Prima Pars
Lecture 162: Divine Missions, Grace, and Newness in Creatures

Transcript
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To the sixth one proceeds thus. It seems that the invisible mission does not come to all who partake of grace. For the fathers of the Old Testament were partakers of grace, right? But to them does not seem to have been made an invisible mission. For it is said in John chapter 7, verse 39, For the Spirit was not yet, what, given, because Jesus was not yet, what, glorified. Therefore the invisible mission does not come to all who are partakers of grace. This may be a very special way that the Holy Spirit is given on Pentecost, right? Kind of by intonum I see that you might say. That's really happy, you know. It's not the only way of the Holy Spirit, but it's one that really stands out, right? It is a sort of prominence, shall we say, right? Moreover, the progress in virtue is not except through grace. But the invisible mission does not seem to be observed according to the progress of virtue. Because the progress of virtue would seem to be continuous. Since charity always either goes forward or, what, falls or fails. And thus the mission would be continuous, right? Therefore the invisible mission does not come to all partaking of grace. Moreover, Christ and the blessed most fully had grace. But to them, there does not seem to come about, what, a mission. Because mission comes to one who is in the distance, who is at a distance. But Christ, according as his man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore, not to all those partaking of grace does it come about an invisible mission. Moreover, the sacraments, the new law, contain grace. But nevertheless, to them is not said to come about an invisible mission. Because they have grace in another way than the soul does. Not therefore, to all things which have grace, does it come about an invisible mission. But against all this is what Augustine says. Invisible mission comes about to sanctify what? Creatures. But every creature having grace is sanctified. Therefore, to every creature of this sort, there comes an invisible mission. The answer should be said, that has been said above, Well, the mission in its very definition implies that the one who is sent either begins to be where he before was not, as happens in creative things, or he begins to be where he was before, but he begins to be there in a new way. And this is according as mission is attributed to divine persons. So don't be a victim of false imagination. Think of, you know, him running out from the Father in doubt to us, right? You know, like a kind of coming to be where he was not before, right? Thus, therefore, in the one to whom a mission comes, is necessary to consider two things. One is the indwelling of grace, and the, what, newness, right? The innovation through grace, right? To all, therefore, there comes about invisible mission in which these two are, what, found, huh? Now, what's that mean, that innovation through grace, right? We're going to expound on that a bit in the reply to objections, huh? Well, the first objection was saying, hey, it doesn't seem that there was an invisible mission to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the Holy Spirit is not yet given. To the first, therefore, it should be said that an invisible mission was made to the fathers of the Old Testament. When Sebastian says in the fourth book about the Trinity that according as the Son is sent, what, invisibly, there comes about something in men or with men, and this was made or done previously in the fathers and in the prophets, huh? So he was sent to Abraham, right? Sent to Isaiah and so on. But therefore it said that the Holy Spirit was not yet given is understood about that giving with a, what? But, yeah, which was a, so that seems to me to be Antonio Masia, like Romeo says, did I ever love before? You know, well, he didn't love, he loved Rosalind, right? But this love that he has for Julius Agree, you know? For I swear, he'd never seen beauty like this before, right? So he couldn't have really loved before, right? That's kind of Antonio Masia, right? Well, Thomas is saying that the text should not be understood like the objection understands it, that the Holy Spirit was not, what, given at all to Abraham or to... Oh, the given. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Although the words might seem to indicate that, but maybe they should be understood by Antonio Masia, right? And what did the soldiers say? We haven't yet begun to fight. Yeah, yeah. See? It's 18-nothing yet. You know? We're really going to fight you now. But that's obviously kind of Antonio Masia, right? Now the second objection is saying, well, one progresses in the virtues, right? To grace and so on. So there's going to be a continual mission going according to the... She says, to the second it should be said that even according to the, what, progress in virtue or the, what, growth of grace, there comes about a, what, invisible mission. Once Augustine says in the fourth book about the Trinity that then to someone is sent the Son when by someone he is known and perceived. That's as far as the quote was given before, right? As far as to be known and perceived is, what, possible for the, what, kaptu? How do you translate that? Kaptu. Capacity. Or the one preceding God, right? Or the one perfect in God, the rational soul. But then he makes kind of distinction here. But nevertheless, according to that, what, growth of grace, especially in invisible mission, should be