Prima Secundae
Lecture 4: The Good, the End, and Man's Own Act

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In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or in the blue of our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you've written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So, in the first part of Aristotle's Premium, he meant the famous first definition of good. The good is what all want, right? And if you recall last time, we went through a little dialectic, right? Is it good because you want it, or do you want it because it is what? Good, huh? And the conclusion of that great dialogue was that you want it because it is good, right? But you see, maybe, most clearly in the beginning, right? An induction, if you go through all the natural goods of man, right? And the desires for them. You can see a reason why this is good for us apart from our, what? Wanting it. So you can see that food is good for us, whether you want it or not. Not that you don't want it, but... And I used to say to the, you know, the students, you know, is money useful in our society because you want it? Or do you want it because it's useful? And they know enough to say that they want it because it's useful, right? So they want it because it's good, huh? Well, now, Aristotle also touches, but very briefly there, upon the end, right? And the definition of end is that for the sake of which, you know? It may be that for the sake of which something is, like the chair you're sitting on is for the sake of sitting, right? Or it may be that for the sake of which something is done, like we study for the sake of knowing, we take medicine for the sake of health and so on. But in the second book of wisdom, Aristotle talks about the good and the end being basically the same thing. Although we speak of the means as being good, it's in reference to the end that's good. So chiefly the good and the end are the same thing. And therefore he makes the interesting statement that those who do away with the end as a cause and so on are doing away with the good. They don't realize what they're doing, right? But if you deny end, you deny that for the sake of which, you're going to be denying the good, right? So you can see all the modern philosophers, modern scientists who deny that anything is an end out there, right? It's kind of funny to talk to, you know, you know, ordinary biologists today and say, you know, are eyes for the sake of seeing? He doesn't quite admit that because you can see with the eyes, you know, he doesn't want to admit that they're for the sake of seeing, right? And the ears and so on, you can hear them, but they're not for the sake of hearing, right? So we go through all these parts and every one of them seems to be good for something, right? But they don't want to admit that any one of them is for the sake of anything because then they're admitting the road to God or something, you know? But notice the definition of good and the definition of end are not the same, right? That's very interesting, right? They're basically the same thing, right? But the definition is not the same, right? But if you examine the definition, you can see why the two would go together, right? If you want something, you ain't that, right? And if you're aiming for something, it's because it's good or at least they think it's good, right? You can see those two go together, right? When you see how the good and the end are tied up, then you can also understand better, the word better, right? And perhaps the most basic statement about what is better is that the end is better and it's what is for the sake of it, right? So if medicine is for the sake of health, health is better than medicine, right? If studying is for the sake of knowing, then knowing is better than what? Studying, right? And sometimes I go back to the more general statement that Aristotle brings out, that when the same belongs to two things, but the one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. So if hot is said of fire and the air around the fire, but the air around the fire is hot because of the fire, which is hotter. And sweet is said of sugar and of dessert, but dessert is sweet because of sugar, which is sweeter. So if good is said of the end and that which is for the sake of the end, but that which is for the sake of the end is good because of the end, which is gooder or better, if you prefer. So that's a very important thing. The other statement that is very basic about the good or about the better is that the whole is better than the part. But perhaps the end is better than what is for the sake of it is even more basic than the whole is better than the part. Because you could say that the whole is for the sake of the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the part. Even though without even thinking about that you might admit that the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the whole is better than the part of the book than the part of the book, right? If you ever bought a book missing a few pages, and I have a lot of books missing a few pages. It's very annoying to get to the missing pages, right? It'd be better to have a book that has all its pages, huh? It's better to have all your arms and legs, I think, huh? You're missing some, right? So this is an