Prima Pars
Lecture 159: Divine Equality in Nature, Magnitude, and Power

Transcript
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No longer in the Father. That's pretty convincing, right? Moreover, one of two opposites is not in the other. So it's virtue and vice, or vice and virtue, one opposite and the other. But the Father and the Son are opposed relatively. Therefore, one cannot be in the other. But now, against all this nonsense is what is said in the 14th chapter of the Gospel of St. John. I am in the Father, and the Father is in me. Now Thomas, before he's going to reply to his objections, he's going to indicate about three ways that the Father is in the Son and the Son and the Father, right? I answer it should be said that in the Father and the Son, there are, what, three things to be considered. To wit, the essence, right, the divine nature. That's what he mentions first, right? That's why I was saying that it's kind of attached to this one on they're being the same in, what, magnitude, right? Because they have the same nature. So he says there are three things to be considered. The essence, the divine nature, the relation, and the, what, origin of one from the other. The proceeding of one from the other. And according to each of these, the Son is in the Father and the reverse is so. For according to the essence, the Father is in the Son. Why? Because the Father is his own, what? Essence. That was an article earlier that we saw, right? And we compare it to the consideration, right? We compared the three persons to the divine nature. And we said, is there any real distinction between the divine nature and the Father? No, they're the same. Is there any real distinction between the Son and the divine nature? No, because then there'd be composition of God, huh? And God is altogether simple, right? We're just reading Aristotle's chapter on the word necessary in the fifth book of wisdom this morning. And at the end, he has kind of three little corollaries after he shows what necessary means and so on. And then he talks about the first thing, which is God, being what? Necessary to itself. And therefore, he reasons that he must be, what? Altogether simple. It's interesting. A nice little tidbit there in Aristotle. I'll just explain the word necessary. But then, you know, I'll show you how this is involved in understanding the first being, the first cause. The one who's necessary to be through himself. And then that such a thing could not be composed. And therefore, he must be altogether simple. It's marvelous, right? Yeah. And Thomas usually begins, you know, the consideration of the divine substance by talking about his simplicity, even before his, what? Perfection. So when Aristotle gets down to the chapter on perfect, he'll explain the sins which God is perfect. Which is different from all the ways that the pictures are perfect. So he says, according to the essence, the father is in the son. Why? First of all, you've got to realize that the father is his own, what? Essence, right? He's the divine nature itself. And he communicates his, what? Essence or divine nature to the son. Not through any, what? Transformation of himself. He changeover. It's transmittatio. Whence it follows that since the essence of the father is in the son, that the father is in the son, right? Because the father is the same thing as the divine nature. But likewise, since the son is also the same thing as the divine nature, it follows that he is in the father in whom is his nature, right? And this is what the great Hillary says, in the fifth book about the Trinity, right? The unchangeable God follows his own, what? Nature, if I could so speak, right? Generating an unchangeable God, right? Giving him the same nature. We understand, therefore, him to be subsisting in what? In him the nature of God, right? Since in God, God is inside him. Inside, inside. Then it comes to the second thing, the relations. According to relation, it is manifest that one of the opposites, relatively, is in the other, according to what? Understanding, right? So you can't understand double without half, right? And half without double, right? So, you know, when somebody says, you know, four is double of two because two is half of four. Is that really an argument? Because you really know one without the same time knowing the other. Or I'm taller than you, right? Therefore, you're shorter than me. Yeah. Maristow had said this before, of course. These guys really understood relatives. And in the third comparison, according to origin, those are the three things we compare the persons to, right? The divine nature, the nations themselves, and then the section of origin. According to origin, it is manifest that the going forward of the understandable word is not to something outside, but it remains the one saying it. And that's, in a sense, it's true when I, what, produce a thought, it stays in my, what, mind, right? And when I imagine it stays, the image stays in my, what, imagination, right? So it's not like we're making a chair or a table, right? So the word is in the one who, what, has