observed when someone, what, proceeds to some new act or some new status of grace, right? As when someone, what, goes forward into the grace of miracles or prophecies, right? One becomes a prophet, right? Or now, record miracles. Or in this, that one from the fervor of charity exposes himself to martyrdom, right? Or he renounces the things that he possesses, like you guys have done. Or like, what, say, Francis there, right? You know, picks up his clothes and he gives everything, right? Or when he undertakes any, what? Yeah, yeah. So what is Thomas saying there? He's not denying that there is a mission, in a sense, every time this all, what, progresses in virtue and grace. But especially, is there ascending when you what? Undertake some new status, right? In the life, huh? So, I assume when Benedict was made Pope. He got hit with grace. Yeah, yeah, there's a real sending, right? You know? Not that there wasn't before, right? And he was progressing in his knowledge and so on. And the love of God. But especially there's a mission being sent to him, right? Perhaps that's a, you know, right now. Time to time he's been sent to me, right? Does that mean he was just, you know, wasting time between the sendings, right? No, but there was a very noteworthy sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Now, what about the blessed, though, right? Because they're not progressing in grace. To the third it should be said that to the blessed there is made an invisible mission in the very beginning of their, what? The attitude. That's very definitely a new status. But after that, there is to them an invisible mission not by the, what? Growth of grace in intensity of grace, right? But according as some mysteries are revealed to them newly up until the day of what? Judgment, right? Which growth is to be noted according to the, what? Extension of grace to many things extending itself, right? That's what he says about it, right? About the blessed home. To Christ there was made an invisible mission in the beginning of his, what? Conception. Not afterwards, huh? Why? Because from the beginning of his conception he was full of all wisdom and what? Grace. Contrary to some popular scriptural popular scriptural college, yeah. What does it mean when it says he grew in grace and you know or it can mean either the outward manifestation of it, right? Our knowledge of what was in there all along but not that he's really growing in grace so he had no more grace when he was 30 years old than he did at conception. Did you say that according to the human? Well, yeah. There isn't any grace as God. He doesn't share in the divine life, right? That's what grace is. Sharing the divine nature as St. Peter says. Partaking in the divine nature. Let's stop and say seven and eight for next time and you can't do both of them, right? And let me just give a little oh, I didn't do the fork yet? Okay. Okay. That's not about the sacraments so I don't have to respond. That grace is in the sacraments of the new law instrumentally, right, as a tool. As the form of the artificial thing is in the what? Tools of the art. According to a certain what? Going down from the agent to the patient. But mission is not said to come about except in respect to the term goal. Whence the mission of the divine person is not to the sacraments but to those who through the sacraments receive what? Grace. Someone was asking me just on email the day. I've heard of your brother Richard's, no, my brother what? I've heard of This is a lecture that logic is principally about the beings of reason, right? Here's a call in what I had said about the following commentators that the category is to speak in general. It's about names, signifying things through thoughts. And so I said, well, you know, Thomas says in many places something like what you're going to be saying. And so many have picked that up, right? That logic is about beings of reason, especially about relations of reason. And Albert the Great, following out of sentences, that logic in a way is about things. But things as they are in our knowledge. And as the great Boethius says, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. So the first thing that happens to things when they get into our reason is to be universal. And that agrees with what Albert the Great says, that the first thing to be considered in logic is the, what? Universal. Sometimes I say it in a more sensible way. It's kind of a pun of the two meanings of sensible. But the first thing to be considered in logic is names said of many things. And that's more sensible for a couple of reasons. Okay? But I think it's in harmony with what Albert is saying. And it's in harmony with the commentators, right? So, but what's up front? And it's very clear in Aristotle's Prayer Hermeneus. What's up front, he's talking about, is always either a name or a speech. But since names signify things to thoughts, what happens to things when they're thought, which involves beings of reason and so on, is going to enter into logic, right? And it's going to be very essential to logic, right? Okay? So, it's not really contrary, right? What Thomas says is that logic is about beings of reason, relations of reason, and that logic is about things as they are in our mind, as Albert says. And to say that you're talking about names signifying things through thoughts. But that's where Aristotle will begin, right? So, Thomas sometimes, you know, when he talks about genus and species and so on, he'll say, well, you've got some relations of reason, right? Because the