awfully basic thing, this first thing. But Aristotle also brings out a very important what? Proportion, right? And what is that proportion, huh? Proportion now, meaning a likeness of what? Ratios, what is that proportion? He brings out, after he points out that there are different, what, arts and sciences aiming at different goods, right? Then what's the proportion does he see, huh? Yeah, yeah. If I say, for example, if I say that seeing is to the eye as hearing is to the... Yeah. If you can supply the fourth term, that means you see a what? Proportion, right, huh? And then you can reason from that proportion, right? So you might say, if seeing is better than hearing, then the eye is better than the what? Ear. But Aristotle is also pointing out that if one art commands another art, right, then the good that the art that commands aims at, right, is better than the good that the art that obeys aims at, right? So if this art is subordinate to that art, like the pharmacist obeys the medical doctor, right, it's because medicine is subordinated to, what, health, right, then? And you can reason sometimes from one ratio to the other ratio, depending on which is more known to you, right? So if you see this art commanding that, then you can guess that this end is superior to, and the other one is subordinated to it, right? But vice versa, if you know that this good is subordinated to that good, then the art that aims at this good will be subordinated to the art that aims at the higher good, right? Aristotle will use that later on to guess that the political art aims at the highest good, right? Why? Because it seems to command all the other arts and sciences to some extent, right? But before he does that, he brings out another thing that there is a, what, highest good or a last end. right? That not every good is desired for the sake of some further good, right? And this is a very important thing, right? But how does Aristotle show that not every good is desired for the sake of another good? You can never start. Okay. It would make in vain, right, what we're doing, right? You're doing A for the sake of B, and B for the sake of C, and C for the sake of D, right? So A and B and C are not worthwhile until you get to D, but that's not worthwhile to get to something else, right? And so you'd be doing everything for the sake of something that would make everything you're doing worthwhile, but you'd never get to something that would make everything you're doing worthwhile. But maybe you could say more forcefully, though, too, that if you desire A for the sake of B, you can't desire A before you desire what? B. And if you desire B for the sake of C, you can't desire either A or B until you what? Yeah. So if everything is being desired for the sake of something else, how could you begin to desire anything? Because anything you were to desire, you'd have to desire for the sake of something else, in which case you couldn't desire it until you desired the other thing. But that could be the first thing you desire, because that's desire for the sake of something else, too. So there must be some end that is simply an end, right? And not a means to some further end. And this will be the chief and the greatest good, right? So in a sense, Aristotle is showing that there is a chief good of man, a greatest good, huh? There is a good that is desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else, but everything else for the sake of it. And later on, we'll be doing this other reading where Aristotle is first on a line about what that good is, right? He talks about the importance of knowing that, huh? You'll have a big weight upon life, he says, right? And if you don't know it, you can't aim at it, right? Okay. So that was the first and the longest part of the, what? Premium, right, huh? That the ethics is about, what? This end that is desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else, right? In the second book of wisdom, Aristotle says, if there is no such end, right, there really wouldn't be an end. Everything would be a, what? A means, right? Now, on page two of your text, did everybody have the text? I have some copy. Anybody else need a copy? Anybody else need a copy? Okay. So we're going to read the first part of the third paragraph there, or sentence. The knowledge then aims at these things being something, what? Political, right? He's aiming at finding out what happiness is, right? That's the name of this chief good. Now, in the next few paragraphs, he's going to be talking about the way we ought to consider these things, right? So he says, enough will be said, if it is made clear according to the underlying matter. This is the basic beginning for understanding how to proceed in these signs, right? You have to know what the matter is, huh? What it's about, right? And then you can decide what, how you should proceed, right? And it's in some way similar to what you have with matter in the first sense, huh? Because in the mechanical arts, right? The servo arts, huh? The instruments you use have to fit the matter. So my brother-in-law there practices the art of carpentry, right, huh? And my wife, the art of the tailor, right? But they don't use the same tools. He might use a hammer and a saw and all kinds of other gadgets, huh? But my wife never makes a dress