Prima Pars
Lecture 158: Equality in the Trinity: Eternity, Magnitude, and the Indwelling of Persons

Transcript
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There's kinds of order, and then we keep one of those differences, right? And we apply it to what? God, right? So I'm before some of you guys in time, right? But I'm before my son also as what? Yeah, as father of origin, right? So you keep the idea of what's specific to my being before my son, right? And drop the idea of my being before him, right? And you apply the spirit of God. We looked already to the reply to the first objection. How does this fit into what we talk about in God? He says, the order of nature signifies a notion of origin in general, but not in what? Particular, right? On the second objection. The second objection is saying, in whatever things there is an order of nature, one is before the other, right? Not necessarily in time, but according to nature and what? Understanding, right? Like two is before half of four, right? Not in time, right? It's not two in time, and then it gradually becomes half of four, right? They're hama, simo, together, right? But yet, you can say that it's half of four because it is two. It's not two because it's half of four. It has that relation, right? Because it's two. It's not the number two because it has that relation. You might recognize that that is so. Now, to the second it should be said that in created things, even when that which is from the beginning is what? Coeval, right? At the same time. Coeval, coordination to its beginning. Nevertheless, the beginning is before by nature and what? Tending. If one considers that which is the beginning, but if we consider the relations of cause and cause, and beginning and begun, right? It is manifest that relatives are, what? Simo, together, by nature and understanding, insofar as one is in the definition of the other. Now, we'll come back a bit upon that. This goes back to the categories, right? In the categories, Aristotle enumerates them. He does substance, usia, and then how much, quantity, and how, quality, and then towards what? A relation, right? When he takes them up, he takes up substance first and then quantity. And then you expect him to take up quality. Instead, he takes up relation for quality. Why? Well, because the batonic definition of relation, what is said towards another in any way whatsoever, right, is relation, huh? And Aristotle sees a distinction that Plato or the Platonists don't see. A distinction between something like double and half, which is said towards something. You're double of something other than yourself, right? Or you're half of something. And then something like knowledge, huh? Which is said to be of something. And what's the difference between those two? Well, double is nothing in itself. It's only something towards another. Why, knowledge is a certain quality of my mind, but upon this quality, or following upon this quality, is relation to the thing known. So, knowledge belongs fundamentally in the genus of quality, under habit or disposition, although it has this relation following upon it. So, by double and half, the whole nature of double and half is to be towards another, or shorter or taller, right? Well, how much is shorter? How much is taller, right? It could be anything, right? So, he then modifies the definition of what relation is. It's one whose whole being, whose whole nature, being of its nature, is to be towards another, right? Now, what about the word beginning? To say this is the beginning of that, well, it seems to be said of something, right? Like I say the axiom of the beginning. Nothing is the beginning of itself, right? So, you're always the beginning of something in a way other than yourself, right? But is beginning purely relation, or is it something that has a relation following upon it? Is it like knowledge, or is it like double and half? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But if you just considered the relation in the beginning, right, that would not be before in nature or definition, what it's said, right? Because relatives have to be understood in reference to each other. But that which is a beginning, but is not this relation, would be before in definition or before in nature. But in the case of the Trinity, they're constituted by what? The relations. So if you just consider the relation, then there's simo, ah-ma. And therefore, one is not before the other. That's a very subtle thing, right? But notice how Thomas is the good student of Aristotle, huh? If you look at the text, I'm not saying it's kind of fun, but if you look at the commendation, partition of the sake of Scripture, supposed to be Thomas' inaugural lectures, he's going to lecture on Scripture. But there he talks about the good student, and he's got a scriptural text, and the good student is compared to the earth, right? And Thomas says, well, why is it a metaphor, right? Well, the earth is what? The law has said, um, right? So this has got to be humble, right? But the earth was thought to be stable, right? So you've got to be humble to learn from the teacher, right? To submit, you know, put your mind under somebody else. But you can't take everything, you know, at random that the teacher says, right? It has some discrimination. You know, maybe he's better than this or than that, right, huh? And so that's the disability of the earth. But then the third thing is the, what, fertility of the earth, huh? So a good student can take the idea he gets from the master