relation of genus to species is a relation of something more universal or something less universal. And things are universal only in the mind, and therefore this relation of the more universal and the less universal is a relation of reason, right? But then, when he's talking in the Summa Contra Gentiles, that no name is said univocally, right, of God and creatures. He goes back to genus, species, difference, property, and accident. He doesn't speak about them as, what, names of relations of reason, although their relations of reason are all from them. But he speaks of them as a complete distinction of names said univocally of many things. And then he shows that there's no name said univocally of God and creatures, because you don't have a common genus, a common species, a common difference, property, or accident, right? So, he says both, right? But in Aristotle there, up front is always the name or the speech. So when you say logic is chiefly about definition, statement, and syllogism, there's going to be all kinds of relations of reason involved in these things. But when Aristotle defines them, he starts with logos in the sense of speech, which is a vocal sound signifying by human agreement, having parts that signify by themselves. This is crystal clear in the paramedics. If you look at Thomas' commentary there, right? But it's Aristotle in the premium, I'm going to talk about, noun, verb, statement, logos, right? And he defines all of these things in general as vocal sounds. He's talking about vocal sounds. He's not talking about relations of reason. Well, there might seem to be a contradiction there, but there isn't, because these vocal sounds signify things through thoughts, and things as thought about would have relations of reason. And so you get into those, in a way, in explaining these names. And I'll come back to the fundamental thing there that he teaches in the peri-hermeneus. The commentators bring up in the categories. And they say the categories in general are not just about names, his names. They're not about thoughts, his thoughts. Not about things as things, right? But the categories is about names, signifying things. Now, what's beautiful about this, among other things, it's a beautiful example of how three is enough. In the first book of Matthew, you're hearing, Aristotle says that what seems to be common to all the early Greeks is a change between contraries, between opposites. And that's part of the 10th reading there. And then he shows, the 11th reading, there must be a third thing besides these two. And you can't have change without this third thing. But then he stops and says three is enough. And a lot of times when I teach the first book of Matthew, I'll point out how often this is true, that three is enough, right? It's not always enough. Sometimes two is enough. Sometimes three is not enough. But it's so common, right? And some say it's a reflection of the Trinity. Some say it's a reflection of the Trinity. Well, basically that. Maybe it's a set like that. Well, here again, we have three things here. Names, things, and thoughts. But you have to see how the three are, what? Connected, right? So I was thinking about this. I tend to think about the same thing again. I'm saying kind of some interesting things about this. And let me ask you this for a graduate. Can two names signify the same thing through the same thought? In other words, can you have two names but one thought and one thing? I think we have a few of them thoughts. Right? Is that a synonym? Yeah. Yeah. In fact, we have a name for this situation, right? And that is synonyms. What are synonyms? Well, they have two names, right? Two different vocal sounds. But they signify the same thing through the same thought, right? Now, of course, the obvious question to ask is, can two names signify two things through two thoughts? And you take the name like circle, let's say a square. Here's two names signifying two different things, right? Through two different thoughts. So they seem to be exactly, you know, parallel, right? This is a little more puzzling, right? Obviously, when you go from one language to another, you're looking for a different vocal sound, but one that signifies the same thing. You're looking for a different type of thing, right? You're looking for a different type of thing, right? You're looking for a different type of thing, right? Through the same thought, right? And sometimes even in the same language you seem to have two words for the same thing, right? And through the same thought. Now, let me go a little more subtle. Notice the same here for us to be in the spot. We've got one thing on top here. Can now the same name signify many things through, does such a name have a name? Yeah, provoquial name, right? Analogous is one kind of provoquial name, right? It can be by chance, right? But it's kind of strange, right? You might think a name signifying a thing to a thought, well, they go together, one, one, one, you know? But here you have two names, but one, one. Here you have one, but what? Two or more, and two or more here, right? Okay. Now, can one name signify many things through one thought? Is that a possibility? Yeah, but strictly speaking, does the word, for example, animal, right? It's said of dog, cat, horse, elephant, etc. But are these different meanings of the word animal? Does animal mean dog, cat, horse, elephant? Or does it mean only what's common to them? A living body with sensations? So, once in a while in class, you know, students get mixed up and they'll want to say, you