Prima Pars
Lecture 147: Appropriation of Divine Attributes to the Trinity

Transcript
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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. May it be for us. Help us to understand what you have written. The Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. We even have the Holy Grail. We claim to have the Holy Grail. Yeah, yeah. The Pope used it at Mass. He was in Spain last year. Yeah. You know, except, you see out there, you know, above the altar. There's the, I was going to bring in some of my travel books, but I had all the other books to bring, so I was way down, so I can't. If you look now at the Article 8 there, in Question 39, the first four objections, at least, are going to come back in the body of the article, right? Because they are four different appropriations, right? But Thomas will order those four different appropriations, one of whom comes from Hillary, right? And the other three, I guess, from Augustine. And he ordered them in a certain way, right? Okay. And I was looking at Augustine, and I was looking at Augustine's text here back in the sixth book on the Trinity, and the tenth chapter in the sixth book, where he begins by Hillary's son. He quotes Hillary. And this is the same text you have here in Thomas, right? So, Augustine begins that tenth chapter with that. But then after that, he goes into talking a little bit about the footprint, or not the footprint, maybe more the image, you know, the Trinity in us. And then he goes to this fourth one that Thomas has here, right? So, you probably find maybe all of these four in Augustine, either in his own words, or he's quoting Hillary, but they're not, what, ordered, right, huh? Okay. So, you have the first, in this chapter, you have the first and the fourth one, but not the second and the third, huh? But Thomas sees an order among those four different appropriations, right? Okay. But see, there's a beautiful text of Augustine. And Hillary must be a little bit before Augustine, huh? He must have the work on the Trinity, because he's quoting from Hillary's work on the Trinity and the references to that. That's very important, too, is he ordained by the tools. Yeah. So, Augustine was ahead, somehow, Hillary's a book on the Trinity. So, you go from Hillary to Augustine and Thomas, you get a fuller and fuller teaching. But, as Gadgetan says in the premium, I guess, to his commentary on the Summa Theologiae, right, that is to be printed in the Leona edition, he says, Thomas seems to inherit the mind of all the Church Fathers because he's so, what, reverenced them, right? We'll come back to this and talk about glory, right? Over there on. So, look at the objections first, and Thomas doesn't reply to them separately, but in the course of explaining each of these appropriations. You remember what appropriation is, right? Taking something that belongs, what, essentially to God, and you're, what, appropriating it to this or that person by reason of a certain likeness between this attribute and this, what's proper to this person, huh? And this is acceptable because you're, what, manifesting the less known by the more known. But you have to understand what you're doing, huh? To the eighth one proceeds thus. It seems unsuitably, huh? By the sacred doctrines are the essential things attributed to the, what, persons, huh? They had an idea of attribution, right? Essentialia, says the Latin, to the persons attributed to them. So, for Hillary says in the second book about the Trinity, that eternity is in the Father. Species in the image, and that's capitalized, meaning the second name there we had, the last name we had, of the Son, right? Son, word, image. And usus, use, that's a little more difficult, that use of the word there, in the gift, right? Meaning, what, Holy Spirit, which is called donum, right? In which words, huh, are laid down three names proper to the person. To wit, the name of the Father, which is, of course, very clear. The name of image, right? Which is proper to the Son. We saw that in the particular consideration of the persons, huh? As he said above. In the name of unaris sividonia, a gift, which is proper to the, what, Holy Spirit. That's one of the names he took up in the Holy Spirit. And it lays down three things that are appropriated. For he appropriates eternity to the Father, species to the, what, Son, and use to the, what, Holy Spirit. And it seems that he does so unreasonably, irrationally. For eternity implies the, what, duration of being. Species, however, is a beginning of being. And use, which seems to pertain to, what, operation. But essence and operation are found to be appropriated to no person. Therefore, unsuitably, I see that these are appropriated to the persons. Well, Thomas would be replying in the objection, or in the body of the article, that essence and operation are too general, right? To have any particular likeness to this or that person. But these other names, as we'll see, do have. And we'll find out what that is when we get there. I'm struck by this, you know. Do you know Thomas' prayers there before an act of communion? And there is where he addresses it to the, what, the God, the Father, right? But he'll say, omnipotence, eterne, deus, right? Well, who's he talking about? Because then he'll talk about your son, man. So, omnipotence and eterne are, what, appropriate to the Father, right? This helps you to understand the prayer, right, or vice