Prima Secundae
Lecture 5: Man's End, Virtue, and the Act with Reason

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Jordan, going through his long induction, right, and so on, gave a general statement that you can apply to man. But you might say, you have to be able to see a proportion, right, huh? So you might say, what is to man as, let's say, seeing is to the eye? Now, if I ask you, what is to the ear, like seeing is to the eye, you can probably see right away, it's hearing, right, huh? But what is to man as seeing is to the eye? Is there some activity that is to man as seeing is to the eye? It's an activity that characterizes man, that man either alone has or most of all has, right? And that would be the act with what reason. So now once you see this proportion, then you can use the if-then-argument, right? You can say, well then, if seeing is the purpose of the eye, then the act with reason is the purpose of man, seeing on that proportion. But everybody knows that seeing is the end of the eye, right? And therefore the act with reason is the end of what? Man, huh? So this is another way of kind of approaching the same thing, right? Seeing a proportion, right? And constructing an if-then syllogism, and so on. And I could do that for any one of these ones. I could say, what is to man as cutting is to the knife, right? What is to man as cooking is to the cook, right? And then once you see the proportion, you can construct the if-then statement. If cooking is the purpose of the cook, then the act with reason is the purpose of man. That's based on the proportion. But you all know that cooking is the purpose of the cook, right? Therefore the act with reason must be the purpose of what? Man. Now in proportion, if you change one of the members of proportion, you've got to change other members, right? So if I add now that not just seeing, but seeing well is the purpose of the eye, right? Then I'm forced to say that what is to man as seeing well as to the eye? You can't simply say the act with reason. You've got to say the act with reason done well, right? You're forced to say that, huh? Well then, if seeing well is the purpose of the eye, then the act with reason done well is the purpose of what? Man. If cutting well is the purpose of what? The knife, and the act with reason is to man as cutting is to the knife, then the act with reason done well is to man as cutting well is to the knife, right? And therefore you can what? Construct an if-then soldier of the vision, right? Hundreds of thousands of them, right? But even the point of that. But then if you say the purpose of the eye is not only to see well, but to see well throughout life, then you say seeing well throughout life is to the eye as the act with reason done well throughout life is to man. But seeing well throughout life is the end of the eye, therefore, done well throughout life is the end of what? Man. It's a scheme of work, right? Now, sometimes we proceed though kind of with an either-or command, Aristotle seems to be doing somewhat there, you know? And sometimes we take another thing that comes out about happiness, that happiness is not just living, but living well, right? So the end of man is not just to live, but to live well. And everybody knows that, right? But now, when you say living, do you mean living the life of a plant well? Or living the life of a dog well? Or do you mean living the life of a man well? Well, what does the life of a man have that the dog doesn't have? Reason, right? So you get to the same position there, right? It's the act of reason, right? The act with reason done well, probably. And notice at this point, I'm not reasoning that the end of man is the act of reason itself. That's an act with reason, right? And I leave for the later part of the Nicomachean Ethics to say, does the end of man consist more in the act of reason itself, right? Or an act directed or measured by reason, right? And say, well, that's a further precision to come later on, right? Because both an act of reason, like reasoning itself or understanding, is an act with reason, but also a reasonable love, right? Or reasonable fear. Or reasonable walk. Or reasonable talk. These are all with reason, right? But does man's end consist more in the act of reason itself? Or reasonable talk? Reasonable making. Okay? So the next paragraph, Aristotle, seems to be touching upon this either or, right? What then will this be? To live seems to be common even to the plants. But what is man's own is thought. The life, then, of nourishing and growing should be set aside. That's not going to be man's own life, huh? Following this, there would be something sensing, which is what an animal is distinguished from a plant, right? But this also seems to be common to the horse and the ox and every animal. There remains a doing of what has reason. But of this, the one is obeying or persuaded by reason. The other is having reason and thinking, right? And this being said in two ways, that according to act should be laid down. But this seems to be said