know, animal means one thing when you talk about a dog and a cat. Well, a dog and a cat are two different animals, yeah. But the word animal is not signifying any difference, is it? It's signifying what they have in common. Now, since you have to be an angel, you know, to see many things, right, distinctly by one thought. God sees everything distinctly by one thought, huh? That's quite a thought, right? The best thought is a thought, okay? But I don't think the same name can signify many things through one thought. I think that's a no-no. Not a real possibility, right? But you have synonyms and you have equivocal names, right? It includes two possibilities, right? Now, this is the subtle thing. Can two names signify one thing through two, or I can, you know, say, can two names signify one thing through many thoughts, right? But keep it simple, impossible. How about dog and animal? They don't signify exactly the same thing, though. Dog and animal. They say, oh, you could be thinking of one thing. Yeah, yeah, that's true. Yeah. It doesn't signify anything. What? I'm just saying, if that's a signify, yes, then it isn't. Could it be like a divine attribute? Yeah. Now, see, that's a very difficult thing, right? And some might say, oh, you just invent this possibility to, you know. So you talk about, let's say, the unchangeableness of God, the goodness of God. They're really two different things, right? But now, when two names signify one thing through two thoughts, are those two names synonyms? No. Thomas, you know, he takes up the names of God, right? He has one of the questions, right? And, like, there's a chapter devoted to that saying, the unchangeableness. And he takes up here, too, I hope you saw it. But there's not, they're not synonyms, right? Because synonyms are two names signifying the same thing through the same thought, right? Well, if you signify the same thing through what? Yeah. Good example, then. Now, can one name signify one thing through two thoughts? One example of this, perhaps, is the word continuous, right? Because in the categories, Aristotle defines the continuous as that whose parts meet at a common boundary. But in the sixth book of natural hearing, he gives another definition of the continuous, that which is divisible forever. So, are these two definitions the same? But you define the same thing in the continuous, right? But one kind of, by way of what? Composition, by coming together. Another way is by resolving it, right? Okay? It's a little bit like if you were to define whole. And say, well, whole is that which is put together from parts. And then a whole is that which can be divided into parts, or distinguished into parts, right? Same, it's not exactly the same thought, isn't it? In one case, you're seeing how the parts combine to form the whole. Other case, you're seeing that the whole can be divided or distinguished into those, right? So, here you have one name, right? Continuous, right? Or whole. Signifying one thing, but through different, what? Thoughts, huh? Okay? The famous example that Thomas, you know, referred to back in the case of Trinity, a little different thing. But how acting upon, undergoing, are both emotional. Yeah. But a little different thought. Now, when you get to the so-called transcendentals, right? Being one, being something, one, and so on. What kind of names are they? Because being in one, and something, signify the same thing? But not, are they synonyms? No. So, they signify the same thing through different thoughts. So, you have many names, more than two names, actually, signifying the same thing through different thoughts. So, you have examples, you know, that are other streams. In philosophy, if we ever get to theology, right? So, being, something, one, even true and good, right? Signify the same thing. But not through the same thought. So, you have many names, signifying the same thing through different, what? Thoughts. Already, you see some philosophy, right? Now, I mentioned, I was looking at Hegel's dialogue here, the Hermenides, where they're talking about being in one, huh? And being partakes of the one, and the one partakes of being. And, uh, is it being in one with two different? That's good. what things right you can partake of right you can partake of whiteness and you can and color you can partake of hell two different things you can partake of right these are different forms in Plato's way of speaking right then and and you know let's say this is a position right but the speaker in the parmenides is speaking about being in one as if they are two words which they are right two names but signifying different things right and uh that's up to you to go out once or anything um but actually they are two words signifying the same thing to a different what but it's a different way which is done see because in the case of being in one as thomas points out but the word one means there is undivided being and uh undivided is negation which is a being of reason and therefore one adds nothing real to being so it signifies the same thing but it adds this negation of reason so the meaning is not the same but being really means that which is right okay uh the good is what all want right now so the good means what desirable being right but to be desired that adds nothing real to the thing but it is kind of a relation of reason so when thomas explains the uh one and true and good he says they add to being a relation of reason i mean excuse me being a reason in one case negation in the other case a relation right okay but now you look