with a hammer there. You know, she used a saw to cut the material. But my brother-in-law doesn't use a scissors to cut the wood. And he doesn't put it together with the needle and thread, huh? See? That's a very obvious thing, right? But the tool you use, right, huh, has to fit the, what, matter, right? You can see that very clearly in the mechanical arts, because they're more known to us, huh? Much like that, even in geometry and natural philosophy and wisdom and so on, and ethics now, right? What is the matter? What is the science about, right? And your tools and your way of proceeding have to fit that, huh? In the sentences there, huh? In the opening articles and so on. Thomas has a very beautiful article. Whether the, uh, the mode of theology of scripture is artful. Artificial, right? Which I wouldn't translate artificial, but is artful. Principle here, right? He says that, um, uh, among other things, that you should. ...seek more or less certitude than the matter, what, admits. And he has a beautiful example, he says. It's equally absurd, he says, right, to allow the geometer to persuade you, right, and then to demand that the rhetorician, right, have a demonstration, an argument that is necessary in the midst of no, you know, doubt, right, huh? It's kind of beautiful, you know, if you know the liberal arts, you know. In the trivium, you've got rhetoric, right, and in the quadri, you've got geometry, right? So someone who's been trained in the liberal arts would see, yeah, you don't expect the, you know, who's going to be the next president, who's going to be the Republican candidate, you know? Well, all kinds of speculation, but can you expect a man to demonstrate that this man will be the candidate at this next time around? You can't expect that certitude, right? That's absurd, right? But, you know, to have the, you know, the geometers say, well, we'll go out and we'll take a pole, you know, and see what the people think about, about the, you can get out of a triangle or something. So that's absurd, right? You can have more certitude than a pole, right? So he says, enough will be said if it is made clear according to the underlying matter. Is that true, too, in the mechanical arts, you know? Can the carpenter be as precise, maybe, as the seamstress? The material doesn't allow that saying what? Pretty, right? Or can the, you know, the sculptor, you know, chipping away at the marble, or he is as precise as the painter, you know? Maybe he can't be a certain exact in this matter, you know? I know some recipes sometimes, you know, it says, well, when you put it in the oven at such a degree and cook it so long, but then there's a little warning, you know? Oven's different, you know? And so it may get done too much in your oven or not enough in yours or something, right? And so you've got to know your oven, right? And so. For a certitude ought not to be sought in like manner, he says, in speaking about all things, just as neither in the products of the arts, huh? And there he's thinking of what I was speaking of there, right? The mechanical arts, right? That's a beautiful comparison he has, huh? But he says there is much difference, huh? In error about good and just things, huh? Now, is that true? So men differ much as to what is good and what is bad, right? And some of these must be mistaken about what is good and what is not, right? But there's a certain what? In certitude there, right? I get into that. In just things. I know myself, I would, you know, when they had adults in a night class there, I always get them going about taxes, right? I say, well, now. Should the rich man pay more taxes than the poor man? Is that just that he should pay more taxes? I mean, all they can say is, you know, he can afford to pay more taxes. Is that a reason to say it's just? You know? If I go to the baker and I buy a loaf of bread for a dollar, and the rich man comes in and he pays $10 or $100? Is that just? If he can, you know, he can pay $10 more, he says, I mean, I can pay a dollar for a loaf of bread, right? So you realize how it's not so clear, right? Is he getting more for his money than other people? There are more policemen around his house than around the house. For me, it's unjust to pay more taxes, right? But then, you know, even if you could in some way say that he should pay more, right? Then, you say, well, should he pay, you know, the same percentage, right? Or it's he paid 10% of his income and I'll pay 10% of my income. So he'd be paying more money out than me, but it's the same percentage. Is that the just amount, 10%? Or should he pay, you know, graduated, you know, like, you know, 20 or 30 or something, you know? You realize how uncertain this is, right? What is just to pay, it's not clear at all, you know? Even if we're clear that he should pay more, a higher, what, percentage or a same percentage? What's the reason to say he should have 30% rather than 10% of his income going to this? Can't say he can live, you know, giving away 30% of it, paying 3% of it. That's no reason to say it's more just, right? So it's not clear at all, right? What's the just amount, right? In that debate about tax levels, has the term just been meaning modified at all? Or is there a dispute as to what just really is? Yeah, yeah. I mean, Marisol's pointing to