Prima Pars
Lecture 156: Equality and Order in the Divine Persons

Transcript
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boy finds out that that's what? False, right? And then as Socrates asks him further, the slave boy eventually comes to realize that the diagonal would be the side of a square twice as big. Socrates says, you know, to the slave boy, suppose this is the original square, right? Now suppose you put another square exactly like that next to it, okay? And then with all this one, another one just like it, and then felt this square here. Now you've got a square how many times bigger than the original one? Yeah. And then he takes the diagonals, right? And not too hard for the slave boy to see if the diagonal cuts it in half. So the square formed by the four diagonals is half of the four, therefore it's twice as big as the original. But the way to double a square comes out of the slave boy's answers. And so Socrates said, I didn't teach it. Right? The answer came out of him, the slave boy has recalled it, right? Now has he immediately recalled it? Does the slave boy know that the diagonal is the side of the square twice as big before the conversation with Socrates? He would be led by the question. Yeah. Yeah. In fact, the slave boy thought the way to double a square, it's a double the side. And so he didn't know he was in fact mistaken about how to do it, right? But the slave boy did know things from which or by which he's able to what? Come to know, right? In other words, through things that he knows already, he can what? Come to know. But is that the same thing as to know? Is the ability to know it, right? From what you know already, is that to know it? Well, it's to know the ability. But that's not to know it simply, is it? Otherwise, you know everything you learned to go to school, right? Before you begin, right? So Socrates is making the same kind of mistake that Mino is making his objection. He's not seeing the distinction, right? Between what is so simply and what is so not simply, right? Now, when Mino objects, he's saying, you know, you can't aim at what you don't know, because then you'd have to say what? To aim at something, you have to see it. You have to know it. And he doesn't see the distinction that you can know in some imperfect way what you don't know. And that might be enough, like in my example, right? To know how to get there either. But Socrates is making the same kind of mistake when he says the slave boy already knew how to double square, right? When he only already had the ability to know it. But that's not to know something, right? As I said to the students, you know, trying to get this idea across to them. If you have a man and woman, you've got a baby, right? Not necessarily, right? You might have the ability for a baby, right? Is that the same thing as to have a baby? You'll find out it isn't exactly the same thing, isn't it? So, you know, the two main opinions about the beginning of things is that matter is the beginning of all things, and God is the beginning of all things, right? And the true answer is that God is the beginning of all things, right? Those who think that, what? Matter is the beginning of all things. I'm making the mistake of thinking that what is before, in a very qualified way, right? In time, is before what? Simply. That's a very important distinction. Okay, the second objection, Thomas has got to properly understand the words of Augustine, right? To the second should be said that Augustine, in those words, does not intend to say that the the sun is able to generate a sun. Rather, what he wants to say is that this is not from the, what? Impotency, the lack of power of the sun, right? That he does not, what? Generate, right? Now, this is going to come up again in the, what? Sixth article, right? In the next question, whether they are equal in power, right? So we'll have some more enlightenment about that, huh? Okay, so we'll expect some more enlightenment, right? We see a little bit in the reply of the first objection, that they have the same power, right? But this power is in the father with the relation of fatherhood, right? And in the son with the relation of what? Sunshepherd. So we'll let that rest at that point. It will get more illumination. Now the third objection was, well, even a man can generate more than one son, right? But he goes back to the arguments he had in the middle of the thing, that the immateriality, right? Which is the first argument, right? And the perfection, which is the fourth argument, right? That the immateriality and divine perfection requires that there not be many, what? Sons in God. Whence that there are not many sons is not from the, what? Yeah. From the fact that he can generate most perfectly, right? Why no son that I generate, another man generates, has the whole perfection of human sonship in him, right? You know anybody, young son? Maybe a son's man, but. So he convinced that there's four reasons, right? You can't have many sons. Not like those, the Hindus have all these. Countless ones. Now, this is the end of the first of the two parts of the, what? Comparative consideration, right? Of the persons. And so you know there's five questions devoted to the comparative considerations, but you