versa. But we'll see what that likeness is, huh? Because power and eternity are appropriated to the Father. Why? Well, it's because he's most of all, what, a beginning that has no beginning, right? Moreover, Augustine says in the first book about the teaching of Christ, the Doctrina Christiana. Oh, that's the way he says that. Not in the De Trinitata, I wonder, huh? These things are scattered among different works of the Fathers, and Thomas will bring them together and order them, right? Okay. Augustine says in the first book of the Doctrina Christiana that, In the Father is unity, in the Son, equality, and in the Holy Spirit, the agreement or concord of unity and equality. And it seems that this is unsuitably appropriated. Because one person is not denominated formally to what is appropriated to what? Another. But as it's said there, or added to that, the three, these three are all one on account of the Father. They're equal, all on account of the Son. They are connected, all on account of the Holy Spirit. But you can't say that they're all wise by the Son. You can't say they're all equal by the Son, right? Okay. How are you to understand what Augustine is saying there, huh? Moreover, according to Augustine, and incidentally in my particular thing, it is a reference to Hugo, which is my name, by the way. In the other one. Yeah. Hugo of St. Victor. Okay. So that's very interesting, huh? My baptismal name is Hugo, huh? I was baptized. I was baptized. Hugo, my name is actually Hugo Duane Burquist, named after a grand uncle who was lost at sea off the coast of Sweden. And then the names got switched around, right? So when I got to the Catholic grade school, you know, the old pastor said, how'd you get baptized? Duane is not a saint's day. And I took it in my confirmation name, Victor, because my father's name was Victor Burquist. And so I always felt an affinity for Hugo of St. Victor, because two of my three names there, come in, huh? Our bishop's last name is Mansoor, and I think Mansoor is for Vincent, a related name. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Also, according to Augustine, to the father is attributed power, right? Potentia. To the son, wisdom, right? To the Holy Spirit, goodness, huh? And this seems to be unsuitable. For virtus, huh? Virtue pertains to power, huh? But virtue is found to be appropriate to the son, according to that of the first epistle of the Corinthians, chapter 1, verse 24. Christ, the virtue of God, right? Of course, Thomas often used the word virtue, too, to mean power, right? Okay? And it's also attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to that of Luke chapter 6. The virtus went out from them, right? And it healed all of them. Therefore, power ought not to be procurated to the, what? Father. As you mentioned before, Thomas the Purse says omnipotent, self-eaternity, deus, right? So you have power there to be attributed to the father. And he had that in the creed, too. I believe in God, the father almighty. You know? So almighty is said of the father, not of the other person, but aren't they almighty, too? Well, that's, how do you understand that? Well, it's an appropriation, right? But why is it appropriated to the father, right? And see the importance of that article where he said that Thomas said, whether the father is a principium, a beginning, right? Because of the definition of power, he said it's a beginning of, what? Operation, right? So the idea of beginning, and because the father is a beginning that has no beginning, right? Then he especially seems to, what? Have the aspect of a beginning, and because power is fundamentally a beginning, then it's appropriated to the father. Yeah? Not because those are not a beginning, but because of the special connection. A beginning that has no beginning, huh? And we'll see the glory of that a little later today. Now, the fourth objection, which is dealing now with the fourth one that Thomas will have in the order of these, right? So Thomas has ordered the objections, right? He's allowed to do that, huh? There's a beautiful text there that you'll see in the third part of the Summa there, where Thomas is asking where the dialectic remains after you have demonstration. And he distinguishes between dialectic before you demonstrate the truth, and then after you've demonstrated the truth and see it clearly, you can go back over the dialectic and what? Order it more carefully, right? So the order of these objections obviously is the same as what? The order Thomas sees among these four appropriations. So the dialectic here is what? Much more useful to leading the student to the truth than have a hit and miss dialectic that you would have before. And you see this, you know, if you compare the dialectic of Plato and the dialogues, where it's kind of all over the place. You go from one thing to another, right? And so on. And then in Aristotle, where it's all ordered, right? And something from this dialogue, maybe it comes in, something from that dialogue comes in, and this should be right before that, and it's right, perfectly ordered. But you don't have that in plain old. Maybe they'll do it more so in his lectures, but the dialogues are like a man who Socrates claims not to know, right? And so he's kind of wandering a bit, right? And the dialectic is not as well, what, ordered, right? Of course, you see what they say is that teaching ought to imitate the discovery, right? But there's a lot of false