Prima Pars
Lecture 154: Divine Power and Notional Acts in God

Transcript
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As if more expressly, I wish to say, from the essence of the Father, right? But Thomas says, this does not seem to be sufficient for the sense of this way of speaking. For we are able to say that the creature is also from God, right? The essence, huh? Not are from the essence of God. He said to be from nothing, right? Whence, in other way, should be said that this preposition, day, and then some kind of subtle distinction between day and Latin and X, right? That the preposition day always denotes, what? Consubstantiality, something of the same substance. Whence we do not say in Latin that the house is de identificatore, right? Because it is not from a cause of the same, what? Substance. We are able, however, to say that something is de alico in whatever way that is signified as a principle that is, what? Consubstantiality. Whether it be an active principle, as the sun is said to be de patria, or whether it is a material principle, as the knife is said to be of iron, right? Or if it be a, what? Formal principle in those things in which the forms themselves are subsistent and not coming to another thing. For we are able to say that the angel, some angel, is of a, what? Intellectual nature. And in this way, we can say that the sun is generated from the essence of the father insofar as the essence of the father is communicated to the son by generation. Excuse me. Insofar as the essence of the father communicated to the son by generation subsists, what? In him, right? So, what's the meaning of that, right? He said the day there can signify, always signify something consubstantial, right? But one thing it can signify is the matter, right? And that's not the meaning here, right? Another one could be something like the efficient cause, but an active principle, right? And when that is said of the essence of the father, is either one of those true? There's no matter to God, right? And can the essence be said to be the father of the son? No. So, it's got to be in this third way, right? According as it is a, what? Formal principle, right? And he gives an example there that the angel is of a, what? Intellectual nature. Does intellectual nature mean the matter of which the angel is made? No. Does it signify kind of like the active principle of the angel? No. But it signifies, what? The formal thing. So, this is what the meaning of it is when it's said of the, what? That the son is, what? Dei essentia patris, right? Hard to see, huh? But you have to see the distinction of those three meanings or three uses of the word dei, right? Yeah. But not a material beginning and not an active beginning, which is like an efficient cause, but more, yeah. I wonder now, if you know, to go back to geometry. If I say that a cube is from six sides, right, from six squares, what would be the meaning of that? Well, is it a maker, though? It's a six. And maybe it's not even the matter, though. It's like it's the matter, you know? But it seems to be something more in terms of the, what? The form, you know? I don't know if that's a good comparison. I mean, it's kind of, no. That wouldn't constitute, would that, would you still call it parts? Yeah, you know, in the more aspect of parts there, but like the matter. Or if you said, you know, another example like this, we say that something is healthy from medicine, right? Well, that would be like an active cause, right? But see, you're healthy from health. Yeah, more formally. And the son is, what? God from the nature of the father, right? But in a formal sense. Yeah. Would you think it would be necessary to say from the nature of the father? Or could you just say from the father? Well, in English, you see, we don't seem to have two words there, X and D. I don't see. So we've got to kind of get the distinction here with our words, right? But I think we can use the word from, we would say, I am healthy from health, right? It's not very common when speaking. That's certainly a different way than saying I'm healthy from medicine, right? Because medicine is like a fish and claws or a maker made me healthy, right? But it's an active source, right? Health is more the form of the healthy. And so the divine nature is like the form of the what? Yeah. Like St. Paul says there in the epistle, right? When he was in the form of God, right? He didn't think it was inequality, you know? And then he took on the form of a slave, right? So, yeah. See, if you were to say that the divine nature generated the son, then there'd be a real distinction between the son and the divine nature. There's a real distinction between the father and the son. And there's no real distinction between the son and the divine nature. We saw that before. Each of the divine persons has no real distinction from the divine nature. The divine nature is all three of them. Each of them is the divine nature. So there's a difference in our thoughts, right? There's something expressed by father that's not expressed by the thoughts they have about the divine nature, right? But realize that the father and the divine nature are the same thing. And the son and the divine nature are the same thing. So when you say that the son is generated from, for one of the words, adjective or preposition, rather, in English, from the divine nature, you've got to say, what do you mean by from there, right? And it doesn't mean, you know, there's material out of which are made of three persons. And it doesn't mean that the divine nature is the father and the son. Then there'd be a real distinction between the reason and the relative opposition. So it's from the nature of the father as a, what? The form. It's now the form, the nature of the, what? Son. It's hard to see, right? You can see a little distinction there, huh? If you don't see a distinction, you're going to stumble, right? And this might be horrible, but... Can you say that the divine nature is the form of cause of the son? Is that what we're saying? No, no, no, no. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no No, no, no, no. But what we understand it is, the nature of form would be, what, son, right? I mean, in other words, it signifies, the abstract signifies there's a form of something, right? Yes. But in God, there's no distinction, real distinction, between what is signified as a form and what has the form, right? Yes. Okay? Because as I say, even St. Paul used to say the word form, right, is in the form of what? God, right? Yes. Okay. Now, the third injection, right? Augustine says that the three persons are not from the same, what, essence or nature, because they are not other, the essence and the person, right? But the person of the Son is not other from the, what, essence of the Father. Therefore, the Son is not of the essence of the Father, right? The third should be said, that when it is said that the Son is generated from the essence of the Father, there is added something with regard to which there can be saved a, what, distinction, right? Because you're saying it's from the essence of the Father, right? Okay? Or it sounds like saying you generated from the essence insofar as it's what? The same thing as the Father. Insofar as the essence is the Father is distinct from the Son, but not insofar as its essence is essence. But when it is said that the three persons are from the divine essence, right? There's not placed something with regard to which there can be, what? Yeah. Through the preposition signified, right? And therefore it is not, what? Yeah. There's a difference there, right? Could you say the Son is generated from the essence of the Father? The Father is used in that description, right? And if there's something by reason of which you can speak of a distinction there, but you say the three persons are generated from the divine essence, not generated, but they are from the divine essence, there's nothing on the side of the divine essence that would, what? And therefore they're going to end up being really distinct. You wouldn't say the Son is from the divine essence. Yeah. They're only three persons, right? See, I mean, in English, if you say this is from that, doesn't that imply some distinction between this and that? So if you said the three persons were from the divine nature, then that implies some distinction between the three persons and the divine nature. And that would be false or heretical, right? You see, a good quote that Thomas asks him, he'll be right. Ex vervis, ordinaptic colatis, heresis, heresis, heresis. From words to sort of put forth, heresis, heresis. How easy it would be to stumble over these things, huh? Mm-hmm. There was a guy who got up in the church and said, she should be called the mother of Christ, not the mother of God. Mm-hmm. You know? But I've seen, you know, Protestants, you know, who are uneasy by our calling Mary the mother of God, right? You can kind of say, why don't we be uneasy about this, right? He doesn't have a mother. Does it end to church as an ex-regionate instead of day, or? Does it use as ex, I think, as an ex-regionate? Ex-regionate. Ex-regionate, yeah. Yeah. Incidentally, they're talking about Mary. I happened to run across an article on the church, I guess it's dedicated now to Catherine Alexandria, the one that's down there on Sinai. And they claim to have the burning bush, you know, the bush that... Oh, yeah. You heard that, or... I can't hear this part, no. And the... I guess the way it got dated to Catherine was, I think a remains were transported there or something. But anyway... But anyway, they're talking about the burning bush, and the church is dedicated to also the Blessed Virgin, and the way they understand the burning bush is that the bush represents Mary, and the flames, Christ, in his divine nature, and in taking the flesh of her, he didn't consume her or her story, right? Yeah. And the explanation I'd always heard from the church fathers was that the bush represents the human nature of Christ, and the flames, the divine nature of Christ, and the two natures remain distinct, and one does not swallow up the other, so to speak, right? Right. But this is also, I think, a meaning you could see in it. Yeah. And so they see that as pointing the way to the Incarnation, right? And explicitly to Mary, right? Yeah. The issues of the fathers. Yeah, yeah. That's kind of interesting, I thought. Yeah, our liturgy typically mentions that from the Incarnation. Mary says, God's an all-consuming fire. How will I not be consumed? If he's going to come to me, how will I not be consumed? Okay, yeah. That's just sort of what those words are about. Yeah. Okay. Now we're down to the, what, fourth objection, right? Tom's going to give a couple of explanations here. To the fourth, then, it should be said that wouldn't it be said that wisdom is created, right? This can be understood not about the wisdom, which is the Son of God, right? But about the created wisdom, which God has put into his creatures, right? For it is said in Ecclesiasticus 1, chapters 9, 10, or verses 9, 10, that he created it, that is, wisdom, by the Holy Spirit, and he poured it forth upon all his, what, works. Reminds me of the second definition of nature, right? The Kisari, or the Kahnikis to speak of there. It's something of an art, maybe the divine art, right? In things, right? Whereby they are, what? They're in, right? And, you know, as Aristotle says, if you could put the, the artist could put the art of building a ship into the woods, so it would build itself into a ship, then you'd have something like nature. It shows the excellence of the divine art, right? You put something of his art into things. I suppose try to do that with a computer, right? You know? But it doesn't serve our needs very much. Yeah. But it