Prima Pars
Lecture 151: Abstraction, Hypostasis, and Notional Acts in the Trinity

Transcript
================================================================================

Whether abstracting through the understanding the relations of the persons, they remain the hypostasis. The third one goes forward thus. It seems that, abstracting by the understanding the properties or relations of the persons, still the hypostasis remain, right? Hypostasis remain. How do you say that plural in English? Hypostasis? Hypostasis. For that, that has itself in addition to something, can be understood removing that which is added to it. Just as man has itself to animal, from addition, right? In addition of the difference, right? And one is able to understand animal, removing the difference, rational. But person has itself in addition to the hypostasis. For a person is a hypostasis, distinguished by property pertaining to dignity, right? Well, sometimes the latinians use the word hypostasis for what? It's a synonym for person, right? But the word itself more signifies an individual substance, right? And then a person is an individual substance of a rational nature, so you add something to it. So it seems like you could understand this without that, right? Moreover, the father does not, from the saying, have that he is the father and that he is, what, aliquus, someone. For since by fatherhood he is the father, if by fatherhood he was someone who would follow the son, and whom is not fatherhood would not be, what, someone, aliquus. Removing therefore by the understanding fatherhood from the father, though he still remains, and he is someone, which is hypostasis. Therefore, removing the property from the person, there remains the hypostasis. Moreover, Augustine says in the fifth book of the Trinity, This is not the same thing to say the ungenerated one, which is to say the father. Because even though he had not generated the son, nothing would prevent one from saying that he was, what, ungenerated, right? But if the son, but if he did not, what, generate the son, there would not be in him fatherhood. Therefore, removing fatherhood, there still remains the hypostasis of the father as something ungenerated. Okay, you're all convinced. But against this is what Hillary says in the fourth book of the Trinity, about the Trinity. The son has nothing except what he has by being born. But by nativity or birth, he is the son. Therefore, removing sonship, there does not remain the hypostasis of the son. And the same reason would apply to what? Other persons. Now, Thomas is going to start with seeing a distinction, right? And this is a distinction that Aristotle had already made, right? Answer, it should be said that there is a two-fold abstraction by the understanding. One, according as universal, is abstracted from the particular, as animal from what? Man. Another, according as the form is abstracted from matter, as the form of the circle is abstracted by the understanding from all sensible matter, right? Like we may extract sphere from marble ball and baseball and the rest of them. Now, between these two abstractions, this is a difference. That in the abstraction which comes about of the universal, according to the universal in particular, there does not remain that from which the abstraction is made. For removing from man the rational difference, the difference rational, there does not remain in the understanding man, but only animal remains there. But in the abstraction, which is noted according to form and matter, both remain in the understanding. For in abstracting the form of a circle from bronze, there remains, apart from each other in our understanding, the understanding of the circle and the understanding of what? Bronze. I didn't even know how to understand that fully, but he's saying that. Now, although in God there is not a universal, nor a particular, nor a form and matter, secundum realm, right? Nevertheless, by the way of signifying, there is found some likeness of these in God, right? According to which Moe Damascene says, that the substance is common, the particular is the, what? Hypostasis. If, therefore, we speak of the abstraction which is by, which is according to the universal in particular, having removed the properties, right? There remains in the understanding the common essence, right? Not, however, the hypostasis of the father, which is, as it were, a particular, right? Because like in the mind of the philosopher, there remains a divine essence, but not the person of the father, right? But if we speak according to the way of abstraction of form from matter, having removed the properties that are not personal, right, there remains the understanding of the hypostasis in persons. Just as having removed, by the understanding from the father, that he's ungenerated, right? Or that he breathes, there could still remain the hypostasis of person of the, what? Father. But having removed the property, the personal property to the understanding, the one that constitutes him as father, there is taken away the understanding of the, what? Hypostasis. For the personal properties are not thus understood to come to the divine hypostasis as a form to a pre-existing subject, right? But they bring with themselves their, what? Yeah, their underlying subjects. Their subsisting relations, right? Insofar as they are the very persons themselves subsisting, just as the fatherhood is the father himself. But a hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since the hypostasis is a, what? Individual substance. Since, therefore, the relation is what distinguishes the hypotheses, hypostasis, and constitutes them, as has been said, it remains that the personal relations, being removed by the understanding, there does not