dead ends when you try to discover something, right? And then when the master comes back after he sees the truth, and he takes those parts of dialectic that are most convenient to lead somebody towards the truth. So this is a very simple example of it, but you can see the order here, right? But if you go through, you know, article after article of Thomas, the objections are actually ordered. And more so in the Summa, say, than maybe even the questions disputate, where it's, you know, a little more dependent upon what the student has heard, right? And they collect the objections. Also, Augustine in the book about the Trinity, in the text I was referring to earlier here. Book 6, chapter 10. He says, Not in a confused way should one take what the Apostle says. Notice that's the Apostle, capital A. From him, and through him, and in him, right? From him, saying, an account of the Father. Through him, per ipsum, an account of the Son. In ipsum, in him, an account of the what? Holy Spirit. But this seems said unsuitably. Because through this that is said in ipsum, there seems to be implied the, what? Relation of a final cause. Which is the first of all causes. Therefore, this relation of cause ought to be appropriate to the Father, who is the beginning, not from the beginning. But notice, there's still a likeness there of the Father, in respect to the Son, of what cause, you know? You start speaking of cause, but we mentioned how Basil and the Greeks sometimes use the word cause there. And it's because usually kind of a loose sense, right? Large sense. But what cause, or like what cause, most of all, is the Father a beginning of the Son? Yeah. In no way is an end or purpose, right? But a Father is to a Son a little bit like the Maker, Hoover. And in us, strictly speaking, he is a cause in the sense of Hoover or Maker, right? But this is the likeness, right, of God the Father and the human Father, right? Okay, now the fifth objection. Moreover, truth is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to that of John 16, 16. I am the way, the truth, and the, what? Life. Now, I used to take that as an example of a text there, where sometimes the Church see more than one sense of the words, right? So when I grew up there, you know, in the Catechisms, they would take these three, for the three parts of the Catechism, and in the Veritas you'd teach the, what, Creed and so on, what you believe, right? And then in Via, you'd teach the, what, Commandments, right? And then Vita, you'd teach about prayer and the Sacraments, huh? Life, huh? Okay. But in the context of the question where one of the Apostles asked Christ, well, where are you going, and how can you get there, right? And Christ answers both questions by saying, I am the way, which in Greek is the word odos, right? I am the road, the truth, and the life. And as Thomas explains, well, as man, he's the, what, the road, the way to God, huh? But as God, he's, what, both truth itself and life itself, huh? So he's answering both of those questions, huh? And so Thomas gets down to the Terziapar, the third part where he talks about incarnation and so on. He says he's going to talk about Christ, who as man, right, is the Via, the road, the way of what? Tending to God, huh? So Via is referring there to the human nature of Christ and truth and life to his divine nature. Yeah. But truth and life. There are what would seem to be appropriations, huh? And likewise, the book of life, according to that of Psalm 39, in the head of the book is written about me. That is, before the Father, who is my, what? Head, huh? And likewise, this that is said, who is, who am? Because, or on that verse of Isaiah, chapter 65, verse 1, Behold, I go to the Gentiles, says a gloss. The Son speaks, who said to Moses, I am who am? But it seems that this is proper to the, what? Yeah, and not appropriated. For truth, according to Augustine in the book on true religion, is the, what? Highest, greatest likeness of the beginning, without any, what? Unlikeness. That seems to be what the Son is, the image, right, of the Father, right? Well, of course, Thomas is going to be saying the reply here, that he's talking about truth insofar as it's the Son, right? But truth, as simply said, is essential, not what? Proper to the Son, right? It's appropriate to the Son. And thus it seems that it properly belongs to the Son who has the beginning. And the book of life also seems to be something proper, because it signifies being from another, right? For every book is written by someone. Well, Thomas will seem to deny that. It's a little hard, that text, I find. And this word, who is, who am, seems to be proper to the Son. Because if, when they said to Moses, I am who am, the whole Trinity is speaking, therefore Moses could say, he who is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit sent me to you. And therefore, and further, you're able to say, he who is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit sent me to you, demonstrating a certain person. But this is false, because no person is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it's not able to be common to the Trinity, but it's proper to the Son. And those are more particular objections to the Fifth. But the first four objections are what? Dealing with the four appropriations that Thomas takes from Hillary and Augustine, and maybe some will go back before Hillary or Augustine, right? That's the Hebrew group. So, okay. Now Thomas