can't understand the distinction of into five, can't you? So what was the distinction? What's the distinction of the first three questions that we've just finished today, right now, and the last two questions? About essence and notion, in comparison to essence, notion, and relation. Relations, yeah. And then this one is persons and nations. So notice, in the first three questions, you're comparing the persons to something other, at least in thought, from the persons, right? Okay. So you're comparing it to the, what? Divine nature, right? Comparing it to the relations, right? Not that these are really different in what? In things, right? The different era of thought, right? And then comparing it to the, what? Notional acts, right? Okay. So the first three questions, right? Which are divided into three, right? Are comparison of the persons to something other in thought from the persons. And now the last two questions are comparing the persons as persons to what? Each other, right? Okay. And this is going to be divided, not into three, but into what? Two. Tinkin. Then we're not to consider, he says, look at the premium here now, beginning of the 42nd question. Then we're not to consider about the comparison of persons to each other. And first, as regards equality and what? Likeness. Second, as regards what? Mission, right? One person sends another person. What the hell does that mean? Okay? And why isn't the Father sent? He's never sent. But you'll find in Scripture it talks about someone being sent, right? I'll send you the Holy Spirit, the Father who sent me, and so on. Now about the first, six things are asked. First, whether equality has place in divine what? Here the problem arises because of the, what, partly because of the word equality. It seems to imply what? Equality, right? It has other meanings. And then, whether the person proceeding is equal to the one for whom he proceeds by, what, eternity. Is the Son as eternal as the, what, Father, right? Or was the Father around before the Son was? Now, we human beings, the Father's around before he generates the Son, right? So that's going to be one particular equality, right? And the third, now, is whether there is some order in the divine, what, persons. Now, why does he take up that right after the second article? Because that doesn't seem to be a question of equality, right? And it's military, does it? And I think I mentioned before how, when I first got thinking about the word order, I first thought about the word order as that it meant before and after, okay? It seemed reasonable to me. That in general, order, before and after. Now, I was reading Thomas, and he's talking about Augustine, huh? And Augustine says there's a ordo naturae in God, huh? Ordo naturae. And in the questionis disputati de potencia, he's talking about this. And somewhat here he talks about it. He'll say, there's an ordo naturae in God. Not an order of before and after, he says, right? And then I said, maybe I was mistaken in saying that order means before and after. Maybe there can be an order of before and after, but also an order of this from that. And in the Trinity, this is from that. The Son proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. But there's no before and after. And that's very explicit in the Athanasian Creed. There's no before and after in God. Any sense of before and after? Only in our thought, yeah. But not in the thing. The Father, God the Father, is not before God the Son. In any sense of before. In other words, not only temporal sense of before, but there's other sense of before. Yeah, no sense of before. No sense of before and the Son before. And when Thomas, you know, shows us, he'll sometimes go back to, he didn't say he's doing it, but I recognize he's doing it. He'll go back to the four central senses of before that Aristotle distinguishes in the categories in chapter 12. And he'll say that in no one of those four senses is the Father before the Son, right? So then I said, gee, maybe I was mistaken. Maybe this is only one of two meanings in order, right? And it was, you know, on the authority of the text of Thomas, I thought that I was mistaken in my first impression, right? But then, I didn't have the sentences of Peter Lombard. I didn't have Thomas' commentary on it, right? And Thomas gives a very complete consideration of this. And more complete in the sentences than in the later works. It's more abbreviated. And there, Thomas says, first thing that pertains to order, he says, is distinction. But he says, really, distinction is not so much what order means, it's presupposed order, right? And then he says, before and after is what order means in general. And then he says, you can have many species of before and after, right? Okay? Now, now he's confirming, Archibald. In science, I was happy that I was not in that. For all, right? If you keep the word order in talking about God, as the great custom does, right? He's keeping some difference down there and dropping the, what? Genius. Now, you see, I'm the father of my son, right? And I'm before my son, right? Okay? And my son, in some way, proceeds from me, right? And that's specific about this order, right? Okay? Now, I'm before Barack Obama, right? Because I was born before he