first objection wasn't it yeah to the first therefore should be said that has been said above this name man by itself has to stand for the what person but from something joined to it it has that it stands for the common nature and therefore this is false that man is every man because is not able to be verified of any one standing under it right but this thing god per se has that it stands for the essence because there's one nature there secundum realm right and not just by consideration whence although for none of the supposita of the divine natures is true that god is a trinity is nevertheless true for the what divine nature yeah so you wouldn't say the father is the trinity yeah you wouldn't say the son is the trinity of the Holy Spirit yeah you say the father is god if you don't say the father is the trinity yeah yeah which not observing or paying attention to none of the tendons Poirotinus Poirotinus Poirotinus Poirotinus Poirotinus Poirotinus Poirotinus Poirotinus Poirotinus Poirotinus He was not absolute, though. Okay, now the second objection. I hear Thomas is seeing a distinction between the way in which God is said of the three persons and the way universal is said of particulars, right? And vice versa. To the second it should be said, that when it is said that God or the divine essence is the Father, it is a predication by identity, right? Not, however, as of an inferior of its what? Superior. Because in divine things there is not the universal and the what? Single. Because universal is only one, I couldn't know my consideration. And universal, you said of many, they differ in their being. But the being of God is what? The same as the divine nature. And the divine nature is common to the three, so it's the same being. It's not strictly speaking universal and singular, though it's something similar to that, right? Whence just as this is per se, the Father is God, so also that the God is his Father. And in no way, Karachi dance. So we say that in the universal and in particular, we say, is an animal a man? So if you say, is a man an animal, you'd say, yeah. Is a dog an animal? Yeah. Per se, right? A dog as a dog, a dog for being a dog is an animal. But now is an animal a dog? Yeah, yeah. But we say, well, it could be. But you don't say it belongs to an animal as such to be a dog. Is seven a number? Yeah. Seven as such? Yeah. Seven to being, per se, to being seven? Yeah. But is a number as such seven? So being a number, it's seven? Well, it could be. But there you say something accidental, right? Is that the way it is with, you know, the Father and God? It could be the Father. You must be the Father, right? So he's saying, Thomas says, say the Father is God. And to say, God is the Father, both of them are, per se. Either one is accidental, right? So what did Plato say in the book on the sophist? I wouldn't say the Dionysus like to quote that, you know. Likeness is a slippery thing. So there's a likeness there between what God being said of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and man being said of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle. There's a likeness there, right? And therefore you might, what? Be, step up, huh? Because of that likeness, huh? Shakespeare's what? Play, it's named from air. It's what? Comedy of airs, right? And the airs are due to what? Yeah, the likeness, though. They're identical twins, so to speak. Two pairs of identical twins, right? And they get mixed up, and you have all this confusion and comic situations, huh? Take a little break now, before we do another article. Take a little break now, before we do another article. Take a little break now, before we do another article. Take a little break now, before we do another article. Take a little break now, before we do another article. Take a little break now, before we do another article. Take a little break now, before we do another article. Take a little break now, before we do another article. Take a little break now, before we do another article. Take a little break now, before we do another article. Those articles have been going to appropriation no more, no more, appropriate to us. To the seventh one proceeds, we are at the seventh one, we are, to the seventh one proceeds it goes forward thus. It seems that essential names should not be, well, appropriated to the persons, huh? For what can verge or lead into error in faith ought to be avoided, right? In divine things. For as Jerome says, from words put forward disorderly, heresy is incurred. But those things which are common, but to appropriate those things which are common to the three persons, or to one of the three persons, but to appropriate those things which are common to the three persons, to one of them, would seem to, what? Verge upon an error of faith, because it could be understood that either only to that person do they belong, right? Or at least that they belong more to him than to the others, right? So if you appropriate wisdom to the son, then either he alone is wise, or he's wiser than the other two, right? Therefore, essential attributes ought not to be appropriated to the other persons. Of course, scripture is filled with all these appropriations, right? So you'd have to throw out scripture, you know? Which is meant to be suitable for our instruction, as St. Paul tells us, huh? Moreover, the essential attributes signified in the abstract signify in the manner of a form. But one person does not have himself to another as a form, since a form from the one of whom it is a form is not distinguished and what? Subject, right? Therefore, the essential attributes, especially, or most of all, signified in the abstract, ought not to be appropriated to the persons. We talked before, didn't we, about the four causes and how they kind of are applied to God, right? So, although you don't really have the mover cause or the maker cause, yet, you know, something like that, right? A little bit in God, because one person generates another, right? So when Aristotle talks about that third kind of cause, he gives his example, the Father. Okay? Not being God the Father, but the human Father, right? So something like that, right? But there's nothing like, what, matter or like, what, end or purpose there in God. And this one here is saying, well, what about form, right? I guess this is going to exclude something like form there. Moreover, what is proprium or private is before what is, what? Appropriated. But what is private is of the notion of what