principally, right? Okay, then he goes on in the next paragraph to bring out this second part of the definition, right? It's not only man's own act, but man's own act done what? Well, right? We did a little break, I think, right there. to the next to the last paragraph in page three, huh? And notice the way Aristotle's proceeding there. He's kind of proceeding by an either-or, right? What does it mean for a man to live well, right? I'll take one part of that. What does it mean? What kind of life is it, right? The life of a plant, right? The life of a beast? Or is it human life, right? Okay, then in the last paragraph in page three, he's starting to get into the second part of the definition now, which is the idea of being done well, right? And then on the top of page four, you get to the third part, right? The definition. If then the activity of man is an act of the soul by reason or not without reason, right? While we say that the act of something and its good act are the same in general, right? As of a harpist and a good harpist, right? And generally thus in all, adding that it excels by virtue, huh? For it belongs to the harpist to play the harp, but to the good harpist to play the harp well. Then if this is so and further that we lay it down, that the act of man is some life and this the act of the soul and actions with reason, but of the good man these done well and what? Fairly. And each is completed by its own virtue. If then it is thus, the human good turns out to be an act of the soul by virtue. And if there are many virtues, which you'll go through in books two through six, according to the best and most perfect, right? And that's why it'll come after he's gone through all the virtues that come back again. But let's take that idea of virtue here, right? Why does Aristotle take this as being kind of the same thing? To act well and to act by virtue, right? Well, you've got to realize what the word virtue means and the common meaning of virtue rather than a narrow meaning of virtue, right? When we hear the word virtue, we think of human virtue, right? And maybe of some, what? Human virtue in particular, right? A virtuous woman, a chaste woman, right? Okay? But you've got to go back to the general to start your thinking about virtue, right? And what is the general meaning of virtue, right? Yeah, that's the kind of analogy. But the general meaning of virtue is what makes a thing good and its own act good, right? Okay? What makes its haver and its own act good, huh? Okay? So in this broad meaning of virtue, anything that has its own act can have its own, what, virtue? And for that matter, its own, what, vice, right? Okay? And the virtues of things other than man are more known to us, huh? Okay? Is that the same thing as a knife? No. Is that the same thing as cutting well, sharpness? No. But sharpness is something had by the knife, in some cases, right? Which makes it a good knife, and its own what? Yeah. Now, you know, we've got this kind of a wooden thing with knife in the house. This one knife is really good, you know. But this other knife, you know, it's awful. So I've got a virtuous knife, an ambitious knife, right? So sharpness is what makes a knife a good knife in its own act to cut good, right? And what would be the vice of the knife then, right? In dullness, yeah. So sometimes when I compare what you're going to do in ethics, you say, well, you have to know, first of all, what a thing's own act is, then the quality of that thing that will make it do its own act well, and then how does it get that one, right? So you begin by saying a knife's own act is to cut. What will enable the knife to cut well? Sharpness. And then finally, how do you sharpen the knife, right? So you've got to do exactly the same thing with man, right? What is man's own act? What is that quality of man that will enable him to do his own act well? And this will be the virtue of man, right? And then how do you acquire that virtue, right? Because the moral virtue is saying the virtue of reason itself will be acquired in different ways, right? See how true that is, right? Warren Murray has a plaque on his kitchen wall, right? And what the plaque says is this. Much virtue in herbs, little in men. A good thing for the kitchen, right, huh? The people are probably eating too much but no, it's much virtue in herbs, right? What is an herb's own act, huh? It's to season the food, right, huh? So if it seasons the food well and makes it more delicious and so on, right? Then it has the virtue of a what? Herb, right? That's not the virtue of man, but it's the virtue of an herb, right? So Warren comes down and he looks at my herbs, and he's like, well, it's been around too long, Wayne, yes. See, it's lost, it's virtue, right? And notice our Lord makes that comparison, right? You're the salt of the earth, right? Well, if the salt loses its what? It's virtue, you could have said that, right? It's savor, it's... It's nothing, what up, right? It's amplifying. So everything that has its own act, even an herb, can be said