gets to the body of the article. I answer, it should be said, that our understanding, which is led by the hand, from preachers to a knowledge of God. And once Indiana was very fond of that word there, manuduchitur, right? Lead by the hand. And he'd often, in talking about teaching there, he'd go to this text of Thomas here on the teacher, which is in the same volume here, if you have it there. I don't know if you have it. Question 117, Article 1, right? Very kind of famous text. And in the last paragraph of the body of the article there, he's talking about the work of the teacher. He says, the master, the teacher, leads the student from things already known to a knowledge of things, what? Unknown. It's the last paragraph, almost. At least in my text, the last paragraph, in Question 117, Article 1. Whether one man is able to teach another. Sometimes it's doubtful. Okay? And I'm not going to look at the whole article, but just this last text here. He says, the teacher leads the student from things already known to a knowledge of the unknown. Do you find that text? But Thomas makes a distinction now, in two ways. First, by proposing to him some aids or tools, by which his understanding uses to acquiring knowledge. As when he proposes to him some statements, less what? Universal. Which, nevertheless, from things foreknown, the student is able to judge, right? I remember how, those of you who had me for the first reading there from the first book of the physics, I'm actually hearing. Aristotle is showing that we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly. And he gives a very difficult and profound universal reason for this. That what is more known to us is not, is less known. But then he has three kinds of examples, right? To bring out that we know things in a confused way first. And he begins, you know, with, you know, when you see a sense of a whole, right? You don't distinguish all the parts at once, huh? And then he gives the example, we name a thing before we can define it. And then the child calls all men father and all women mother, right? And then everyone distinguishes. And that's an example of using less universal statements to manifest a, what? More universal statement. As when he proposes to him statements less universal, which, nevertheless, from things already known, the student is able to judge, right? Or when he proposes to him some sensible, what? Examples, right? Or some likenesses, huh? Or, apposita, right? Or other things of this sort, from which the understanding of the learner is manu duchiter in Latin. How does your text translate, if you're in English, how do they translate manu duchiter? Or 117, Article 1. What word do they use? Yeah. Is he able to judge? No, they don't really translate it. Yeah, see, it's a Latin word, it's a compound word, but it's manu, which is by the hand, right? Duchiter, led by the hand. I suppose it comes back from the idea of taking a little child who's first led to walk, right? He can't walk by himself, so he's led by the hand, right? And he can walk, and he's led by the hand. Something like that, where the teacher is leading the student by the hand, Thomas says. It's a very common thing he uses, and by which the understanding of the one learning is led by the hand to a knowledge of the unknown truth. Now, in a sense, Augustine, when he looks for the image of the Trinity in creatures, right, and even when he looks for the footprint, he's manifesting the great mystery of the Trinity per, what, similia, as it says in the text here, right, then? In another way, when he strengthens the understanding of the one learning, not in the way this takes place in the angels by some act of power of a superior nature, as has been said about the angels, where the higher angel illuminates the lower one, or our angel, the dying angel, we pray, to illumine you. We study these things. Because all human understandings are one grade in the order of nature, right? But insofar as he proposes to the student the order of, what, principles or beginnings or premises to conclusions, right? Because perhaps to himself, he does not have so great a, what, power of bringing things together, right? That from beginnings and premises, he is able to, what, deduce conclusions. And therefore, he said in the first book of the Posture Analytics of Aristotle, the demonstrations of syllogism making us to know. In this way, the one who demonstrates makes the, what, hear, know it, right? So, in the easiest sciences, like I've been referring to Euclid, right, all Euclid does is to, what, propose the order of premises to conclusions. When you come to a new theorem in Euclid, right, all he does is use the ones that you've already seen. But you don't have a sufficient qualitative power of power to bring these together, right? So Euclid brings them together for you, right? You've probably forgotten some of them already, you know, and usually they have nice text that they give you the number of the theorem that's being used, right? And you go back and go, oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, you see? But if you went back, you should be able to figure it out from the ones you've done before, right? But that's all you have to do in Geometry because it's so easy, you know, to do other things. But you get into natural philosophy or wisdom. Some of these more difficult sciences, theology, then you need this monodexio, right? So when she and Dion give a course on the monodexio, proper