was born, right? I'm before him in time. But he didn't proceed from me. Okay? So that's a different specific order, right? In the order I have with my son, right? So, as Father Boulay was always coming in to us, now with this example or with other examples, it's very common when a name is carried over from creatures to God, that you drop the genus and keep what is, what? Specific. Okay? So like sciencia, right? Mati. When it's carried over to God, you drop the idea of this habit, right? That it is. And just keep the idea of the act for which is a habit, huh? What is specific to it, huh? In a sense, if you take over understanding to God, right? Now, you and I have understanding. Let's say you and I have the ability to understand, right? And our ability to understand is, what? Different from our ability to walk. Well, walking is not carried over to God. God doesn't walk, except maybe metaphorically speaking, right? But in God, is there an ability to understand that's different from understanding? No. So you drop off the idea of ability, but keep the idea of, what? Actually understanding. God understands everything, right? So, when you speak of the order nature, you're dropping the genus, the idea of before and after, and keeping what is specific to one order, right? Namely, the idea of what? Origin. Origin, yeah. Okay. Now. What's the first meaning of before and after that Aristotle gives in the 12th chapter of Categories? Before and after and time. Yeah. Now, you see the connection then in a way between the second article and the what? Third one, right? If the son proceeds from the father, you might think that the father is in some way before the son, right? Which would make some sense. You're talking about human beings, huh? But in God, there's no what? Before and after there. Well, then why does Augustine speak of order, right? Well, as they say, you keep the specific difference of one order, right? And drop the generic notion out. You keep the idea of origin from one thing to another, but not that what is the origin of something else is before it, right? As they say, that's a common thing in theology, right? You know, justice is a what? A habit. Aristotle defines human virtue, moral virtue. It's a habit with choice existing in the middle towards us, right? There's choice in God, right? God chooses things, but there's no what? Habits in God, right? So when you carry the word virtue over to God, you drop the what? Yeah, you drop the genus, right? Now, the fourth article is the second kind of what? Equality, right? Will the divine persons are equal in what? Magnitude, right? Or is one of them greater than the other, right? That kind of dangerous way of, what? Speaking of Hildegard, I've got to show up there. You know, he speaks of the fathers being mayor, but the son is not menor. Sounds like a contradiction of words, right? And then whether one of them is in the other, right? Now, why the heck should that be attached to their being equal in magnitude? Well, their being equal in magnitude is because each of them is God, right? And so if the father is God and the son is God, then in a way the father is in the son, right? Because there's no difference between the father and divine nature we saw, right? And since the divine nature is in the son, right? In a way the father is in the son, right? So maybe that's why that article comes up, right? After the one about their being equal in what? Maggitude, right? Because in that one he's going to be saying they're equal in magnitude because each of them is the divine nature. Each of them is God. And therefore in some way they're in each other as God. They're distinct as relatives, right? And then the third one, with an equal according to power, we'll get some more illumination, right? About the father not really having power that the son doesn't have, right? In the same argument you could say well the father and the son have the power of breathing in the divine person, right? The Holy Spirit doesn't have that power. Isn't he less powerful? Well, you've got to be careful about that, right? It made those things become more clear as you go along, right? But notice, you can kind of divide the first article against the other five, right? The first article is saying can you speak of equality in God, right? What does it mean here, right? It doesn't mean quantity, right? And then, if you look at the remaining five articles, there's three kinds of equality, right? They're equal in duration, you might say they're all equally eternal, right? And then they're equal in what? Magnitude or greatness. And then they're equal in what? Power, right? And perhaps those three are ordered in a certain way, right? Because you think of, in us, right? Magnitude. You think of man as being a greater thing than a dog, and then you talk subsequently of the power of man to do certain things, right? By eternity talks, maybe about his duration, his very being, right? So, so you could divide one against three kinds of equality, right? You see that? So you're not dividing into six, but Thomas doesn't get so pedantic, right? See what he's doing. But in a sense, he's doing that, right? Because you find in the second, the fourth, and the, what, sixth article, the word equal again, right? But