to have a what? Virtue, right? Now, which of my eyes is more virtuous, huh? You know? You're kind of a blur now, you guys over there. You're really a blur, yeah. Yeah. You're more distinct, you know? Yeah? So you might say that, which is my virtuous eye? This eye here is more virtuous than this one here, at least for seeing at a distance, right? For reading, it might be different, but... Okay? I say, it doesn't mean that I look at the girls with this eye, the bad eye. No, I'm probably more looking at the girls with the good eye, right? Than the bad eye, right? You see? It doesn't have to do with moral virtue, right? Now, it's more difficult to know what the virtue of the eye is than the virtue of the, what? Knife, huh? But if you go to the eye doctor and he examines your eye and so on, right? He'd probably say, the shape of my thing is this, and that's why I don't see it clearly, right, and so on. Now, I guess they can fix your eye a bit, actually, you know, these things, I'm afraid of those things. So I could still read quite easily with this, so why bother? And I can even read without, you know, laying in my bed there. But, again, you say, the virtue of the eye, whatever it is, right, enables the eye to see what will, right? And then how is it you can acquire that virtue that can be acquired, right? So this is the general meaning of virtue, right? It's the quality, right, that enables the thing to do its own, act well. And you can speak of the vice then, too, right? The opposite of that, huh? The quality that would make it, you know, so what is the quality of the eye here and the right that makes these guys be a blur down there? You know? And what is the quality of this eye that makes them be more distinct in my seeing, right? You see the idea? So, most people don't know where to begin when they hear the word virtue, right, huh? But this is where you're supposed to begin, right? And you're supposed to see the virtue of the knife before you see the virtue of the man, right, huh? But even before you know what the virtue of the man is, Aristotle started to investigate that, huh? in the beginning of the second book, right? he'll define moral virtue and so on. But it's already clear from the general idea of virtue that these are equivalent to act well and to act by virtue, right? So Shakespeare in Tailing of the Shoe I guess it is, yeah, the early part there, the man is studying virtue and that part of what? The tweets of happiness by virtue especially to be achieved, right? Most people say, well, I know what virtue's got to do with my happiness, you know? But if by virtue you mean what enables you to do your own act well and to do your own act well is what happiness is well then it must be activity in accordance with what? Virtue, right? That's where Aristotle spent all this time talking about the virtues in books 2 through 5, the world virtues and the virtues of reason itself in book what? 6, right? And then book 7 he talks about things that either excel in virtue or fall below it, right? I don't have quite the full notion of virtue. And he has two whole books devoted to friendship, right? Which is either virtue or effective virtue the highest friendship, but thinking a little ahead of the game here, right? That's why he adds it as a second part. It's man's own act you can see that done well or man's own act according to what? Human virtue, right? Again, the third one. But further in a complete life, right? For one swallow does not make a spring nor one day, right? And thus neither one day nor a short time makes one blessed and happy. So I study Euclid for one day or one week that's not going to make me happy but if I study him for a lifetime I'll be a happy man, right? And of course in Christianity we talk about something called what? Perseverance, right? So what has Aristotle done here? He says, a line therefore has been drawn around the what? Good, huh? That's the way I translate the Greek word peri-graphi, right? Peri-around-graphi-to-draw a line. But Aristotle will in the 10th book of Nicomotum Ethics actually has gone through all the virtues and knows them and so on. Then he'll come back and say more precisely what the end of man is, right? Coming back, is it according to what? Political foresight? Or is it according to wisdom, huh? And the one is more human happiness but the other is more godlike and more divine, huh? Therefore a higher one. So I thought it would be good to look at these texts here a little bit before we go to the Prima Secundi, right? Let's go back to Aristotle I mean, Aristotle, I mean, Aristotle but Shakespeare's education used reason, right? Examined a little more logically, the logical structure of this, huh? What does Shakespeare say there? What is a man, right? If his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed a beast no more, right? What's the structure of what Shakespeare's saying, right? Let's put the words down here again here. What is a man if his chief good of his time be but to sleep and feed a beast? If you want to analyze what he's