to what? Logic, right? It's a very difficult science. It has, as Thomas says, maximum difficultata, the basic difficulty, and wisdom even more so, right? And he gave a course on the monodexio, proper to that, which is totally neglected, you know, you'd say. So, Thomas, you'll find that term used in different senses, but similar senses, right? So, going back now to the body of the article here, question 39, article 8. The answer should be said that our understanding, which is led by the hand, right, from creatures to a knowledge of God, and sometimes properly, sometimes metaphorically and so on, right? Phrase, please. Since it's necessary, that it consider God according to the way that it takes from, what? Creatures, right? Now, this is nothing new to us, is it? That's why we have many names of God, right? Because perfection of God is altogether one and simple, right? But in a superior way, it contains perfections of creatures, right? But in creatures, where we start, they're all multiplied, and we work our way back, right? And so we have many, what? Yeah. You've heard me comparing many times that to, what? The radiative circle, right? And there's one point at the end of all these radii, that's God. And at the other end, there's many, and that's the, what, multiplication and diversification of these perfections as they are creatures, right? So if I say, you know, God's wisdom is the end of this line, and God's, what, love is the end of this line, and so on, right? It's really the same point I'm talking about. It's the end of all those lines, but I can name it by as many radii as I am. And because I'm starting, I'm being lured by the hand. Church fathers speak of what? Stuttering, right? Our mind stutters. Yeah. It'll be the end of it, yeah. But that's a very concrete way. You don't want to lose that. I know when we were reading, what was it? Book of Job, I guess it was one of those books, in the Old Testament, and I was kind of looking at the text I had, and the translation would say, you know, I helped the blind man, you know, couldn't see it like that. But the original text says, I was an eye to the blind man. I was a foot to the blind man. You know? So concrete, right? And it's not quite that concrete, but it's something like that, to be led by the hand. Now, we're going to go back to creatures for a while, if you'll permit the necessary, what? But, yeah, we turn to the creatures, right? In the consideration, however, of some creature, there are four things that occur to us in certain order. For first, we can consider the thing, what? Absolutely, right? Insofar as it is a certain being, a certain thing, right? Secondly, it's consideration of a thing insofar as it's one. And that reminds me a little bit of what Aristotle does at the beginning of the fourth book of Wisdom, right? Where he talks about being as the subject of wisdom. And then he talks secondly about one, being in a way the subject too, right? But being comes first and then one, right? So in book seven, eight, and nine of wisdom, he takes being as being. Book ten, the one, right? So he has the same order here. The third is a consideration of a thing, according as there is in it a power, and there I think virtue is a sense of power, to what? Operating to doing something and to causing things, right? And you see how those three are perfectly ordered, right? Because in a sense, the meaning of one is undivided being, right? So being is more basic than one. So that one adds to the idea of being or thing that it's undivided. And then those first two are kind of considering the thing in itself. Now the third thing is, according as there is a power in the thing, to do something or to cause something. And very close to the third thing is the fourth thing. The fourth is a consideration of a thing, according to the relation which it has to the things cost, huh? Okay? So you can consider me as, what, a man? One man, right? I'm a father, right? And then this relation with all these grandchildren, children and grandchildren running around, right? Okay? Now this can all be applied to God. So, these four appropriations that are objected against in the first four objections are going to be in this exact order that he's distinguished here, right? According, therefore, to the first consideration, by which is considered absolutely God, according to his, what, very being, huh? Is taken the appropriation of Hillary. According, as eternity is appropriated to the father, right? Species to the son, use to the what? Yeah. Now the is one to understand, of course, is the first one, right? Now what is the definition of eternity that goes back to the master there, oethius? Simo. Yeah. Tota simo. Tota simo. And perfecta. Tota simo. Yeah. So, vitae terminogidis means what? Anindic, has no beginning, no end, right, huh? Okay? So, what's the connection between eternity, then, and the father? Eternity has no beginning. He has a beginning without a beginning. Yeah. Yeah. The father has no beginning. Well, the son has a beginning, right? Because he proceeds from the father. And the Holy Spirit has a beginning. Because he proceeds from the father and the son is one beginning in them. Tota simo. Okay? And notice, one of the names of the father was what? No, I mean, one of the properties of the father. One of the notions, let's say, of the father. In Nashabilitas, right? Yeah. Which, in a sense, is touching upon him having no, what? Beginning, right? Yeah. Okay? We'll