and develop it or apply it and see consequences of it, right? Like when Max Planck discovered the quantum, right? And then later on comes Niels Bohr, or five years later, Einstein uses it to explain the photoelectric effect. And then 13 years later, Bohr uses it to explain the atom, right? The stability of the atom and so on. So it becomes very fruitful in the mind of someone who gets this idea but he sees consequences of it and applications but no one else has seen it before. That's the culminating quality of the student, right? He's got to be humble to listen to the master. As Thomas says, he's got to read the master or listen to him carefully, frequently, and with reverence. And he's got to have stability, right? And then finally he's got to, what, not stop with what the master's given him. But you know the idea of seminar, right, comes from the word for seed, right? So in a sense what the teacher's doing is planting a seed in your mind. And like Empedicus says, if you press this down from it in your mind, you'll get many things from it, right? And this is what happened, you know? So what Thomas is taking what Aristotle did in the, what, categories, right? And I think I mentioned how Kajetan is good in that, right? He's going to have a commentary on that, categories by Thomas, right? But Kajetan, you know, reflecting his understanding that Thomas has, from the categories. That distinction, right? Between something whose whole nature is to be towards something, right? And then one who's, what, you know, has a certain relation followed upon it, but it's something other than that relation, like knowledge. And beginning is like knowledge. It's that kind of a relative, a secundum, dicci, in Latin, what they use, right? As opposed to a relative, a secundum esse. But you've got to be careful about those words, what they mean. That's a distinction our style is making. From the relative secundum dicci, it's at the beginning. Whatever is said to be of another, right? To something whose essay or nature is, yeah, yeah. So he says, look at this whole second objection. To the second it should be said that in created things, even when that, what, which is from the beginning, is, what, coeval, right, together in what, duration, to its beginning, nevertheless, the beginning is before by nature and intellect, if one considers that which is the beginning, right? Okay? Just like if I say, if you consider that which is knowledge, it's a quality, not a relation, right? Okay? But if one considers the relations of cause and cause and of beginning and the begun, it manifests that relativah are, what, simul, together, amah, in Greek. Aristotle already taught this. The relatives as such are simul. I don't become tall than you, and while there you become shorter than me, right? And one of these can't really be understood without the other, insofar as one is in the definition of another, right? But then we find out this strange thing, in God, the relations themselves are subsisting persons in one nature, right? Whence neither on the side of the nature nor on the side of the relations can one person be, what? Before another. Neither by nature nor understanding, right? So from the categories to... Question 42, article 3. Odd 2, huh? Pipe and smoke. Now, the third objection is misunderstanding, right? We speak of an order of nature, we don't mean what an order of what? There's a distinction in the nature itself of God, huh? To the third, it should be said that order noturi is said not by which the nature itself is ordered, right? Because then there would be distinction in the nature itself. But that the order in divine persons is to be noted according to a natural, what? Origin, huh? We talked about that in the previous article again, right? But that the Father, what? Naturally generates the Son. He doesn't choose to generate Him, right? He chooses to create you and me. Now, the priest there in the parish there, you know, he says, God loved you before anyone else loved you. You know how we're loved by our mothers, you know, especially in the song, but God loved you even before your mother loved you, right? And it's because God loved you and chose you to be that He arranged, among other things, your mother and father would meet. That's kind of interesting thought, I think, huh? But this is not the way the Father generated the Son. He didn't choose to generate Him. And the Father and the Son did and taught to breathe the Holy Spirit. To breathe the Holy Spirit. So, I guess he uses the phrase, order naturae, right? He means, what? Order the origin of one person or the other, but that it's a, what? Natural proceeding, not a voluntary in the sense of a chosen one, right? Almost in harmony with their will, right? Now, the last objection was saying, why not say ordo essentiae, ordo notoriae. The fourth, it should be said that nature, in a way, implies the notion of a beginning. So, Aristotle, the second book of Natural Hearing, defines nature as beginning and cause of the notion of restoration. So, it has the idea of a beginning, but the word essence doesn't have that idea. And therefore, the order of origin is better named, huh? The order of nature, as Augustine names it, Than the order of way. Yes and so. So, he's defending Augustine's way of speaking, right? Take a little break here before you do the fourth article. Thank you. Okay. Particle 4 here. It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in what? Magnitude, right? For it says in John 14, verse 28, the Father is what? Greater