doing here in a sense, huh? Projectly, right? What does he base himself upon? You take the three ways I mentioned in the Aristotle's arguments here, right? You can make a long large induction, right? Establishing the general statement that a thing's own act is its what? In, right? And then seeing that man's own act is the act with reason then syllogizing that that's his in, right? Or you can proceed by way of a what? Seeing a proportion, right? That the act with reason is to man as cutting is to the knife or seeing is to the eye and then recognizing that seeing is the purpose of the eye or cutting is the purpose of the knife, right? Then including the act that reason must be, right? Or a third way that man's end is to live well is it by the life of a plant to the life of a beast to the life of a man, right? Which of these three ways of reasoning is Shakespeare using here in this great exhortation to use reason? Which I consider the greatest short exhortation to use reason I've ever seen? Is it based upon an either-or primarily or is it based upon a proportion? Yeah. Because what proportion is underlining this whole thing here? Yeah, yeah. Now, in order to not be too, you know, pedantic and so on, right? He doesn't speak of the chief good of the beast, right? But he says what it is, right? To sleep and feed, right? So that's basically the proportion, right? The chief good of the beast is to the beast, right? As the chief good of man is to what? Man, right? That makes sense, doesn't it? Well, then you can argue by alternating in proportion, right? If the chief good of man is no more than the chief good of the beast, then man is more than the beast, right? Then man is no more than the beast, right? But man is more than the beast, right? Another way of argument than argument, right? A denial of the consequent. Therefore, the chief good of man must be something more than the chief good of the what? Beast, huh? Now, I'm trying to show the students to examine the force of the argument the way it proceeds. I used to take a mathematical example, right? And I'd say, what is the three? No, excuse me. What is the three if it be half of four? Two or more, yeah? Of course, Aristotle says that, you know, the natures of things are like numbers, right? Or what is a four if it be half of six? Yeah. So you can say half of four is to two as half of six is to what? Three, right? So if three is half of four, it's no more than two and that's obviously absurd, right? So, likewise here, right? If the chief good of man is simply the chief good of the beast then man is no more than a beast but we all know man is more than a beast, right? You don't think so but preach like a beast and you will rave and rant and protest that you're being treated like a dog, right? Well, that's all you are. What are you complaining for? It's your own position that you know I'm no more than a dog. People are as a dog, right? So, in a sense, Shakespeare is, what, very rigorous in this way of reasoning, huh? Marvelous, marvelous exultation, huh? But he's almost as you were saying the third argument here too because Aristotle was saying that to live well means to live the life not of a beast but the life of a man and that's a life that's reasonable. I wonder how many people would even admit that, right? Because they're not too sure exactly what a reasonable life is and they're afraid to admit that they should be leading a reasonable life that they may find out that they're not doing that and now they're caught. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. A reasonable act is almost an act with reason done well. It almost has that meaning, doesn't it? So Shakespeare had obviously read the Nicomachean Ethics. It's in Troyes and Cressida that he has one of the characters allude to the who's not a proper hero of ethics, right? But there are a description of Shakespeare there where the character says, he's studying that part, he's applying that part of philosophy that treats happiness by virtue especially to be achieved. It's a pretty good description, a short description of the Nicomachean Ethics, it seems to me, right? It's about happiness, but it spends a long time talking about virtue, right? Books and books and that. So it's about happiness being achieved by virtue, right? What are the, for the Christian, what are the chief virtues? Yeah. But most of all, the theological virtues, huh? Faith, hope, and charity, huh? That's why I kind of admire the premium, right? To verbum Dei, right? If you get the official Latin text, it doesn't, like in the translation, say introduction. It says premium, huh? And the first part of the premium there is talking about sharing God's life and so on, right? But then it goes at the end to what? Faith, hope, and charity, right? But it talks about the order of generation there in Augustine, right? That the world, by believing, might come to hope in God, right? And by hope in God, come to what? To love, right, huh? After love arrives in the scene, then it perfects, you know, hope and faith. But in