remain the, what? Hypostasis, huh? But, as has been said, some say that the hypostasis in God are not distinguished by the relations, but by origin only. That the father be understood to be a hypostasis, through this that he is not from another, right? The son, through this that he is from another by generation. But the relations coming, as it were, properties pertaining to dignity, constitute the notion of person, whence they are called personalities, right? Whence removing these relations, to the understanding, there remains hypostasis, but not, what? Persons. But this cannot be. Directly, right? Hey, I hate to be debating this guy, wouldn't you? But this cannot stand, when I caught up two things. First, because relations both distinguish and constitute the hypostasis. This has been shown. It's not the origin, right? Distinguish and constitutes them, right? They're distinguished and constituted by something intrinsic to them. Secondly, secondly, Because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as is clear at the definition of the great Boethius, saying that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Whence, in order that there would be a hypostasis and not a person, it would be necessary to abstract rationality on the part of the nature, not over on the part of the person property. So you can understand hypostasis, individual substance of a understanding person, right? But in God, the hypostasis are persons. So the persons don't remain once you abstract the relations from them, because relations both constitute and distinguish the persons. That's a mouthful, Thomas. Okay, now the first objection, right? Say that a person adds to hypostasis, so you can remove what's personal and still have the hypostasis. To the first, therefore, it should be said that person does not add over hypostasis a property distinguishing absolutely, but a property distinguishing that pertains to what? Dignity worth. And the whole of this is taken in place of one, what? Difference, right? Now, a property distinguishing pertains to dignity, according as it is understood, it's subsisting in this most noble nature, the rational nature. Whence removing the property distinguishing from the person, there does not remain the hypostasis, but it would remain if one took away the, what, rationale to the nature. For both the person and the hypostasis is individual substance, right? Whence and God, in the notion of both, is a, what, relation distinguishing, right? So there's no distinction of hypostasis in God, there's not a distinction of, what, persons, because they're in a divine nature, which is a rational nature, huh? Now, the second objection was saying he's in the aliquis, right? By something different than he's a person. To the second, it should be said that by fatherhood, the father is not only, what, a father, but he is a, what? A person. And he is a quiss, someone, or a, what? Hypostasis. Nor does it follow that the son is not a, what? Someone or a hypostasis, just as it does not follow that he is not a, what? Person. So the father is a person by fatherhood, and the son is a person by, what? Sonship. Is that better than sonhood? There's gold chips and silver chips. Okay, now, what about this objection from Augustine? Yeah. To the third, it should be said that the intention of Augustine was not to say that the hypostasis of the father remains, what, ungenerated when one removes fatherhood, right? As if in nashibilitas, right, not being born, constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis of the father. For this cannot be, since ungenerated places nothing, right? But it's said negatively, as he himself, ipsi met, teach it, right? He himself says. But he speaks in general that not everything ungenerated is, what? Is a father, right? And one of which you might say that God is ungenerated if he knew nothing about the trinity, right? That wouldn't constitute the fatherhood, would it? Removing, therefore, fatherhood, there does not remain in God the hypostasis of the father as he's distinguished from the other persons, but only as he's distinguished from the creatures as the Jews understand, right? So Jews don't apparently believe the trinity, right? No, and Aristotle and those guys knew nothing about this. Even though he was a number three to honor God with, huh? So he stopped knowing. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. And help us to understand how it's your written. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So when you talk to your Mohammedan friends, you've got to be able to defend us against the charge of being polytheists. Now, the Mohammedans think we're polytheists, right? A little lapse on our part, right back to polytheism. And I know what the Jews think of us, but they don't believe in the Trinity either, do they? So, I'm kind of struck by Thomas, you know, ending the treatise on the substance of God with the unity of God, right? To leave you with that thought before he takes up the Trinity. But the Koenig said, you know, sometimes these mysteries are revealed in a certain order. So if the mystery of the Trinity had been revealed in the Old Testament, in a polytheistic age, you would not have overcome this polytheism. And so maybe there's a reason why God did not reveal in an explicit way in the Old Testament, the way he does in the New Testament. The Koenig had made a similar remark. Do you know how he spoke of the Marian century? Starting with the Immaculate Conception there, ending up with the Assumption, and so on. But there's a reason maybe why those great mysteries of Mary were being defined more explicitly, long after the mysteries about Christ had been defined. Because Mary is so elevated, you might think she's another goddess or something, right? But