has a mind of its own, as they say, right? Norrie says, is it unsuitable that in one context of speech, scripture should speak both of what? The generated wisdom and the created wisdom, right? Why? Because the created wisdom is a partaking, a certain partaking of the what? Uncreated wisdom. Or it is able to refer to the what? Nature created of the sun, assumed by the sun, that the sense would be, from the beginning and before the ages, I was what created. That is, I was foreseen that I would be joined to what? Creatures to human nature. Or, and this is, now the one that's going to be applied to even his divinity, his divine generation. Or through this, that the divine wisdom is said to be, what? Created and generated. Created and generated. Created and generated. Created and generated. Created and generated. uh the way of the divine generation is insinuated for us or indicated for us for in generation what is generated takes on the nature of the one generated which pertains to its what perfection but in creation the one creating is not what changed right but the one created does not receive the nature of the one what yeah therefore the son is said both created and generated so that from the word creation we take the what unchangeableness of the father and from generation the unity of nature in the father and the son and thus is explained in the understanding of this scripture by hillary in the book about what it's in that son that's a little bit like we saw you before you know we have to use like to say god is what um good to indicate is what perfection right we have to say god is goodness itself to indicate his what simplicity right i mean in either way is what adequate so we have to use these two to express him and uh something like that right that you use one word to indicate the fact that he comes from the father without any change of the father there is a human generation right or in the animals you know because you don't really have maybe you know in the angels you don't have generations to be speaking so one angel doesn't generate another angel so you have um a true offspring you might say in animals right so a dog produces a dog of the same nature and a cat produces a cat and a man produces a man but there's a change going on right in the in the parents huh and uh so in god there's a real communication of nature right but no change how do you express this or you say there's birth to indicate there's a real a real birth right a true birth because you truly have one who's generated is also god okay but unlike the generations we know there's no change in the one generating and therefore we use the word create because in creation god is in no way what change you know so you'll think god created i got bored and uh you know but we have a hobby or something you know yeah yeah yeah now he says the authorities induced about the holy spirit they're not speaking about him but about the what created spirit right which sometimes is called wind sometimes air sometimes the breath of man sometimes even the soul right or any what substance you know so the word a breath or air a breath or air first name is a what material substance that has no color and can't be seen really right and then we carry the word over to a substance that's immaterial and uh so we call the soul of spirit sometimes and of course you already the angel spirit right and the goddess spirit there was those sections now is difficult the other one was the other one right so he gives three different explanations right sometimes christ is said to be predestined god you know it means what you're thinking looking forward to the incarnation right huh that uh there's a man predestined to be god it's a little bit like this way of speaking you know the one explanation there right refers to the um creative nature okay well i guess you got out of that one now talk about the student i have when i was first teaching in saint mary's and i think about that kind of bright guy but he'd always come in every day with an objection you know well i've heard all these ones because you've read thomas you've heard these and ones that you haven't thought of and and i don't answer them and i could see him you know he knew i was answering the objection you don't say kind of you know go back he's foreign until i tried to answer just then he relax and it's like that they told me after the course he said i always thought i was going to get you this day you it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you know it's like that you At least she's involved in the class. She was a gay. Yeah, yeah. Okay, now we get to the two questions, the two articles here, four and five, which are about the power, right? And Thomas is going to be talking especially about the power of generating, but you could also talk about the power of what? Breathing, right? So if there's really, what, generation God, right? And there's also what? The breathing of the Holy Spirit. Must you also speak of the power to generate, the ability to generate, and the power to breathe or the ability to breathe? To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that in God there is no power or ability with respect to the notional acts. For every ability or power is either active or passive. This is the first distinction that Aristotle gives in the ninth book of Wisdom. He takes up power or ability. But neither of these seems to be fitter or to fit. For there's no passive power in God because he's, what, pure act, right? Nor is there an active power, for it doesn't belong to one person to respect another, since the divine persons are not, what, made, as has been shown. Therefore, in God there is no power for the notional acts. Of course, the first meaning of the active power is the power to make something, right? The power to act upon something. Well, did God the Father make the Son? Then the two of them got together and made the Holy