the order of generation, belief comes first and then hope and then finally charity, right, huh? So it's those virtues that make these activities, what, be done well, right, huh? Can you believe without the virtue of belief? Or you might in kind of a haphazard and, you know, people way, you know, and maybe so, you know. I remember working in the package store and the guy saying one day, well, they find out that Christ had never been there and, you know, would that be something, you know, there had been such a man, right? Would that be, you know? I don't know what the man's faith was, you know. You know, you don't know what's going to show up these days, you know. I mean, you know, it's a lot of stuff, you know. But that kind of, you know, kind of a little bit shaky there, you know. Well, should we go on? I don't know what we should go on to. Now, what Aristotle does towards the end of Book 1 of Nicomagni Ethics is to give a division of what? Yeah, but a division of human virtue, right? Okay. And what's that division he gives to human virtue? It's touched upon here in this text. What is that division of human virtue that he gives? Reason in itself and reason by participation. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's why I tend to, when I first, you know, state the end of man, I tend to use the phrase, an act, what? With reason, right, huh? And as I explain to students, is an act with reason mean the same thing as an act of reason? How are these two phrases related? So you could say, every act of reason, like reasoning or understanding, right, is an act with reason, right? But is every act with reason an act of reason? The doctor says to me, you shouldn't get a large society per question, right? They always tell the story, Ron Ricardo tells the story, you know, he was feeling too good, you know, and so on. And so you go see the doctor, right? The doctor says, there's nothing wrong with you. He says, you don't get any exercise. It just happens to some of the executive types, you know, they don't get any exercise. So, maybe taking a walk is a reasonable, what? Thing for me to do, right? So I'm taking a walk, this is an act with reason. But it certainly is not an act of reason. Well, somebody still makes you a thought there, you know. So what about an emotion, right? Can anger be an act with reason? Can there be a reasonable anger, right? Of course, in the Gospel of the Mark, I think it is, there's a place where Christ is actually angry with the hardness of heart of these Pharisees and so on, right? Anger. Well, it's, you know, for the girls in my class, you know it. So, we're not saying yet that an act of reason is better than an act of reason. There could be a reasonable love, right, huh? Right? You see? And so, a reasonable love, you know, at this point we don't know whether that's the end of man or not, right? Okay. So we're not yet saying, you know, the end of man is understanding or something like that, right? It might be just a reasonable love, right? It's obvious you didn't have any sisters. Wow, why do I object to this? Because you're all picking on the girls. If you had sisters, they'd have cleaned your clock. So, then there's an act, therefore, that is what? An act ordered or measured by reason, right? But that is not a, what? Act of reason itself, right? And so, on the basis of this distinction, Aristotle is going to distinguish between two kinds of virtue, right? And the moral virtues, which will correspond to the second here, right? And the virtues of reason itself, huh? Now, usually, in translation, they speak of the moral virtues and intellectual virtues. I don't like that term, intellectual virtues. You'd rather call them simply the virtues of reason, right? In itself, right? In Aristotle, well, in the sixth book, you know, when he first distinguishes the virtues of reason, he'll distinguish five of them, right? And one is the art in the sense of the right reason about making, right? And then foresight, or prudence, as they call it from Latin, the word for foresight, which is the right reason about doing, right? And those are the practical virtues of reason, right? And then you have what he calls nous, intellectus in Latin, natural understanding, right? Reasoned out understanding, and then what? Wisdom, right? You distinguish those, what? Five, right? Now, some of those are, what? Lowest species, like natural understanding and wisdom is only one of them. Some are, what? General, yeah. Like reasoned out understanding, you know, geometry, arithmetic, logic, natural philosophy, and so on, right? And then art, that's not, there are many ones, but there are different matters. And then foresight, right? Well, you know, Thomas takes up foresight in the secundi secundi, he speaks of the foresight, the individual, the father, the family, right? The king, and then Douglas MacArthur, right? You know, he has those four. The military, foresight, political foresight, right? The military, foresight, right? The military, foresight, right? The military, foresight, right? The