they're no more particular. And then you have to figure out why those other two ones are in there, right? Why order in divine persons is attached to the consideration of their equality in eternity. One of them being the other is attached to their being, what? Equal and baggage to it, right? But maybe that will become clear when we get into those, the articles. So to the first, one goes forward thus. It seems that equality does not belong in the divine persons. For equality is noted according to unity, or oneness, in quantity, as is clear through the philosopher in the fifth book of wisdom, metaphysics. But in God, or in the divine persons, there is found neither, what, intrinsic continuous quantity, which is called magnitude, nor extrinsic continuous quantity, which are called, what, place and time. Extrinsic measures. Place is the measure of the, what, mobile, mobile, and time of, what, motion itself. Nor, according to, what, discrete quantity is there a found, discrete quantity, is there a found inequality, because two persons are more than what? One. Therefore, equality doesn't belong to the divine persons. A lot of things can be untied there, right? More of a divine persons are of one essence, or nature. But essence is signified by way of what? Form. It's like human nature is said to be our form. But it coming together in a form does not make equality, but, what, likeness, huh? Therefore, divine persons went out to speak of likeness and not, what? Moreover, in whatever things is found equality, those things are said to be equal to each other. Because the equal is said to be equal to the equal, right? But divine persons are not able to be, what, said to be equal to each other. Because as Augustine says in the sixth book of the Trinity, the image, if it is perfectly fulfills that of which it is the image, is co-equal to it. But that is not equal to its, what, image, huh? The image, however, of the Father is the Son. And therefore, the Father is not equal to the Son. They have a little problem like that with the word like, huh? Because it, what's an image? Image is a likeness of something, right? If they make a statue of you, that statue is, what, a likeness of you, right? It's like you. Would you be said to be like your statue? So the Son, one of the names of the Son we saw was, what, Son, Word, or Thought, and Imago, right? So maybe you should say the Son is like the Father, but not the Father like the Son. Moreover, equality, the Son is like the Father, and the Son is like the Father, and the Son is like the Father, and the Son is like the Father, and the Son is like the Father, There is a certain relation, right? But no relation is common to the three persons. Only the divine nature is common to the three persons, right? But according to relations, the persons are distinguished from each other. Therefore, equality does not belong to the divine persons. If you have this relation there, do you have another person? Equality? But against all this is what Athanasius says. This again, the Athanasian Creed. The three, what? Co-eternal persons, co-eternal and what? Equal. Thomas is going to answer. I answer, it should be said, that it is necessary to place equality in the divine persons. Because according to the philosopher, in the 10th book of wisdom there, in physics, that's the book on the, what? One and the many. The equal is said by negation of more and less. That's a very subtle thing. Two lines are equal, doesn't it? One is neither longer nor shorter than the other, right? I notice in the categories, right? Aristotle has a chapter on before and after, meaning on the four central means of before in the crowning sense. And then in the next chapter, he has an Hama, which he translated as Simo, in Latin, right? Or together than English sometimes. Sometimes we make a lot of simultaneous. So, why is it put together, or Simo, or Hama, after, before and after? Yeah. Yeah. So, if I say two events are what happened together, neither happened before or after together, right? So, it seems like Hama, in Greek there, Simo, Latin, or together, I don't know if I speak in English, but it's understood by negation of before and after. And Aristotle is saying the same thing about equal, right? So, you're kind of sitting there on the grammar, right? Because you say equal and unequal, right? Well, unequal is by negation of equal, yeah. But equal itself is understood by negation not of unequal, to be circular, but by negation of more and, what, less. So, you can't say that one of them is more or less than the other, right? For as Boethius says, the great Boethius says in his book on the Trinity, that the difference follows those, right? The difference of deity, right, follows those who either, what, increase or diminish, as the Arians, right, who distract, huh, the Trinity, vary them by grades and merits, and, what, lead them into a plurality of, what, beings, right? So, if one of these persons was more or less than the other, they wouldn't all be, what, the same God, would they? Wouldn't them be something. The reason for this is, because of unequal things, there cannot be one, what, quantity in number, right? But quantity in God is nothing other than his very, what, essence. Whence it follows that if there