touch upon this when we get to the glory of the father. There you go. Okay. So, eternity, insofar as it signifies something to not have a beginning, right? To be not principled. Latin word, right? Signified este non principiatum. And St. Dion, you know, his native language, of course, is French, right? He made this proportion. He said, English is to French as what? Greek is to Latin, right? He says, Greek is better than Latin for both philosophy and for poetry, right? And likewise, English, he says, is better than French for both philosophy and for poetry, right? And the French language, like the Latin, seems more abstract, you know, than the Greek or the English. I think I mentioned before, he used to use the text of André Gide there, his introduction to the French edition of Shakespeare in the Plain edition. And he talks in general about the difficulty translating any poet from one language to another. But then the particular difficulty of translating Shakespeare into French, right? And he calls the French language Presque Antipoetic. That's a very strong man. He's a master of the French, you know, prose, right? I guess French is much better at prose than poetry, but it became very abstract, you know. And Descartes, people like that, helped it to become very abstract. But then you also kind of cut off from your roots and the senses for philosophy. Now, I mentioned a time, you know, when I was first teaching and lodging an assumption there, and I got thinking about this English phrase, to think out. I knew the eight senses of in and out. And so the idea of thinking... out a definition, thinking out a what? Division, thinking out a conclusion. You can distinguish these different senses of thinking out if you knew the eight senses of it now. So that was a pretty great idea. So I went to Monsignor Dian to see what he thought about. That was good, he says. But then he added, but you can't say that in French. And so Monsignor Dian took it as a compliment to St. Thomas that he could think so well in Latin. And so I said, you know, then I said, it's a compliment to Monsignor Dian, you can think so well in French. That's kind of funny, because a lot of people think that French is better for philosophy than English, right? Because they think you like getting the abstract right away. People like Tain, you know, that great, you know, direct critic and so on. What did he say about the cause of Antutti of Mozart? The music is so pure, you have only to breathe it to be happy. He has a beautiful book on the Victorians, right? And he makes a beautiful contrast between his French and the English, right? And how the French can be abstract, you know, right away, you know. And of course, I don't know what they're talking about, but it all sounds pretty good. Well, one of the inner jokes, you know, of philosophy is that Kant is much more clear if you mean him in French than in English. So, beware of that French clarity, huh? And you see how Descartes was deceived by clarity, right? He thought the clear and distinct was more certain for us, huh? It's just the opposite of what Aristotle says, huh? But doesn't he recall that Aristotle said it and why he said it and give me a reputation of it? But the great physicist there, Max Born, says, young man, I was deceived by the clarity of mathematics. Now, the second name here is quite difficult, huh? And, um, Species, huh? How do you translate that into English, huh? Species, huh? Now, you see, in English, logic, huh? Now, if you have, say, a genus, like animal, a genus in comparison, let's say, dog and cat and horse. Now, these are called species, right? Which is one of these strange words, which I guess you spell the same way if it's singular or plural. But horse is a species of animals, right? Cat is a species of animal, right? Well, animal is a genus of dog and cat and horse and so on. A genus is a name said with one meaning, right? Of many things, other than kind, signifying what it is, right? But it can only signify what each of these is in general, and therefore you need differences to complete the species. And the species is a name of a particular kind of thing placed under the genus in which the genus is said and answered the question, what is it? Now, in Greek, you have similar words. You have genus, huh? Okay? Which would be almost the same as Jesus, right? It's very similar. But here you'd have what? Cat. Now, perhaps the nearest thing in English, can't hear me already, would be the word form, right? Okay? And so sometimes we'll speak, you know, democracy is what? One form of government, right? Or as Churchill said, that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the rest. So form is probably the way to translate it into English. When I'm in studying fiction, I like to speak of the forms of fiction. It's alliterates, that's the reason I like it. But you're talking about the species of fiction, right? But the word form is not exactly analogically the same as these two, right? Because edos and species have relation to the eye, right? So the edos is a form in a sense that is seen. And in the Greek word identis, it means to see, right? Or to understand, it means that also. And the species is related to, you know, spectacles and so on. So here's a little more particular etymology, right? As opposed to maybe like the word form or lack it to be more correct, of course, by the form, right? But it's a sort of richness there in the Greek and the lacking. Now, peintle, you