military, foresight, right? Maternal foresight, and then the foresight for your own individual life, right? So, three of them are Jane, right, and they can be subdivided, right? But two of them are the lowest species, right? They can't be subdivided into different kinds. But in the books 2 through 5, he takes up these virtues that are not in reason itself, but in what can partake of reason, and this is true both of the will and of the, what, emotions, huh? Now, it's clear that some of the moral virtues are in the emotions, like courage is in the irascible emotions. Irascible appetite, it's called, thumas in Greek. And some are in the concubstable appetite, like temperance, right? Okay, various kinds of temperance, and probably utrapalea, huh? And, but some are in the will, right? And clearly justice is in the will, right? Now, some of the other virtues is a little more hesitation sometimes, but Thomas was speaking and assuming this only as liberalities being in the will, right? And, of course, in the great Avicenna says, you know, God alone is liberal, right? But God doesn't have, properly speaking, the virtues that are in the emotions, right? But he does have the virtues that are in the, what, will, right? And so he has justice, right? And liberality. So, kind of interesting, the order which Aristotle precedes, right, huh? Because he begins, the first virtue he talks about is courage, right? And then temperance, huh? And perhaps he talks about those two first, because they both concern your body, right, huh? Courage, what can threaten your body, right? And temperance, what pleases the body, right? And therefore, they're very fundamental virtues. But there's also an interesting thing that the word virtue itself seems to have come from courage, right? The virtue of a man, vir. And the same way the Greek, the Greek word arete, is the connection with courage, huh? And it's kind of interesting, you know, that the Medal of Honor and so on is given for courage, right? They don't give you a Medal of Honor for being temperate. Or even being just all your life, you know, they don't give you a Medal of Honor, right? As if somehow courage is recognized as a virtue before temperance is or before justice, right? And then he takes up the virtues that are concerned with, what, money, huh? And you have liberality, right? And magnificence, huh? And this is kind of closely related to your body, right? Because this is where you, you know, you're a man of substance, as they say. He has money, huh? And then he goes to the virtues that are concerned with honor, like magnanimity and so on. Very interesting the way he proceeds there, right? And takes up mildness, which is kind of concerned with honor and dishonor, right? To get angry and get insulted or something, right? And then he takes up the social virtues there, huh? Truthfulness and utrapalaya and friendliness, right? And the virtue of friendliness should not be infused with friendship, right, huh? Because friendliness is something showing to everybody in your daily life, right? Like friendship is something more one-to-one, you know, and so on. It's very important, huh? Going back to women from women. Well, the woman is friendlier, or is she really your friend, right? But there's a difference there, right, huh? And I mean, it's kind of an interesting distinction, right? So in book three, you know, I mean, book two, he works out the definition of moral virtue. And then he simplifies in all the moral virtues. So it's a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards us. It's determined for a right to be said. And he shows how that's true of courage, right? And how it's true of, what, temperance? And how it's true of liberality. Liberality is between, what, stinginess and, what? Extravagance, yeah. Yeah. Part of guilt, yeah. And then in book three, he takes up a discussion there of choice that's going to be involved in all of it, you know? But then he takes up courage and temperance in book three. And then the other moral virtues in book four, liberality and so on. And then finally, in book five, the whole book is devoted to justice, a very important virtue. And then book six is the virtues of reason. So he takes up the moral virtues before the virtues of what? Reason itself, huh? Thomas gives us the reason for it. He gives two reasons. He says they're more known to us. And because by them, we're disposed for the virtues of reason. So, stingy and temperance and so on, you're not well disposed of the life of the mind. And so you're not for foresight, right? The plane goes out of the water. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, your representative just had to, you heard about him, just had to resign his position there. Involved in getting a woman there in Washington. Sorry, who? Getting involved in getting a woman, you know. In your group. A representative from New York State, yeah. He had to resign his position. This was going to be a lecture in the spring for his. Was it Oscar Randall? No, no, no. I didn't know the guy's name. I'd never heard before, you know. It's one of the districts there. But he's a married man with kids and so on. And got involved in some extra cricket activities. So, had to resign, you know. Dr. Rupus, could you kind of slowly go over again that definition you just rattled out about? Yeah. Of moral virtue? Yeah. Okay. It's a habit with choice, right? Habit with choice. Existing in the middle, right? Not the middle of the thing, but the middle towards us, right? As determined by what? Right reason, right? Meaning by foresight, really. Determined by it. Yeah, yeah. So, you see, like, if you take, say, take mildness, right? Anger, which is concerned with anger as a matter, right? Well, I can get angry more than I, what, should, right? But I can also get angry less than I, what, should. Who's his name? Donahue there, you know? Catholic Lee, you know? He's already there. There are various things going on, right? You see? And there are things you should get angry about, right? If you're using my kids for target practice, you know, I mean, I shouldn't be too gentle about this, right? You see? But now, if you bump me in the hall, right? You see? Well, was it an accident? Or were you, you know, one of these kids, like, in high school goes down and bumping everybody? You know, all these kids do it in high school. And so, in some cases, there might be some anger required. In other cases, not, right? You see? The only reason can say that, right? Or I say, how much did you eat? You know, for dinner, well, if Grandma is serving Thanksgiving dinner, you might eat more than you would eat normally at home, right? But you take into account the fact that Grandma's gone to an awful lot of work to prepare this stuff, and she'll be disappointed if you don't eat heartily, and so on, right? But you've got to take into account the, what, the circumstances, right, no? No? The doctors, can the doctor have a drink? Well, I wouldn't say before he goes into... Brain surgery. Surgery, yeah. But maybe after he comes out of ten hours of, you know, being in the, you know, huge things. Maybe it's time for a drink or something, right? To relax him, right? Yeah. You know? But reasons as a drink before would have been bad, right? Yeah. Maybe afterwards it helps him to relax and calm down from this thing. I worked with a guy who had been in the airplanes going over Germany, you know, before the landing there. Of course, he said, you didn't eat anything because you just throw it up when you got there. It was intense, you know? And I guess the first day they went and they missed their targets, so the next day they said, go back, but fly lower. Oh, boy. Yeah. And he says, but when you got back to England and you got off the airplane, they were passing out cups of scotch, you know? Yeah. Get off. So, I mean, but reason, only reason can take into account the circumstances, right? Should I get angry at all or not angry at all, you know? Maybe sometimes we should get angry, right? Offending the faith, right? By other times, maybe we shouldn't get angry or maybe not at all. Only reason can see that, right? So it's a middle towards us, right? Which may not be... The same thing for the little boy who might eat less than the working man, right? The working man might eat more than the professor, yeah, yeah, yeah. And, you know, I guess these farmers, my brother Richard worked on a farm one time in the summer, and they have, you know, like a... They've got a meal between breakfast and lunch. I mean, otherwise they couldn't keep going, right? But we don't need a meal between breakfast and lunch, right? And so, that's the way he defines it, you know, it's a habit with choice existing in the middle towards us, right? What is needed too much or too little for me today in these circumstances, right? And that requires the use of reason, right? But he has choice in the definition of it too, right? Sometimes you can almost change the definition of business and say it's a habit of choosing, right? What is in the middle towards us, right? As determined by right reason, right? So you get in the habit of choosing to drink moderately, I'd say, right? And I knew a guy at college, Ian's brother there. Every Friday and Saturday night, they go down to the bar, right? And, you know, I was seven or eight, whatever time it was, and drink until closing time. Well, I think you're choosing to drink kind of, you know, excess, right? And then you've got to get a little vice, I guess, a little too dependent, huh? You have to go on the wagon for a while, this guy. Go up to the Cheser Retreat House in northern Minnesota and get fixed up for a while. It's the end of this habit, you know? So Aristotle does take up choice, you know, which is an element of the definition of moral virtue in the second book, right? It does take up choice and consider that what it is, right? In the beginning of book three there, you know? I used to do, and I talked about marriage a bit, you know. I define marriage as the stable union of a man-woman by mutual choice, right? For the sake