this, right? You know, it's uncertain there, right? Do you see that it's just for him to pay a higher percentage of income than me? Or can you see even that it's just that he paid, you know, a greater amount than me? Is that even clear, right? It's nice that he does, maybe, because, you know? Makes some people happy. Yeah, I mean, that's the reason, right? I'll just talk about redistributing wealth, you know, and so on, huh? But whether it works or not, I guess it doesn't work, I guess. Eventually you run out of people's money to distribute this, they say. You know? But suddenly that's just, right, you know? It's unjust that some man should make that much money, you know, huh? And sometimes we think that way, don't we, huh? You know? But how much more is really unjust, you know? When I was back in the 50s there, and Walter Luther, the labor guy, wanted no salary to be more than $10,000 in the country. That's $10,000 worth more in those days, but it's kind of arbitrary, right? Way back when, somebody paid him $99 million a year to do whatever he was doing, acting and so forth. And Larry King asked him, yeah, but Bill, $99 million for what you do? Is it really worth it? And Bill Conley just smiled. He says, but they're willing to pay. I'm willing to take it. Look at Regan's autobiography there. I guess one time they were taxing 97% of his income, right? As an act. So it was worthwhile. I think he moved for 3%, you know? So, these things are uncertain, right? So if they seem to be by custom only, now this is not Aristotle's opinion. Aristotle thinks that there are some things that are good by nature, and some things that are bad by nature, right? But the fact that some people think that they are by custom only, right, is a sign of the lack of what? So to the lack of precision here, right? And he says, and there is much error about good things, due to many being harmed as a result of them, right? So is it good to be wealthy? You say, well, yeah, yeah, it's good to be wealthy, you know? But then sometimes they kidnap your child or your wife or something like that, right? See? And for ransom, you know? Don't bother to kidnap my kid because I couldn't put up much, you know? So is it good to be wealthy? Or to be, you know, a courageous man, right, you know? Maybe get in there trying to stop a fight or something because you're a strong guy, you know? But you get hurt, right? And the weak guy, you know, he just cowers. So money is good, right, we'd say. Courage is good, right? But some people have been undone by these things, right? So, you see, they're good, but, you know, it's not really clear that they're always good, huh? For some have perished through wealth and others through, what? Courage, yeah. We should be content, therefore, he says, in speaking about such things and from such things, right? For the conclusions you reach, right? And the things you proceed from. To show the truth, what? Roughly, right, huh? I've read Thomas' commentary on the word roughly there, right? He's saying you're applying universal things, right? To singular, you know, changeable things, right? And you can only roughly apply these universal things, huh? So a lot of times something bad happens from something good you've done, right, huh? There's a bad result from these things, huh? We're talking now about, I don't know if you're following the thing about Egypt there, you know, but Ubarak might resign today. We don't know. That's the talk, but it's a rumor. But anyway, I'm going to speak tonight. But they're talking about, you know, the, it's not the first revolution that is staged, it's the second one, right? So you have the famous example, you know, was it Kerensky there was, you know, in power after the falling in the Russian monarchy, right? And then the Communist Tagore, right? So you have all kinds of examples, you know, it was that second revolution that is one to watch out for, right? Yeah. So you've got to be careful, right? So to show the truth roughly and in what? Outline, right, huh? And I always thought, I saw in life that I was going to marry a woman who was a Catholic, right? You know, real Catholic. And a woman who thought that marriage was, was a joke, a dead end, right? No way out. So should you marry a woman of a different faith? I mean, my mother was a Catholic, my father was Lutheran, you know, in background, you know? And I'd hate to have this go on, you know? So, you know, you've got to be kind of careful about these things, right? So I'd say, as a rule, I'd say you should marry someone of the same faith, right? And maybe of the same background to some extent, right? I know, like, in Quebec there, you know, we'd notice that the Quebecers have a different sense of humor than we have, right? So I don't know, you know, like in marriage, you know, but I've heard people, you know, going into religious horrors in Canada, you know, and they used to have a different sense of humor, right? And how can you deal with people you don't share some sense of humor with, you know? Or think that they laugh at you, you don't laugh at it, or vice versa, right? It's kind of the thing that people laugh at your jokes or something like that, right? So I'd say, you know, you should maybe marry, you know, or should a white man marry a black woman or vice versa, you know? Well, it