was some inequality in the divine persons, there would not be in them one, what, essence. And thus, the three persons would not be one God, which is impossible. Therefore, it is necessary to place equality in the, what, divine persons. You can't say that one person, he's saying, then is more or less than another, right? Because if one person was more or less than another, one person would not be, what, God. They would all be one and the same God, right? Therefore, it can't be, what, more or less? And equality is negation of more or less. They're neither more nor less than, they must be equal. If I'm neither taller or shorter than you, then I must be equal to you in height or something. Now, in the body of the article, it doesn't solve this whole problem about the word, right? And you see this in English, though. You have this with words like, like in Shakespeare's definition of reason. Reason is the ability for what? Large discourse. Looking before and after, right? Well, is large there in the sense of what? Quantity? No. When I explain large discourse, I say, well, one meaning of that is that reason can have a discourse about the universal. And universal covers many things, right? That's a little bit like quantity, right? Okay. But another meaning of large discourse is that reason can have a discourse about great things, right? Very important things. Like we're having a discourse here about God, right? Even a discourse about the soul, a discourse about human happiness and so on. The end of life. But this is a large discourse in the sense of a discourse about the what? The human happiness. Now, in trying to explain that meaning to people, I use a manuductio by the opposite, right? I say, what do you mean by small talk? Well, it doesn't mean that you're, you know, small in a quantity, in a sense, does it? No. It's talking about unimportant things, little things, right? Okay. So, large discourse is like big talk, right? And we're talking about great things, right? Okay. So, great here is not in the original quantitative sense of great. It's like small is not the original meaning of small. The original meaning of small is in quantity and the, what? Strict sense, right? Okay. What if we say somebody's a small person? What does that mean? Talk about his physical size? Could be. But does that have another meaning? What about he has a small mind? Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's part of it. Yeah. I've got a church that will say about Clinton Ackley. I told you that. He says, a very modest man. With much to be modest about. So, he says, to the first, therefore, it should be said. This is the first, you know. Like, I can't move the word, right? Stucked on the original meaning. I was thinking, you know, do you know Thomas' prayer there for before communion? And, of course, he's talking about how he's approaching the sacrament and how he's weak and how he's, what, sinful and poor and so on. And he says, out of your immense, what? Lajitatis, right? Yeah. That's large in this other sense. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that two-fold is, what, quantity. In one, what is called the quantity, and molis in Latin means, what, a heap, right? Or dimensive quantity, right? One dimension. One dimension. One dimension. One dimension. Two dimensions, three dimensions, right? Which is found only in what? Bodily things, right? When in the divine persons it has no what? Place. So we're not speaking then of the Father and the Son are being equal in size, right? At least you're the first to be in the size, right? It doesn't mean I'm going to size you up, though. That's a different sense, isn't it, probably, huh? I'm not going to, you know, see how tall you are, I'm going to size you up here. Character and so on, right? But notice that you're moving the word here, right? The first meaning of size, the first meaning of large and small and so on is what? Quantity, strictly speaking, yeah. The other is the quantity of what? Virtue, right? Which can be taken to mean power or the perfection of the thing. Which is to be noted according to perfection of some nature or somewhat form. Which quantity is designated according as it is said something is more or less, what? Hot. Or more or less sweet or something, right? Insofar it is more or less perfect in what? Eat, huh? Now he says quantity of this sort is to be noted first in its root, right? That is in the very perfection of the form or the, what? Nature, huh? And thus it is called, what? Spiritual magnitude. Just as a great heat on account of its, what? Intention and its perfection of the seat. And therefore, Augustine says in the sixth book of the Trinity. And notice Augustine's, what? Alliteration, right? He's fond of those things. I mean, reiteration. In hisque non mole bagni santa. In those things which are not, what? Great in their, what? Heat, huh? Bulk, yeah. That is, what? To be more, which is to be, what? In Latin. Yeah. It comes out much better in Latin. Hocus meus esse, quadus meleus esse. That is, to be more, which is better, right? But in Latin, it's what? Literature. That's why you say you can't translate a narration, right? Shakespeare says, full, fathom, fi, thy father lies. How can you translate that in other language? Because