is, what? Appropriated. So it's the same word there, right? But the essential attributes in the way of understanding are before the persons, as the common is before the, what? Private, huh? Not exactly that clear. Aristotle says it in physics, though, right? You don't really have the universal term. Therefore, the essential attributes ought not to be, what? Appropriated, huh? See what he's saying there? You're making, what, proper in the definition of the appropriated, and therefore you're making the private in the definition of the common. Well, that shouldn't be. Now, but against all this nonsense is what the apostle, at least in St. Paul now, 1 Corinthians 1, Christ, the virtue of God and the wisdom of God. So here, even the abstract name is being appropriated to what? To one person, right? Now, Tom's going to try to justify what you find in Scripture, right? You know, I'm just going to descend to that way of speaking Scripture, right? While thinking about it. Why is it appropriate that Scripture should do this, right? The answer, it should be said, that to the making known, the manifesting of faith, it is suitable to appropriate essential attributes to, what? Persons. For although the trinity of persons is not able to be, what? Proven by demonstration. Thomas said that in a previous article, right? That the philosophers really weren't able to arrive at this, right? Nevertheless, it is suitable that it be declared to some things that are more, what? Manifest and known to us. But the essential attributes are more known to us by reason than what is private to the but persons. And a sign of this is that from creatures, from which we take our knowledge, that from creatures we're able, by certitude, with certitude, to arrive at a knowledge of the essential, what? Attributes. Like Aristotle knew that God was saying earlier, simple, and what? Perfect, huh? He knew that God was one, right? At the end of the 12th book of wisdom, he shows that God is one, right? Then he quotes Homer. The rule of many is not good. Let there be one. Even the poets see something like this. But the philosophers, or we from creatures, were not able to arrive at a knowledge of the, what? Personal properties as had been said above. So, thus, therefore, just as, what? The likeness of the footprint, huh? Or the image found in creatures, we use to making known the divine persons, huh? So also we make use of the, what? Essential attributes, because they're more known to us, huh? Now, you know that I like Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? And so, following my master there, Shakespeare, my reason has thought out the definition of reason. Shakespeare gives us that, right? So there proceeds from my reason a thought of what my reason is. And when I understand clearly and distinctly what my reason is, boy, do I love it. This ability that I have for a large discourse, looking before and after, right? And I realize what all those words mean, and therefore fully what reason is, huh? I really love it, huh? Intellectum valde ama, as St. Augustine says, right? And this is an image of the, what? Trinity, right? So from the Father, like my reason, there proceeds a thought, right? Of himself. And then, see how good he is, there proceeds love, right? This is not the same thing now as appropriation, but he's saying, just as we make use, or as Augustine does, right? Helps us to understand a bit the Trinity through the image of it in us, and even through the, what, footprint, right? And I go all the way back to Homer there, and what do you do with the plot, right? Beginning, middle, and end, right? Because the footprint of the Trinity is found where you find a, what, beginning, middle, and end, which is, and the beginning is the footprint of the Father, the middle is the footprint of the, what, Son, and the end is the footprint of the, what, yeah, so you've got these footprints here, huh? Okay? So just as we manifest to some extent, I guess it goes into that because this thing is so removed from us, huh? So inaccessible to us, right? He tries to help us a little bit, you know? Even though we realize that these, what, footprints and even the image is so far removed from God, right? So just as the likeness of the footprint or the image found in creatures we use to a manifestation of the Divine Person, so also we use the, what, essential attributes. And this manifestation of the Persons, the essential attributes, is... called appropriation, right? Now, how is this done? Thomas says, it's kind of very subtle now. He goes on to say, the divine persons are able to be made known to the essential attributes in two ways. In one way, by way of what? Likeness, huh? Just as those things which pertain to the understanding are appropriated to the Son, like wisdom. Who proceeds by way of what? Understanding. God's understanding of himself. He proceeds as the word, the thought of God, right? In another way, by way of dissimilitude, as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because among us, fathers are accustomed, on account of their old age, to be what? Infirm, right? Lest we suspect something of that in God. So, we appropriated, say, wisdom to the Son by way of likeness, huh? Because he proceeds per modem intellectives. But also because sons, young sons, and creatures tend to be foolish, huh? In studying English literature, there's a saying, you know, to play the young man. And it means to play the fool. So, you know, by way of contrast, right? Okay. So, it's kind of interesting. The appropriation is both by reason of likeness and by reason of, what? Yeah. And the Holy Spirit is called, what? In a breath, huh? Because he proceeds by way of love, right? But, you know, people are hacketed and so on tend to, you know, do things they shouldn't do. So, we appropriate goodness to him by way of likeness because goodness is the object of love and also because most of our, what? Spirit, you know, is driving us into wrong things, huh? The spirited are, you know, rushing into what he shouldn't. Fools rush in. So, we appropriate goodness to him by way of opposition as well. That's by way of, what? Likeness, huh? That is very subtle, that. That distinction, huh? When you mentioned the beginning, then on end, did you say that Augustine mentioned that one? Or was that your thought? Well, Thomas does sometimes. I think he goes back to Augustine, too, probably, but the idea of the footprint of God, right, huh? Right. Is found wherever you can see something of a