seems kind of hard on the child if he's going to, you know, be with the blacks or the whites, you know, they have a hard time, right? You see, I wouldn't want to say, you know, you shouldn't ever do this, right? But I say, for the most part, it's better to marry some of your own faith, your own customs, you know, your own color and skin and so on, right? But there are exceptions, you know, and it's turned out very well and so on, you know? And I show a man, I always want the idea that a man should be older than the woman he marries. Of course, you always joke about Shakespeare because he married a woman. older than himself, right? But in the Twelfth Night, I guess, you know, the guy's saying, you should marry a woman younger than you, you know? So, you'll say, it's like his own experience right now. But I wouldn't say that a marriage where a man marries a woman older than him is doomed necessarily, or is a bad idea necessarily, I don't want to say that, right? I'd say for the most part, a man should be what? Older, right? For a number of reasons. One sense, men, you know, mature later than women and so on, right? And women use their looks and so on, right? So, this sort of thing. First, I think the woman should be 18 and the man 36. I think he says something like that, in fact. But the reason he gives is that the time when the woman is no longer able to bear children, the man has lost interest in sex and so. And so, it's a very concrete reason, right? For the difference in age, right? So, but how certain is that? You know, what the age of the man should be and the woman should be and so on, right? I said the man should be five years old, I think. There's a rule. But actually, I wouldn't give it as something universal, right? There are exceptions, right? So, he says, and in speaking about things and from such things, the czar, for the most part, rather than what? University, right? Always a man should be older than his wife. Always a man should marry a woman of the same color skin, right? Always, you know? I'd say for the most part, I think this makes sense, right? That a man should marry a woman who's younger than himself. That, you know, marry one of the same skin, same religion, and so on. But, it's not a good geometry, right? Every two is half a four, right? And so on. You want to have that kind of serenitude, right? Two for the most part. Now, in the same way, he says, one should receive each thing said. That is to say, the student, right? For it belongs to the educated man, to seek certitude in each kind of subject, to the extent of the nature the thing admits. I think this is a beautiful example of this. For it seems about the same to accept the mathematician persuading, right? Which is a weak way of moving the mind, right? And to demand demonstration from rhetorician. So nobody knows what? Nobody can demonstrate what's going to happen in Egypt, right? I might, you know, try to persuade you what's going to happen, you know? But you can't expect, you know, me to be, have the certitude that a geometer has about the equilateral right-angled triangle or something, right? Now, that's the second part of the, what? Premium, right? So you know what we're aiming at and then a little bit about how one can proceed, right? The kind of certitude you can have, right? The kind of exactness you can have. Now he's going into, in the last two paragraphs here on this page too, he's going into the who is or is not as suitable what? Here are the signs, huh? Now he says, each man judges well what he knows and of these things he's a good judge. The man educated in something about that and simply the man educated in all things. Hence, the young man is not the proper here of political knowledge. For he is without experience of the actions of life. Well, the arguments are from these and what? About these. So, can the young man talk about marriage and so on? We can talk. They know what it's all about, right? No. A kirkegaard has got that famous banquet, you know, where he kind of imitates in a playful way of play-doh. But these men go out in the countryside and they're going to have a wonderful banquet out there in the countryside. No women are allowed. And then after dinner they're going to each give a speech. There's going to be a speech about women, right? But they're not allowed to give the speech until they feel the influence of the wine upon them. But each guy is seeing women from a different angle, right? So one is a young student who's all mixed up about women, right? Another is an experienced married man, right? Another man is a man who is a tailor who realizes you're just fashion, right? Another is a professional seducer and so on. Each of them see it from a different point of view, right? But certainly the married man would see it differently than the what? Young student, right? I come from a family of all boys, so probably get a slow start, understand women. I mean, if you have sisters, you might more know what a woman is, right? And it's kind of a natural way to pick up some knowledge, you know, for a woman in our life, right? You get some knowledge, you're watching your mother, you know, but if you watch sisters, you get, you know, some more, I don't know, what your experience is if you had sisters, right? Now there's a second difficulty that you can