the words would mean full and fathom and fi, it would not be in the same letter, right? You can see in French. What did you call it when you're speaking about the purpose? You can't translate what? Alliteration. Yeah. Oh, alliteration. Yeah. See, full, plen, in French, huh? Yes. Fathom, I don't want the word to be there. Fi, senc. You know? Fathom would be, what? Payer or something? Oh. Yeah. So it wouldn't, again, the words that mean the same wouldn't mean the, what? Same, right? There's a, there's a bug. Okay. We're seeing with the best in here, right? Mole magne sun, right? And Melius essay, Quartus Melius essay, right? There's a nice flow because of the alliteration, right? Yes. Augustine has a certain style, right? That's why Latin scholars would rather read what shapes, I mean, Augustine than Thomas, right? Because he has this nice sister, right? For that is Melius, better, which is more, what? Perfect, right? Secondly, one notes the quantum, the virtual quantity in the effects of the form, right? For the first effect of a form is for something to be, right? So to be a chair, the wood has to, what? The form it's acquired from the carpentry, right? For everything has to be existence according to its, what? Form. The second effect is, what? Operation. For every agent acts through its own, what? Form. One notes, therefore, the virtual quantity, both according to the being and according to the operation. According to being, insofar as those things which are of a more perfect nature are of a greater, what? A greater iteration. Let's go back to Trinity. According to operation, insofar as those things which are of a more perfect nature are more potent to act. Thus, therefore, the great Augustine says in the book on faith to Peter, equality is understood in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, insofar as no one of them either precedes by eternity, right? Or exceeds in magnitude or is, what? Overcome in power, right? Knows exactly the three that Thomas is going to be talking about, right? And fact in the same order, right? Okay. As Cajetan says in his commentary on the Summa, you know. In the New England edition, he used to print Cajetan's commentary with the Summa, and he says, Thomas seems to have inherited the mind of all the church fathers, because he so studied them and reverenced them. And I see something similar. You know, Aristotle seemed to have inherited the mind of Plato and the philosophers before him, because he read them so carefully, right? So, but they had the same, you know. And the same is true, I think, of Euclid, right? So Euclid didn't, you know, he probably didn't originate the Thaggurus there, but all these other things, right? But he, what? Seems to have, what? Taken all over, right? And brought to his imperfection. So when you read Thomas, you're not reading, what? One man on his own. Going off on a tangent, right? Can I ask him about this quantity of virtue? Is it quantity in the, when he's speaking about this quantity of virtue, would it belong to the category of quantity? No, no. No, but it would be, it would belong to something, kind of transcending the categories, but more in terms of what perfection, more in terms of form. So the difference between less hot and more hot? Quality, yeah. That's really just a difference in quality. It's quality, yeah. So the hotter thing has more of the perfection of it than the less one, right? The same way if I say he's more just, more virtuous than somebody else, right? Then he has more of the perfection of this virtue than every man has. He's more humble than somebody else, right? He has more of the perfection of the virtue of what? Humility. So are we using quantity in like, is it a metaphorical sense, or, you know, I'm trying to understand. No, no, I don't think it's, I don't think it's metaphorical. It's equivocal by reason, right? It's like words like excel, you know? See, somebody, one ability to excels another, right? It's higher than it, right? But you might say that one student excels another because he's a more perfect, right? So this quantity of virtue could exist in any category. You could have more or less perfection. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You see, Aristotle, in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what? Numbers, right? And there you see kind of likeness that it's based on, right? You see, Aristotle, in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing, right? You see, Aristotle, in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, he compares natures to what he's doing And, you see, numbers differ by the addition and subtraction of a one, right? You have a different number. Now, in logic, say, you know, we talk about adding a difference to a genus. And so, you say, you've got a stone, and a stone is just a body, right? Now, a body plus life equals what? But a body plus life plus sense equals a what? But a body plus life plus sense plus reason equals a what? Man. So, you see, I like this there, right? Between numbers and the nature of things, right? And if you go back to Shakespeare's exhortation to use reason, right? Well, so he says, what is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed? A beast, he says, no more. And that's the