than me. And the Apostle, meaning St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 15, the Son himself will be what? Subject to him who subjects to himself all things. So, moreover, fatherhood belongs to the dignity of the Father, right? But fatherhood does not belong to the Son. Therefore, not whatever dignity the Father has does the Son also have. Therefore, he's not equal to the Father in what? In magnitude or greatness. It's not as great as the Father. I guess magnus means great, huh? Magnus. Magnitude means great greatness. Moreover, wherever there is whole and part, many parts are something more than one only or fewer parts. Just as three men are something more than two or one. But in God, there seems to be what? A universal whole and part. For under relation or notion, there contain many what? Oceans. Since, therefore, in the Father there are three notions and the Son only two, it seems that the Son is not equal to the Father. And the Holy Spirit is going to come in third because he's got only one notion. But against all this nonsense of what is said by St. Paul in Philippians 2.6, he did not consider it what? Theft, right? To be what? Equal to the Father, right? Okay. I answer it should be said. It is necessary to say that the Son is equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing other than the perfection of his what? Nature. But this is of the notion, the definition of fatherhood and sonship, that the Son through generation arrives at having the perfection of the nature that is in the Father, just as the Father. But because in men, generation is a changing over, right? It's a changing over of the one going forth from ability to act. Not at once from the beginning does the man who is a son be equal to the what? Father generating. But through a suitable what? Increase or growth. He's led to what? Equality with the Father. Unless it happens otherwise on account of some defect in the beginning of the principal generation. Now it is manifest from what has been said before, that in God there is properly and truly fatherhood and sonship. Nor is it possible that the power of God the Father was defective in generating. Nor that the Son of God successively and by changing over arrives at what? Perfection. Whence is necessary to say that from eternity he was equal to the Father in what? Greatness, huh? Whence also Hillary says in the book about the synods, the councils, take away infirmities of the body, right? Take away a beginning of the conception. Take away pains, huh? It was the mother's pains, huh? Yeah. And all human necessity. Every son by natural birth is what? Equal to the Father because he is also of light to the nature. Now, this first, probably the first objection, huh? Thomas gives two solutions, right? And in the second solution you've got to be careful of the words, huh? To the first effort should be said that those words are understood to be said about Christ according to his, what? Human nature in which he is less than the Father and subject to him, right? That's usually the way Thomas replied to that objection, right? But according to his divine nature, he is equal to the Father, right? And this is what Athanasius says, and that's again in the Athanasian Creed, equal to the Father by his divinity, less than the Father by his humanity. And you could say by his humanity he is less than himself as God too, right? But he emphasizes the Father there because of the text, right? Say the Father is greater than me, right? But now this is the second way here. Or, according to Hillary, in the ninth book about the Trinity, by the authority of giving, the Father is, what? Greater. But he is not less. To whom, what? One in the same being in nature is given, right? I always find that, you know, way of speaking a little bit difficult, right? Because mayor seems to imply meaner, right? Just like double implies half, right? So he's saying that the Father is greater because he gave the divine nature to the Son, right? But the Son is not less because we see it's one and the same. Yeah. It seems like a little bit of a strain, huh? But notice Thomas quotes the Synod here. And in the book about the Synod, about the Consuls, it says that the subjection of the Son, right, is the piety of what? Nature of birth. That is the recognition of the paternal authority, but authority meaning, you know, he's the origin of the Son. But the subjection of the others is the infirmity of creation, right? Okay? Now, again, the word subjection there seems strange to apply to the Son in his, what? Divine nature because he has a divine nature from the Father, right? Should you really use the word subject there, you know? But you have to figure out how to be understood here, right? He says the recognition, you know, it's kind of stretching it seems to be the word subjection. I heard a priest the other day, not in parish, but in another place. He was talking about the humility of Christ, right? And he was attributing humility to Christ, not only in his human nature, but in his divine nature because he receives his divine nature from the Father, right? Again, I would say that's like the word subjection, you know? Because when Thomas talks about humility, he'll say, well, God cannot really be humble because no one he can subject himself to, right? And, but Christ as man can be humble because he puts his human nature on his divine nature. But, you know, I don't want to accuse the priest of, you know, of false things, you know? It seems to be kind of used to the word humility, like the word subjection, right? But again, you have a synod doing that, right? And you might even find folks, you know, saying something like this, you know? I think you've got to interpret those ways of speaking benignly, right? But maybe not extend them because they can be misunderstood, right? Because is a son in any way under the Father? I don't think according to his divine nature, as man he is. But even as man he's under himself, it's God, right? But it's God, is he under the Father? No. So, but subjection comes from that, you know? The book of the synods is a collection of the councils, is that what it is? Yeah, or a book about, you know, synods, yeah. So that was an authoritative text? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But recognizio, you know, that the Father is the beginning, right? When he proceeds. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. We call it subjection, it's kind of a stretching of the word, kind of contrary to it. But you've got to be careful, because remember back in the substance of God, you had the word perfect, right? And the word perfect, etymologically, it comes with the word made, right? So if you say God is perfect, you're saying he's made? No. You've got to be careful, because the etymology of a word is not the meaning of the word. Right now, and Thomas is often pointed out, right? I kind of criticize people who say that the word philosophy means a love of wisdom. And at least in Aristotle, it doesn't use the word philosophy to mean a love of wisdom. That's in the etymology of the word, right? If Aristotle's philosophy is naming the knowledge that a love of wisdom would pursue, and that's how it got the name philosophy, but he doesn't use the word philosophy to name the love of wisdom itself. So I think the meaning of the word philosopher is a love of wisdom. That's what a philosopher is. But the meaning of philosophy is not the love of wisdom that he has, but the knowledge he pursues because he has this love of wisdom. So the primary meaning of philosophy is, well, wisdom. And Thomas, in his comment, in his ninth book, I think it is, of wisdom there, where he's talking about how a definition is never one word, right? But sometimes he says we use a synonym that's more known, and that helps the student, but it's still not a definition of a synonym, right? Like he says the synonym for philosophy, he says, sapientia. It doesn't say, you know, amor sapientia. See, but he calls it wisdom, right? So, that's really the way Aristotle, when Thomas uses the word philosophy, it doesn't mean a lot of wisdom. But that's its etymology, right? And you say, you know, the etymology of perfect is me. That's not the meaning of the word perfect. And so it's not the meaning of the word perfect is said of God, right? So, I mean, I suppose you could defend this way, but, you know, and, you know, you could tack breakfast and say, well, you're confusing breakfast, the etymology of the word subjection, you know? But still, there's no need to use such a word. Kind of a funny way of naming, you know? Well, I'd be careful about it, you know? Just like Thomas in that earlier thing didn't seem to reject entirely the origins of the way of speaking, he's always, what, yeah? Or if we say, or if we say that the Father and the Son are always breathing the Holy Spirit, right? Has he been breathed yet? You know? Might have better say, you know, they've always breathed the Holy Spirit, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. Face off there with the prophet and the prophet's a ball, you know? Maybe, he doesn't hear you, maybe he's taking a nap, you know? Yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow, yow. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, to second, it should be said that equality is noted according to what? The magnitude, the greatness of it. But greatness in God signifies the perfection of the nature, as has been said, and pertains to the essence of God. And therefore, equality in God and likeness is to be noted according to the essential attributes, huh? Nor is it possible by the distinction of relations to speak of, what, inequality or unlikeness, huh? That's a little goes back, in a sense, to the categories, in a sense, huh? Because greatness is, what, if you take greatness in the quantitative sense, it would be something absolute and not something, what, relative, right? And if you take greatness is referring to the excellence of the nature, right? Again, it's not the relation, right? Once Augustine says, again, Maximinus, that the question of origin is what, from what, right? But that of equality is qualis au quantis, right? Those are the concrete words for the second and the third, what, categories. Now, Aristotle distinguishes the categories, those three, you know, quantity, quadrulation, or Thomas does. He says, you know, it signifies something absolute, and then he subdivides into quantity, quality, or something not absolute, but towards another way. So the word magnitude, then, seems to signify something, what, absolute, huh? Now, fatherhood, therefore, is what? The dignity of the father, right? Just as the, what? Yeah, just as the essence of the father. For dignity is absolute and pertains to the, what? Essence. Thus, therefore, just as the same essence, which in the father is fatherhood, right? In the son is sonship. And therefore, the same as the dignity, which in the father is, what? Our fatherhood, and in the son is sonship. Truly, therefore, it is said, that whatever a dignity