have besides lack of experience, right? Further, being a fowler of the emotions, Aristotle takes it kind of for granted, right? He will listen in vain and uselessly, right? Since the end here is not knowledge, but what? Action, right? It makes no difference whether he is young in age and their false emotions or youthful in character, right? What did he say about this one guy? You said you remained a child all his life. For the defect is not by time, but through living and pursuing each thing by emotion, but knowledge is useless to such as it is to the incontinent, huh? Now the incontinent is opposed to the vicious man, right? I mean the vicious man does bad and thinks it's good to do bad, right? The incontinent man knows he shouldn't be doing what he's doing, but he can't what? Help himself, right? I remember a guy, you know, smoking and he says, he says, never start this, he says. It's an awful thing. So what good does it do this man to know that smoking is bad for you if he can't, what, give it up, right? Here's how later on he used the example there of the man who goes to the doctor, the doctor tells him to lose weight or tells him to do this or that and he goes off and doesn't do it, right? What's the sense in going to the doctor for medical advice if you're not going to follow the advice that he gives you? Because that medical advice is not for the sake of knowing, but for the sake of your health, right? The sake of doing something. And so if you don't do it, it's useless, right? So Aristotle sees ethics and in general practical philosophy as not knowledge for the sake of knowing, right? But now it's the sake of doing, right? What should I do as a human being, right? What should I do as a father, what should I do as a citizen or a senator or a king or something, whatever I am, right? That's not knowledge for the sake of knowing, right? When I first picked up the basic books of Aristotle that we all kind of grew up with, you know, the Oxford, you know, you see it in one volume, everybody's book. The only interesting to me who wrote it was a book called Politics. But that was unbeknownst to me, you know, really practical knowledge, right? It's for the sake of doing here, huh? But he says, to those desiring and acting according to reason, you know, if you desire to be reasonable, right? Try to be reasonable and so on, then it's very good for you to know, right? That's what I was saying, right? But if you just follow your emotions, don't bother with this book. Don't waste our time. Waste your own time. Go live it up. Because this knowledge is going to be useless to you, right? In fact, it'll make you worse, right? Because you know now that you shouldn't do these things, right? And you continue to do them, right? Okay? That's kind of beautiful what Aristotle says, huh? So you need, on the one hand, experience, but... Desire also to be what? Reasonable, right? To act according to the reason. On the top of page three in your text there, Aristotle has an epilogue, right? He usually calls it epilogue. I mentioned before how the premium to wisdom there has an epilogue. And here he has an epilogue. And what he does in the epilogue is to recall what he's done in the premium. In the case of the premium to wisdom, there are two things he's done, right? Here there are, what, three things, right? But he recalls them in the reverse order that he did them. He recalls the thing he just did, the thing there, and so on, right? It's like if I recall my life yesterday, and then the day before that, and then the day before that, right? So he says, let this much about the here. He's got to have experience, right? He's got to not be a follower of the emotions, but a follower of reason. And then he'll be suitable here, right? And how it should be received, the amount of certitude and so on, decision you can have in the science. And that was the second thing he did. And what we propose, right? And then in the Greek, you have the Greek word for paved the way, right? So we call this whole thing a premium, right? It has these three parts. So Thomas got help here in front of the epilogue in dividing the whole premium, right? But he divides premiums that don't have an epilogue too, so not limited like we are. Now let's look at this, let's try to look at this chapter 7 here, right? Now one way you can approach this a little more explicitly than Aristotle here is by going back to the definition that Plato gave of a thing's own act. It's going to be our third definition here, right? It's in the poem, thing's own act. Plato gives this definition of a thing's own act, or Socrates does. It is the act that only that thing can do, or it does better than other things. So it's the act that only that thing can do, or it does better than other things. So sometimes people don't have a screwdriver they can find, they take a knife out of the drawer and they use that to turn the screw, right? It kind of wrecks the knife if you're not very careful, right? And it doesn't work as well, you know? Screw, right? So we wouldn't say that, you know, turn the screw is the knife, sole, and what? The act. But maybe the cut is the knife, sole, and act, right? I suppose, you know, I got a little thing, I used to open up letters, you know? I thought I could cut my bread with that and so on, right? I