the word, right? Or who thinks the word, if you want to speak to it. That's one way they understand the first words there. In the beginning was the, what, word, yeah. Sometimes they understand the beginning meaning to mean, in the beginning of time is the word, the beginning of duration, right? Signifying the eternity of the, what, the word, right? But sometimes they apply beginning to the Father, especially, yeah. And so, in the beginning was the word, in the Father was the word. That's what he's talking about, right? And then the same reason could be given about the, what, Holy Spirit. So, we can say there are three ways, right, in which the Father is in the Son, or the Son is in the, what, Father, right, huh? Now he's going to reply to the objection there, drawn from the eight senses of in there. To the first, therefore, it should it be said that those things which are in creatures do not sufficiently represent those things which are of God, right? And therefore, according to no one of those ways which the philosopher enumerates is the Son in the Father, right, or the reverse. It proceeds nevertheless, or it approaches nevertheless more to that mode according to which something is said to be in the, what, principio originante, huh? And that's the, what, the seventh meaning, right, of the end. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, because the sign of that is that Basil uses the word, speaking of the Father as being the idea. It's maybe not the, to be extended of the way of speaking, right? But it resembles that, right? So just as, you know, the, when Aristotle defines the mover cause, he says, whence first there is the beginning of motion, right? So that's similar to saying that the Father is the beginning of the Son, right? Okay? So the way that something is in its maker or its source, right? It kind of approaches that, right? Nevertheless, this falls short, huh? Because there is lacking a unity of nature in created things, huh? So I don't have the same nature and number that my father had. I have the same in species, but not individually. In the case of God. In the case of God. In the case of God. In the case of God. In the case of God. The Son has the same nature numerically that the Father has. When he created things, there is lack of this unity of nature between the beginning and that which is from the beginning. Incidentally, Aristotle doesn't give in his famous distinction of the senses of these common words and the order of them. He doesn't give all the senses. What he does is to give the, I call them the central senses, right? And so when Thomas goes through the eight senses there in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, he says, what about in time? Because Aristotle, even in that same book, he takes up time, will talk about what is in time, right? What does it mean to be in time, right? And Thomas says, well, this has led back to the first sense, to be in place, because place is an extrinsic measure of the body, right? Like we might take a glass or something, you know, and you need two cups and you fill it up and you, right? So it measures that. And time measures most of all motion, but things that are subject to motion. So time, like place, is a kind of extrinsic measure of things. And so to be in time is like to be in place, huh? And so it's led back to that sense, okay? Why don't you go to the second sense? Pardon, oh, that's really, what? Kind of, what? Quite different sense, huh? You go forward like that. In the same way when Aristotle gives the meaning of, like, beginning, right? In the fifth book of wisdom, the first meaning of beginning is the beginning of the rope, the beginning of the table, the beginning of your property, right? And if I come in to your property and drive or walk down from the beginning of your property, the beginning of my motion will kind of correspond to the beginning of your property. And the time it takes me to get from the beginning of your property to here, the beginning of that time corresponds to that, right? So the beginning in magnitude, the beginning in the motion over that magnitude, and the beginning in time kind of correspond. And it's even more clear if we talk about the before and after. If I drive from here, let's say, to Boston, right? The before and after the road corresponds to that, it'll be a before and after in my motion. So just as Framingham comes before Boston, so the trip from Worcester to Framingham will come before the trip for that part of the motion from Framingham to Boston. The time it takes me to get from Worcester to Framingham will come before the time from Framingham to Boston, right? So they're very close, right? And so Aristotle would give what I call the central sense. It'd be the before and after the road. And to that, you'd leave back these, what? Other senses. Attach to them, yeah, yeah. So there are other senses that attach to the central senses. And it's very clear in what Thomas says about the word in and about the word what? What? Yeah, yeah. And the word beginning, right? Okay. And, yeah, so the first sense of before