the father has, the son has also. Nor does it follow, the father has fatherhood, therefore the son has, what? Fatherhood, right? Because quid, or what, is changed into another category, right? Adalio quid. For the same is the essence, and therefore the dignity, or worth, of the father and the son. But it's in the father, according to the relation of giving, and the son, according to the relation of what? Does he humbly acknowledge receiving the divine nature from him? That's a piece he's trying to do, almost serving, you know? Now, to the third, it should be said, the relation in God is not a, what? Universal whole. Although it is said of many, what? Relations. So likeness here is going to deceive you into thinking that there is a, what? Universal whole. Just like when you say God, or the father, the son, and the Holy Spirit. It seems like God is a universal whole, right? But then, universal whole is said of things that differ in their, what? Their being. These guys don't differ in their being. Each one is I am, who am. So the father says, I am, who am. The son says, I am, who am. While the real God stands up. Because all the relations are one, according to their, what? Essence and being. Which is repugnant to the notice universal, whose parts are distinguished, secundum esse, right? That goes back to the reason why we didn't say that God is in a genus, right? Or a species, right? That God is really a universal whole. Instead of this many, because then they'd have to differ by their being. And likewise, the name person, as has been said above, is not a universal in God. But, whence neither all the relations are something more than one of all. That's a very subtle thing. nor are all the persons more than one only. Why? Because the whole perfection of divine nature is in each of the what? Persons. I heard Thomas say, you know, in another text, an angel is his own nature, right? There's only one angel of each kind. Why, we human beings, we partake of human nature, right? We can't affect human nature with me because I'm not the only man. So I was making a joke, I said, I partake of human nature. I said, I always knew I wasn't fully human. She was told that the humans, because they wouldn't, they used to sell a shrine to have her picture, they'd bring incense to her. And so somebody asked her, what do you think of it? She says, after all the work I've done, they treat me as if I weren't human. So we can't really say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit partake of one nature, because then that one nature would be something more than one of them. But there's no distinction between the Father and the divine nature. There's no distinction between the Son and the divine nature, or the Holy Spirit and the divine nature. So the Father and the Son together are not more than the Holy Spirit. Or the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together are not more than the Holy Spirit. They use the word communicate. You can say that the divine nature is common to them, but it's not common in the sense of universal. It's not something that they all protect, it's something that they all are. It's one of them. Consider it by himself, is this, right? Now, does it say anywhere in Scripture, you know, that God is three persons? Are they explicit? Or the Father, these three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are one God, right? You don't have those things as explicitly stated as they might be stated in theology. You can see that very explicit way of stating it can come out, which you find in Scripture, you know. But you don't find it spelled out quite that way, you know. Yeah, in Scripture. So, I guess we're going to have to stop here, right? What do you say? Seek it, man. Seek it, man. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, you are enlightened. Our guardian angels, think of the lights of our minds. Orden, illumine our images and arouse us to consider it more correctly. Say, Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. And help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So, the six articles of question 42 would be divided into two or three parts, if you want to divide them. Chapter 42? Yeah, we're in 42 now, after article 5 of 42. Article 5, the first one, against the other? Yeah. So, the first article could be divided against the last five, right? Yeah. Because the first one is asking, in general, can you speak of equality in God? Obviously, there's a question about equality, because it first of all suggests quantity, and you have to see what equality means here, right? And then you could say, the other five articles would be divided into three, according to three kinds of equality. And one would be equal in duration, or eternity, right? One in greatness, or magnitude, right? And one in, what? Power, okay? And you say, okay, that's three, and you've got five articles, right? Okay. Now, why the fifth article should be attached to the fourth, right, is pretty clear by the articles we'll see. Because, perhaps, one of the main reasons for saying, the Son is in the Father, and the Father is in the Son, is because the Father is the same as the divine nature, and the divine nature is the same in numbers in the Son, and vice versa. The Son is the divine nature, right? And that nature is in the Father, right? So, in that sense, although the other reasons, too, here, why one is in the other, but you can see it's tied up immediately with the idea that they're being equal in magnitude, right? Because they have the