Spirit? Moreover, power or ability is said with respect to what is what? Possible, right? But the divine persons are not of the number of possible things, but of the number of necessary things. So we saw before that God is necessary to be through himself. Therefore, with respect to the notional acts by which the divine persons proceed, one ought not to lay down, what? In God. Or if I use the word ability in English, right? Then you say, well, something had to be able to be, right? And God's not able to be, he would. Yeah. He necessarily is, right? Okay. I'm not one who's able to be. He says, I am who am. Okay? Moreover, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the, what, concept, the conception of the understanding. But the Holy Spirit proceeds as a love, which pertains to the will. But power, God, is said in comparison to, what, effects. Not over in comparison to, what, understanding and willing, right? Now, why do they say that, right? When God isn't any real, what, difference between God and his operation of understanding is operation of willing, right? Right, power seems to be the source of something, the beginning of something, right? And so that if God had a power to understand, then it would seem to imply that God and his understanding are something different, right? Okay. So power seems to be said more with respect to creatures because there's a real distinction between God and the creature, right? Therefore, in God, we're not not to speak of power in comparison to the notion of, what, acts. Against this is what Augustine says, that troublemaker. Against Maximus, the heretic, right? If God the Father is not able to generate a son equal to himself, where is the omnipotence of God the Father? Therefore, in God, there is power with respect to the notion of acts. This comes up in the great question, it's just to be taught to a de potencia, right? I think they're my favorite disputed questions, you know. You know, several questions on the Trinity, eventually, but, you know, the power of generating coming up again. Thomas says, I answer it should be said, that just as there are laid down to be actual, a notional acts in God, to generate and to breathe, so it is necessary that there be placed a power or ability with respect to these acts. For power signifies nothing other than the beginning of some, what, act. When since the Father is understand as the, what, beginning or source of generation, and the Father and the Son as the beginning of, what, breathing, it is necessary that to the Father we attribute the power of generating and to the Father and the Son the power of breathing. Because the power of generating signifies that by which the one generating generates. But everyone generating generates by something. Once in everyone generating it's necessary to place a power of generating. And likewise in the one breathing, right, there must be that by which he breathes, right? And therefore in the one breathing, which is the Father and Son, we've got to place the ability or the power to breathe, right? So you're convinced that God has the power to, for the Father at least has the power to generate. So the first objection says that every power power is either active or passive. Neither can belong here, right? Because God is pure active, it can't be the passive power. And if you give an active power, then it seems that God the Father made the Son, right? And the Holy Father, the Father and the Son made the Holy Spirit. To the first therefore it should be said that just as according to the notion of Acts, there does not precede some person as, what? Made. So neither is there power for notional acts, so neither is power for notional acts said in God by, what? Respect to some person made, huh? Okay. But only, what? Respect to some person, what? Proceding. So, what is he saying there? He's saying the Father has no power to make the Son, but he does have the power to, what? Generate the Son, right? And the Father and the Son have no power to make the Holy Spirit, but they do have the power to, what? Breathe the Holy Spirit, right? But the generating of the Son or the breathing of the Holy Spirit, neither one should be, strictly speaking, called a making, right? Certainly making the first sentence where you transform matter, right? Okay? And where the thing made is, but if you speak of, what? Creation is a kind of making, right? And there you're not making, you're transforming matter, right? But the making is going to be kind of an act. And there you're not making, right? And there you're not making, right? the divine art right and therefore we are kind of like the artifacts of god right but the sun is not the artifact of god he is god okay so the artifacts of the artist are not the artist not equal to it right that's great you define it here yeah power is nothing other than the beginning of some act so that's like it's not the cause of some act just the beginning is more general yeah that's the same i think that's what you should do reasoning from that yeah that does not mean your cause so narastal begins the ninth book of wisdom he talks about um ability with respect to motion right and then later on he shows that ability is not only found in regard to emotion but in regard to other things right and so um so we need to speak and say the ability to understand right or the ability to love right and love understanding or loving or not strictly speaking motion and uh so you have to kind of move the word right but aristotle you know one of the central questions of the third book of wisdom there where aristotle was proceeding dialectically with the questions of philosophy is whether anything you know comes to be without emotion right there is there is creation really he didn't get that right and he wouldn't raise the question unless he he thought eventually there's going to be what something you know coming into existence not through motion right so if you