word more there, right? No more. What's he saying there, right? He's saying that if the chief good of man, if the greatest good of man, right, is no more than the chief good of the beast, then man is no more than a what? Beast, right? Now, that's based upon a beautiful proportion, right? If the chief good of man is to man, as the chief good of the beast is to the beast. And then alternate the proportion, right? Therefore, if the chief good of man is no more than the chief good of the beast, then man is no more than the beast, right? Now, he didn't bring out the force of his argument, you know, I say, what if he say this? What is a three if it be half a four? He'd say a two, no more, right? And that's in the sense of the way Shakespeare's reasoning, right? He has a great, great rigor of what he's doing there. He's kind of amazing. I don't know why he does this. I don't know why Shakespeare does this. I told you years ago, you know, I was reading Kittredge's edition of Shakespeare's Chili Caesar. And Mark Antony, you know, was saying, I'm going to speak here like Brutus, you know, just say what I think, you know. And he actually makes a, what, Kittredge notes, he makes a complete enumeration of the qualities of an art. Now, what the heck is that in the seat, right? You know? It's not in the order of Aristotle's rhetoric, because he alliterates, right? No words, no words, no words, you know, and so on. But I said, you know, there's a precision in Shakespeare, and nobody knows where it's quite there. It's there, and it doesn't serve any obvious poetic purpose, right? You shouldn't notice it the first time you read it, because it'd be too distracting, right? But there's a double excellence in Shakespeare, right? So, if you take away reason from man, you used to have a beast. Take away sense of the beast, just of the plant, right? And something like that with numbers, right? Four, three, two, one. This would be man, this would be the beast, this would be the plant, this would be the stone, right? And you take away from four, one, and you have no more than three, right? Take away one from three, get two, and so on. But there you see how more or less are really what? Taken in an unquantitative sense, right? But look back to the quantitative sense, and Aristotle, in the Eighth Book of Natural Hearing, he makes a comparison, that the natures of things are like what? Numbers, right? So man, beast, plant, and stone are like four, three, two, and one, right? And I see Plato sometimes said the natures of things are numbers. And did he mean this? And did Aristotle say, well, they're not really numbers. But there's a likeness between them, right? And so, two, when we talk to him, we say, man is an animal. But then, if you add rationed animal, they get man. Well, add, is that quantity? The only substance. Yeah, yeah. So, but you're looking back to, originally those words were used. Add and more or less were used originally in quantity, practically speaking. But it's carried over by a certain, what? Like this. So likewise, we're reasoning, too. We say, what does that add up to, right? Or, if a guy can't put together two premises, we say he can't put two and two together, right? Well, that's kind of metaphoric. But these are general words, like more or less, you know? They seem to be, by certain likeness, carried over from quantity to quality. But you'll see this running through all our words, almost. These words equivocal by reason, they get their start in the continuous. Like the word beginning, right? Aristotle begins the fifth book of wisdom, which is all about words equivocal by reason. The first word he takes up is the word beginning. And the first meaning of beginning is like the point is the beginning of a lion. Now, this lion here is the beginning of the table. The surface of a body is the beginning of the body, right? So it's tied to the continuous. And then he says the foundation is the beginning of the house. And then he says the carpenter is, in another sense, it's the beginning of the table. But now he's not part of it, right? He's not in it. And then he speaks of the beginning of what? Knowledge. Where your knowledge begins. So he still uses the word where. But it's not in place, right? Where your knowledge begins, is that in place? And the last thing he says, the end is the beginning. But then he's really moved the word, right? But the end of all you have in mind, in a sense, is the beginning of all your what? Actions, right? But as Monsignor Dion said about somebody who can't move the word. Sure. I'll stop. So we'd answer the first primum, right? Now we answer the second objection. Okay. And this is the second objection is saying, when you speak of likeness, right, then equality. Well, in the second sense of equality, equality adds something to what? Likeness. Now we can only like, but just like the other person. Okay. Just mean equal, right? After my father died, I heard somebody, my cousin saying to me, just like your father. Does that mean? Just. And of course, just means, in a way, equal. If I say it just fits, you know, it's more or less, right? So just, in that sense, presupposes likeness, right? But you're what? Exactly like, as you say, right? Just like your father. And Thomas begins