when the other mysteries have sunk in, and they're well-established and so on, then you can bring out the greatness of Mary without that same danger. And the Koenig thought that maybe mysteries about St. Joseph would come out now, that the mysteries of Mary were kind of been clarified, right? And I remember as I grew up as a child there, like in my home parish nativity, you had the main part there with the central altar, then you had the side altar for the Blessed Virgin, and then the side altar for Joseph. And that seemed to be like in most of the churches in St. Paul, Minnesota. And I kind of thought, well, yeah, any church has got a side altar to Mary and one to Joseph. But you see the prominence of Joseph, huh? And maybe it was time, you know, after the great mysteries of Mary had been brought out, that Joseph, you know, who I have his mysteries brought out, but we'll see. So, to the fourth article. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that the notional acts, like to generate, to breathe, and so on, are understood before the, what, properties of relations. Now, Thomas, you'll see in the body of the article, makes some distinctions, right? Very subtle, but see them. For the magistrate, the teacher, right? That's the, who? Yeah. Antoine Messier is known as the magistère. That's quite a title, huh? Even though, in other sense, Christ is the magistère, but you find this very often. And for what? Centuries, several centuries there, right? The sense that Peter Lombard was something that everybody who was going to get a doctorate, so you say, in theology would comment on, right? And Thomas has a long thing in the sentences, huh? But she was thinking of revising when he decided to write the Summa, right? I guess she was Bishop of Paris one time, huh? So the magistrate, the teacher, says, He is always the Father because he, what, always generated the Son. So this is saying your understanding of his being the Father, and subsequent to his, what? Yeah, he's understood to have generated the Son, and that's why he's the Father, right? And thus it seems that generation, according to the understanding, or our understanding, goes before fatherhood, right? That's especially in regard to the Father that he's going to make this distinction, huh? Or use a distinction as he says, huh? Moreover, every relation presupposes in its understanding that upon which it is founded, right? Now, Aristotle, in the fifth book of Wisdom, said that some relations are based upon quantity, huh? Or the one, and some are based upon acting upon and undergoing, right? And so the objection is an example here, as equality is, what, presupposes some quantity. But fatherhood is one of the other kind of relations that is based upon action and undergoing. But fatherhood is relation founded upon the action, which is generation. And Thomas is going to say in the reply, right, that if you consider in fatherhood, or father, just the relation, not the fact that it's constituting a person, but just that it is a relation, then it's posterior in understanding to the act, right? But if you consider it as constituting a person, right, well, then you understand that person as being before he does something. In the case of the son, it would be somewhat different, as you'll point out in the reply to the third objection. Moreover, just as active generation has itself to fatherhood, so birth to sonhood. But sonhood, or sonship, presupposes birth. For he is the son, because he was born. Therefore, for like reason, fatherhood presupposes, what, generation. That seems to be quite similar, those two, what, ratios, huh? But ratios are likenesses that are, what, far apart, right? Exercise the mind, saying, no. You've got to see exactly in what way these, what, are alike, yeah. And the case of generation, and being generated, or being born, in one way they're alike, in that they're both relations, which, as relations are understood as based upon the fact that you're generated, or we're generated by another. But if you see these relations as constituting persons, there'd be a big difference. Because you have to understand the relation of fatherhood as constituting the person of the father, as before he's doing something, right? But the son, even that way, you can understand as a result of what the father has done. And therefore, it can be understood as being before the son, right? Because birth is a way to the one who's born, right? Or being generated is on the way to the one being generated. But generation proceeds from the one generated. So it's going to presuppose, in that way, a father, right? As a person. But against this is the generation, is the operation of the person of the father. But fatherhood constitutes the person of the father, right? Therefore, it's before, in understanding, fatherhood, then what? Generation. Well, Thomas will see a distinction and use a distinction, right? He'll see a distinction between the relation being considered simply as relation, and then the relation being considered as constituting this person who is the father. And in one case, it will be, what, understood after generation, and another before. That's very subtle, right? The great Shakespeare says we should look before and after, right? And this is a question of before and after. And you say, well, if the father... is before generation, that's it. Generation can't be before the father. But it's possible for the father to be before generation in one way of understanding the father as a constituted person, right? Another way, understood simply as relation, to be after generation and to be based upon generation. Do you see that? It's very subtle, though, right? As you know from your great study of the categories, even there are Stato-distinguished