go back to the to the definitions of the causes you see the third kind of cause aristotle speaks of whence first there's a beginning of motion so he's really defined the mover right and then he kind of attaches to that the maker the man who forms something right and then that's not exactly the same thing to move something and to form it and then the creator would be what a cause and that kind of cause but he'd be different from the mover and the maker because strictly speaking there the maker there is the one who what forms the matter right and god doesn't form the matter but rightly produces the whole matter and form so you gotta move the word as monsignor dion said you can't move the word he says that's a typical problem with the uh the modern philosophers right so you see them when they're talking about infused virtues we speak of right of course infused means poured in right of course first thing you pour it in you pour water in my glass but they can't move the word you know because it doesn't absolutely mean that you know one guy used to say you know what do you think the soul is a bucket for grace but they're stuck in the first meeting of infused right you know poor wine now the second question was saying hey ability is as best to what is possible right was able to be but god is what altogether necessary to the second then it should be said that possible according as is opposed to necessary follows upon the what passive power which is not in god right whence neither in god is something possible in this way but only according as the possible is contained under the what necessary and thus it is able to be said that just as what is possible for god to be so also is possible for the son to be generated right i already distinguished those senses of possible right because if you say um in one sense possible means something what is able to be and not be right and and but if you say that no way is necessary possible and it's not able to be right and then it's impossible and you got a real problem there right okay now it reminds me that part of it comes up when you're talking about creation and possibility of creation right and uh let me say well before god created things were they able to be you say well if they weren't able to be you could not have created them right if they were able to be there had to be some ability there before he must have been something out there he was able to be them right so he could have made them to be and how do you solve that kind of objection right well two ways you can solve it right you can say well yeah they're able to be by the ability of god right not by a matter of some sort out there which is able to be them right okay but the other way is to say well when we say that they're able to be we mean that there's no contradiction saying that they are now aristotle would you know take you know some examples this problem but aristotle would say um is too able to be um half of four well it's not able to be half of four in the sense in which wood is able to be a chair or a table see because wood has its passive ability whereby it can be and um it isn't necessary there would be a chair or a table right it's able to be one or the other right that's not the sense in which um two is half of four is able to be but some might say well if it's not able to be then it's impossible to be and therefore two is never will be half of four say when it's actually necessary right so what is able to be mean there right but it means that there's no contradiction in saying that two is what half of four right that's a different meaning of it right and uh people are most often deceived by mixing up the senses of a word and most often by these most common words like able right able is a very common word um it's able to show up in a lot of places and so if you can't distinguish the sense in which two is able to be half of four which is not opposed to it being what necessarily half or four is it because able there is opposed to unable or impossible right and if something's necessary then it's to be then it's impossible for it not to be right okay um so if you had to distinguish the sense in which two is able to be half of four from the sense in which wood is able to be a chair you're already in deep what trouble right so this is the same distinction the way that thomas is bringing out it right so there's one able possible that is opposed to necessary and that is what is able to be and not be right and that's opposed both to the necessary and the impossible right the impossible is not able to be and the necessary is not able to not be and so between those two so to speak is what is able to be and not be i'm going to say Aristotle for the wisdom somebody will be denied there is such a thing and he says that you know the obvious difficulties are given in saying that right so can it happen that uh two is half of four or can that not happen yeah yeah yeah but there's another sense of happiness where what it could be and not be right so you've got to be aware of the fact that it has that consensus I don't know, you know, think a little bit of the equivocation of that word, right? If you use the expression able to be, you say it of both of these, and you say, you say it of what is able to be and not be, and you say it of what is necessary, right? Maybe this gets the new name, because it adds something, right? Okay, it's not just able to be, but it must be, right? Or this is just able to be, maybe it's a little bit like that, I don't know. It seems to be a little bit like that, right? In the same way it is the word, you know, possible, right? Just kind of similar to the word, that's the word you use in my term, possible. In one sense, the possible is opposed to the what? Necessary, right? And in another sense, the necessary is possible. So you can't confuse those two meanings, right? But possible here means, in a sense, that there's no contradiction