that Aristotle gives in the categories is before and time. It's a very explicit definition. But before in motion, before in the magnitude, is reduced to that first, what? Sense, right? Okay. So you leave back these other senses. So you kind of join other senses to the side of these ones, huh? There's a forward movement from the first to the eighth sense. So it's very subtle what Aristotle does. So essentially you could leave this back to the seventh sense a bit, but it's not the same exactly, right? Okay, now the second objection said, well, the son goes forward from the father, isn't he, therefore, outside of him, right? He says, well, the going forward of the son from the father is not like the going forward of the creature from God, right? But it's according to the way of a going forward that's inside, right? As the thought goes forward from the heart, right? And remains in it, huh? Or like the image goes forward from the imagination, but remains in the imagination, doesn't go to the outside, huh? When I think about something, there proceeds from my reason a thought, huh? But that thought is not outside my reason, it remains in my reason. Whence this going forward in God is by, what, only a distinction of, what, relations, huh? Not according to some essential, what, distance, huh? The third one, he says, that the father and the son are opposed according to relations, huh? But not according to their essence or substance, right? And that's the main reason why we said that they are one and the other, right? That's why this is attached to the fourth article. But nevertheless, he says, of those things opposed relatively, one is in the other. So you can't really understand double without understanding half, or father without understanding son, right? And incidentally, that's the reason why I divide the articles of faith, say, about the divinity, of different in the two ways Thomas proceeds, right? Thomas has two explanations of the division of the articles. In one of them, you have three articles, one for the father, one for the son, and one for the Holy Spirit. And then the other division, you have one article because of the, what, unity of the father, son, and Holy Spirit, right? Well, I take the middle position and have two articles, right? Because one would be the distinction of the father and the son, because you can't really understand the father without the son, and so without the father. And that's why when Thomas took up the names of the second person, he says, you don't have to take up the name son, because we're going to take up the name father, right? So they kind of belong together, like one knowledge, father and son, right? Just like double and half. And then the breather, and the breathe, right? The distinction of the Holy Spirit from the father and the son. So, I make two articles, huh? So, I think it's better than saying three, or just one, right? In between, but that's my... How many articles do you have in total? Well, Thomas says two ways of doing it, but the one I think is the best, is you divide the articles on the divinity of Christ, and on the humanity of Christ, each of them into six. And you have the twelve, which is the name of the apostles, right? There's a playful attachment of one of each of the articles to one of the apostles. And I think I have to take that too, you know, rigorously, but it's kind of beautiful, that's the way it is. So you have one article on the divinity of God, right? Two on the, what? On the distinction of the father and the son, the distinction of the Holy Spirit from them. One, and just like I just have two processions in God, right? Which are the basis for these relations. And then you have three according to the three effects, right? The creation, and sanctification, and glorification. And then you get to Christ, you can divide the six. There's two ways of doing them. One from Psalm 8 there, where you divide them according to the Psalms of, I mean, the articles of descent, and the ones of ascent. And so you have his coming man, infuse himself, taking on the form of a slave, right? And then his, what? Death, and then descent. And then his, what? Resurrection. And then his, what? Ascension. And then his, what? Second coming, right? So in a sense, he merits the ones of ascent by the ones of what? The descent. So there I divide it into two, and each of the two into three, right? But he who humbles himself should be exalted, right? That's the principle. But then in the great prayer, the Te Deum, right? You have another one, right? Where you have, it divided into three. And you have his becoming man, right? And then the main thing he did in his life. As far as redeeming us, his death on the cross, and then the things that follow upon that were the miracle and merits of the cross, he now obtains actually for us, right? And that's what? The descendant to hell, where he gives us the beatific vision, and then the resurrection, where he perfects our body, and then gives us a good place in the ascension, right? According to the old division, the quits of the soul, the quits of the body, and the