wouldn't cut it as well as the knife, right? But in the case of my eye, maybe it's only through my eye I can see, right? I can't see through my ears, I can't, you know, okay? For my teeth in front, car is for what? They can bite, your teeth in back can chew, right? Can I bite your teeth in back? I suppose I could, but not so well, right? Could I, you know, chew with these teeth in front? Well, it'd be a little bit hard to hold it there right there in the right position, so I suppose I could if, you know, if I had lost all my other teeth and how many of them? I'd need a little bit of chewing there, right? So this is the definition of a thing's own act. The act that, what? That thing alone can do, right? Yeah, pretty much better, huh? The act that that thing alone can do, huh? Or that it does better than other things, right? You got the idea? Now, just as before we saw a connection between the good and the end, is there a connection between the end and the thing's own act? This is the statement you want to manifest. Any thing's own act is its what? End is our purpose, right? Okay. Now, it's best to manifest this at first by deduction, huh? And going back to Shakespeare's definition there of reason, its ability for a large discourse, huh? Looking before and after. Well, sometimes we speak of a large induction, right? A discourse that is from many instances, right? So when I approach this statement here, I'll make a large induction, right? And the stupider the audience, the longer the induction should be. By making a large induction starting from the tools of man, right? And then from what? The organs of man, huh? And then from the occupations of man, right? So, in order to manifest this by a large induction from the tools of man, meaning the artistic tools, from the organs, which is a Greek word for tool, but we use it now for the tools, the body of the organs of man, and then from the occupations of man, huh? And so we say, let's start with the tools of man. What's a knife's own act? And what's the end or purpose of a knife? Yeah. And what's a pen's own act? What's the end or purpose of a... Yeah. Okay. And what's a hammer's own act? The hammer, right? What's the end of it? It's the hammer, right? Now, without insulting your uncle, it's all the tools of man, right? Thank you, Gary. But each tool of man seems to have its own act, right? Suddenly, this tool either alone does or that it does better than other ones, right? And one thing you learn, say, even, say, with screwdrivers, right? You know, this screwdriver is for that screw. And you get a screwdriver that isn't for that screw, it's either not going to do it or not going to do it as well, right? Especially if it's one that's hard to move, right? You need one that's really just the right... made for that, right? One that would do it better than other screwdrivers will do it. So you can make an induction then and say that every tool has its own act, and that act is its, what, end or purpose. Then you can go to the organs, which is a Greek word for organon, they're a Greek word for tool, of the body, right? And you say, well, does the eye have its own act? Yeah, to see. And eyes are for the sake of what? Seeing. Seeing. And the ear has its own act, which is to hear, right? And the ear has its own act. And the ear has its own act. And the ear has its own act. And the ear has its own act. And the ear has its own act. And to here is the end or purpose of the ear. And the teeth in front have their own act, which is to bite. And to bite is their end or purpose. The teeth in the back have their own act, which is to chew, right? And that's it. And the heart's got its own act to pump blood and so on. And the other things that I don't know about. It goes through the parts of the body, right? So each organ seems to have its own act. And that's the end or purpose of that particular organ, right? Now, it's the same thing true about the occupations of man, right? Does each occupation have its own act? Does the teacher have his own act? It's to teach, right? And what do we hire the teacher for? To teach, yeah. And what's the cook's own act? Yeah. And why do we hire the cook? The cook one. Yeah. And what's the piano's own act? Yeah. So he hires the pianist there in the restaurant, right? Play the piano, right? Okay. What's the picture's own act? Hit the ball? Picture. Yeah, I got a picture. Picture, picture. Yeah, I got a picture. Yeah, I got a picture. Yeah, I got a picture. Yeah, I got a picture. Yeah, I got a picture. Yeah, I got a picture. Yeah, I got a picture. So each occupation has got its own act, right? And that's why we have the plumber for his own act, right? Okay. So you can make, you know, you can go on and on, you know, go on and on, you know, go on occupations of man, but I don't worry you with doing that, right? So, and then you can make an induction from what? The conclusion of the first three inductions, right? You can say, well, every tool has its own act, and that act is its end, right? Every organ has its own act, and that act is its end. Every occupation has its own act, and that act is its end, right? And therefore, in general, the grand induction is that, what? Yeah, yeah. I know Sir Aristotle is proceeding along these lines, huh? But to say that happiness is the best, right? It is the end