in its being, right? So no contradiction with being a chair, even though it doesn't have to be a chair. And there's no contradiction in two being half a four, but it must be. And that's one of those words that you will find in the fifth book of wisdom, right? I still anticipated all the difficulties that they have here in theology, in a way. Now we've got to come to the third objection, right? It takes longer to answer the third objection. Moreover, the Son proceeds as the Word, which is a conception, the understanding, the Holy Spirit, as love, which pertains to the will. But power in God is said in comparison to effects, right? Not in comparison to understanding and willing, as was had above. Therefore, in God, we're not meant to speak of power in comparison to emotional acts, right? Well, maybe, let's see what Thomas, we look at what Thomas says there. Power, as I said, could be more said in reference to creatures than in reference to emotional acts. Because there's a real distinction between God and the creature, right? But it's a real distinction between the Father and the breathing and the generating and the power. Oh, see? It might be more according to our way of understanding, right? But why does it include Mr. Thomas here, right? Okay. To the third, it should be said that power signifies a, what, beginning. So, when Aristotle defines power in the beginning of the ninth book, right? And he says he starts with the powers that are most known to us, the reference to emotion. So, the act of power is a beginning or source of change in another as other, right? And then the passive one of being changed by another, right? Okay. But in the definition there of power is beginning, right? Okay. Now, there's an axiom about beginning. Right? What is the axiom of beginning? Nothing that means beginning itself. Yeah. And Aristotle states this axiom in the first book of natural hearing, the first book of the physics. Because he says, Parmenides and Melisius upon us say that everything is one. So, therefore, they're really doing away with beginnings, he says, because nothing is the beginning of itself. And so, if you have no multiplicity in the world, stay in position, right? Then how can there be a beginning, right? So, it's a little bit like the beginning, I mean, the axiom of before and after, remember? Nothing is before or after itself. So, there's always a distinction between what is before and what is after. So, today cannot be before today or after today, but it's before tomorrow and after yesterday, right? So, a beginning implies a distinction from that of which it is a, what? Beginning, right? Now, there's considered a two-fold distinction, right? In those things which are said about God. So, this is a distinction of distinction, right? One, secundum rem, in the things, right? The other, secundum rationum. Reason or thought only, right? And that's why he says only, right? Because you can have, you know, a real distinction, a distinction of thought about things that are really distinct. But then you can have a distinction of thoughts that is only. Like, I was looking at the Parmenides, which is a terrible dialogue, play, I don't really think. He's talking about being in one, right? And how one partakes of the other and so on, as if they were different, what? Things, right? And Aristotle says, well, being and one, in the fourth book of Wisdom there, they're really the same thing. But they're not synonyms, the words, because a one adds the idea of indivision. So, one means undivided being. So, difference in meaning from being, right? But this undivided is just a negation, which is a being of, what? Reason adds nothing to being, right? So, they're one and the same thing. They differ. Secundum rationum. It's the Latin here, right? And they're different thoughts. The words are, what? Are not synonyms. Remember we had an article earlier, you know, about God? You know, these words synonyms? Because even though you're signifying the same thing, it's not the same thought. So, Aristotle had already seen this distinction, but Thomas is using it here. Why would Aristotle distinguish between, say, substance and quantity and quality being according to the future predication? Well, then, substance and quantity really are, what? Are distinct, right? What you are and your size are not the same thing. And my substance and my knowledge of geometry are not the same thing. So, they have a distinction in things, right? The distinction between act and ability, right? It's a distinction in things, between matter and form. But the distinction between being and one, let's say the one that's compared with being, right? It's a distinction in our thoughts, but not in things. But the being unity of the thing is the same thing, right? So, he said, it should be considered, however, a two-fold distinction of those things that you just said about God. One, secundum rationum, in the thing. The other, secundum rationum, reason only. Now, secundum rationum, in reality, God is distinguished by his essence from things of which he is the beginning through, what? Creation. Just as, what? One person is distinguished from another of which he is the, what? Beginning, according to, what? Some notional act is the beginning of it. But action from the agent is not distinguished in God, except by reason, what? Only. Otherwise, action would be an accident in God, maybe that composition in God, right? And therefore, with respect to those actions by which some things go forth. already distinct from God, either essentially or what? Personally. One can attribute to God in some way power, right? According to the what? Proper notion of a beginning, right? Remember we had an article there about, is God the Father a principium? Right, the beginning, remember that? Because what? A beginning is always distinct from that which is the beginning, right? So the Father can be said to be the beginning of