know, they speak sometimes of the ideas, but that's kind of a misleading way of translating it, because idea means, you know, a thought of living. But if you've got to translate the botanic forms, right? So sometimes you see people translating the forms. Because of this reference to the eye, there's some idea here of what? The beautiful, right? And in English, say, sometimes you take the word, say, shape, right? Like you say, the girl is shapely. I mean, she says, shape, any shape. You mean there's something beautiful about her shape, right? Okay. So you can see that in English word shapely a bit, right? It has a connotation of beauty that the form doesn't have as much, right? But even the word form in some sense, if you say something is disformed, or, you know, that it's uglier, distorted in some way, right? Okay. So, but apparently the Greek and the Latin words are more the idea of beauty, right? Isn't the Latin word formosa? Yeah, yeah. That's for the island, I guess. It means a beautiful island, right? The Chinese, the Chinese get there. Speciosa? Is there a word speciosa? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, sure. Yeah, now just read Augustine here, because he's the master here. The same chapter 10, in book 6 of the Trinitate, yeah. He's quoted the same thing from Hillary, right? And then he's explained the word. In qua, he says, It's not just Thomas, you know, it's a guest already, right? But apparently if you do, you know, Latin better, you'd see that that's reasonable, right? Okay. So, you've got to see the idea that species here is being appropriated to the sun, second person, because of the idea of beauty, right? And we accept that much. Now, what's the connection between beauty and the sun? No, it's okay. Notice that Thomas in the text says, Speciosa, or Pugtudo. Okay, it must be easier than it is to see it in English, right? With English word species, you don't see that connection. Speciosa, or Pugtudo, has a likeness with the things that are proper to the sun. Now, he's going to tie it up with the three names you see in the sun. He's a sun in the full sense of the word, right? And he's an imago, and he's what? He's the verbal, right? And St. Thomas says, now, For beauty, three things are required. First is integrity, or wholeness, or perfection. Okay? As Aristotle said, whole and perfect mean almost the same. So when you get to the third group of words in the fifth book of wisdom, you have the word perfect as the first word, and the words attached to perfect, and the word whole. Words are tied with that. Because those which are, what, missing, you know, or diminished, by this very fact are, what? Yeah, if you're missing an arm or a leg, that's kind of ugly, right? Sorry for you, but the arm, you know? Your body, not from your soul. So that's one thing that's required of beauty, right? And a suitable, what? Proportion, or consonance, harmony, right? So that's one thing that's required of beauty, right? So that's one thing that's required of beauty, right? So that's one thing that's required of beauty, right? So that's one thing that's required of beauty, right? So that's one thing that's required of beauty, right? Consonancia, sounding well together, right? The third thing that required is what? Clarity, right? I notice that third thing so much in the fall when you have the beautiful leaves, right? On a cloudy day, they're not that striking, but then you get a nice bright day, and they really look very beautiful. Whence things that have a brilliant color are said to be what? Beautiful, right? So when Romeo sees Juliet, right? She's brighter than the candles and so on, right? As regards the first thing, the idea of being whole, right, or perfect, it has a likeness with what is proper to the Son, insofar as he's a Son in the strict sense, having in himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father, right? Whence, to insinuating this, Augustine says it's exposition, right? So Thomas doesn't hesitate to say he got it from Augustine, right? Every time he says that God is liberal, he always quotes what? Of the Son, right? Okay. Where to it in the Son is there the highest in the first life, et cetera, right? Augustine goes on to explain this in terms of perfection of the Son, and he has all perfection of what? God, because he is God. Okay. As regards the second one, the idea of being in harmony, right, it belongs with what is proper to the Son, insofar as he is the express, what, image of the Father, right? Whence we see that some image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents a thing, even though the thing might be, what, ugly, right, huh? Okay. And this is what Augustine touches upon, and he says, where there is so great coming together, and the first equality, right, he's anticipating the second thing we'll be talking about, the unity, the second group of appropriations. But as far as the third, it belongs with what is proper to the Son, insofar as he is the word, right, that lightens the whole world, right? Which is light and the splendor of the understanding, as Damascene says, right, huh? And this, Augustine touches upon, he says, as the word, the perfect word of God, which is not like anything, and the art of the omnipotent God. To go back to the beginning of John's Gospels, didn't he say that he's the word? He calls him the word there, right? More than the Son. And then he says, the one who enlightens everyone who considers the