exterior quits. And then the, what, third part is the second coming, right? He's going to come to judge us, right? So if you look at the Te Deum, you can see that implicit there, that division, right? It's dividing them into three. So you can find them into two or three, but nothing else is allowed. I see, when you talk about the creeds, then, in the Nicene-Constantinople creed, you divide everything into three, according to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But you attach certain other things to the Father, like creation, and appropriate them. But then in the Athanasian creed, there's quoted a lot here, you divide it into what? Two, according to the divinity of Christ and the humanity of Christ. Thomas uses that, you know, usually he's dividing the articles. He uses that when he gives the compendium of theology, right? You'll go back to the text there in St. John chapter, what? The chapter there, he takes up what eternal life is, right? 17. 17, yeah. How does the eternal life know you, Father? Him will be ascent, right? And so he says, belief, in a way, is a, what, prelibatio, foretaste of the eternal life, right? In eternal life, you have these two things, the humanity and the divinity of Christ. And he divides according to those two. And that's the way the Athanasian creed has it, right? I don't think he'd say one is correct, was incorrect, they're both good. But that's why the rule that I give or teach, I call it the rule of two or three or both. Because sometimes it's used to divide both. Like the example there of Aristotle dividing the plot. Praises Homer for teaching the Greeks how to make a good plot. A course of action is the beginning, but it'll end, right? That makes sense. That's into three. But then later on, he gives the division of the plot into the tying of the knots and the untying of the knots. And that illuminates the plot as two. So sometimes you should divide by two, sometimes by three, sometimes by what? Oh, yeah. I was noticing, you know, I was reading the fifth book of natural hearing there. And Aristotle is dividing up change or motion. Now, in the categories, if you look at the chapter of motion, he distinguishes six kinds of motion or change. Obviously, it doesn't make any sense, right? It's absolutely incredible, right? But in the fifth book of natural hearing, he divides change into three. And then one of the three, he subdivides into three. And one of those three into two, and that gives you six. But if you knew just that chapter in the categories, you wouldn't see that to really see why there are six, six, you have to, what, divide by three or two. That's what he does. But in the categories, when he gives the ten highest genre, substance, quantity, quality, and so on, he just enumerates the ten and illustrates them. And if you don't have a text, Aristotle approaches those ten through two and three, right? But Thomas, in the two places where he does do it, in the third book of natural hearing, the commentary, where action and passion come up there, and he has to expand the categories. And then the fifth book of wisdom, where he takes up being, according to the fixed verification. And Thomas, in both texts, always divides into two or three until he gets to ten. So, you know, the Gospel of St. John is divided into two. The Gospel of Matthew into three, right? So, what Mark and Luke is, we never know, because Thomas, the rest is silence, as heaven says, right? But I'm sure it's two or three. You know, the Psalms, there's about 150 of them. And Thomas, you know, in the commentary there, he talks about the different visions of them, and he just rejects them for one reason or another, and finally adapts the ones suggested by Augustine, right? And Augustine divides the 150 into what? 150? Into three, right? It's a beautiful, beautiful division. It corresponds to the division of the petitions of the Our Father into three. Absolutely perfect. You get to marry these two guys, right? But, so I still have a little reticence. I say, you know, the rule of two or three are both. For the most part, I say, you know, it's perfect for a little bit of case. But, you know, I think there's a reason on the side of things, and there's a reason on the side of our mind. We just can't, can't... That's not what we're going to teach. Or three. Or other. Okay. So we're ready to go on to articles. Six, I guess, huh? Amazing, amazing how we go forward here. This is the third kind of equality, in particular. Equality of what? Power, right? To six, one goes forward thus. It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father by power or ability. For it is said in the Gospel of St. John, chapter 5, that the Son cannot do anything or make anything, from himself, right? Except for what he sees the Father doing. Sounds like he's the supported artist, right? He's got to look at what the Master's doing and imitate him. But the Father is able to do something from himself, right? Did they translate from what? Text. What? Yeah, but it's from himself, right? I'll say it. I'll say it. Yeah. Moreover, greater is the power of the one