same, what, divine nature in number, right? Okay. So, in the second of those three parts, in the second part of the five, I mean the six, right, you attach five to, what, four, right? Okay. And that's easier to see, perhaps, in why he should attach, whether there's order of the Torah in God, or in the divine persons, to, what, he being eternal, right? Okay. But, if you think, perhaps, of the contrast here between the order of this before that, which he's going to reject in God, right? But the order of this from that, right? Which we explained last time more at length is taking over one of the, what, differences, but dropping the, what, genius, huh? So, if you think you're, this is an opposition to before and after, and you go back to the categories of our style, and the first sense of before and after is, what, time, right? And so, eternity is going to negate that before and after of time, right? And that's an occasion, maybe, to say there's no other before and after, but that's where the word before and after begins, in the time, duration. And so, if the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son, then we begin to see there's no before and after, right? Starting with the first meaning of before and after, which is where one is before and in time, another, right? Okay? Or where one could be without the other and be without the other senses, huh? Do you see that? Okay? So, you see, we could divide these six articles, then, into two, right? The first one, talking about equality in general, against the particular consideration of three kinds of equality. But to the first and the second, there is another article attached, right? Because it, a special connection, which is especially clear here, but I think you can see it a little bit if you look at the other one, too. Okay? It had, so, it's one and then two, two, two, six go together, and then five and six? No, four and five go together, and two and three go together, right? Oh. And then six stands by itself, because that's in power, right? Okay? Now, Thomas doesn't bother to do that, because he's, as he uses in the commentary on the Perihemoneus, Aristotle, he says, Studiens brevitate, right? He's studious to be brief, right? And so, Perkins has to unfold a little bit the master there, right? So, let's look now at the fifth article here. To the fifth one goes forward thus, it seems that the son is not in the father, and the reverse is not so, the father and the son. For the philosopher, that's Aristotle, right? In the fourth book of natural hearing, physics, lays down eight ways of being something in another, right? Of course, as Aristotle points out there in the fourth book, that's when he's talking about place and the first and then time. And the first meaning of yen is to be in place, to be in this room. And then there are seven other senses of it that he gives there, right? And we mentioned before how Thomas orders the eight senses, in the way Aristotle shows us in the fifth book of wisdom. Aristotle himself doesn't order them there. And by none of these is the son in the father or the reverse, as is clear to one running through each of those ways, right? Therefore, the son is now in the father, nor the reverse. So, we can run through those eight meanings now, if we want to. So, the first meaning of yen is to be in place, to be in this room. Well, as the father in the son is in a place, are the son in the father? Now, that's something that pertains to the natural bodies, right? Second meaning of yen is what? Part and whole, right? And so, is the father in the son, is it part of the son? Or is the son in the father? Is it part of him, right? The third meaning of what? In is like the genus is in the, what? Species. And you can reduce to that the difference in the species. Was the father like the genus of the son? Like, animal is in man? No? And then the fourth meaning of in is the species in the, what? Genus. So, is the son in the father as man is an animal? Or seven is a number? Okay. And the fifth sense is, what? Form and matter? Is one of these the form and the other the matter? Obviously, this is not so. God is pure act. In fact, is one and the other as a whole is said to be his parts? Well, it can't be. God has no parts. Okay? Is one in the other as, what is it, the power of the other? One is the, what? The mover or the maker of the other? And in the last sentence, I left my heart in San Francisco. Is one in the other as its purpose? No. God doesn't have any purpose. But he is the purpose of all the things. So, discorrenti, Thomas says, right? Running through, right? All of these, huh? This is the broad sense of discourse on to go from one thing to another. To go through all of them doesn't seem to be any one that applies, right? So, therefore, there can't be, you know, the father and the son, the son and the father. That's pretty convincing, right? Moreover, second objection. Nothing that goes forward from something is in it. But the son from eternity goes forth from the, what? The father. According to that of the prophet Pichius, huh? Egressus euso initio. Going forth is from the beginning. The beginning was the word, right? From the days of eternity, huh? It comes out by speaking of the days of eternity, huh? That's because you're starting from creatures, right? Therefore, the son is not in the, what, father? If you went forth from them, huh? It's like you went forth from your mother and you're no longer in your mother, right? So, he went forth from the father and he's no longer in your mother.