of children, right? So I said, when the priest says to you, do you take so-and-so as your wife or your husband? And he doesn't say, you know, do you have wonderful feelings about so-and-so? He do have wonderful feelings, but he's asking you to make a, what, choice, huh? And then I would come back and say, you know, now, if the husband or the wife is tempted to be unfaithful, right? Are they being true to themselves? They're being true to their emotion. This is the emotion that has arisen, but they're not being true to their choice, right? Okay? Which is more me? My emotions or my, what? Choice. Or take that example I would give there, you know. Suppose I am an alcoholic, right? And so after one of my bust-ups, you know, I get to a little bit of thinking, and I say, I've got to give up drinking, right? And now I've, what, chosen to give up drinking, right? Now an alcoholic is going to be challenged, right, to drink at some time again, right? And now if he follows that urge to drink again, and he can't handle it, is he being true to himself? Well, which is more him, his, what, choice or his, what, urging for a drink, you know? Choice is more you, right, huh? And sometimes trying to bring that out, I'd say, you know, if you're a member of the jury and judge or whatever it is, which do you take more seriously, other things may be equal? A premeditated murder? Or a murder of passion, huh? Which do you judge more severely? A premeditated murder, because he seems more to have, what? Because he has chosen, in a sense, to murder this person, right? He's had time to think about it, right, huh? By the passion, there's less choice involved there, right? So he seems less responsible, right? So the choice is more me, right, huh? You know, Shakespeare has those beautiful two plays there where one is in the Kikipa's appetite, one is in the Erasko appetite, right? And the man who is fouling his concupisable appetite in opposition to his reasonable choice, right, thinks he's being true to himself, right? And that's Proteus there in the two gentlemen of Verona. Now he's engaged, and engagement in those days meant more than, means in our day, right? It's almost equivalent to marriage, right? And he's, with 20, you know, thousand soul-confirming oaths, he's pledged to Julia, right? And then he sees his friend's girl at the court, right? And, you know, he's got to pursue her, otherwise he's not true to himself. Well, he's not true to his, what, emotion, yeah. And the other one is in Coriolanus, right, where Coriolanus is true to his angry nature, right, huh? Yeah, I'm false to myself, he says, you know. You know, come down, come down. And, but I contrast that with what Polonius says in Hamlet, right? This above all to thine own self be true. He must follow the night of the day, though it's not going to be false to any man, right? So, Proteus is going to be false to Julia and false to his friend, Valentine, right? He's going to steal Valentine's girl at the Friday, anyway. And is he being true to himself, then? See? Well, I mean, Polonius is saying, if you're true to yourself, you can't be false to anybody else. But these guys are saying, or one of them is saying, he's got to be false to his friend and his girl. He's got to be true to himself. So, who's correct, right? Well, I think Polonius is, right? Because when you're true to your reasonable choice, right, huh? You're more being true to yourself than when you're true to your, what, temporary or sudden emotion, right? Because that reasonable choice is more you than, you know? Maybe that's why he says, to thine own self, rather than just to thyself, to the known self. Yeah, yeah. I think, again, it's because reason is more me than emotion, right? And reason is involved in choice. It's like in the monastic life, I mean, when you make a choice, right? You know, but this is a considered thing, and that's more you than this sudden, you know, I just want to be free, you know, in prison, you know, whatever it is. That's the purpose of which play on the Shakespearean and the Exhortation you're using? Hamlet. Hamlet. Yeah, Hamlet is a very key play. In fact, Hamlet has a lot in there about the nature of fiction and of the play itself, right? So you get the mode, you know, that Shakespeare's creating there as well. But it's really kind of a marvelous thing. That definition of reason, I think, is the best definition of reason I've heard. I was reading my favorite book the other day there, Some Autogyn Theolus, and Aristotle, of course, is, I mean, Thomas is reading against the very way it's there, you know, as is the years and so on. But I'm kind of struck, you know. And what Aristotle calls the perspectivum faculty, right? Well, I guess that's a word for looking, looking, yeah. And Aristotle several times says that, you know. But kind of Shakespeare puts it together, right, in a way that you don't find exactly. It's kind of strange. I mean, Shakespeare's defined reason, in a sense, more fully than Aristotle or anybody else. But it's kind of strange, I don't know.