world. So, that's beautiful what Thomas does there, right? And Augustine before him. Three things that pertain to what beauty is, and these fit into the three names of the Son, huh? And therefore, it seems appropriate that the beauty should be what? Yeah. It doesn't appear in the Passion and Death, right? Yeah, a little card from the Dominicans there around Easter time, and I had to begin, it's a little card, I don't know what's by, the painting, but it's about the resurrection, right? Instead of, you know, going down in a cave, it's kind of like when they stand above the ground, you know, and there's two angels sitting there, one and two angels, and then there's three persons, and the first person's got like this, you know, like, where is he? That's how I can see it. It's not the big slide if I read it too carefully. I didn't notice a woman, because, you know, it's kind of interesting. I've never seen one exactly like that, but it's, you know, what happened? Very nice little ones. You know, it's that little thing that Jamaicans put out, the miniscat, you know, and they have these nice pictures in their lot, you know, and they sell these nice little pictures, and they keep these for bookmarks and stuff. Nice little things. Okay. So that's really a beautiful explanation there. What? No pun intended. You know, the theory one is a little more stretched, right? Because use here, sometimes Augustine would distinguish between uses and what? Yeah, to use something to enjoy, and the whole secret to life is to know what to enjoy and what to use, and don't use the things you should enjoy, and don't try to enjoy the things you should just use, right? Okay. So Thomas has to, first of all, clear up that little thing there, right? Use has a likeness with the properties of the Holy Spirit. Largo modo, right? Taking it in a large way, huh? The word use, right? According as uti comprehends under itself, what? Frui, right? Okay. So, notice, we've talked about this way of naming things, right? But use could be divided into use and what? Enjoyment, right? Okay. And of course, when you enjoy something, you use it, don't you? Okay. But if you use something that you don't enjoy, you might just keep the word use for that, and then you enjoy it and add something, right? Okay. Insofar as to use something is to take something in the, what? Faculty, the power of the will. And to enjoy is to use with joy. Okay? Cum gaudio, uti, huh? They were very generous with the wine when I was in Spain, you know, because we had, sometimes we had to, you know, go out and get our own, but, you know, we had four or five that we had, you know, in the hotels and so on, and they were very generous wine, but I remember one of the wines was gaudium. No one knows the name of the wine. Joy. Joy. So, yeah, so you don't know Latin, but it's cum gaudio, uti, you've got the Latin in it for you, you know, to use with joy, huh? That's what this bottle of gaudio is for. I guess Spain is, now produces more wine than either France or Italy. It used to be France, Italy used to be, and I first was reading about it, but quantity doesn't necessarily mean quality, as they say, you know. But, you know, they're getting better too. Did they give you a free take for having all the grandchildren? actually I found that the Spanish, you know, the little children that come, they're very handsome, you know, good looking, you know. You know, that's what I found. Yeah, we're all sitting there. We're sitting all the time, they just say, I adore you, you know. They're really cute, these little girls and boys too. That's how you see them in the museums, you know, coming in with their little, they had uniforms, they had to say, very sweet, which one. Okay. So, using, use is kind of there for, to what? Frui, right? To enjoy, which is, cum gaudio, uti, and to use the joy, as Augustine says, in the 10th book of the Trinity. So, the use, therefore, by which the Father and the Son enjoy each other belongs, of what is proper of the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is, what? Love. And this is what Augustine says, huh? That illodilectio, that love. Directatio, pleasure. Augustine uses that word. Felicitas, right? Which is the, what, Latin word for happiness, but it's a more perfect word, huh? Felicitas comes from, what? Fruitful. Okay? Let's see, I noticed that when I was first reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, they translate the Greek word, eudaimonia, in the English text, like in Oxford, as happiness, right? And, but in Latin, you get the Latin commentary of Thomas to be translated as felicitas. But happiness comes from half. As if, it's something that happens, right? They're lucky in life. Good luck. But felicitas has got the idea of what? Fruit, huh? And fruit is the, what? A natural result of a good tree, right? That produces fruit. And, that's closer to what Aristotle's talking about because he's talking about, what, as Shakespeare says, it's part of philosophy that deals with happiness by virtue especially to be achieved, right? So you can say that happiness is the natural fruit of good deeds. And misery is the natural fruit of bad ones, huh? You know, Shakespeare has that in Macbeth, the unnatural deeds do breed unnatural troubles, right? But breed, that idea of, that idea of nature. But Aristotle used the word eudaimonia, which has the idea of the influence of a higher being, right? And so he has a discussion there in the first book, you know.