by pointing out, the second, therefore, it should be said that where one is noting equality according to, what? Virtual quantity, right? According to perfection. Equality includes in itself likeness, right? And adds something, right? Because it excludes what? The excess of one or the other, right? For whatever things come together in one form can be called like, although they, what? Partake that form unequally, right? Just as if one was to say that air is like fire in, what? Heat, right? But Thomas is thinking of, what? Air being a little bit like steam, right? Okay. Well, steam is hot, maybe not as hot as the, what? Fire, right? But they cannot be said to be equal if one partakes more perfectly of that form than the, what? Other, right? And because there is not only one because not only one is the nature of the Father and the Son but it's, what? Equally, perfectly in, what? Both. Therefore, we not only say that the Son is like the Father that one excludes the air of the Nomeus but also we say that he is, what? Equal that one excludes the air of, what? Yes. There we go, son. And the third objection was saying, well the Son, though, is the imago, right? Of the Father, right? Therefore, he should be called the likeness of the Father or like the Father and not vice versa, huh? Thomas said, well you're overlooking a distinction here. To the third it should be said that equality or likeness is able to be signified in two ways in God. That is to say by nouns and by, what? Verse. Now, as a noun as it's signified by nouns mutual equality is said in divine persons and so each one is, what? Like the other, right? An aconversal. For the Son is equal and like the Father and vice versa. Same is true. and therefore because the divine essence is not more of the Father than of the Son whence the Son has the, what? Magnitude or greatness of the Father which is to be, what? For him to be equal to the Father. So the Father has the same magnitude as the Son, right? Same divine nature. Which is for him to be equal to the Son. But according to creatures as Dionysius says in the ninth chapter of the Divine Names one does not have this reciprocal conversion of equality and likeness, huh? So is God like me? No. I am in some distant way like him, right? I'm made in his image and likeness. For the caused are like their causes insofar as they have in some way the form of the causes, right? But not reverse. For the form is chiefly in the cause and secondarily in the cause. Now we use words or I mean verbs rather in God. But verbs signify equality with what? Motion. Because therefore the Son receives from the Father whence he's equal to him, right? And not reverse. On account of this we say the Son using the verb is what? but co-equal to the Father and not the reverse, right? He's likened to the Father you might say, right? Or he's generated like the Father. Fourth thing the projection is talking about this relation of equality, right? Isn't the distinction in God that the what? Divine nature is common to them but the relation is what? Distinguish them, right? There is a relation that doesn't distinguish them, right? It's very interesting what he says here about the relation of equality. To the fourth effort should be said that in the divine persons there's nothing to consider or think about except the essence, right? The divine nature in which they what? Communicate come together and the relations in which they are what? Distinguished. Now which is equality? Well, it implies both of these, right? Now we've met this before in other things, right? Like you said is the ability to generate does that signify the divine nature? Is that the divine nature? Does it signify the divine father? Well, maybe it's the divine nature as it's in the father, right? Kind of has a meaning that involves both, right? Well, equality you're not equal to yourself, right? So equality in some way implies the person's distinction relations whereby they're distinguished but because they what? Have the same nature and number, right? Then it touches upon the divine nature, right? So he says equality implies both to wit the distinction of persons because nothing is said to be equal to itself, right? So you're equal to yourself so you're neither more nor less than yourself but you're not equal and unity of persons because from this the persons are equal to each other that they are one, what? Greatness or one magnitude and one, what? Essence or nature Now it's manifest that the same is not referred to itself by some, what? Real relation Nor again is one relation referred to another through some, what? Other relation, right? For when we say that fatherhood is opposed to, what? Sonship Opposition is not a relation in the middle between, what? Yeah This is one way that you get a relation of, what? Reason, right? When you're relating relations Otherwise you'd have, what? Relations going on forever, right? Then the relation of the relations would have relation to those relations because in either way in both ways relation would be multiplied forever, right? And therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not some real relation that is distinct from the, what? Personal relation that you have a fourth person there, right? But in its end relationship