the Son, and the Father and the Son, the beginning of the Holy Spirit. Because there's a real distinction between the Father and the Son, and God can truly be said to be the beginning of creatures, right? So that book, I think, is mainly the Apocalypse, right? That he said, I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, but the beginning and the end, right? The Arte, right? And the Telos, right? Beginning and the end. The proper notion of the beginning, right? Which requires a real, what, distinction. And therefore, just as we place the power of creating in God, right? So we, what? Able to place the power of generating or of, what? Breathing in God, right? But to understand and to will are not such acts which designate the possession of one thing from another, you know, from God, as distinct, right? Either essentially, like the creature is, or distinct, really, personally, as the other person is, right? Hence, with regard to acts of this sort, one cannot say the notion of ability or power in God, except according to the way of understanding and signifying only. As are diversity signified in God, but the understanding being the power of understanding and to understand, right? Since, when, although the understanding of God is his essence and has no, what, beginning, right, huh? Okay? So, we've met some of these things before, right, huh? Is God's understanding a beginning of his loving? No. And we have to try to understand God's understanding and loving from creatures, right? And could I love wisdom? Say, I'm going to love her wisdom. Could I love wisdom if I didn't understand what wisdom is? What? Is that because there's a real? Yeah, yeah. So, my understanding of what wisdom is, is a beginning of my loving wisdom, right? That's why, you know, with God, too, right? Faith is before, what, charity, right, huh? I have to, in some way, know God, know who God is, before I can, what, love him, right? And so, you know, in the Vatican Council there, they quote Augustine, right? In the Dave Erber, right? So, the whole world, my believing, might come to hope, and my hoping come to, what, love, right? But is God understanding what he is, a beginning and source of his loving himself? Yeah, yeah. But according to the way of understanding, right, huh? We say, well, if God didn't understand himself, could he love himself? See? Can you love something you don't know? There's got to be kind of careful there, right, huh? Because, is God's understanding himself something different from his loving himself? Yeah, see? Because, in us, our understanding and our loving are not the same thing. And even our understanding God and our loving God are not the same thing, huh? We can love him more than we understand him, right? So, because we start from creatures, we have a different thought of understanding, a different thought of loving, right? And then we apply both of these to God, but then we say, in God, they are the, what? Same. Like my example there, I'm using always a circle, right? Okay? So, the center of the circle is one point, but it can be defined as the beginning of this line and the beginning of that line. But the two points in circumference, my understanding and my loving, are really distinct points, right? But, my thinking of the center as being the beginning of this line that ends in my understanding, and the beginning of this line that ends in my loving, is really one and the same point, right? But it's defined differently, right? See, but, you know, Thomas would kind of reason from God understanding himself to his, what? Loving himself, right? Because the good is known, the good is understood, is the object of, what? Love, right? You couldn't understand God's love without understanding his understanding. It's kind of interesting, it's in order, right? So, there's a distinction in order, which is in our thoughts, right? But realize there's not a real distinction in God, and a real order in God corresponding to this, right? But, in terms of the Father and the Son, then there's a real distinction in God between the Father and the Son, and a real proceeding of one from the other, right? So, that's kind of interesting, and you can see this a lot in the great questions, just to be taught to be potentia, right? You have one question which is dealing more with the power of God with respect to creatures, right, and creating, the power of creating and so on, and then there's power of generating, right? And the power of breathing is similar to the power of generating, right? But, the basic, what's the key thing that Thomas is saying there, right? Well, he's saying that power, in its definition, is the beginning of something, right? And beginning is always distinct from that which is the beginning. So, if there's a real distinction between the beginning and that of which it is a beginning, you're really using the word power in its, what? Proper notion. There's a real distinction between the Father and the Son, and between God and the creature. So, there you have more, the proper notion of power, right? But, in order to understand the willy of God, then power seems to, what? Be only in our, what? What he says there, the secundum modem intelligendi, right? In significanditandum, right? But, there can't be any real distinction there between God's ability to understand and understanding. What I mean is a great distinction between my ability to understand, and I actually understand it. And I had the ability to understand many things before I understood them. I guess I have the ability to understand even more things than I understand now. At least there's not a contradiction. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, my ability to understand is the real beginning of my understanding. But, it's God's ability to understand the real beginning of his understanding. So, that's beautiful, huh? So, we take a little break before we go on to this article here.