who, what? Commands and teaches than of the one who obeys and hears. But the Father commands his Son according to that of John, chapter 14. Just as the Father has given a command to me, so I do. And the Father also teaches his Son, according to that of John 5, that the Father loves the Son and shows him everything that he does. Nice guy, huh? Likewise, the Son hears, right? According to that of John 5. As I hear, so I, what? Judge. My teaching is not my own, he says, right? That's really true about me, but is it true about him, too? Therefore, the Father is obviously of greater power than the Son, huh? Pretty convincing, huh? Yeah. More. This is the extended one now. It pertains to the power of the Father that he's able to, what? Generate a Son equal to himself. For Gustin says in the book against Maximinus, if he is not able to generate one equal to himself, where is the omnipotent power of the Father? But the Son is not able to generate a Son, right? Therefore, where is the omnipotence of the Son, right? Therefore, now, whatever pertains to the omnipotence of the Father, is the Son able to do right? And thus he's not equal in, what? Power. I'm convinced, aren't you? See, if you don't have this little dialectic first, huh? Then your mind will run forward too fast, right? Contrary to what Farlan says, wisely and slow, they stumble and run fast. But against this is what is said in John 5, 19. This is a very important thing. Whatever things the Father does, these the Son does likewise, right? In the same way, right? Now, the Son is just kind of a tool of the Father. He would say, whatever Michelangelo does, in the same way, his chisel and hammer do, right? In some way, what he does, his hammer and chisel do, right? But not equally, right? Not in the same way, right? But it's being moved by Michelangelo, right? But here, the Son, see, military, does it in the same way. Now, Thomas argues, The answer should be said that it is necessary to say that the Son is equal to the Father in, what? Power. Why? Because the power of doing follows the, what? Perfection of the nature. For we see in creatures that the extent that something has a more perfect nature, so is it of more, what? Power in action, right? I can see the reason why the, or another reason, I should say, why the equal magnitude of the Father and the Son was considered before, what? The equal power of them, right? Because he's reasoning from, what? They're having the same perfection of nature. They're both having the divine nature, perfectly, right? That they must be equal in their power, despite all these strange objections that have to be answered, right? For he's been shown above that the very notion of the divine fatherhood and sonhood, right, requires that the Son be equal to the Father in, what? Magnitude. That is in the perfection of his nature, huh? Whence it follows as a night to day, right? That the Son is equal to the Father in power, right? And the same reason is about the Holy Spirit with respect to both, huh? There's still a little bit of, you know, reluctance in your mind, because you'd heard those objections first, right? So Thomas is not going to leave the, what, cistern open to you fall down. He's going to close it up right now, right? By replying to these objections, huh? Now, in the first, probably the first objection is going to tie up that text, right? From the said contra, right? And if you look at the first objection, it's in the same place, right? 519, right? In John, right? To the first therefore it should be said that in this, that the Son is not able, ase, right, from himself, as it were, to do anything. There is not subtracted from the Son any power which the Father has. Why? Because at once, stop them, right? There is joined under that, right? That whatever the Father does, the Son, what? Does likewise, right? But what is shown here is that the Son has his power from the Father, right? From whom also he has the, what? Nature, yeah. When Hillary says in the ninth book about the Trinity, that this is the unity of the divine nature, that thus the Son acts per se, he's elected, right? Through himself, that he does not act ase, from himself, huh? That's a very subtle distinction you have to, what? See, right? He's not the tool of the Father, then he would be acting per se, right? But he's not acting ase because he doesn't have from himself his little nature or power, but from the Father. That's kind of beautiful that Thomas can see that distinction, right? And it's in Scripture, you know, and he says, no, I have to text that, right? The Son cannot do anything like it says in the first objection, ase, right? So Thomas has to hold on to that, right? But if he didn't act per se, he wouldn't be acting smilitar, like the, what? Yeah, in the same way the Father does, huh? Because God, I mean, the Father and the Son act through their, what? Nature, right? Through the same nature, right? So whatever the Father does, likewise the Son does, right? But not from himself. That's something to think about, huh? He's the interesting guys, aren't they? I think I'd like to know