four central meanings of what? Before. It's possible for A to be before B in one sense and B after B in another sense. Like we studied philosophy before what? Theology. But theology is before philosophy and dignity or worth. So nothing prevents philosophy being before theology in the order of learning and in the order of goodness or excellence, theology being before philosophy. So Thomas is probably not a very subtle thing. In one way, we understand the father's fatherhood through the fact that he generates, right? Through generating. Just like some relations are based upon what? Acting and doing. Others upon quantity. And this upon some action you're doing. But another way we understand the father is before generation. If we see fatherhood as constituting a person. Well, the person is understood to be before he does something. What did Descartes say? I think, therefore I am. Well, no. Thinking is coming before in knowing, before knowing that I am, right? But in things that I am should be understood I have to be before I can do something, right? I can't do something before I am, can I? No. Thomas says, It should be said that according to those who say that the properties, the relations, do not distinguish and constitute the hypostasis, the persons, but they merely make known the hypostasis, the persons, as distinct and constituted. And it should be said absolutely that the relations, according to the way of understanding, follow upon the notional acts. Because then they're just going to be considered as relations, huh? That these persons already constitute and distinguished have, huh? Just as my person is more fundamental than, what, my being a father or a teacher or something like that, sorry. So that it could be said simply without any distinction that because he generates, he is the father. And then that he generates is what? In our way of understanding, before us being the father. But supposing what we've shown before, that the relations both distinguish and constitute the hypostasis, I'm just talking like in Greek here, huh? They both distinguish and constitute the persons in God, right? Is necessary to what? Use a distinction. And I kind of like the fact that it's kind of struck by using the word use, right? I'm always kind of hesitant to say, I'm going to make a distinction. It seems like I'm kind of inventing a distinction to get out of some kind of a difficulty or something, right? I'd much rather say that you see a distinction, right? Rather than that you, what? Make one, right? Not that there can't be in some way defended the way of speaking, but it's not as good as to say I see a distinction. And the distinction you see, in which Thomas, in this case, sees, he's now going to use. Okay? What's the distinction that he sees? Well, we'll see as we go on here, huh? But we've already touched upon it, right? But supposing what we've shown before, that relations distinguish and constitute the hypostasis of the persons, it is necessary to use a distinction, which I have seen. It's Thomas' scene. Because origin is signified in God actively and what? Passively. Actively, as generation, is attributed to the Father. And breathing, if we take this for a notional act, is attributed to both the Father and the Son. But passively, as Thomas will point out later on, I think the next question, this passive is secundum, grammar only, right? Passively, as birth or nativity, is attributed to the Son, for want of a better word, right? Possession to the, what? Holy Spirit, huh? Or being breathed, huh? Now, Thomas sees a number of distinctions here. The first is between those origins that are signified passively and those that are signified actively. And then those that are signified actively is going to see an even more subtle distinction that we've talked about. And he says, origins signified passively, simply, right? Come before. According to our understanding. They come before the, what? Properties of the persons proceeding from them. Even the, what? Personal ones. The ones that constitute those persons. Why? He gives a reason here. Because origin passively signifies, signifies as the road, huh? The way to the person constituted by that property. So being born is, what? Signifies as the coming to be, right? The one being born, being breathed, right? Likewise. Likewise, origin accurately signifies, is before, according to the understanding, then the relation of the person originating something which is not personal. Remember how he spoke before of how fatherhood constitutes the father, right? Breathing doesn't constitute the father, right? Sonship constitutes the son, right? So if you take breathing, he's going to make the same point as he made before. For the notional act of breathing, according to our understanding, precedes a relative property that doesn't really have a name, right? Which is common to the father and the, what? Son, right? But now the most subtle distinction that he sees. He uses. I've got to correct myself, huh? But the personal property of the father can be considered in two, what? Ways. In one way, simply as a, what? Relation. And thus, again, according to the understanding, it presupposes a, what? Notional act. And this is what Aristotle had taught already, right? The relations are based upon quantity or upon action and passion. Because relation, as such, in quantum use, relation as relation, is founded upon act. But, if we consider it in another way, according as it constitutes a person, it's constitutive of a person, he says. And thus, it's necessary that it be understood before, the relation to be understood before, the actual, notional act. just as the person acting is presupposed or understood before the action. The being of one, of someone, right, is understood as before