beginning, middle, and end in the creature, right? Okay. So, the beginning is not from anything else, but something proceeds from it. And that's something like the Father, right? He's not from anyone else, but there's something from him, right? The Son is a bit like the middle, because the middle is from something, after something, and something is from it. So, the Son is a little bit like the middle, huh? And the Holy Spirit is a bit like the end, because the end is from something, but nothing proceeds from it, right? So, it's kind of a distant, even more distant like this there. That's kind of beautiful, huh? The beginning, middle, and end, huh? Which is what the great Homer said, a plot should have, right? So, that's called the footprint. There's various ways you can find that footprint, even in water and other things. So, you know, in material things, the substance has a form, which is like the thought, right? And then there proceeds from, there's some kind of inclination towards certain operations, which is like the Holy Spirit, or like love, right? Where you have an inclination towards something. So, Thomas does two things then by the article, right? He first says why this is what? Appropriate, right? And we're being led from what is more known to what is what? That's not. In fact, even in the order here, the Summa, you can see you take out the essential attributes before you take out the Trinity, right? And, but likewise, you can see it from the fact that the essential attributes can be arrived at. It was very difficult to do so, but they can be arrived at by natural reason. And even Aristotle arrived at that, But the Trinity, not even Aristotle, the philosopher, could arrive at this, huh? So we use the more known to manifest the less known, right? Thomas talks about this too, you know, in the Summa Contagentilis where more explicitly you divide what can be known by reason as well as by faith. And the first three books, what can be known only by faith, in the fourth book, right? And Thomas finds out the way you're going from what is more known to us, right? To what is less known to us. So what can be known by both faith and reason is more known than what can be known only by what? Faith, right? The contrary to what some people think the moral law, right, can be known by reason, natural reason as well as by faith. And so those things are very well known to us, huh? Quite a trinity is not known by both. Now, Thomas answers the first objection saying that the essential attributes, you've got to understand what you're doing here, the essential attributes are not thus appropriate to the persons, that they are asserted to be what? Private to them, right? But rather they are what? Appropriated to making known or to manifest in some way the persons either by way of likeness or by way of what? Unlikeness, as has been said. Whence no error of faith follows but more a manifestation of the what? Truth, huh? But you've got to know what you're doing, right? Just like even with metaphors, there's a certain manifestation of the truth, right? But you've got to know what you're doing. And these things are not being said property of God, right? This is a different thing than metaphor, obviously. But you can't know what you're saying and how you're saying it. You can say it that way or not. The second objection is saying, well, the central attributes, especially when they're taken in the abstract, like wisdom, right? Seem to signify a form and so on. And one person is not the form of another, right? To the second, it should be said, if in this way were appropriated the essential attributes to the persons, that they were what? Private to them. In other words, if the son alone is what? Wisdom, right? It followed then that one person has himself another in the relation of form. In other words, wisdom signifies that by which, right, one is wise. So, is the father wise by the son? Well, he says Augustine excludes this in the seventh book of the trinity, showing that the father is not wise by that wisdom which he generated, as if the only, the son alone is wisdom, right? So, thus, the father and the son together are able to be called wise, so that only the son and the father and the son together could be said to be wise, not over the father without the son. But the son is said to be the wisdom of the father because he is wisdom from the what? From the father. For both per se are what? Are wisdom, right? And both together are one wisdom. Whence the father is not wise by the wisdom which he what? Generates. He wasn't wise until he generated the son, right? He wasn't wise except because he generated the son. No? but the wisdom which is his own, what? Essence. So that's why we have to be careful with the other thing, you know what I mean? Does the Father love the Son by the Holy Spirit, you know? I didn't see what that means, right? It can be said in some way, right? But it doesn't mean, in a way, I guess, to what is being denied here about being wise to the Son, right? Now the third objection was saying, well, the central attributes are what? Before in our understanding of the person, right? Wise and appropriation, included in the word itself, proper. I think I did a little bit of stuff here, right? We'll talk about this as a distinction here. To the third it should be said that although an essential attribute, according to its own, what? Motion, is before the person in our way of understanding, right? Nevertheless, insofar as it has the, what? Notion of being appropriated, nothing prevents what is private to the person to be before what is, what? Appropriated, huh? Just as color is something that comes after a body, because body is a substance, right? Color is an accident of quality, so it's posterior to the body insofar as it is a body. Nevertheless, it is naturally before, what? A white body, insofar as it is what? Okay? Isn't that done? Christoph talks about that in the fifth book of wisdom. So this is where he's going to take Augustine and Hillary and so on and the magnificent appropriations they make, right? That'll help us to understand the Trinity better. Think it all in it. Help us, time. I won't be here next week, but the following week I'll be back. Coming back on the Tuesday night, next week I'll be following that. May 8th. What? May 8th, I think, right? Next week is May 1st. Yeah, I won't be here next week, but the following week I'll be here. So May 8th you'll be here. Yeah. May 8th, I think, right? That's... That's...