them better, but, you know, it's what little bit I know about them, if I'm interesting. I find myself kind of boring, you know, but at least I find these people very interesting. Now, second objection is talking about things like, God, the Father said to what? Give a command to the Son, right? Or to show him something, right? The Son hears from the Father, right? To second should be said, that in the demonstration or showing of the Father, and the hearing of the Son, is not to be understood anything, except that the Father, what? Communicates, now as to the Son, just as he communicates the divine nature, which is the same thing as the divine. And to the same, one can refer the command. Amen. Amen. Amen. the father, right? To this, that from eternity, he gave him the knowledge and the will of things to be done in generating. They can also refer this to Christ, to Christ's human nature, but that's the easy way out, right? And so the son is said to hear from the father because he's the word that proceeds from the father. So, you know, the father spoke and the son heard, meaning that he is the word of the father. So these are beautiful ways that scripture has touching upon this mystery of the generation of the son. And the third objection is taken from the famous one that, what, isn't the father got the power to generate his son and the son doesn't have that power, right? And this is confusing. Quid, he says, ad aliquid, right? To the third, it should be said that just as the same divine nature, the same essence, which in the father is fatherhood, right? In the son is what? Sonship. So the same is the power by which the father generates and by which the son, what? Is generated. Whence it is manifest that whatever the father is able to do, the son is able, huh? It does not however follow that he can generate, huh? Because this would be changing quid, right? In ad aliquid. For generations signifies only, what, a relation in God in the manner of an act, right? The son, therefore, has the same omnipotence as the father, but it by the relation. Because the father has it as giving it, and this is signified when it's said that he's able to generate. The son has it as receiving, and this is signified when it's said that he can be generated, huh? We saw before that those notional acts are not really different from the, what, relations, huh? Although they signify it in the manner of an act, huh? So you have the same power with a different relation in the father and the son, right? He had the same power in the father and the son, but with a different, what, a relation, huh? And power is not in the same category as relation, is it? So a difference in relation is not a difference in power, is it? So that involves a lot of what we've seen before, huh? Yeah. Very subtle. Let's take a little break before we go on to the last question. sent invisibly. Fourth, whether it belongs to each person to be sent. Of course you'll find out it's only the Son and the Holy Spirit that are sent to be sent. Whether to be invisibly sent, whether both the Son and the Holy Spirit are sent invisibly, right? Six, to whom the invisible mission of the Father and the Son of the Holy Spirit comes to. And then seven about the what? Visible mission. Dove descending, I guess. Fire coming down on top of the apostles. The Son becoming flesh and so on. And the eighth thing, strange little article here, whether any person sends himself visibly or invisibly, right? Don't let you think about that and see. There must be a way of dividing it into two or three, huh? Yeah. First half and the second half. First and the second, and the third through the last would be the third part. So what would be the, you could divide the whole eight arcs into how many? Two or three? Three. First one against the second and the third, and the third would contain. You have visible and invisible. It looks like you have the first two and then you have invisible for three. Invisible and invisible is three through eight, like invisible kind of thing. The first one is just on whether the suitability of descending. The whole thing. And then two, three, seven is just on descending itself. And then the third one is eight, whether it's on a person. Now the, in terms of these divisions there, one thing I may have studied for you a number of years ago, is about prayer, right? And in this summa secundi secundi there, he takes up prayer under the virtue of religion, right? He's got, if I remember right, there's about one big question, like 16 articles. And you go back to the sentences, he takes up prayer, right? And those 16 articles are not just one question of 16 articles. There are several questions, each of which has a number of articles, right? So you get kind of the way of speech to be divided, right? And they just kind of, you know, students baby taught, right? Just, you know, see? But then it comes to the categories, you know, like, who should pray, you know, to whom should you pray, for what should you pray, and so on, right? And how should you pray, right? And so these naturally fall into certain, what, categories, less