at the two definitions of continuous is something different right okay because you can uh define something that has parts by the way the parts combine to form the whole and by the way the whole can be divided into those parts right so a little different reason so there's different ways in which two names can signify the same thing through what different thoughts right it's different in the case the transcendental and the case of the two definition is continuous or kind of definition is getting the whole right now here's a third way it's going to be done in yourself in the classroom analytics he says you can um uh demonstrate the definition from matter or parts from the definition from in suffice that uh definition is speech making known what a thing is or speech signifying what a thing is that's from the end if i say definition of speech composed of a genus and differences right that's also definition of definition but more from the matter from the parts a very complete definition would involve both right you see but this is another way in which it's not it's different from the way in which it's continuous as in two meanings right okay so the word definition can signify the same thing with these two different definitions now um in the case of of god it's it's another way right see but what i've done with those three examples is give you a few different ways that what two names or even one name can signify the same thing through different thoughts right so that's you know subtlety there right in those two things but then you know then go back to my example there in a circle and if you call this point a and this point b and this point c and then we call this the line who's the line who's in this a plus the line who's in this b this is the line who's in this c these are all different points and all different lines right but now this point here i could say is the beginning of the line a it also has to be in line b it also has to be in line c sorry three different notions of that center right and no one is adequate to be on all the greatness of that right it is truly the beginning of the line a it is truly the beginning of the line b it is truly the beginning of line c but i have a better knowledge of that point when i say all three of these things right okay well this is the way creatures are as far as our perfectionist or divided right so my knowledge is not my love and my love is not my hand my hand is not my foot and so on right i'm out you know but god is the beginning of all these things right so i can have many thoughts of him right something like i can have many thoughts at this point here it's a beginning of a line a it's a beginning of line b whereby these things descend and that's a different way from all the other ways that i gave you come i say once the mind you know stops and thinks basically of the fact that hey names signify things through thoughts you've got three things to be involved here right then you start to go into details and say hey there are one one one one one one one each name signifies a different thing to a different thought and it gets a little more involved because you have what two names that signify the same thing the same thought and one thought can signify many things and three thoughts and so on right but the most difficult thing to understand i think among all those is the last one right you can have uh one name or many names signify the same thing with different what thoughts it's kind of a strange thing right how's that possible right you know give me four ways this is impossible right just trying to exhaust it it's not such a unheard of thing right it's because in a particular way in which this is true that many names signify the same thing with the different thoughts i mean dionysius has a book called the divinis dominibus right about the divine names right and all these names that he talks about in that divinis dominibus are they signifying different things and signifying the same thing god but all through different costs right how's that impossible right but in different ways right it can't be like i said that the word definition signifies the same thing for different thoughts when you say it's speech composed of genius and differences and speech making known what the thing is there's a style of apostolic analytics right he gives the definition of demonstration by its end the soldiers are making it so the cause and that which is the cause not otherwise then they're on the demonstration that but it's a a soldierism from necessary premises right and he goes on to say one precisely the kind of premises it's from right but he demonstrates the second one from the first right they have one definition by end and one by what matter of parts that can't be with god like he has one definition from his end one from his parts he doesn't have any parts doesn't have any matter and doesn't have any in him you see well it's kind of quite a different way right well is it the same as as the uh the way in which uh being is one signified that's a lot to be thought that right now think about it when doctor pieces up at the wall there you know again by putting shakespeare what's in a name and christian answer was sometimes there are many things in a name but shakespeare's talking about the fact that the names signify what kind of arbitrarily by custom or by agreement right he says what's in a name a rose by any other name still smells sweet so next time we'll do the last two articles here right and then we'll kick the bucket for the summer right and come back in the fall