of all. Seems to be agreed upon, and it is desired that what it is be said more, what? Distinctly. Perhaps this will come about if what man does is taken up, right? Well, it's all saying that, right? For just as the flute player and the sculptor, right? And every artist, and generally everyone for whom there is something to do, some act, and everything in general that has its own act, you might say, right? To make no more precise. The good and the well-being seems to be in what? Doing this, right? So also it would seem for a man, if there is something he does, are there then some doings and acts of the carpenter and the shoemaker, right? But of man there is none. You can kind of hear us in the video. He is by nature without anything to do. See? You say, does the cook have anything to do? Yeah. Cook, right? Does the teacher have anything to do? Yeah. Teach, huh? And does the violinist have anything to do? Yeah. Play the violin, right? Does man have anything to do? As man? See? Is any activity that belongs to man as man, right? Like to play the violin belongs to the violinist as a violinist, right? There he's making the comparison to the occupations of man. And then he goes on to talk about the parts of man, the organs, right? Or just as there seems to be something done by the eye, right? The eye seems to have its own act, and the hand and the foot, and generally by each of these parts, should one also lay down something that man does besides all these? Does a man have his own act? That's what Airstyle's doing there, right? Mark Cagdon's Airstyle, right? He used to use this example in class. He'd say, suppose you go down there on Main Street there in Worcester and get the first man that comes along, right? Hopefully a man's not been ruined by going to college or something like that. And you say, you bought a ballpoint pen, you say, what's this for? Well, that's for writing, yeah. You bought a knife, ain't for me to scare you. What's this for? What's the cut, you know? And so on. What's the eye for? You say, yeah, see, yeah. What's man for? Oh, oh. You'd hesitate, right? You'd answer right away what a knife is for, what a ballpoint pen is for, what an eye is for, right? A heart is for, and so on, right? What's man for? That kind of shows that it's less known what man is for, and what the eye is for, what the cook is for, and, you know. Yes, and what's the cook for? Yeah, yeah. So that's why you've got a reason from those things, right? Like I'm doing here, right? Okay. Now, does man have his own act? Is there an act which man alone has? Well, if man alone has reason, right? Then the act with reason is man's, what? Own act, yeah. But a thing's own act is its end. Therefore, man's end must be the act with, what? Reason. Fair enough, right? Fair enough, right? That's one way to develop, and I was going to proceed a little differently, but to develop by induction that a thing's own act is its end, right? And then seeing that the act with reason is man's own act. And then you syllogize from those two premises that the act with reason is man's end, right? Now, you can come back and go through this whole process again, but go back and, what? Be a little more precise and say that the, what? End of the cook is not just to cook, but to cook, what? Well, right? And they won't hire me to play the piano. I won't play the piano well, right? So the end of the pianist is not just to, what? But to play well, right? If you have a ballpoint pen, you know, as you write, you know, the blanks, you know, sometimes it comes out and says it doesn't. Well, it's really achieving the purpose of the ballpoint pen. And if they give you a knife and you can't really cut your steak or something, you want a knife that you can cut well, right? You might ask for another knife or something, right? So you make the same induction, but now adding this idea, right? And why do I wear glasses, right? Well, to see well, right, you know? So the end of the eyes is not just to see, but to see well, right? So you can add then that the act of, what? Well, a thing's own act done well is its, what? Ender purpose, right? And therefore the act with reason done well, right, is going to be man's ender purpose, huh? Now if you go to the automobile place and buy a new automobile and it runs fine around the block and it stops, that's it. Has it achieved the purpose of it, right? No, it's got to be for the life of an automobile, right, that's going to run, huh? And if you buy a ballpoint pen with a thing and so on and you write a page and it stops, it's it. So is the end of man just the act with reason done well for a day or a week or throughout, what? Life, huh? So eventually Aristotle will bring out that third part, right? One swallow does not make a summer, right? We've got a party there and the guy's taking a drink. One swallow does not make a summer. He's like Aristotle, so that makes a pun upon the word. Now, there's two other ways in the kind of syllogizing, what I call the syllogism, compound syllogism. And you can approach this whole thing to the compound syllogism, of which there are two main ones. I was getting kind of the syllogism, right, huh? On the compound syllogism, the two common forms are the if-then and the either-what-or, right? Now, if you approach this through the if-then, it'd be...