they're doing something. Don't you see the distinctions? If you see them, you can use them and avoid these problems. He said, we can consider fatherhood, right, simply as relation, right? Now, relation as a relation, if that's all you're considering about, right, is always based either upon quantity or upon acting upon and undergoing, right, action and passion. And, And in the case of God, it's not based upon quantity, right? But based upon action, right? So then, the relation of fatherhood is understood as fouling upon the act of what? Generating. In the same way, you say that I am a father because I generated somebody, right? So if you consider it just as a relation, period. But now if you stop and say, yeah, but this relation constitutes the person of the father, right? And then if you see it in that way, or consider it in that way, as constituting a person, well, this person is presupposed to what he does, huh? Yeah. And if he didn't do it, he wouldn't be following it. Yeah, yeah. But this is an action of a person, right? And consider it... I know, I know, I know, I know. But then, that's going back and saying that the relation is what's most fundamental, right? And if you stop there and just consider the relation as a relation, what you say is correct, right? But if you go beyond it and say, but this relation, right, constitutes, right, a person, right? Then you say, well, which is more fundamental in understanding? That something is, right? Or that it does something, right? But then it is more fundamental, right? So, the father has to be before he can do something, right? Because what he does is understood as proceeding from him as a person, right? Now, this is not the same with the son, because the son is understood as, what, proceeding from, or resulting from this active generation of the father, right? So, it's very subtle what Thomas is saying, right? Now, in referring then back to the words of the magister, right, the teacher, Peter. To the first, therefore, it should be said that when the magister says that because he generates, he is the father, right, he says he takes the name of father according as it designates a relation, what, not over according as it signifies a subsisting, what, person. Because in that way, it would be necessary to say the reverse. Because he, the father is, he, what, generates son. Otherwise, you'd have him, what, doing something before he's understood to be. Does that make sense? So, Thomas says you have to see and use this distinction, right? Now, the second thing was arguing from the, yeah, the second objection, again, is saying that every relation presupposes understanding that upon which it's founded, right? Thomas says, okay, yeah. If you consider this relation as a relation, then it's posterior. So, he says that objection proceeds about fatherhood, considered simply as a, what, relation. And not according as it is constitutive of a, what, person. Now, the third says, do we have to have the son existing before, huh? Okay. The third, therefore, it should be said, and this is playing on our difference now, right? And then notice how the injection proceeds, going by a, what, proportion, right? You know my simple example for math, right? Four is to six is two is to three. Three, and then I come back and they say, well, that's true, isn't it? Now, two is to three is the ratio of a, what, prime number to a prime number. Therefore, or the ratio of a, what, even number to an odd number. Therefore, four to six is the ratio of a even number to an odd number. Why have I made a mistake here? Now, Plato says, like, this is a slippery thing, right? And I misunderstood, or haven't understood fully, in what way four and six are like two and three. They're not like two and three in being the ratio of a odd, an even number to an odd number, right? They're not like two and three, like being the ratio of a prime number to a prime number, right? Two and three are prime numbers. Two and three are one's odd, one's even, right? But that's not what the likeness is based on, is it? In what way is four to six, then, like two to three? Yeah. You could say that four is the same parts of six, that two is the three, right? And if you have a hard time seeing that, think of four as being two twos, and six as being three twos, right? So, four is two of the three twos and six, right? So, it's the same parts of six that two is the three. That's exactly the way in which they are like. But I misunderstood it when I exaggerated, right? So, Thomas here now points out a difference, like I'm pointing out a difference between two and three and four and six, right? That the passive thing, nativity is the road to the person of the son, right? It's not understood as proceeding from the son, right? Why, generating or giving birth is understood as proceeding from the father, right? And so, since nativity or birth is a road to the person of the son, therefore, according to understanding, it precedes the father, even, the son rather, even as it is, what? Constitutive of the person of the son. But the active generation is signified as going forth from the person of the father, and therefore, it presupposes the personal property of the father as constituting the father, right? So, Thomas sees the difference there, right? I think I mentioned how, you know, when I was first thinking about the four tools of dialectic, and Aristotle gives the tool of difference before the tool of likeness. And so, I said to Monsignor Dion, you know, maybe he does that, right? Because to see the likeness without seeing the difference is going to be a cause of what? Yeah, an even deception, right? You seem to sort of agree with that, right? He knew you were a person. Now we go on to the third comparison. He compared the person.