than 16, right? And then, so, if I remember right there, I have to go back, you know, to see exactly the details. But these sentences, the division was more explicit then, but then the order that was better in the summa. So you can go back to the sentences and get the distinction of the groups of articles, and then the order of the groups is better done in the summa, so remember right there. So, sometimes you find something from the earlier work, you know, and, you know, you might find this divided up to the sentences, but I haven't made that comparison exactly. So it sees, you know, so it's an example of how sometimes something is more distinct in the earlier work than in the later, although it belongs to the wise man to order, so the order is more perfect. And, of course, the order here is more Thomas' order, because in the sentences, it's according to the distinctions of the parts of the work that he's coming on, and the questions that arise, you know, I propose that text, that's not necessarily that the articles are in the perfect order of learning, right? That's the way he's warning us there in the beginning of the book, right? It's the exposition of books requires, you know, and this question comes up, and so on. You know, these horrible things called your induction to philosophy books, you know, they used to, as a college professor, they'd send you, you know, free copies of these things, hoping you'll adopt them for your course, you know, and so on. But, I mean, you know, they all got a section there on the existence of God, you know, pro and con, and so on. And so, if you were using that book as an introduction to philosophy, you'd have to talk about whether God exists or not, right, and what people say on the sad side. And that question isn't really, you're not really ready for that question until you've done an awful lot of things beforehand. So, in expounding that book, the introduction to philosophy, you know, and some universities, they might have, you know, they might adopt, you know, a department, a book that everybody uses, you know, for the deductions, and then you'd have to say something about it, you know. Don't read this book. Well, I know, I know, but it would be out of the order of learning, right? You see, if you try to defend, you know, show what's good about the arguments for and what's bad about the arguments against or something, you'd still be dealing with something that they don't have the foundation they need for, right? Things that come before. So, it's out of the order of learning. Or, you know, a lot of times they'll go in and maybe not have an ethics course of some sort, you know, and they'll be talking about some particular moral problem, you know, about business or about medicine or something, you know, but it presupposes so many things, right? And so, you're really taking up these questions that are controversial now or being discussed now or, you know, but the occasion for discussing this question is an occasion for discussing it out of what the order of learning. So, all these things, you go back and you've heard things from the beginning, right? You pick up a modern logic book and they say something about the syllogism, you know, and what they like about it or what they think is deficient about it or incomplete about it, you know? That's not where our style begins, you know? I think a beautiful thing, you know, you know, if you look at Thomas' premium, the logic, right? She gives them the beginning of the perimenes and, more completely, the beginning of the postulitics. Well, there he divides logic according to the three acts of, what? Reason, yeah. And, of course, in the first act of reason, you're talking about, you know, distinction, division, that sort of thing. In the second act, you're talking about statement, right? In the third act, you're talking about reasoning, right? Well, I was rereading Richard II, you know, and I'm thinking again about this beautiful phrase he has in there. It says, This is a line there, dull on feeling, bearing ignorance. You've got to think about it again, because I always recognized why he calls ignorance bearing, right? As you know from your study of reasoning, right? Reasoning is coming to know or guess something. In the fullest sense, it's coming to know something you didn't know, but something you knew already, right? It's coming to know a statement that was unknown to you before, but through statements that you know already. So, knowledge is what? Not barren, but knowledge is what? Fertile. And if you know some statements, you can sometimes, by putting them together, come to see another statement, right? This is very clear in Euclid, right? You learn one theorem, and you can use that theorem to prove something else, that to prove something else, and it keeps on going, you know? And so, knowledge, you could say, is fertile, right? And not only do you know something when you have knowledge, but you can come to know something else you don't know, do what you do know, right? But Shakespeare calls ignorance a barrier. Isn't it beautiful, right? And a lot of...